Justice Yashwant Varma of the Delhi High Court has been embroiled in controversy since an enormous amount of unaccounted cash was reportedly discovered after a fire at his residence. After the fire was extinguished, four to five partially burned sacks containing “remains of Indian currency were found in the said room,” according to a police report released by the Chief Justice of India (CJI). The Supreme Court Collegium has now decided, following two meetings on 20th and 24th March, to return him to his parent Allahabad High Court.
Senior advocate Ujjwal Nikam, meanwhile, stated that a transfer or suspension was insufficient and asked Parliament to start criminal charges and, if required, impeachment procedures. On the other hand, Allahabad High Court lawyers have announced an indefinite strike in protest of the ruling. Interestingly, the matter has been shrouded in uncertain secrecy and critical concerns have yet to be addressed.
No true accountability for judges: Justice V. Ramaswami case
Notably, this is not an unprecedented situation as judges have been the target of such grave accusations in the past. Nevertheless, there exists a considerable shortfall in the consequences of their questinable actions.
Justice V. Ramaswami was the first judge to face an impeachment motion and he would have been the first one to be removed from office had the Lok Sabha approved the resolution put out by the opposition. He was the only judge to be chosen with the support of his father-in-law, a chief justice who resigned during the Emergency when the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) discovered undisclosed cash in his house.
Ramaswami was convicted of lavishly furnishing his official apartment with bedding, plush furnishings and air conditioning without following the proper procedures as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court resulting in a major political and judicial controversy in the 1990s. Veteran Congressman Kapil Sibal was his counsel. Just 196 of the 401 members of the house cast their votes in support of the impeachment.
Due to the abstention of 205 Congress members and a few members of other parties, the motion was unsuccessful. Ramaswami ascended to the position of a judge on the Supreme Court of India, despite a contentious career.
Cash delivered at the door of a sitting judge: Justice Nirmal Yadav case
A package worth ₹15 lakh arrived at the residence of Nirmaljit Kaur, a Punjab & Haryana High Court judge, on 13th August 2008. The packet was mistakenly sent to Justice Kaur’s Chandigarh address when it was intended for Justice Nirmal Yadav, a serving judge of the same court, according to the preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court collegium, which was headed by KG Balakrishnan, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) at the time, initially cleared her name. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) then filed a closure report in 2009.
Afterward, Nirmal Yadav was transferred to the Uttarakhand High Court. If Justice SH Kapadia, who took over as chief justice after Balakrishnan retired, had not examined his predecessor’s judgment and permitted her prosecution, the case would have been quietly dismissed. On the day of Yadav’s retirement in 2011, the President of India approved her prosecution. The case is still pending in the special CBI court after 14 years.
Sexual harassment of a woman additional district judge: Justice S K Gangele case
The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s Justice S K Gangele also had to deal with the removal process. He was cleared by a committee that Hamid Ansari established in April 2015 after accepting a resolution backed by 58 MPs to investigate allegations of sexual harassment against a female district judge in Gwalior. In her 2014 resignation papers, the complainant, who served as the chairman of the Vishaka committee against sexual harassment, outlined that she had to step down in order to preserve her “dignity, womanhood and self-esteem.”
Resignation before accountability
Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court was the second judge to be the subject of an impeachment motion. He resigned in September 2011, just days before the motion was scheduled to be presented in the Lok Sabha, making him the first judge in India’s judiciary to be ousted by an overwhelming majority vote of the Rajya Sabha. A Calcutta court convicted him guilty of distorting facts and embezzling ₹33.23 lakh in 1983 while serving as a court-appointed receiver in his legal capacity.
The charges against Justice Sen were heard by a three-judge inquiry committee that was founded in 2007. The Prime Minister was then advised to remove him by the CJI. A motion to impeach him was made in 2009 by 58 Rajya Sabha MPs. In February 2009, Vice President and Rajya Sabha Chairman Hamid Ansari constituted a committee that confirmed the accusation. On 18th August 2011, the Rajya Sabha considered and approved a proposal to remove him, voting 189 to 17. The motion was to be discussed by the Lok Sabha on 5th and 6th September 2011 but he put in his papers on 1st September.
Paul Daniel Dinakaran Premkumar, a judge in the Karnataka High Court was recommended for promotion to the apex court by the Supreme Court collegium in August 2009. However, a number of distinguished members of the legal community accused him of corruption. In December 2009, the administration sent back the propsal to the collegium. He was moved to the Sikkim High Court as Chief Justice.
After 76 MPs petitioned for his dismissal, Hamid Ansari accepted the proposal. An inquiry panel under the Judges Inquiry Act was set up by him in January 2010. However, Premkumar voiced his lack of faith in the committee and resigned on 29th July 2011, the day of its first meeting to investigate 16 charges, some as serious as stealing over 300 acres of land from farmers in Tamil Nadu’s Tiruvallur district following his appointment as a judge of the Madras High Court.
Judiciary protects its interests: Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973)
The Kesavananda Bharati case has its roots in the land reform initiatives implemented in the Indian state of Kerala during the 1950s and 1960s. The Kerala Land Reforms Act, passed by the government in 1963, set a cap on the total quantity of land that an individual could own. The act allowed for the acquisiton of surplus land from landowners and its allocation to the impoverished and landless.
Sri Kesavananda Bharati served as the leader or pontiff of the Edneer Mutt, a Hindu religious organization located in the state. The head of the Edneer Mutt, a Hindu religious organization in Kerala, India, was Sri Kesavananda Bharati. The ownership of land held by religious institutions was restricted by the Kerala government in 1970. The Kerala High Court heard an appeal against the act’s constitutionality from the Edneer Mutt, led by Sri Kesavananda Bharati. The Supreme Court then heard the matter and decided in favor of the state government.
In the meantime, the Indian Parliament enacted the 24th Amendment to the Constitution, which aimed to restrict the judiciary’s authority and the reach of judicial review. Furthermore, the 25th and 29th Amendments were ratified, which aimed to restrict fundamental rights and grant Parliament the authority to change any provision of the Constitution. Sri Kesavananda Bharati contested the legality of these revisions in a petition, claiming that they went against the fundamental framework of the Constitution.
This resulted in the Kesavananda Bharati verdict, which limited the Parliament’s ability to change the Constitution while upholding the basic structure concept and the independence of the judiciary. However, it is important to note that the judiciary gave itself more power by developing a mechanism to overturn modifications that threatened its authority. The same has since been applied to “protect judicial independence” and resist judicial reforms.
K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India And Others (1991)
In a significant decision in K Veeraswami v. Union Of India And Others (1991) case, the Supreme Court of India considered whether the Prevention of Corruption Act (1947) could be applied to Supreme Court and High Court judges. Former Madras High Court Chief Justice K. Veeraswami, the appellant, challenged the criminal charges brought against him under the act, arguing that, as a constitutional official, he ought to be immune from them in the name of protecting the judiciary’s independence.
The case could proceed after the Supreme Court, in a majority decision, approved the dismissal of the appeal. Supreme Court and High Court judges are, in fact, categorized as “public servants” under the act, according to the main conclusion. However, section 6 of the act stipulates that prior sanction from a competent body is required to prosecute them under section 5(1)(e).
The majority ruled that Article 124 of the Constitution, which involves the President and both Houses of Parliament, specifies a precise process for removing judges. The act’s requirement becomes impractical as the President has the power to remove a judge, however, he or she cannot choose to prosecute on their own (due to alleged executive bias). As a result, this effectively excludes judges of the Supreme Court and High Court from the act’s purview.
The decision pronounced that “per incuriam and sub silentio,” or when a court renders a decision without specifically expressing or taking into account a particular legal point, no criminal case might be filed against a judge of the Supreme Court or High Courts without the Chief Justice of India’s prior consent. This raised concerns about accountability as judges were shielded from inquiry or prosecution. The judiciary defended it by maintaining that it was required to maintain judicial integrity and stop harassment.
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (1993): The birth of collegium system
A constitutional disagreement about the process for selecting Supreme Court and High Court judges in India resulted in the Second Judges Case (1993), officially known as Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India. In the first judges case, the Supreme Court affirmed the executive’s dominance over the nomination of judges, holding that the CJI’s participation in the process was limited to consultation. However, it turned into tensions and disputes between the judiciary and the executive over the appointment and transfer of judges.
On 6th October 1993, the Supreme Court in a historic ruling declared that the word “consultation” would imply “concurrence” and decided that when it comes to the appointment and transfer of judges, the CJI has the highest authority. This was a major change from the previous First Judges Case decision. The ruling determined that, in accordance with Article 124 of the Constitution, the CJI’s opinion, as the head of the judiciary, must be interpreted as “concurrence.”
As a result, the apex court underlined the necessity of a “collegium” system that involves the CJI and a group of senior judges to suggest judges for appointment and transfer. The goal of this collegium system was to guarantee that judicial appointments and transfers were guided by the independence and quality of the judiciary and not by the influence of the executive branch.
The verdict clarified that although the executive (President of India) must confer with the CJI, the latter’s recommendation is most important. The CJI’s recommendations cannot be rejected by the administration without good cause. The court stressed that judicial selections must not be impacted by political factors or executive meddling and its independence must be maintained.
The Second Judges Case established the collegium system and the Chief Justice of India’s primacy, which drastically changed the country’s judicial appointment landscape. Fundamentally, the collegium operated on the principle of “by the judges, of the judges, and for the judges.” It was viewed as a power grab since it produced an opaque, judge-dominated structure in place of a balanced executive-judiciary procedure. This led to the judicial system becoming an insular network, lacking accountability to anyone except its own members. Meanwhile, other pillars of Indian democracy do not enjoy the privilege.
Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (2010)
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 laid forth judicial standards, mandates that judges disclose their assets and creates procedures for dismissing Supreme Court and High Court justices. The assets and liabilities of judges, as well as those of their spouse and children, must be disclosed, per the bill brought by the United Progressive Alliance government. The National Judicial Oversight Committee, the Complaints Scrutiny Panel and an investigating committee were established by the bill. Moreover, anyone could complain to the Oversight Committee about a judge for “misbehavior.”
The bill was then referred to a standing committee and passed in the Lok Sabha in May of 2012, but lapsed consequent to the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha. It seeks for a time-bound investigation of judges who are accused of corruption and sexual harassment. The Bill stated that after the panel receives complaints, they will be forwarded to the scrutiny committee and if the charges are significant, the chairman will request an investigation.
As per the Bill, the inquiry panel, which was to be named the oversight committee and would be overseen by a former Chief Justice of India (CJI), who would assemble a probe team that will look into charges against a judge using an advocate picked by the government. All such processes would be regarded as judicial proceedings, and the probe against a judge must be conducted in camera. If charges are proven after an investigation, the judge could have their judicial work suspended.
Unsurprisingly, there was opposition to the bill. AP Shah, head of the Law Commission and former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, stated that it would have a “debilitating effect on judicial independence.” He alleged that it breached the Constitution’s protection extended the higher judiciary which “doesn’t enable Parliament to create another venue that leads in impeachment proceedings stemming from a complaint submitted by one person.” He added that the proposal permits public complaints claiming misconduct by a sitting Supreme Court or high court judge, which may lead to their impeachment.
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (2015): NJAC Case
The Supreme Court upheld the collegium system for judicial appointments in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), also referred to as the Fourth Judges Case. The proposed National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) would have been in charge of hiring, appointing and transferring judges, attorneys and other legal staff under the Indian government as well as all of its state governments. The commission was created by amending the Indian Constitution by the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act 2014, also known as the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act 2014, which was approved by the Rajya Sabha on 14th August 2014 and the Lok Sabha on 13th August 2014.
It would have established a new mechanism for the nomination of judges in place of the collegium system, which the Supreme Court had activated through judicial fiat. The Indian Parliament passed the act in addition to the Constitution Amendment Act to govern the National Judicial Appointments Commission’s functions. The Constitutional Amendment Bill and the NJAC Bill were approved by 16 Indian state governments before being enacted into law by Indian President Pranab Mukherjee on 31st December 2014. On 13th April 2015, the Constitutional Amendment Act and the NJAC Act went into effect.
However, after considering petitions from a number of individuals and organizations, with the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAoRA) serving as the primary petitioner, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled on 16th October 2015, by a 4:1 majority, that the NJAC was unconstitutional and maintained the collegium system. The 97th Constitutional Amendment Act was also deemed invalid by the court.
The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) which would have comprised representatives from the legislature and executive branch, was intended to take the place of the collegium system under the amendment. The court declared that by undermining the judiciary’s independence, this amendment went against the fundamental framework of the Constitution. As envisioned in the amendment, the NJAC was declared as interfering with the nomination process and weakening the independence of the judiciary.
Justice CS Karnan vs. Supreme Court Of India (2017)
The first Indian high court judge behind bars is named Justice CS Karnan. He was taken into custody in Tamil Nadu. The ex-judge was convicted of raising accusations against other judges. After writing to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and urging action against the judges, he was found guilty of contempt of court by the nation’s Supreme Court. He urged PM Modi to look into the matter and take action against persons on the list.
He was then summoned before the highest court and prohibited from carrying out any administrative or judicial duties. The seven justices of the bench were accused of caste prejudice by Justice Karnan, who prohibited them from leaving the country and demanded compensation. The Supreme Court then mandated that a group of government doctors conduct a mental evaluation of Justice Karnan. In a furious reaction, he ordered the seven judges to take similar tests.
He issued a judgement that sentenced India’s chief justice and seven other Supreme Court justices to five years in prison. The judges were found guilty of harassment and discrimination, among other offenses, according to the judgment. The media are not allowed to publish or broadcast Justice Karnan’s remarks, according to the supreme court. The case was perceived as the judiciary pulling together to quell criticism and safeguard its image instead of openly addressing Karnan’s accusations.
Do judges have to declare their property or assets?
According to data gathered a year ago under the Right to Information Act, just 13% of Indian High Court justices had disclosed their holdings. There are around 1,100 judges in the High Courts and 34 justices, including the Chief Justice, in the Supreme Court as of March 2025. Only 98 of these judges, mostly from the Delhi, Punjab-Haryana and Kerala High Courts made their assets publicly available, per a report in News18.
The High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay have already ruled that in compliance with the Right To Information Act of 2005, asset declarations are not considered “information.” While the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Courts concluded that asset declarations were confidential and inappropriate for internet posting, the Gujarat High Court has similarly maintained that there is no public interest in disclosing the personal information of the judges.
A statement of assets and liabilities must be submitted by each service member in accordance with the All India Services (Conduct) Rules 1968, which aligns the pay of judges with that of public officers, especially government secretaries. The Supreme Court laid down rules in 1997 mandating that judges disclose all assets to the Chief Justice, including real estate and investments in their own names and also in the names of their spouses or their dependents. This guideline was not followed, though.
The Supreme Court in 2009 decided to post asset disclosures of judges on its official website. In the same year, the Delhi High Court likewise agreed to make the assets of judges publicly available. The majority of judges have not voluntarily disclosed their assets in spite of these steps which could have developed a norm for transparency and honesty.
The laws requiring the declaration of these assets was suggested by the Parliamentary Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice. A parliamentary standing committee report titled “Judicial Processes and their Reforms” from August 2023 suggested a law that would require judges of the Supreme Court and High Court to file yearly asset returns and create clear guidelines for asset disclosure. The accountability bill and NJAC Act were also steps taken in the same direction.
No mechanism for judicial accountability
The Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968 governs India’s current judicial accountability system. It states that a three-member committee must decide whether to remove a judge for “proven misbehavior or incapacity.” A Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist make up the panel. Although it operates similarly to a trial court, this committee is solely called upon following the successful filing of an impeachment resolution in the Rajya Sabha or Lok Sabha. The presiding officer of the house who is either the Speaker in the Lok Sabha or the Vice-President also the Chairman in the Rajya Sabha, must approve the resolution.
The removal from office requires an absolute majority in the Rajya Sabha or a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. This makes reaching an agreement challenging, particularly in a politically sensitive setting. In India, judges are exempt from many laws and can avoid accountability by stepping down before to official proceedings. A weakness in the system’s capacity to hold judges accountable for their misconduct is revealed by the fact that this protection surpasses that accorded to elected officials.
Despite numerous charges of corruption, impeachment procedures have only been initiated against Supreme Court or High Court judges four times in India’s history. There are two primary methods that our legal system handles accusations of corruption against these judges. The first is an internal process that the Supreme Court instituted in 1999.
The Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the relevant High Court reviews complaints against judges internally under this system. A three-member committee composed up of senior judges probes the claims if they are believed to be genuine. Nevertheless, this procedure is informal, opaque and infrequently leads to serious disciplinary action beyond a resignation recommendation or a suspension of judicial work.
The second method, which is protected by the Indian Constitution, is impeachment by Parliament. However, impeachment is an unfeasible weapon due to the high threshold required, support from a two-thirds majority in both houses. It is a laborious procedure that rarely leads to impeachment. Actions taken against dishonest judges are unknown to the general public and the legal world. Contempt laws, however, are the main reason why judges escape punishment for their misdeeds.
It is challenging to openly debate or look into claims of corruption against judges in India due to the country’s severe contempt of court regulations. This stifles independent journalistic research and public scrutiny. Additionally, the judiciary has a conflict of interest because it governs itself to a greater extent than other government agencies. There is no independent body to monitor judicial conduct. The single constitutional means of removal, impeachment, is rarely used and is heavily politicized, making it a weak deterrent.
The judiciary is lacking transparency in India
Many people believe that the judiciary is the last stronghold of accountability, justice, and equity. However, this claim has always been disputed due to instances of corruption, self-preservation and a lack of transparency. The aforementioned cases demonstrated how judges, when confronted with accusations of wrongdoing and corruption, utilize the constitutional protections afforded to them to avoid indictment and trial in addition to reflecting the delay in administering justice.
When an inquiry is commenced, it is carried out by other judges based on a framework they have set up, resulting in lingering uncertainties and a severe lack of desired impartiality and transparency. This privilege is not extended to anyone else. The judiciary requires and enforces standards of transparency and integrity from everyone except itself.
According to the Ethics Act of 1978, federal judges in the United States are required to report their sources and amounts of income as well as any gifts that surpass a specific threshold. High-ranking public officials, including judges, are required by South Korea’s Public Service Ethics Act 1993, to report non-public company shares, real estate, and intangible assets. Public officials are required to disclose their assets under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 in the Philippines.
Anti-corruption rules in Russia mandate judges and their families to keep track of their assets and income. On the other hand, in India, judges are safeguarded by a complex system. While they have the option to disclose their assets, there is no legal requirement compelling them to do so. High levels of opacity characterize the judiciary’s operations, especially when it comes to the collegium system’s appointment and transfer of judges. It erodes public confidence.
Moreover, efforts to address the problem, such as the NJAC Act or the accountability bill, never proceed to a logical conclusion which only exacerbates the issue. Several attempts to alter the collegium have been met with resistance from the judiciary, which is frequently denounced as self-empowerment but is justified as defending independence.
Due to the collegium’s opaque operations, decisions are not made public and no formal criteria are revealed and hence it has been accused of nepotism and bias, with arguments that it shields a judicial elite that is exclusive.
Likewise, since statements made during court proceedings, including by judges, are deemed privileged and immune from defamation lawsuits, it is not possible to bring a defamation case against a high court or supreme court judge. A defamation case could only be brought against a judge who speaks in a public setting or in their private capacity. A judge’s remarks could possibly be subject to litigation under the Contempt of Courts Act in addition to any other remedies available to the aggrieved party if they are deemed to be defamatory and constitute contempt of court.
A historic ruling by the Supreme Court on 2nd May 2002, mandated that political candidates reveal their educational background, assets and obligations, including those of their spouses and dependents, and any criminal history they may have. The court decided that the right to vote in a democracy includes the right to information for vote-casting citizens. Hence, politicians are accountable to the public every five years and can be rejected by the people in each election. They must reveal their assets, criminal backgrounds and various personal details in affidavits for public awareness.
However, the same doesn’t apply to the judiciary, which is another crucial part of the democracy. The judges are not required to adhere to any such regulations, implying that the public does not have a right to know about judges and their judicial conduct, unlike other pillars of Indian democracy. It appears that the judiciary in India operates in a manner akin to a separate entity where judges are subject to different laws and regulations, superior than common Indians. They benefit from supreme protection and lead lives shrouded in absolute secrecy, a privilege not afforded to the general populace or other arms of the democracy.
