The world has never been as linked as it is today. Ships cross oceans that once seemed impossible to navigate, trains cut through borders and highways tie cities thousands of kilometres apart. However, another story is quietly unfolding behind this growing web of connectivity. The routes that carry goods from one country to another are no longer just about distance or convenience. They are increasingly shaped by wars, sanctions, shifting alliances and a rapidly changing geopolitical order.
When one route becomes uncertain, nations begin looking for another and when old pathways can no longer be taken for granted, new ones start to surface. It is in this transforming landscape that an ambitious idea is gaining ground. A direct route that could eventually take Russia to the Indian Ocean. It would open a new passage to India and create a link that could potentially redraw the map of global interactions. This bold proposal was recently put forward by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to enhance connectivity between Moscow and New Delhi along with minimising reliance on strategically critical maritime terminals.
“A rail link to the Indian Ocean should also be explored. Risks related to the Bosporus and the Strait of Hormuz might require alternative routes: through Turkmenistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Any options providing access to India are acceptable,” he expressed in an interview with TASS on 6th August.
This does not yet equal to an authorised direct train line but suggests that railway services might be extended as part of a larger transportation network between the two countries. What makes the plan particularly striking is that it runs through Central Asia, which sits atop vast reserves of oil, gas and critical minerals and acts as a natural bridge for different parts of the world: East Asia, Europe, South Asia and the Middle East.
The timing could hardly be more crucial as the conflict between Iran and the United States has sent ripples through global markets felt far beyond the battlefield. The Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery through which around one-fifth of the world’s petroleum and liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes, has effectively been shut down, leaving energy-dependent economies including India vulnerable and scrambling for alternatives.
With every disruption, the quest for routes that can bypass such chokepoints becomes more urgent and Central Asia has found itself at the heart of that search.
The motive behind Russia’s recommendation
The stakes for global trade have rarely been higher. As tensions continue to simmer across West Asia, the routes that carry the world’s energy supply and products are looking far less secure. For Russia, the turmoil has brought an unexpected boost to its energy exports and revenues.
However, the country wants to move towards a more dependable way to transport its cargo towards the Indian Ocean which does not leave its trade entirely at the mercy of unstable maritime lanes. That mission has taken on greater relevance as the India-Russia relationship continues to deepen. Their bilateral trade touched $68.7 billion in the 2024-25 financial year, with Russian energy exports accounting for a substantial share.
Hence, the statement floated by Khusnullin could add an entirely new dimension to this partnership. He had also pointed to the precarities surrounding Hormuz and the Bosporus (between Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara). Ankara limited commercial ship movement in the Black Sea due to attacks on vessels amid the Russia-Ukraine war, causing a headache for Moscow because the Bosporus Strait works as its key maritime chokepoint.
Khusnullin emphasised that non-traditional routes will perform a critical role in the near future. And Russia seems to be keen to proceed in that direction. Its approach is centred on strategic connectivity, logistics and freight. The intention is to transport commodities between Russia, Central Asia, West Asia and India faster and more efficiently.
The multi-modal freight corridor could entail commutes by train from Moscow through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, accessibility to ports like Bandar Abbas, admission into Iran using current rail networks, journeys to India with sea linkages and further rail construction. However, the implications of this proposition stretch well beyond a new railway line for New Delhi.
A corridor running through Central Asia could eventually provide a more direct overland link to Russia, while giving an entry into markets across Central and South Asia as the traditional trade pathways endure unprecedented pressure. The idea also fits into the larger vision of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which aims to join India and Russia through Central Asia and Iran while offering a substitution to the regular sea channel, slashing cost, distance and time.
The doors to India’s extended neighbourhood could possibly be opened wider, bringing a region that has long remained geographically close yet otherwise far away within better reach. In fact, India’s trade with the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) remains surprisingly low, hovering at just $1.7 to $2 billion in 2023. The same has surpassed $100 billion between the region and China in a sharp contrast.
India’s presence in Central Asia and INSTC
India has long understood that Central Asia is too important to remain distant in an increasingly volatile world where reliable routes have become just as imperative as the trade itself. This has pushed New Delhi to explore fresh avenues around old geographical barriers, from developing Chabahar Port to joining the Ashgabat Agreement and backing other connectivity initiatives in the region.
However, a 7,200-kilometre International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is among India’s primary logistical gateways there. It is a sprawling web of ships, railways and roads designed to stitch together a trade route from India through Iran and the Caspian Sea to Russia, Central Asia and Europe. The project straddles the Indian Ocean to the Caspian Sea using the Persian Gulf and continues into Russia and Northern Europe.
Its wheels were set in motion on 12th September 2000 when India, Iran and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement in Saint Petersburg. However, the three founding members were later joined by others taking the number to 13 ratified member states, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman and Syria while Bulgaria stayed as an observer.
Notably, the INSTC is not a single route carved on a map but a network of three interconnected corridors, each offering India a different way into the Eurasian heartland. The trio has come to be considered a game-changer for India’s engagement with Central Asia and the wider Eurasian area.
The Central Corridor begins at Jawaharlal Nehru Port in Maharashtra and stretches across the Indian Ocean towards Iran’s Bandar Abbas. It moves north through Iranian ports such as Nowshahr, Amirabad and Bandar-e-Anzali from there before crossing the Caspian Sea to Russia, reaching ports including Olya and Astrakhan.
The Western Corridor links Iran and Azerbaijan through the twin border points of Astara and connecting with the rail networks of both countries before progressing south towards Jawaharlal Nehru Port. It is created to bring together existing infrastructure across borders that have historically divided these markets.
Then comes the Eastern Corridor, perhaps the most valuable from India’s Central Asian perspective. It runs through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other nations of the region, developing a land bridge between Russia and India.
Why India needs INSTC
The INSTC has long been pitched as a faster option to the conventional Suez Canal route to Europe. Its appeal has only soared as the latter route has been subjected to one disruption after another, such as accidental groundings like that of EverGiven in March 2021 and regional confrontations comprising Houthi threats in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait. However, the corridor is about more than commerce for New Delhi. It is a continental necessity.
Breaking free from geopolitical landlock: The partition did more than redraw India’s borders. It also snapped the country’s direct land routes to Afghanistan, Central Asia and northern Eurasia. The problem was exacerbated when Pakistan repeatedly refused overland transit through its territory. India had no choice but to look elsewhere. The answer was a multimodal network of sea, rail and road links running from the Arabian Sea to Iranian ports such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, creating a land bridge into Eurasia without having to depend on transit routes controlled by a hostile neighbour.
The cost advantage: India’s trade with Russia and Northern Europe was dependent on an extensive route. Vessels would travel through the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Mediterranean Sea, English Channel and Baltic Sea, a journey of more than 16,000 kilometres that could take 40 to 45 days. Furthermore, there is always the looming sword of obstructions along the way, leaving shipping schedules exposed to delays and uncertainty. INSTC changes that equation, dropping the physical distance by around 40%, reducing transit time to 18-25 days and bringing overall freight and operational costs down by roughly 30% to 40%.
Countering the maritime upheavals: For India, putting all its eggs in one basket, that is, a single maritime route comes with a price. A disruption in the Suez Canal, a flare-up in the Red Sea or trouble around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait could rapidly throw an entire supply chain into disarray. Lives are endangered, freight rates shoot up, insurance premiums follow and cargo that should have arrived on time is left waiting. The Hormuz crisis has exposed this grave susceptibility.
On the other hand, INSTC could mitigate the same as India is granted another route to Eurasia as a large part of the journey is shifted to land, leading to breathing room when maritime bottlenecks are targeted. The possible outcome made the endeavour even more attractive for India. The framework offered an alternative to the risky and long sea routes that had historically carried a large portion of trade traffic for the country and denoted an expedited way to markets in Central Asia, Russia and Europe.
Trade resilience: The worldwide pattern of trade has been altering. Western sanctions reshaped Russia’s trading routes and India had to figure out a secure manner to continue its strengthening relations with the country. The trade volumes of various commodities have been rising from crude oil and fertilisers to vegetable oils and industrial components. This is where the INSTC lands into the picture.
It provides a crucial conduit between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), linking it with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, presenting a better transit route for the increasing ties. Yet there is another side to the story. India’s trade with Russia remains tilted in Moscow’s favour, while the situation with the landlocked Central Asian markets is shockingly modest.
Geography has been a big part of the problem and the absence of infrastructure and geopolitical obstacles continues to impede progress, even with the inauguration of Chabahar Port. However, the INSTC might help close some of these gaps, not only by facilitating trade but also by fostering strong ties between businesses and institutions. It could improve the flow of information, knowledge and commercial opportunities along the route.
Counterweight to Belt and Road Initiative: India’s concerns have encompassed much more than just trade, as Beijing’s Belt and Road program proliferated throughout Eurasia, featuring missions like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and a flourishing network of rail connections. New Delhi therefore began pushing its own vision through the INSTC and its “Connect Central Asia” policy, offering the region a separate window to the outside world.
The goals were not limited to merely countering Beijing’s influence but also aspired for these countries to possess more diverse choices in terms of partners and trade routes. The logic was straightforward: the region should not have to entrust all its economic and strategic interests to one power, which is both predatory and could threaten its sovereignty and strategic independence.
Unfortunately, the project progressed in fits and starts for twenty years as it endured its share of obstacles along the way. Western sanctions, financial constraints, gaps in infrastructure, regulatory hurdles and regional tensions all slowed things down. However, the INSTC was reported to gain momentum in 2022 but the ongoing situation in Iran has resulted in another hurdle to its progress.
Russia and China reconfigure trade routes
The old routes that once seemed permanent are persistently being reassessed as nations are no longer complacent about them and are pursuing other pathways to maintain connectivity and keep the trade flowing. India is striving to achieve its connectivity objectives while a former superpower and a present economic heavyweight are also busy laying down new routes and connections of their own.
Russia and China are building links across Eurasia, from pipelines carrying energy to railways opening up fresh routes for trade. The construction of infrastructure for maritime and overland trade has been tremendously expedited by the two sides. These projects include logistics corridors to bypass conventional shipping lanes, natural gas pipelines, cross-border railway bridges and Arctic maritime channels.
Power of Serbia 1: The project commenced in the gas fields of eastern Siberia, where the pipeline picks up Russian natural gas towards China. It stretches for more than 3,000 kilometres before penetrating the border near Blagoveshchensk to bring 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of the supply. It then continues through the vast East Route network for nearly 5,000 kilometres towards Shanghai. The two systems form a direct link between Russia’s gas-producing regions and one of China’s major economic hubs. The pipeline’s capacity has been constantly growing since its December 2019 launch.
Power of Serbia 2: This is the next project in line to bring gas from Western Siberian fields, which once supplied European markets, through Mongolia and into northern China. The pipeline is expected to stretch about 2,600 kilometres and have the capacity to carry up to 50 billion cubic metres of gas a year. After its completion China would be turned into Russia’s main overland gas customer. The two sides are at present working out the details, including long-term prices, the volumes of gas to be supplied and the funding.
China-Russia Far Eastern gas pipeline: “Power of Siberia 1” was already functional with enhanced capacity gas when China and Russia began working on another route in the Far East. This pipeline starts from Russia’s Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas network and proceeds to the Chinese border, crossing near Hulin in Heilongjiang Province. From there, it continues through Changchun and Shijiazhuang, taking Russian gas deeper into China. The route is designed to supply around 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas each year to the country’s northeastern industrial belt under a 25-year agreement.
Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye railway bridge: A little farther north, work was underway on the first rail bridge linking the two countries across the Amur (Heilongjiang in China) River. The Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye Bridge connects Heilongjiang province in China with Russia’s Jewish Autonomous Oblast. As a result, China’s rail network is directly tied to the Trans-Siberian Railway. The groundbreaking ceremony of the 2,215-metre structure was held in 2014, and the work was completed in 2022. It operates as an alternative route for moving bulk goods such as iron ore, coal and minerals, helping boost rail freight capacity and cut down transit time.
Dzhalinda-Mohe cross-border railway line: With the rail links between the two countries expanding, another crossing was planned further along the Amur River. Russia and China have approved the Dzhalinda-Mohe rail bridge. It would connect Dzhalinda in Russia’s Sakha Republic (Yakutia) with Mohe in Heilongjiang of China. The route is expected to offer an alternative to the busy eastern ports, reducing freight journeys by as much as 2,000 kilometres. It is being planned mainly for goods such as timber, coal and critical minerals with seasonal mixed-mode transport under consideration prior to the construction of a permanent rail bridge. Russian estimates suggest that the bridge could add around 10 million tonnes of freight capacity each year.
Eastern Polygon rail network and border crossing expansions: As more goods began moving towards China, Russia started upgrading its main rail routes in the east. The country’s state rail operator has been expanding the Eastern Polygon, which includes the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway to handle the growing cargo traffic. At the same time, Russia and China agreed to improve important land crossings such as Manzhouli-Zabaykalsk. The work includes adding standard-gauge rail connections and widening road inspection lanes to make it easier for freight to move through some of the busiest border points.
Northern Sea Route and a Polar Silk Road: Russia’s long coastline in the Arctic has given it a natural advantage when it comes to the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In recent years, it has worked with China to develop the route for commercial shipping, including the use of ice-class vessels and LNG tankers. The route connects Russia’s northern ports with destinations in China and leads to a shorter journey between Europe and East Asia. The corridor offers substantial reductions when compared to the conventional southern route via the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Suez Canal and Mediterranean.
China is provided with a replacement route to transfer goods between Europe and Asia as well as reduce reliance on passageways through the unstable Middle East. It also fits into Beijing’s broader aim of a “Polar Silk Road” through which it desires to expand its involvement in Arctic transport and infrastructure. The growing accessibility is linked in part to the melting sea ice in the Arctic.
More projects to strengthen trade and connectivity: The plans between China and Russia do not stop with the routes already in use. They continue to work on new crossings and transport relationships, with some projects completed and others still taking shape. Among them is a proposed €1.3 billion fifth rail crossing in the Far East, which would connect to the Trans-Siberian Railway and provide China with another route for bringing in energy and other resources even in the winters when transportation becomes challenging.
The two countries reportedly wanted to resume international cargo movement through the Dzhalinda border crossing through an ice crossing during winter and ferries when the river is navigable in summer. Interestingly, the push for closer connectivity is taking a distinct form over the Amur River, where a cross-border passenger cable car is nearing completion. The project, which began in 2019 will connect the Chinese city of Heihe with Blagoveshchensk on the Russian side.
The objective is simple: changing geopolitical realities, bad weather or any other obstacle should not be allowed to disrupt the steady movement of commodities or people. In a world where supply chains stretch across borders, there is an urgent need to keep those connections open and devoid of hassles. Therefore, China and Russia are putting efforts and resources into finding new routes and building more options, so that demand can continue to meet supply without unnecessary interruptions.
New India-Russia corridors for uninterrupted trade
India, home to around 1.5 billion people, has a strong reason to look beyond its traditional trade routes and find dependable alternatives that can keep its commercial links open. Global power struggles have repeatedly shown how quickly shipping and commerce can be affected when tensions rise, with the Iran-US conflict being a recent example.
For India, preparing for such disruptions is not a novel exercise. Over the years, New Delhi has worked on developing other channels for its international commerce, including with Moscow with the aim of creating a faster and more convenient maritime link between the two countries.
The Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor: India and Russia have been collaborating on a sea route that takes a different path from the one traditionally used for their trade. The corridor ties the east coast of India with the Russian Far East, covering roughly 5,600 nautical miles. The project was formalised in 2019 when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Intent in Vladivostok, and the route has since transformed into a reality.
The Mumbai-Saint Petersburg passage which moves through the Suez Canal covers about 8,675 nautical miles, while the Chennai-Vladivostok route is around 5,647 nautical miles. This could bring cargo transit time down from more than 40 days to about 24 days. The route runs from Vladivostok through the Sea of Japan before moving past the Korean Peninsula and into the South China Sea.
The ships would then pass via the Strait of Malacca, enter the Bay of Bengal and make their way towards Chennai. There has also been discussion of bringing countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia into the wider network, which could give the corridor a broader regional reach. Furthermore, it is an important door for India to reach the resource-rich Far East and decrease reliance on fragile West Asian markets.
Russia invites India to the Arctic: India’s interest in the Northern Sea Route is translating into practical cooperation. During President Vladimir Putin’s December visit to New Delhi, the two partners processed the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support (RELOS) agreement that allows their military ships and aircraft to use each other’s facilities under agreed conditions.
India and Russia have also been discussing greater cooperation in Arctic operations, maritime logistics and training, giving Indian vessels and personnel more experience in polar waters.
The NSR runs from the Barents Sea towards the Bering Strait, providing a shorter connection between northern Europe and parts of Asia than the traditional Suez Canal. However, it matters for more than the distance it can save. India could gain greater access to the energy and natural resources of the Russian Arctic along with a maritime link between Europe and Asia. It also adds another option to New Delhi’s wider trade network, particularly as it is determined to keep its supply lines reliable amid changing global conditions.
The growing imperative in an unpredictable world
It is not just India, Russia, China or a few other countries that are looking to secure their trade routes. Across the world, countries are trying to keep their commercial links steady amid increasingly uncertain times, particularly after the recent crisis in the Middle East disrupted shipping and sent energy prices higher.
These new routes, whether completed or still under development, are not without their own hurdles, but they can offer alternatives when existing ones are disrupted. The traditional trade passages cannot simply be abandoned, at least in the coming years, but the heavy reliance on them can certainly be reduced. This could also limit the impact of complications in major routes, whose cost is often borne by countries that have little to do with the crisis itself.
Thus, whether it is a proposed railway link, the INSTC, the Northern Sea Route or another corridor, the primary goal is to guard the steady flow of trade, energy and connectivity against seen or unforeseen scenarios in addition to finding faster and more efficient ways of accomplishing the same.
