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Explained: How Iran’s Strait of Hormuz blockade and Qatar’s LNG halt could trigger an unprecedented global energy shock

Shraddha Pandey
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Explained: How Iran’s Strait of Hormuz blockade and Qatar’s LNG halt could trigger an unprecedented global energy shock

The US-Israel war against the Mullah regime in Iran is having global implications. First, Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, and on 2nd March 2026, Qatar announced a full halt to the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products. The decision came after Iranian drone strikes targeted an energy facility of Qatar’s state-owned energy giant, QatarEnergy, in the massive Ras Laffan Industrial City and a water tank at a power plant in Mesaieed Industrial City.

While the world’s largest LNG producer confirmed that no casualties occurred in the Iranian strikes, the production of LNG and related products has been halted for “security reasons”. The Ras Laffan Industrial City is home to the world’s largest LNG export plant.

QatarEnergy declared force majeure on its energy shipments. This is a legal clause excusing delivery failure due to extraordinary situations like drone attacks. The move will have serious implications as Ras Laffan alone accounts for the bulk of Qatar’s LNG output.

“Due to military attacks on QatarEnergy’s operating facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City in the State of Qatar, QatarEnergy has ceased production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products,” a statement issued by QatarEnergy reads.

Global impact of Qatar halting LNG production

Qatar supplies approximately 20% of the global LNG exports. With Qatar’s 82% clients based in Asia and a significant chunk in Europe, Qatar played a balancing role. Qatar supplies 42% of India’s LNG requirements. An indefinite discontinuation of LNG production and removal of this massive volume would essentially create an immediate global supply shock, further exacerbating the fragility of global energy security.

If we look at the immediate market reaction, the European benchmark gas price (Dutch TTF) skyrocketed 46-54% in a single day. Similarly, Asian LNG spot prices surged 39%. Oil prices recorded a spike as high as 13% intraday.

In Asia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, among others, rely heavily on Qatari cargoes. Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Akazawa Ryo Masa, has reportedly said that although Japan’s immediate supply is protected by stockpiles and spot-purchasing, Tokyo may seek to diversify its LNG imports.

Meanwhile, Indian importers like GAIL and Petronet also face direct contract risks. If the situation persists for long, Asian LNG buyers will scramble for replacement cargoes, which would essentially mean not only higher prices but also open the risk of power plants and industries cutting output or switching fuels.

Indian companies are reported to have reduced LNG supplies to industries after Qatar announced a production halt. Petronet has informed GAIL and other companies about reduced supplies. GAIL and Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) have informed customers about the gas supply cut, which ranges from 10% to 30%.

Meanwhile, India may also turn to its trusted supplier and partner, Russia, for short-term LNG imports, much to America’s disappointment.

For Europe, the situation only gets worse as its energy security was already exposed after the loss of the Russian gas pipeline in 2022. A dramatic surge in prices will raise household electricity bills and industrial costs. While the European Union’s gas coordination group will convene on 3rd March to discuss the overall impact of the escalating war in the Middle East, Europe’s storage is relatively healthy and since winters are also ending, it may not face an immediate crisis.

Israel’s pursuit of eliminating the ‘existential threat’, America’s ‘regime change’ ambition, and Iran’s revenge collectively bleeding global energy markets

None of this ends at just Asia and Europe; there will be ripple effects. While the US and Australia may witness higher prices and export opportunities, being among the top LNG exporters, they are reported to have limited spare capacity.

The US has already grabbed the opportunity, with Venture Global, offering uncontracted cargoes to help “stabilise” the markets as Qatar turns the tap off.

QatarEnergy halting LNG production only worsens a potential crisis triggered by Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait’s blockade has already resulted in a surge in oil prices. The IRGC has threatened to attack any vessels, compounded by tanker strikes, insurance cancellations, and suspensions by major shipping lines like Maersk, which has effectively brought commercial traffic to a near standstill. A desperate and vengeful Iranian Mullah regime, in its pursuit to disrupt global energy supply and gain leverage, has choked off roughly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil and a significant share of LNG exports, including from Qatar.

Appearing on Iranian state television, Iranian Brigadier General Ebrahim Jabari, the adviser to the IRGC commander, said, “The price of oil has reached $81/bbl, and the world is certainly waiting for it to reach at least $200. The Strait of Hormuz is closed. Our heroes in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy and the Army will set fire to any ships that wish to pass through this strait.”

Various media reports also indicate that the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered energy price spikes, with oil rising toward or beyond $100 per barrel and the European gas benchmark jumping over 50%.

It must be recalled that the fresh wave of anti-regime protest in Iran had hyperinflation and consistent economic downslide as its immediate trigger. Now, an intransigent Iranian Mullah regime seems to be deliberately exporting the same crisis through the Strait of Hormuz blockade and Gulf energy strikes, ‘punishing’ its adversaries and the wider world with global energy supply disruptions, price spikes and inflation.

Besides Qatar’s halt on LNG production, and the Strait of Hormuz blockade, Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery, Israeli gas fields, and Iraqi Kurdistan oil output are also seeing a precautionary shutdown amidst Iran’s retaliatory strikes. On 2nd March, an Iranian drone targeted Aramco’s refinery in Ras Tanura on Saudi Arabia’s east coast, triggering a fire.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, companies like DNO, Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Dana Gas and HKN Energy have halted their production as a precautionary measure. The companies used to export 200,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) through pipeline to Turkey’s Ceyhan port in February this year.

In Israel, the Netanyahu government has directed Chevron to temporarily halt the giant Leviathan gas field. Israeli gas field shutdown has put its exports to Egypt to a standstill.

On 28th February, there were two explosions at Iran’s Kharg Island, which processes 90% of Iran’s crude exports. Although Iran is heavily sanctioned, the country is the third largest producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum ⁠Exporting Countries, pumping roughly 4.5% of global oil supplies. Iran’s output is about 3.3 million barrels per day of crude, in addition to 1.3 million bpd of condensate and other ‌liquids.

The Middle East remains volatile, and even a short halt would inflict massive damage; the disruption extending to months would trigger a global energy crisis. Although other producers are stepping in, they cannot instantly replace 20% of the global supply. The return of normalcy in global energy supplies remains contingent on the return of normalcy in Iran and the Gulf countries.

‘Buy a MacBook for the victim’, says Bombay HC in a POCSO case after minor agrees to ‘settle’, withdraw charges against uncle: Read when and why it happens

Divyansh Tiwari
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‘Buy a MacBook for the victim’, says Bombay HC in a POCSO case after minor agrees to ‘settle’, withdraw charges against uncle: Read when and why it happens

Following an amicable settlement between the parties, the Bombay High Court quashed a First Information Report (FIR) under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses (POCSO) Act, 2012 in a recent ruling that has spurred discussion on the convergence of justice, compassion, and legal rigor. Mohan Maruti Jadhav was charged by his young niece with crimes under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO, as well as provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

The survivor later affirmed that she had no complaints about her uncle, whom she characterised as treating her like a daughter, and the court remarked that the accusations were the result of a ‘misunderstanding.’ The offender was ordered to deposit Rs 1.5 lakh in order to buy a MacBook to support the survivor’s education as part of the resolution.

This decision, which was made on February 13, 2026, is an example of a developing trend in which Indian courts have the authority to halt criminal proceedings based on settlements, even in situations that are not compoundable. But why do these results happen, and what do significant rulings from the Supreme Court tell us about their legitimacy? Let’s discuss.

The legal framework: Power to quash under Sec. 482 of CrPC

The fundamental authority of High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, lies at the core of these agreements. In order to safeguard the interests of justice or avoid misuse of the legal system, this clause gives courts the authority to revoke FIRs or criminal actions. Non-compoundable crimes, such as those under POCSO or rape, usually cannot be settled privately, in contrast to compoundable charges under Section 320 CrPC, where parties can formally compromise. Nonetheless, courts have increasingly used Section 482 to permit quashing when prosecution would be pointless, especially in private disputes that have been settled amicably.

This discretion must be in line with the public interest, it is not unrestricted. Quashing is uncommon, as the Supreme Court has stressed, and should only be used in situations where accusations are absurd or continuation would be more detrimental than beneficial. Courts consider reconciliation vs child protection in POCSO situations, frequently permitting quashings if the survivor (upon majority) agrees or marries the accused, provided the case meets certain criteria.

Systematic pressure and pragmatism

The courts are overburdened. Approximately 70% of the roughly 54 million pending cases as of early 2026 are criminal in nature. Litigants are forced to criminalise conflicts in order to gain more leverage due to civil court delays, which frequently last decades. For example, what starts out as a family or contractual dispute might evolve into formal complaints (FIRs) claiming sexual offences, assault, or cheating, utilising criminal proceedings as a shortcut to compel settlements. This is made worse by police inefficiencies, investigations take a long time, witnesses become hostile, and evidence deteriorates with time, making convictions difficult. Settlements in these situations prioritise victim care, clear the backlog, and restore harmony, particularly if the victim marries the accused or retracts accusations.

Guiding Principles

Through significant rulings, the Supreme Court has issued important guidelines that emphasised caution while quashing non-compoundable offences.

Under India’s CrPC, non-compoundable offences, those not covered by Section 320, cannot be handled privately between parties. Instead, the State prosecutes them as crimes against society. These grave crimes, such as POCSO child exploitation instances, necessitate full court trials without exception, in contrast to compoundable ones, where victims and accused can compromise.

The Court listed seven grounds for quashing FIRs in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), including situations in which the charges are ludicrously unlikely or reveal no crime. This laid the groundwork for court action to stop pointless prosecutions.

This was extended in the landmark Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), which held that settlement ensures justice and that High Courts have the authority to invalidate even significant offences if they are predominantly civil or private in origin. In contrast to marital or business conflicts, the Court cautioned against quashing horrible crimes like rape or those that have an impact on society.

Building on this, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) defined the parameters for quashing in situations such as murder attempt (Section 307 IPC), emphasizing the assessment of the seriousness of the offense, the sincerity of the settlement, and the likelihood of conviction. The Supreme Court reaffirmed limitations in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017), quashing is not allowed for economic violations or those with societal repercussions, even after settlement.

The Courts, however, have been very watchful for sexual offences, because sexual crimes have a larger impact on society. In Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra (2025), it was decided that a rape FIR might be quashed in ‘exceptional circumstances’ when the parties reached a voluntary settlement, and the prosecution did not serve the public interest.

However, in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan (2024), the Supreme Court rejected quashing POCSO proceedings based merely on compromise, emphasising the Act’s objective to protect children from exploitation. Courts are guided by a four-step test from Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024): Determine if the allegations, on their face, constitute a crime, assess the legitimacy of the settlement, take into account the impact on society, and make sure there is no abuse of process.

Patterns of allowance or refusal

Other situations reflect this approach. In POCSO cases, quashing frequently happens when victims become married to the accused and enjoy stable lives. For example, in a 2025 Supreme Court decision, the proceedings were dismissed to prevent tormenting a married couple with children. In order to promote family peace, the Kerala High Court dismissed two POCSO cases in 2025 after settlements resulted in marriages. In a similar vein, a POCSO FIR was dismissed by the Delhi High Court in 2023 following a settlement between juvenile parties. But rejections are frequent, Despite reaching a compromise, the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused quashing a rape POCSO case in 2026, considering the victim’s body to be ‘her temple‘ and the crime to be social.

In 2024, the Supreme Court upheld child protection by reinstating a POCSO FIR against a teacher, overturning a High Court quash based on family settlement.

POCSO cases are occasionally overturned by courts when the victim marries the accused and has a stable life, but only in circumstances where there is unmistakable proof that there was no actual crime, such as forceful assault, and the relationship was consensual between near adults.

Conclusion: Justice or compromise?

These settlements continue because they provide workable answers in the face of structural problems, such as court vacancies, procedural adjournments, and evidentiary obstacles that impede justice by delaying trials. However, detractors contend that they weaken deterrence against serious crimes and commodify victims, particularly children. The MacBook order in the Bombay case emphasises a victim-centric approach, but also raises questions. Does financial aid actually restore dignity, or does it run the risk of encouraging forced compromises?

In the end, Supreme Court precedents require that settlements not take precedence over public accountability, even as they humanize the law by promoting reconciliation. Maintaining a balance between equity and empathy is crucial as India struggles with judicial changes. In order to ensure that quashing promotes justice rather than expediency, courts must carefully consider the facts of each case.

Pahalgam attack: NIA investigation turns to China over GoPro used in recce. Read what the Letter Rogatory is

Anurag
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Pahalgam attack: NIA investigation turns to China over GoPro used in recce. Read what the Letter Rogatory is

On 2nd March, the National Investigation Agency was granted permission by a special court in Jammu to issue a Letter Rogatory to the competent judicial authority in China. The request seeks assistance in identifying the purchaser and end user of a GoPro camera which was allegedly used to reconnoitre Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley ahead of the deadly Pahalgam terror attack.

The premier counter-terror agency of India had sought permission from the court to contact Chinese authorities to get information about the GoPro camera, as it was linked to a distributor in China.

The development came in connection with the 22nd April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 people, including a Nepalese tourist, were killed.

Camera traced to Chinese distributor

According to the court order accessed by OpIndia, a GoPro Hero 12 Black camera was identified as a “crucial electronic device” in the investigation. The court recorded, “One such crucial electronic device is a GoPro Hero 12 Black Camera, bearing serial No. C3501325471706, which is relevant for establishing pre-attack reconnaissance, movement and operational preparation of terrorist module involved in Pahalgam attack.”

The NIA had issued a notice under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita to the Netherlands-based manufacturer, GoPro BV, seeking details regarding the supply chain and activation of the device. In its official response, the manufacturer informed investigators that, “The said camera was supplied to AE Group International Limited, a distributor based in the People’s Republic of China; and the camera was activated on 30.01.2024 at Dongguan, People’s Republic of China.”

Souce: Jammu Sessions Court

No end-user data with manufacturer

However, GoPro BV told the agency that it did not hold downstream transaction or end-user details of the device. The order noted, “The manufacturer has further stated that it does not possess downstream transaction details or end-user records of the said device.”

It further added that the “activation, initial use and commercial trail of the said device lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, and the information necessary to trace the purchaser, end-user and associated technical records can only be obtained through judicial assistance of the Chinese authorities.”

Notably, India and China are not signatories to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The court observed that recourse was being taken to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which both countries have ratified. Furthermore, the Ministry of Home Affairs has given its concurrence for issuance of the Letter Rogatory in the case.

Court allows Letter Rogatory

Allowing the application under Section 112 of the BNSS, Special Judge Prem Sagar held that the information sought was critical to the case. The court observed, “Since the information sought for is very important so far establishing the chain of custody, user, attribution and evidentiary linkage of seized device i.e. camera, GoPro BV, which was supplied to AE Group International Limited, a distributor based in the People’s Republic of China.”

Source: Jammu Sessions Court

The judge ordered that the Letter Rogatory be issued to the competent Chinese judicial authority “for seeking assistance and tracing the purchaser, end user and associated technical records to unearth the larger conspiracy”.

The investigating officer has been directed to upload a soft copy of the Letter Rogatory, along with Chinese translations, to the MLAT portal, and to send three physical sets, one original and two copies, to the International Police Cooperation Unit of the Central Bureau of Investigation for onward transmission through diplomatic channels.

What is a Letter Rogatory in simple terms

A Letter Rogatory is basically a formal request sent by an Indian court to a court or authority in another country asking for help in a criminal investigation. It is used when important evidence is located outside India. For example, if a device was activated abroad or a company is based in another country, Indian investigators cannot simply demand that information. They must ask through a legal process.

Under Section 112 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), the investigating officer first approaches an Indian court. If the court is satisfied, it issues a formal letter to the foreign country. That country can then question people, collect documents, or gather technical data and send it back officially. The request is sent through the Central Government and diplomatic channels.

If there is no treaty between the two countries, the process still works, but it is slower. The foreign country is not automatically bound to help. It decides under its own laws whether to cooperate. In simple terms, it is a legal way of asking another country, through courts and governments, to share evidence needed in a criminal case.

Background to the attack

On 22nd April 2025, Pakistan-backed terrorists attacked tourists at Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam. They killed 26 innocent Hindus after confirming their religious identity. The terrorist attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink of a wider conflict. In response, India launched Operation Sindoor in early May and targeted terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan retaliated, but its missile and drone attack was neutralised. India further retaliated and attacked military infrastructure deep inside Pakistan. On 10th May, a ceasefire was announced. In July 2025, the government informed Parliament that the three terrorists involved in the attack had been eliminated in an encounter in the Dachigam forest area.

The latest development shows that investigators are now seeking to establish the full chain of custody and international trail of the camera allegedly used to carry out reconnaissance before the terrorist attack. It is being seen as part of efforts to uncover what the court described as the “larger conspiracy” behind the attack in its order.

Leftist-secular group stages demonstration in Ahmedabad on Gujarat riots anniversary: When will they start talking about the 59 Hindus who died in Godhra?

મેઘલસિંહ પરમાર
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Leftist-secular group stages demonstration in Ahmedabad on Gujarat riots anniversary: When will they start talking about the 59 Hindus who died in Godhra?

Even as it has been established that Muslim mobs set two coaches of the Sabarmati Express on fire in a premeditated plot to burn 59 Hindu karsevaks alive on 27th February 2002, even after 24 years of the horrific crime, some people continue to peddle conspiracy theories about it. Some time back,  former Chief Minister of Gujarat, Shankarsinh Vaghela, whose political relevance has faded, gave a similar statement. The pro-Muslim conspiracy theorists who claim that hundreds of Muslims were massacred in the riots that broke out across Gujarat after the Godhra train burning and that all this happened under Modi’s rule, do not say what happened in Godhra before these riots (in which both Hindus and Muslims died) took place? (In which only Hindus were killed, as part of a premeditated conspiracy.)

For many years, there have been clever attempts to erase the anti-Hindu Godhra incident and shift focus only on the riots and to blame the Hindus of Gujarat and the then Modi government for it. In this, the so-called secularists from Gujarat and outside Gujarat, along with some of their NGOs and organisations, have played a major role.

One group is the ‘Movement for Secular Democracy’. The ‘Secular Democracy Movement’ activists gather in Ahmedabad every year on 28th February and wave banners of ‘Justice’, ‘Peace’, ‘Ekhlas’ and ‘Communal Unity’. They keep talking about establishing ‘communal unity’ in Gujarat and maintaining ‘communal harmony’. They take pictures and go home. This year too, a group of these people gathered on 28th February.

Here, the date is important. February 28th is the day when the riots in Gujarat started. But what happened the day before is not discussed. The day before, on the 27th, two train coaches were set on fire at the Godhra railway station, and 59 Hindus, including 27 women and 10 children, were burnt alive. This was an ‘unprovoked attack’. What happened next was a reaction to this heinous incident.

These pretentious secular democrats mention the ‘Godhra massacre’ in their social media posts, but they hold these demonstrations on the 28th. Even on that day, they don’t bother to remember those 59 innocent karsevaks, to light a candle for them. Because if they do that, they will have to discuss the Godhra incident as well.

If we really want ‘justice’ here, we should ask for it for the 59 Hindus, whose only crime was that they went to the temple of their God for Karseva. Who were burned alive by Islamists dur to their hatred for Hindus. Those 59 innocent people were killed for being Hindus and devotees of Lord Ram. They were punished for their devotion to Ram. Let alone asking for justice for them, either their names and plight is suppressed, or somehow those Hindus are villainised by the secular-liberal coterie. Is this ‘secularism’?

If lectures on ‘community unity’ are to be given here, they should be given to the radical Muslims of Godhra and others like them, who could not tolerate the existence of Hindu Karsevaks. The ‘bhaichara’ sermons should be given to those who still have this mentality like the Muslims of Godhra, and even today they go to a Hindu tailor’s shop and cut his ‘head and body’ just because he supported a woman’s freedom of expression.

If these mobs, thirsty for the blood of Hindus, learn all this, then ‘peace’ will come automatically. The secular mentality of always portraying Muslim perpetrators as victims by putting the responsibility of maintaining ‘peace’, ‘fraternity’ and ‘communal harmony’ on the shoulders of Hindus is very old, and that is why this secular-liberal group in Gujarat and outside, whenever they talk about ‘Gujarat Riots’, they start the discussion from the 28th. The horror of 27th February was not mentioned, where the roots of the incident that happened later in reaction were. A gang is sitting ready to formulate some conspiracy theories from above, so that the discussion can be diverted elsewhere, and the blame is not placed on Muslims.

In fact, the ecosystem has this habit that they never talk about the action, hold back the reaction and portray the Hindu community as guilty. Those who created a stir over Nupur Sharma’s comments, those who raised slogans of ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’ in many cities of the country, and those who killed Nupur’s supporters never mention what was said about Lord Shiva in the same debate, before the same comments. Whatever the incident, they always find some Hindu to blame and some Muslim to portray the victim.

Such demonstrations and demonstrations may seem small and worthless, but in the long run, their results may be opposite. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss it. It is also necessary to remind them of the incident of February 27th, 2002, frequently. Some dates in history should not be forgotten; this is one such date.

The idea of ‘unbreakable friendship’ between India and Iran is more myth than reality: Read how geopolitical reality marks the relationship between the two nations

Divyansh Tiwari
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The idea of ‘unbreakable friendship’ between India and Iran is more myth than reality: Read how geopolitical reality marks the relationship between the two nations

Few ties are as cherished in the fabric of international relations as the one between Iran and India. Ancient civilisations linked by shared languages, poetry, and trade routes generate feelings of timeless brotherhood. The Mughal architecture, food, and even lexicon of India are influenced by Persian. Terms like ‘dost’ (friend) are used in both languages.

However, this story frequently obscures a more nuanced reality that is characterised by strategic hedging, geopolitical differences, and shared mistrust. India and Iran are far from being staunch allies; their relationship is tense, particularly since Iran became a theocratic state in 1979 as a result of the Islamic Revolution.

Based on historical examples, voting trends in international forums, and current hotspots like the Chabahar port project, the idea of unbreakable friendship is more myth than reality.

Ancient ties meet modern rifts

From the Indo Aryan migrations around 2000 BCE to the spread of Persian literature in colonial India, India and Iran have a long history together. The linguistic foundations of Sanskrit and Persian are similar, and historical interactions have ranged from Zoroastrian exiles seeking asylum in India to joint anti-colonial campaigns against the British Empire.

The 1950 Treaty of Friendship established perpetual peace after independence, but Cold War tensions strained relations. Under the Shah, Iran’s pro-Western posture clashed with India’s non-aligned but Soviet leaning stance.

Relations were momentarily improved by the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and established the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini. India saw it as a setback to imperialism, and relations briefly improved. But Iran’s shift toward pan-Islamism and its backing of Pakistan in the Indo-Pak disputes soon deteriorated the situation.

India’s close ties to Iraq, a Soviet ally at the time, further strained relations with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Iran denounced India’s 1990 response to the Kashmir riots as ‘unjustified’ and even cancelled an invitation to India’s foreign minister. These incidents demonstrate how theocracy sparked ideological conflict in a partnership that had previously been pragmatic.

Clashing votes: From Kashmir to nuclear ambitions

These divisions have been exacerbated in international forums, where voting trends indicate divergent agendas. In the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Iran has continuously supported resolutions denouncing India’s purported breaches of human rights in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, has denounced Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA, voting against Tehran for non-compliance in 2005 and referring it to the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2009.

Iranian authorities condemned this as ‘backstabbing,’ particularly in light of Iran’s 1994 objection to an OIC resolution on Kashmir that exempted India from sanctions. Recent human rights divergences underscore India’s hedging. In January 2026, India voted against a UNHRC resolution criticising Iran’s protest crackdowns, emphasising stability, but abstained from a 2024 IAEA censure of its nuclear operations.

The Ayatollah’s anti-Hindu barbs

The personal and ideological imprint of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose speech has frequently swung into explicit criticism of India’s Hindu majority framework, is at the heart of Iran’s post revolution differences. Through the prism of Islamic solidarity, Khamenei’s remarks have depicted India as a place where Muslims are persecuted, repeating clichés that pit ‘extremist Hindus’ against the faithful. This anti Hindu attitude, which is nuanced in diplomacy but abrasive in public statements, has frequently caused tensions in bilateral relations and exposed the theocratic state’s preference for pan-Islamic narratives above practical alliances.

A stark example occurred in March 2020, during the Delhi riots, when Khamenei tweeted, ‘The hearts of Muslims all over the world are grieving over the massacre of Muslims in India. The govt of India should confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam.’ The hashtag #IndianMuslimsInDanger magnified the message, prompting swift Indian condemnation as inflammatory meddling. Similarly, in August 2019, when Article 370 was revoked in Kashmir, Khamenei encouraged India to ‘adopt a just policy towards the noble people of Kashmir and prevent the oppression & bullying of Muslims,’ while using good relations as a diplomatic fig leaf.

The trend accelerated in September 2024 when Khamenei declared, ‘We cannot consider ourselves to be Muslims if we are oblivious to the suffering that a Muslim is enduring in #Myanmar, #Gaza, #India, or any other place,’ adding that India was among the countries where Muslims face suffering. India’s Ministry of External Affairs responded, calling the remarks misinformed and unacceptable, and urging Tehran to look at their own record on minorities. In 2010, during his Haj speech, Khamenei asked for global support for Kashmiri Muslims, comparing their predicament to that of other oppressed populations.

These initiatives, which frequently coincide with domestic Indian flashpoints, highlight a deeper ideological divide. Khamenei’s theocratic worldview, which is based on exporting the Islamic Revolution, sees India’s democracy as a fight between Hindu extremism and Muslim suffering. While India has responded gently, summoning envoys and delivering rebukes, such rhetoric has fueled Iranian perceptions of India as an antagonistic state, straining efforts to maintain even normal cooperation. It further reinforces the myth of friendship by disregarding how Iran’s leadership intentionally undermines India’s internal narrative on pluralism.

Chabahar: A port of promises and pitfalls

The Chabahar port is both a beacon of potential synergy and a source of friction, perpetuating myths of genuine friendship. The 2016 trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan saw India promise $500 million for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, which was intended to serve as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia by avoiding Pakistan. A 10 year pact signed in 2024 pledged an additional $370 million, demonstrating strategic alignment. However, US sanctions have consistently hindered development. India postponed investing for fear of sanctions, causing Iran to threaten Chinese engagement. India was forced to shut down its operations and pay $120 million without full returns after Trump rescinded the sanctions relief in September 2025.

Broader stains

Although unsubstantiated, Iran’s claims that Indian tech firms supported Mossad during the Israel-Iran clashes in 2025 add espionage drama and erode trust. Iran’s criticism of India’s Islamophobia through the CAA and Kashmir policies is one example of a broader tendency. Once a lifeline, the oil trade crumbled after India was forced to stop importing due to U.S. sanctions in 2019, moving to Saudi Arabia and Iraq instead. The U.S.-Israel strikes in February 2026 caused a 20% increase in oil prices, endangering the safety of India’s diaspora and its import dependent economy. India’s energy concerns are heightened by Iran’s threats to attack tankers or block the Strait of Hormuz.

A partnership, not a friendship

India’s strategy exemplifies pragmatic neutrality by maintaining connections with Iran for oil and connectivity while strengthening ties with Israel and the United States for defense and technology. Although it avoids Shia Sunni divisions and U.S.-Iran conflicts, this dehyphenation, treating relations independently, increases Iranian discontent over alleged Western biases. Misconceptions arise from overemphasizing cultural ties while neglecting post revolutionary changes: India’s secularism clashes with Iran’s Islamic solidarity, which frequently unites with Pakistan. New Delhi treads gingerly, putting independence first in a multipolar world as tensions in West Asia rise, potentially leading to oil shocks and economic disruptions.

The story of India and Iran is not one of unshakable friendship but rather one of strategic interaction. Historical links serve as a basis, but geopolitical realities such as nuclear aspirations, positions on Kashmir, and outside influences cause enduring divisions. New Delhi needs to exercise caution as West Asian tensions rise, and there is a chance of oil shocks and trade disruptions for India. The truth is more nuanced: two nations split by strategy and bonded by history. The fiction of perpetual brotherhood serves narrative purposes. That is frequently the cost of independence in a multipolar world.

When Communists in Iran were jailed and executed by the Islamic regime, as soon as Ruhollah Khomeini came to power after the 1979 revolution

Jinit Jain
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When Communists in Iran were jailed and executed by the Islamic regime, as soon as Ruhollah Khomeini came to power after the 1979 revolution

The Middle East today stands on the edge of another historic rupture. With the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in US-Israel strikes and Tehran launching retaliatory attacks across the region, the Islamic Republic appears to be entering one of the most uncertain moments in its four-decade history. Iranian missiles targeting American bases and urban centres like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha are a reminder that the geopolitical aftershocks of this event could reshape the region for years.

Yet to understand the present crisis in Iran, one must revisit a profound historical irony. The theocratic regime that came to power in Tehran in 1979, one that would eventually become the standard-bearer of militant Islamist politics, was not merely the product of religious mobilisation. It was also aided, legitimised, and politically enabled by an unlikely alliance: Leftists, Marxists, and secular revolutionaries who believed the Islamic clergy represented a revolutionary anti-imperialist force.

This alliance, built on ideological delusion and tactical opportunism, proved fatal. Within a few years of the revolution, the very Leftists who had supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini found themselves imprisoned, tortured, and executed by the Islamic regime they helped create.

The story of this betrayal is one of the most striking examples of political self-destruction in modern history.

The Revolution that united strange allies

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not a purely Islamist uprising. In fact, it was a broad coalition of forces united by one objective: overthrowing the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah’s regime had ruled Iran with an iron hand, backed by Western powers, particularly the United States. Opposition to him came from many directions, religious clerics, liberal nationalists, student movements, trade unions, and Marxist organisations.

Communist groups like the Tudeh Party, leftist guerrilla organisations, secular intellectuals, and Islamist revolutionaries all found themselves fighting the same enemy. According to contemporary accounts, the revolution was driven by “a wide range of class and social forces, united on a program of democracy and anti-imperialism.”

For many Leftists, Khomeini appeared to be an anti-imperialist leader capable of mobilising the masses against Western influence. The Islamic clergy, in turn, used the revolutionary fervour generated by workers, students, and intellectuals to overthrow the monarchy.

Source: AP

It was a tactical partnership born of convenience. But history would soon show that it was also a catastrophic miscalculation.

The Left’s ideological blindness

To understand why so many Marxists and secular revolutionaries supported Khomeini, one must examine the ideological climate of the 1970s.

Across much of the world, particularly in the developing world, anti-Western sentiment was the dominant political narrative. Any movement opposing a regime perceived as aligned with the United States was automatically viewed as progressive.

In Iran, the Shah was widely seen as a Western puppet. His government had come to power with the help of the CIA-backed coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.

This historical memory deeply shaped Iranian political discourse. For many Leftists, the primary contradiction was not between secularism and religious authority but between imperialism and national sovereignty.

Khomeini understood this sentiment well. During his exile in Paris, he carefully crafted rhetoric that appealed to secular revolutionaries, promising democracy, freedom, and independence.

He even suggested that the future government would not be dominated by clerics.

Many believed him.

The moment the revolution changed

When the Shah fled Iran in January 1979, celebrations erupted across the country. Millions poured into the streets as Khomeini returned from exile.

For a brief moment, it appeared that Iran might embark on a democratic transformation. But within months, the direction of the revolution began to shift dramatically.

The Islamic clergy rapidly consolidated power. Revolutionary courts were established. Secular institutions were dismantled. The new regime began enforcing Islamic laws across society.

Universities were closed. Independent political organisations were banned. Women were pressured into adopting Islamic dress codes.What had begun as a multi-ideological revolution was becoming a theocratic state.

The purge of the revolution’s allies

The real turning point came in 1981. As opposition to clerical rule grew, the Islamic Republic launched a massive crackdown on dissent. Revolutionary courts conducted rapid trials and issued death sentences with alarming speed.

Between June 1981 and March 1982, thousands of political opponents were executed across Iran. The victims included communists, socialists, liberals, nationalists, monarchists, and members of religious minorities.

Ironically, many of them were the same revolutionaries who had helped overthrow the Shah.

The massacre became one of the largest waves of political executions in modern Iranian history. Estimates suggest that thousands of dissidents were killed in a matter of months.

These executions were not merely acts of repression; they were foundational acts of state formation.The new regime used violence to eliminate alternative centres of political power.

The role of revolutionary courts

Central to this purge were the Islamic Revolutionary Courts.These courts operated without due process. Defendants were often denied lawyers, trials lasted minutes, and verdicts were predetermined.

Judges used vague religious charges such as “waging war against God” (moharebeh) or “spreading corruption on Earth” (ifsad-fi-alarz) to justify executions.

These concepts were later codified into Iran’s legal system, forming the basis of the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 1982.

When revolution devours its children

The irony of the Iranian Revolution is that the Left helped create the conditions for its own destruction.

Communist groups that had once celebrated the overthrow of the Shah soon found themselves banned and persecuted.

The Tudeh Party, which had supported the Islamic Republic in its early years, was eventually outlawed. Thousands of its members were arrested, tortured, or executed. The revolution had devoured its children.

This pattern is not unique in history. Many revolutions eventually turn on their early supporters. But the Iranian case stands out because the ideological divide between the allies was so stark.

Marxists who believed religion was an instrument of oppression had allied themselves with a clerical movement seeking to establish religious rule. The contradiction was bound to explode.

The cost paid by Iran’s youth

One of the most disturbing aspects of the 1981 purge was the age of many victims.

A significant percentage of those executed were between eleven and twenty-four years old. Some were teenagers or high-school students accused of sympathising with opposition groups. Some were executed after brief interrogations and forced confessions.

Mass graves were created across the country to bury the victims, and many families were never informed about the fate of their relatives. Even today, the Iranian state continues to conceal the full scale of these killings.

The silence of the global Left

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this story is how little attention it received internationally.

While human rights organisations documented the atrocities, large sections of the global Left remained reluctant to criticise the Iranian regime.

The reason was ideological.

The Islamic Republic positioned itself as a force resisting Western dominance in the Middle East. For many activists in Europe and America, that narrative overshadowed the regime’s internal repression.

Thus, the massacre of thousands of Leftists by an Islamist regime received far less attention than similar atrocities elsewhere.

The long shadow of the revolution

The political system that emerged from this violence has defined Iran for more than four decades. The doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist, placed ultimate authority in the hands of a Supreme Leader.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini in 1989, ruled Iran for nearly four decades. His tenure saw repeated domestic uprisings and confrontations with the West.

According to reports following the recent US-Israel strikes, Khamenei’s death could push Iran into a new phase of instability. But, regardless of what happens next, the foundations of the current Iranian state were laid during those early years of revolutionary violence.

Lessons from a tragic alliance

The Iranian Revolution offers a powerful lesson about political alliances built on short-term calculations. Many Leftists believed they could cooperate with religious revolutionaries to defeat a common enemy and then shape the future state.

Instead, they became the first victims of the new order. The Islamic Republic consolidated power by eliminating them. History has repeatedly shown that ideological movements driven by absolutist doctrines rarely tolerate pluralism once they seize power.

Yet the Iranian case stands out because the warning signs were visible from the beginning.

The irony of revolutionary politics

Today, as Iran faces another historic moment following the death of its Supreme Leader, the legacy of the 1979 revolution still looms large.

The clerical regime that emerged from that upheaval was not an inevitable outcome of Iranian history. It was the product of political alliances, ideological miscalculations, and brutal consolidation of power. Among the most tragic elements of that story is the role played by Leftists and Communists who believed they were participating in a progressive revolution.

Instead, they helped usher in one of the most enduring theocracies of the modern world. And when the revolution was over, they were the first to be eliminated.

History, as always, has a cruel sense of irony.

With Jagmeet out of the coalition, Canadian govt goes into buttering up India mode: Read how Carney is trying to salvage a ruined bilateral relationship

Shraddha Pandey
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With Jagmeet out of the coalition, Canadian govt goes into buttering up India mode: Read how Carney is trying to salvage a ruined bilateral relationship

Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada appears to be more eager than ever to salvage ties with India, undoing the profound damage his predecessor, Justin Trudeau, inflicted through years of diplomatic blunders motivated by domestic Khalistani appeasement politics. With a change in leadership, there has been an evident shift in the Canadian approach towards India.  On his maiden bilateral visit to India, PM Carney met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and proclaimed that India and Canada are entering “a new era of partnership.”

During the India–Canada CEOs Forum in Mumbai on Monday, PM Modi announced that India and Canada have entered a long-term nuclear deal.

Marking a significant and pragmatic departure from Trudeau-era distrust and diplomatic bitterness, Canada and India are now strengthening cooperation in various sectors, particularly space, technology, energy, and critical minerals. PM Carney’s India visit is centrally aimed at expediting a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India. This agreement would be aimed at doubling two-way trade, increasing trade to $50bn by 2030.

Change in leadership, change in rhetoric? Canadian PM acknowledges that “natural partner” India is not a “middle power”

The Canadian Prime Minister’s recent speeches and statements during his four-day visit reflect a pivot in Ottawa’s foreign policy from levelling preposterous allegations of transnational repression to buttering up the economic giant that is India. In an interview with News18 on 1st March, PM Carney acknowledged that India is “not a middle power” but a nation on an entirely different trajectory of global influence and economic dynamism.

When asked if ‘middle powers’ like India and Canada are resetting ties, PM Carney said that while he is content with Canada being called a middle power, India cannot be called that. Earlier, PM Carney had hailed India as a “natural partner”.

“Not to be too picky about the rhetoric, but I wouldn’t call India a ‘middle power’. I’m happy for Canada to be called a middle power. But India’s trajectory and ambition is totally different,” the Canadian PM said.

Reappointment of High Commissioners, appointment of liaison officers, changing rhetoric about India’s so-called ‘transnational repression on Canadian soil’ to more: Carney government’s consistent steps salvage a ruined India-Canada bilateral relationship

Clearly, Canada has learned the hard way that India is not the country it would want to antagonise for domestic appeasement politics. Carney’s rhetoric and actions indicate that Canada is now prioritising unlocking the full potential of India-Canada relations, especially at a time when Ottawa is seeking to diversify away from an unpredictable United States under renewed tariff pressures and constant ‘51st state’ mockery by President Donald Trump.

After assuming office in 2025, Carney has made gradual but consistent efforts to salvage the India-Canada bilateral relations that had been left in tatters since the 2023 diplomatic rupture over the killing of Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. India had strongly rejected the allegations, but the fallout led to the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats, a suspension of trade talks, and eventually the withdrawal of high commissioners.

However, in August 2025, India and Canada announced the appointment of new high commissioners to each other’s capitals. Since Canada initiated hostilities at the government and diplomatic level, it was for Canada only to take the first step towards mending ties with India. With Trudeau out and Carney in, the new Canadian Prime Minister did not waste time and invited PM Modi to the G-7 Summit.

PM Modi decided not to carry forward any grudges and attended the summit. The shift in India-Canada relations began take shape from hereon, with both countries agreeing to reappoint high commissioners.

In February this year, India and Canada agreed that each country would establish dedicated security and law-enforcement liaison officers on each other’s soil. The decision was announced following high-level talks during the visit of India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval to Ottawa on February 6–7, 2026. Doval held meetings with Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor and Deputy Clerk to the Privy Council, Nathalie G. Drouin, as well as Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree.

According to official statements from both governments, the two sides agreed to a shared workplan to guide cooperation on national security and law enforcement. A central element of this plan is the mutual posting of liaison officers. “During the meeting, it was agreed that each country would establish security and law-enforcement liaison officers and that their respective agencies would build on working relationships,” the statement said.

These officers would work as dedicated points of contact, facilitating faster and more direct coordination between Indian and Canadian security agencies on counter-terrorism, organised crime, and other transnational threats.

Before the first bilateral visit by a Canadian Prime Minister to India since 2018, the Carney government officially stated that India is no longer involved in violence, extortion, or transnational repression on Canadian soil.

Ottawa said that it is confident that India is no longer linked to violent crimes in Canada and points to renewed security dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. Despite Trudeau himself admitting that there was no evidentiary proof of India’s involvement in Nijjar’s killing, the Canadian government’s recent “India no longer linked to violent crimes in Canada” statement indicated a pragmatic recognition that managing security concerns and rebuilding diplomatic and economic ties do not have to be mutually exclusive. It would have been understandably embarrassing for Canada to hand an outright vindication to the Indian side, given that there has only been a change in Prime Minister and not the elected liberal government.

These steps taken by Canada have indicated a significant de-escalation that clears the air for deeper cooperation in critical sectors, including nuclear energy. Canada’s shift in approach and the flattery have yielded results, as on 2nd March, India and Canada signed a $1.9 billion Uranium deal.

The Canadian Liberal government’s shift in tone is still facing pushback from anti-India Liberal MPs and Khalistani extremists. However, the political reconfiguration following the 2025 federal election has played a key role in the gradual but mutually beneficial India-Canada relations reset.

Khalistani Jagmeet Singh’s NDP lost 17 of their 24 seats to Liberal and Conservative candidates. Singh enjoyed immense influence in the Trudeau government and constantly peddled the Khalistani narrative. However, Singh lost his own seat in the elections last year and had to step down as NDP chief. NDP’s drubbing resulted in the political arm of the anti-India Khalistani cabal losing its outsized influence in the Trudeau minority for years as it no longer held leverage within the governing coalition.

Although the Khalistani menace cannot be destroyed within a year or two, Canada appears to understand that territorial integrity is India’s red line finally, and Ottawa’s tolerance of those who intend to violate that redline will only cause a rift with India. While the Carney government may have not taken any dramatic measures to discontinue Canada’s decades-old practice of harbouring Khalistani terrorists, in fact, it too, tolerates anti-India ‘protests’ by Khalistanis in the name of ‘free speech’, a reduced domestic pressure, offers a conducive environment to (re)build strong ties with the emerging superpower and economic powerhouse – India.

Iran may not need to physically stop every ship through St of Hormuz, insurance companies are doing it: Read how war risk premium has more control over oil tanker movements

Anurag
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Iran may not need to physically stop every ship through St of Hormuz, insurance companies are doing it: Read how war risk premium has more control over oil tanker movements

Tensions are escalating after the United States and Israel launched missile attacks on Iran and Tehran retaliated by attacking Israel and US bases across the Middle East. Amid the tensions, the Strait of Hormuz crisis is no longer just about missiles and naval manoeuvres. It is increasingly about marine insurance.

According to a Financial Times report, on 28th February, insurers informed shipowners that they would cancel policies. Furthermore, insurance companies have indicated price increases for vessels travelling through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

That means that, even without a formal blockade, insurers are effectively tightening the choke point through pricing, cancellations and war risk clauses. Not to forget, around one fifth of the world’s crude oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, along with a significant share of global LNG exports.

Yet the immediate brake on tanker traffic is not an Iranian warship physically stopping vessels. It is underwriters issuing cancellation notices and sharply raising premiums.

War risk clauses triggered before markets reopen

According to media reports, war risk insurers submitted 48 to 72 hour cancellation notices for ships operating in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz ahead of trading resuming on Monday. Firms including Skuld and NorthStandard moved swiftly after the latest strikes.

Container ships in the Strait of Hormuz as rising war risk premiums threaten global oil transit. Image: Dall-E

This means that existing cover can be withdrawn at short notice. Shipowners must then renegotiate protection at significantly higher rates or risk sailing uninsured through what underwriters are increasingly treating as a war zone.

Cargo war risk insurers, covering oil, grain and other commodities on board tankers, are also preparing to cancel and reprice policies.

Premiums rising to unviable levels

Until recently, insurance costs for vessels transiting the Gulf were about 0.25 per cent of a ship’s replacement value. For a 100 million dollar vessel, that meant roughly 250,000 dollars per voyage.

Brokers now estimate that premiums could rise by as much as 50 per cent in the near term, pushing the figure to 375,000 dollars per voyage, barring any direct attack on merchant shipping.

For ships calling at Israeli ports, where rates had hovered around 0.1 per cent, similar hikes are expected.

When war risk premiums climb rapidly, they can outpace freight margins. In extreme cases, the cost of insuring a voyage can approach or even exceed the profit on the cargo itself, rendering the trade commercially unviable.

A similar pattern has already played out in the Red Sea. After repeated attacks and threats by Yemen’s Houthi rebels near the Bab al Mandeb strait, war risk insurers sharply increased premiums for vessels transiting the area. In many cases, underwriters either imposed steep additional charges or required short notice approvals for each voyage. As a result, several major shipping lines chose to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope instead of crossing the Red Sea, adding weeks to transit times and significantly raising fuel and freight costs.

The leverage of fear over firepower

Iran may not possess the physical capacity to intercept and stop every tanker in the narrow waterway. However, if the threat environment is perceived as sufficiently severe, insurers will price that fear into their policies.

Underwriters are factoring in risks such as vessel boarding, seizure by Iranian forces or proxies, and the possibility of disruption orders. Some ships reportedly received radio warnings attributed to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard suggesting the strait was closed.

Even without an actual closure, such signals amplify perceived risk. Once insurers withdraw cover or multiply war risk premiums, shipowners face a stark choice. Either absorb sharply higher costs or reroute and delay cargoes.

On Saturday, at least three vessels reportedly turned away from the strait while owners reassessed the risk.

When insurance becomes the blockade

War risks are typically excluded from standard hull and protection and indemnity policies. Owners must purchase separate war risk and strikes cover. These policies often include rapid cancellation clauses of 48 or 72 hours.

If major markets, including those in London, which account for a substantial share of global marine war risk underwriting, tighten capacity or demand steep additional premiums, the effect can resemble a financial blockade.

In such a scenario, oil flows do not halt because every ship is physically stopped. They slow because the economics no longer work.

The Strait of Hormuz, therefore, is not only a military flashpoint. It is also an insurance flashpoint. And at this moment, the war risk premium may have more immediate control over tanker movements than any navy in the Gulf.

Who was Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, who was killed in the recent US-Israeli strikes

Aditi
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Who was Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, who was killed in the recent US-Israeli strikes

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei has been killed in the coordinated US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which started on February 28, 2026. The death of Khamenei was confirmed by several Iranian media outlets on March 1, 2026.

However, before the confirmation by the Iranian media, US President Donald Trump posted a lengthy message on Truth Social around 3:07 am on Friday (local time), celebrating Khamenei’s death. Describing Khamenei as the “most evil person in History”, Trump hailed his death as a mark of justice to the people of Iran, the “Great Americans”, and all those who suffered during Khamenei’s rule.

Source: Truth Social

The nearly four-decade-long rule of the 86-year-old Khamenei in Iran has been marred by numerous controversies. However, his decision to continue Iran’s nuclear programme, despite America’s clear warning, has been a major highlight of his political tenure. Since last year, his regime has been facing widespread protests from the Iranian people, who were opposed to his suppressive policies. This hostility at home, clubbed with America’s displeasure over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and Israel’s long-standing resentment, provided a conducive environment for the present US-Israel coordinated action against the Khamenei regime.

The fresh US-Israeli strikes on Iran followed the brutal crackdown by the Iranian regime on widespread anti-government protests, which began in December last year. The protests had erupted due to the economic instability in the country and spread to all 31 provinces of Iran. Khamenei’s brutal approach towards protestors provided legitimacy to the US intervention in the country.

With Khamenei’s death, the existing economic and political instability in Iran is expected to exacerbate. His son, Mojtaba Khamenei, is expected to succeed him, as former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who was considered his heir-apparent, died in a helicopter crash in 2024.

Who was Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei ?

Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei was born on April 19, 1939, in Mashhad, Iran. He studied Islamic theology and was deeply influenced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while being taught by him in Qom. Khamenei was actively involved in opposing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, who had him arrested six times before sending him into exile for three years.

During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which uprooted the monarchy, Khamenei became a close ally of Khomeini and eventually succeeded him as the Iranian Supreme Leader in 1989. Before that, he served as the President of Iran from 1981 to 1989 and led the country through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). An assassination attempt on him in 1981 left his right hand paralysed. During his tenure, Khamenei faced nationwide protests in 2009, 2019 and 2022.

Khamenei strengthened the ‘Axis of Resistance’, Iran’s network of allies in the Middle East. He supported terrorist organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and various other groups in Iraq and Syria. With these allies, Iran was able to create a forward defence against the US and Israel.

Khamenei’s support for Ummah and false accusations against India

Even though Iran adopted a balanced approach towards India under Khamenei’s rule, he repeatedly criticised India for alleged targeting of Muslims in India. In September 2024, he claimed that Muslims in India were enduring suffering. “The enemies of Islam have always tried to make us indifferent with regard to our shared identity as an Islamic Ummah. We cannot consider ourselves to be Muslims if we are oblivious to the suffering that a Muslim is enduring in Myanmar, Gaza, India or any other place,” Khamenei wrote on X on September 16, 2024.

This was not the only time he accused India of allowing the alleged persecution of Muslims. On many earlier occasions, he tried to tarnish India’s global image by making baseless claims of Muslims being “massacred” by “extremist Hindus”. He threatened that India would be isolated from the Islamic world if the Indian government did not stop targeting Indian Muslims. “The hearts of Muslims all over the world are grieving over the massacre of Muslims in India. The govt of India should confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam,” he wrote on X on March 5, 2020.

Khamenei made remarks about India’s internal matters, like the Kashmir issue, in the name of the Ummah. In August 2019, he accused the Indian government of being unjust towards Indian Muslims. “We’re concerned about Muslims’ situation in Kashmir. We have good relations with India, but we expect the Indian government to adopt a just policy towards the noble people of Kashmir and prevent the oppression & bullying of Muslims in this region,” he posted on X on August 21, 2019.

Shia Muslims in India protest against Khamenei’s killing

Khamenei was not only the Supreme Leader of Iran, but he was also revered by Shia leaders of Shia Muslims across the world. Despite his open criticism of India, Khamenei was a popular figure among the Indian Shia Muslims. As a result, the impact of Khamenei’s death is also being felt in India, as large numbers of Shia Muslims staged protests against his killing across various states in the country. Shia Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir organised protests at Lal Chowk, condemning his killing.

Several Shia women came out on the streets crying and mourning Khamenei’s death. The protesters described him as “a lion” and said many more like Khamenei will be born.

Similar protests have erupted in different parts of the country, including Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh, and J&K.

Dear Congress and AIMIM, PM Modi’s Israel visit was for India–Israel relations, Iran–US conflict is not India’s business

Anurag
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0
Dear Congress and AIMIM, PM Modi’s Israel visit was for India–Israel relations, Iran–US conflict is not India’s business

West Asia is once again on the boil. Israel and the United States launched an attack on Iran on 28th February (local time), codenamed Operation ‘Operation Shield of Judah’.

Following the missile attack, Iran retaliated and launched missiles towards Israel. It also hit several locations at US military bases in several countries including Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and others.

While the situation needs a serious diplomatic point of view from India’s perspective, opposition leaders in India have chosen to turn a complex geopolitical conflict into a domestic political weapon. Leaders from the Samajwadi Party, AIMIM and Congress lined up to insinuate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel was either ill-timed, morally suspect or strategically complicit. The insinuation is not just misplaced, but it reflects a troubling, and possibly deliberate, misunderstanding of India’s foreign policy priorities.

India–Israel relations are about India’s national interest. The Iran–US confrontation is not India’s business to adjudicate, which opposition leaders seem to have failed to comprehend.

What Akhilesh Yadav said, and why it misses the point

Samajwadi Party leader Akhilesh Yadav was in Kannauj when the strikes began. Speaking to the media, he invoked the External Affairs Minister’s phrase “this is the new normal” to argue that wars will continue and societies will function, but that socialists have always been against war. He reiterated that war never brings good and that countries fight to humiliate each other.

While there is nothing controversial in saying that war is harmful, foreign policy is not built on moral abstractions alone. India does not control whether Israel and Iran fight. Nor can New Delhi impose peace in West Asia. The real question here is, should India freeze its diplomatic engagement with a key strategic partner every time that partner faces conflict?

Notably, Israel is among India’s most critical defence partners. From missile systems and UAV technology to intelligence cooperation and agricultural innovations, India’s security architecture has deep Israeli inputs. The relationship predates this government but has been elevated to a strategic partnership under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Furthermore, Israel has stood strong whenever India has faced conflict with hostile neighbours like Pakistan, something India cannot ignore while dictating its diplomatic stand.

To reduce a high-level bilateral visit to an endorsement of war is to ignore decades of growing cooperation rooted in India’s own defence needs.

Owaisi’s charge of ‘betrayal’

In Hyderabad, AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi suggested that if Israel did not inform India about the strike, it deceived India. If it did inform India, then the Prime Minister should have cut short his visit. He further claimed that Israel used PM Modi’s visit to send a message that India stands with Israel against Iran.

This line of argument assumes that India is either a co-conspirator or a helpless pawn. Both assumptions are flawed.

First, sovereign nations do not routinely share operational military decisions with even close partners unless there is direct coordination. India is not a party to the Israel–Iran hostilities. Expecting advance briefings on tactical strikes reflects either naivety or political theatre.

Second, India’s engagement with Israel does not nullify its relations with Iran. India has invested in the Chabahar port, maintained energy ties and sustained diplomatic engagement with Tehran for years. Strategic autonomy means engaging multiple partners without becoming an appendage of any.

Owaisi also invoked the presence of nearly ten million Indians in Gulf countries and warned of the “message” being sent. But India’s diaspora in the Gulf has thrived precisely because New Delhi maintains pragmatic relations across rival blocs. Suggesting that one visit will endanger millions is alarmist.

Jairam Ramesh and the charge of ‘moral cowardice’

Congress leader Jairam Ramesh went further, calling the visit shameful and accusing the Prime Minister of “moral cowardice” for standing with Israel. He linked the subsequent Israel–US assault on Iran to the timing of the visit, implying recklessness.

This argument conflates chronology with causation. High-level visits are planned months in advance. The Israel–Iran shadow conflict has been escalating for years. To suggest that PM Modi’s presence emboldened Israel is to exaggerate India’s influence over the strategic calculations of Washington and Tel Aviv.

More importantly, diplomacy is not a morality play. India must engage partners based on its interests. Standing with Israel on issues like counter-terrorism or defence cooperation does not mean endorsing every military action it undertakes.

Salman Khurshid and the ‘where is our voice’ question

Former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid asked whether India is complicit or simply silent, and questioned why New Delhi is not speaking up to its friends. He drew parallels with Russia–Ukraine and suggested that India lacks the courage to tell the truth.

India’s approach in recent global crises has been consistent: call for restraint, protect national interests and avoid being dragged into bloc politics. That is not silence. It is strategic calibration.

Publicly berating one side may satisfy domestic audiences, but can close doors for back-channel diplomacy. India’s foreign policy establishment understands that influence is often exercised quietly.

Neutrality versus strategic autonomy

Much has been said about India’s “80-year legacy of neutrality”. In reality, India has evolved from Cold War non-alignment to strategic autonomy. Non-alignment meant not joining military blocs. Strategic autonomy means pursuing multiple partnerships simultaneously.

India can have robust defence ties with Israel, energy and connectivity ties with Iran, civilisational ties with the Gulf monarchies and growing engagement with the United States. None of these are mutually exclusive.

The opposition’s narrative frames the Israel visit as a departure from neutrality. In truth, it reflects a mature foreign policy that prioritises India’s security and economic interests over ideological signalling.

India’s stability in a turbulent neighbourhood

It is remarkable that amid aggravated hostilities in the Middle East, the US–Iran tensions, the Gaza–Israel war, the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the massive unrest in Bangladesh and Nepal that toppled governments, India has remained a peaceful, functional democracy far removed from the immediate worries of war.

Pakistan continues to grapple with political instability. Afghanistan is under Taliban rule. Bangladesh and Nepal have seen turbulence severe enough to destabilise governments.

Yet India has not descended into chaos. Its economy continues to function. Its democratic institutions operate. Elections are held, governments change peacefully at the state level, and the armed forces remain firmly under civilian control.

That stability is not accidental. It is the outcome of deliberate policy choices, firm internal security management, and a clear articulation of national interest under the Modi government. In a world where wars erupt with little warning, preserving peace at home while navigating external fault lines is an achievement.

The bottom line

Prime Minister Modi’s Israel visit was about India–Israel relations, especially in defence and technology. It was not an endorsement of the Israel–US assault on Iran, nor was it a betrayal of neutrality.

Foreign policy cannot be reduced to partisan point scoring. India must engage major players in West Asia based on hard national interest. The Iran–US conflict, however tragic or consequential, is not India’s war to fight.

What should concern Indians more is not whether New Delhi cut short a visit, but whether India remains secure, stable and economically resilient in a volatile world. On that count, the record speaks louder than the rhetoric.

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