On 12th June, the Madhya Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) arrested Mohammad Faraz for his involvement in terrorist activities. His arrest uncovered a wider network that was working to advance the Popular Front of India’s (PFI) plan to overthrow the Government of India and establish Islamic rule in the country. Codenamed “Mission 2047”, the plan was first revealed in 2022, months before the PFI was banned by the Government of India. During interrogation, the accused disclosed how they were radicalising youths.
According to investigators, members of the module were being radicalised through WhatsApp, Telegram and other messaging applications. Pakistani handlers administered some of these groups, assigned tasks to recruits and encouraged them to become “true jihadis” who would be prepared to kill designated targets and die in the name of jihad.
The four accused identified during the investigation are Mohammad Faraz alias Khalid Saifullah, Naim Abdullah, Shakir Mew and Izhar-ul-Haq. The ATS is examining their individual roles, Pakistani contacts, digital network, possible funding channels and efforts to recruit young men across different states.
‘Mission 2047’ and the plan to overthrow the government
Izhar-ul-Haq, who was arrested from Madhubani in Bihar, reportedly told investigators that he and others associated with the Pakistan-linked network were working towards “Mission 2047”. The objective was to implement the PFI’s agenda across India by 2047. According to the ATS, the mission envisaged replacing the existing system of governance with a radical Islamic order. Izhar told the agency that people being prepared as “mujahideen” across the country would emerge simultaneously when instructed and attempt to overthrow the government. Pakistani handlers had reportedly assured members that a large network was being built for this purpose.
The recruits were also made to take an oath that they would carry out target killings and create fear across the country when the time came. The investigation is now focused on identifying other people connected to this network and determining how far its activities had spread. The ATS secured Izhar’s remand until 22nd June to question him about the organisation’s structure and the methods used by its members.
Pakistani handlers pushed recruits towards jihad and martyrdom
The interrogation of Mohammad Faraz revealed that members of the module were in contact with Pakistani WhatsApp groups. Faraz told investigators that handlers used jihadist videos, religious material and video calls to influence recruits. They asked him to become a “true jihadi”, follow every instruction given to him and remain prepared to sacrifice his life while carrying out the mission.
The handlers reportedly promised that dying while following the path of jihad would earn him martyrdom. They also assigned tasks designed to produce fear and instructed members to act against designated targets when ordered. Faraz was told to obtain a passport. He was reportedly assured that he would be taken to Pakistan through another country and trained as a mujahideen. Separate inputs being examined by the ATS also refer to plans for specialised training in Afghanistan.
During searches, the ATS recovered jihadist documents and PDF files from Faraz’s mobile phone. Investigators believe that some of the material had been sent from Pakistan.
Faraz tasked with recruiting poor and unmarried youths
Faraz, who worked at a doctor’s clinic in Bhopal, had reportedly been assigned the task of building a network in Madhya Pradesh. Pakistani handlers wanted him to identify poor, unmarried and relatively young men who could be isolated from family influence and gradually radicalised.
The module specifically targeted unmarried youths so that concern for parents, spouses or children would not prevent them from carrying out dangerous assignments. Recruits were approached through social media and messaging platforms. Faraz created groups, shared videos linked to extremist activity and attempted to connect new members with the wider network.
The material gathered during the investigation indicates that young recruits were paid salaries of up to Rs 40,000. Meetings were held to identify suitable candidates and discuss how they could be drawn into the network. They were then provoked in the name of implementing Islamic Sharia and a blasphemy law. Radicalisation was reportedly carried out in stages. A recruit would first receive one task to complete within a limited period. The next assignment was shared only after the previous task had been completed.
Network operated through WhatsApp and Telegram
The four accused admitted during questioning that they remained in contact with people in India and Pakistan through Telegram and WhatsApp groups. Faraz had been active on such platforms for nearly four years. He was known as “Khalid Saifullah” in the groups and had also been given the identity of “Lashkar Commander” to help him expand the digital network.
Investigators say the online groups were used to circulate jihadist material, hold meetings, assign work and monitor recruits. Pakistani handlers decided what tasks would be given and when they had to be completed. The process was designed to ensure that members received only limited information at each stage. Once a task was completed, the handlers would issue the next instruction.
The ATS is examining Faraz’s mobile phone, chat records, social media accounts, call detail records and other digital activity to trace the people connected to him.
Roles assigned within the module
Investigators have identified the different responsibilities assigned to the accused. Faraz was engaged in adding new people through social media and expanding the network in Madhya Pradesh. Naim Abdullah helped strengthen contacts within the network and introduced Faraz directly to Pakistani jihadist handlers. Faraz told the ATS that he had known Naim, a resident of Deoband, for around five or six years.
Naim reportedly introduced Faraz and another Bihar-based suspect to foreign handlers. The ATS later arrested him following information provided during Faraz’s interrogation. Izhar-ul-Haq and Shakir Mew were involved in conducting closed-door meetings and delivering speeches to radicalise young men. Shakir was described as a second-level commander who played an important role in the module.
The network’s structure allowed different members to handle recruitment, communication, ideological indoctrination and contact with foreign handlers.
ATS arrests and investigation timeline
The ATS made its first arrest on 12th June 2026, when Mohammad Faraz was taken into custody from the Qazi Camp area of Bhopal. During questioning on 13th June, investigators examined his old contacts and social media groups. This led them to Naim Abdullah. Naim was arrested from Uttar Pradesh’s Saharanpur region between 13th and 14th June. The ATS questioned Faraz and Naim separately and also confronted them with each other’s statements.
Shakir Mew was arrested on 14th June from the Tapukara police station area of Alwar district in Rajasthan. He was produced before a court and remanded for questioning. Information regarding Izhar-ul-Haq emerged during the continuing investigation. He was arrested on 18th June and produced before a Bhopal court on 20th June. The court remanded him until 22nd June. The agency is now attempting to identify other members, local facilitators and people who may have attended radicalisation meetings.
Foreign links and funding routes under investigation
Material connected to the case identifies PFI-linked activity in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Investigators are examining whether Bangladesh and Nepal were used as routes for transferring funds into India. The material also refers to money being sent from Mauritius to PFI-linked channels in Uttar Pradesh after the Hathras gang-rape case.
The ATS is scrutinising the banking records of Faraz and the other accused to determine whether they received money from abroad or through intermediaries operating within India. Faraz told investigators that his father worked in battery repair and that he was the only son in his family. The agency is comparing his financial background with his digital activity and possible transactions linked to the network.
Faraz’s activities remained concealed behind his clinic job
Faraz had worked as a compounder at Khushboo Clinic for around 15 years. He was known in his neighbourhood as a deeply religious person. He and his wife also taught children at home and conducted Quran classes every Tuesday morning. A board outside the house mentioned classes between 10 am and noon.
The ATS operation at his residence was conducted in secrecy. Around 12 officials, including three women personnel, surrounded the house before entering through the roof and taking him into custody.
His house and the clinic where he worked were later found locked. Investigators are now examining whether anyone connected to his professional, religious or neighbourhood circles was approached for recruitment. The ATS is also investigating his martial arts training, use of lesser-known applications, objectionable social media comments and possible preparations to travel abroad.
The digital evidence, statements of the accused and their links with Pakistani handlers are being examined to establish the full scale of the network and whether sleeper cells had already been created in other parts of the country.
What is PFI’s ‘Mission 2047’?
In 2022, OpIndia accessed an eight-page internal document attributed to the Popular Front of India titled India Vision 2047. Carrying the tagline “Towards Rule of Islam in India”, the document laid down a phased roadmap to establish an Islamic government in the country by 2047, the centenary of India’s Independence.
The document claimed that political power had been “unjustly taken away” from Muslims by the British and declared that it should return to the Muslim community. It also asserted that PFI did not require the support of a Muslim majority to achieve its objective. According to the document, the organisation believed that support from even 10% of India’s Muslim population would be sufficient to bring the Hindu majority “to its knees” and restore what it described as the “glory of Islam”.
The plan was divided into four stages. The first stage focused on uniting Muslims of different sects under the PFI banner, expanding recruitment and creating an Islamic identity that superseded Indian identity. Cadres were to be trained in offensive and defensive techniques, including the use of rods, swords and other weapons. The document also called for repeatedly reminding Muslims of real or manufactured grievances to sustain anger against the Indian State and Hindus.
The second stage proposed the selective use of violence to terrorise opponents and demonstrate collective strength. Cadres showing potential were to receive advanced training in firearms and explosives. At the same time, terms such as the Constitution, the National Flag and BR Ambedkar were to be used as a cover to conceal the ultimate objective of establishing Islamic rule. The document also spoke about infiltrating the executive and judiciary, securing favourable outcomes and cultivating ties with Islamic countries for funding and assistance.
In the third stage, PFI planned to forge political alliances with Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes while creating divisions between these communities and the RSS. The organisation aimed to contest elections, discredit secular political parties and present itself as the principal representative of Muslims and marginalised communities. This stage also called for stockpiling weapons and explosives and using trained cadres to attack those considered hostile to the organisation’s interests.
The fourth stage envisaged PFI emerging as the undisputed leader of Muslims and acquiring enough political support to capture power nationally. Once in power, loyal cadres were to be placed in the executive, judiciary, police and armed forces. Those opposing the organisation were to be eliminated, while an Islamic Constitution would replace the existing constitutional order.
The document also proposed recruiting at least one person from every Muslim household, building secret training centres, maintaining depots for weapons and explosives and creating a dedicated armed force. Cadres were instructed to collect personal information about Hindu and RSS leaders before a “final showdown”.
PFI further envisaged seeking assistance from foreign Islamic countries during a confrontation with the Indian State. It specifically referred to its relationship with Turkey and called for similar links with other Islamic nations. Mission 2047, therefore, was not presented merely as an ideological campaign, but as a long-term programme combining radicalisation, recruitment, political infiltration, armed training, foreign support and organised violence to replace India’s constitutional system with Islamic rule.
What is PFI and why was it banned?
The Popular Front of India, or PFI, was an Islamist organisation that operated through a wide network of members, front organisations and political affiliates across several Indian states. It presented itself as a group working for the rights and empowerment of Muslims and other marginalised communities. However, investigations by central and state agencies linked the organisation to radicalisation, violent mobilisation, terror financing, arms training and attempts to build a covert network capable of challenging the Indian State.
The organisation had been under the radar for a long time, and the “India Vision 2047” document became one of the final nails in the coffin for PFI. The immediate chain of events leading to the ban began in 2022 after police unearthed a suspected network in Phulwari Sharif. Investigators arrested Athar Parvez and Mohammad Jalaluddin and recovered documents that revealed plans to radicalise Muslim youths, provide weapons training and work towards converting India into an Islamic state. Jalaluddin was also identified as a former member of the banned Students’ Islamic Movement of India, or SIMI, who had later joined PFI.
Further arrests and searches revealed WhatsApp groups, overseas contacts, digital material and links to the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” network. Investigating agencies also examined PFI’s suspected involvement in violent incidents, including the murder of BJP youth leader Praveen Nettaru, and a conspiracy to attack Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rally in Patna.
The government’s case against PFI rested on three broad findings: the organisation’s nationwide network, its funding channels and its involvement in violent and terrorist activities. The National Investigation Agency, Enforcement Directorate and state police conducted raids across several states in September 2022. Hundreds of PFI members and office-bearers were detained, while digital devices, documents and financial records were seized.
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, PFI and its associates received funds from India and abroad through banking channels, hawala and donations. These funds were layered through multiple accounts to conceal their real purpose and were then used for unlawful and terrorist activities. The government also cited links between PFI members and terrorist organisations, including ISIS, as well as attempts to infiltrate organisations such as the RSS and gather sensitive information.
On 28th September 2022, the Union government banned PFI for five years under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Eight of its associated organisations were banned alongside it. The government concluded that PFI’s activities posed a serious threat to India’s sovereignty, security and public order. The ban was therefore based not merely on its ideology, but on accumulated evidence of radicalisation, foreign funding, violent conspiracies, terror links and an organised plan to undermine India’s constitutional system.
