The Indian Institute of Management Udaipur has announced a new undergraduate management programme that introduces a flexible academic structure, allowing students to earn different qualifications depending on how long they remain enrolled. Applications for the institute’s new Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA) programme will open on 4 March 2026.
Unlike traditional undergraduate courses that require students to complete a fixed three- or four-year period, the programme is designed with multiple exit points. Students who choose to leave after the first year will receive a certificate, those completing two years will obtain a diploma, those completing three years will receive a degree, while students completing the full four-year track will graduate with an honours degree. The model allows learners to pause or exit their studies without losing academic recognition for the time already spent in the programme.
The institute says the programme is built as a digital-first offering intended to expand access to management education beyond students who can relocate to a full-time residential campus. Teaching will combine recorded lectures, live interactive tutorials, faculty masterclasses and discussion-based sessions conducted online. At the same time, examinations will be conducted in supervised centres to maintain credibility and academic standards.
Another distinctive feature of the programme is its bilingual learning framework. While the course design allows learners to begin their studies with Hindi-friendly learning support, the structure also includes English pathways so that students comfortable in either language can participate. The approach is intended to make management education more accessible to students from smaller towns and non-English-medium schooling backgrounds while still retaining professional relevance.
The modular structure of the course also reflects the realities faced by many Indian students, who often balance higher education with financial constraints, family responsibilities or employment. By allowing learners to progress through milestone credentials rather than forcing them into a single all-or-nothing degree pathway, the programme attempts to reduce the risk of students dropping out without any formal qualification.
The institute has also indicated that the programme will include scholarship support and financial aid options to improve affordability for students from different economic backgrounds. According to the institute, keeping entry costs manageable is an important part of ensuring that the programme can reach a wider section of aspiring learners.
Observers note that such flexible and digitally delivered programmes are increasingly being explored as India looks to expand access to higher education while maintaining academic rigour. If the model succeeds in attracting serious learners and maintaining employer confidence in the credential, it could encourage other institutions to experiment with similar structures in the future.
The launch of the programme, therefore, represents not just another course addition, but also a test of whether flexible, technology-enabled undergraduate education from premier institutions can scale while preserving the credibility traditionally associated with them.
On 3rd March, Congress leader Sonia Gandhi accused the Modi Government of moral abdication for not issuing an emphatic public condemnation over developments involving Iran. In an op-ed published in the Indian Express, she attempted to cast calibrated diplomacy as complicity and restraint as surrender. The argument presented by the Congress leader was designed for political effect.
Furthermore, it is also one that does not withstand even a modest examination of the Congress Party’s own record when it was in power at the Centre. India’s foreign policy has rarely been conducted through loud moral declarations. India has always shaped its foreign policy while keeping national interest, strategic balance and institutional prudence as its priorities. This principle did not begin in 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi took charge of office. It was equally visible under the United Progressive Alliance government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, with Sonia Gandhi having a strong hold on the decision-making processes.
The Libya precedent that Congress prefers to forget
In October 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed during the Libyan uprising amid a NATO backed intervention. The way Gaddafi was killed raised significant questions about sovereignty, regime change and the limits of international intervention. A sitting head of state was eliminated in the course of an externally supported conflict. If ever there was a moment to invoke the sanctity of sovereignty or to lecture the international community on moral responsibility, this was it.
But what did the Congress-led UPA government do at that time? It issued a restrained statement expressing concern about the situation in Libya and hoped for peace and stability in the country. There was no dramatic condemnation of the manner of Gaddafi’s execution. There was no invocation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which Sonia Gandhi invoked in her recent op-ed.
There was no rhetorical positioning about India’s civilisational duty to speak up. The response was measured, cautious and deliberately understated. At that time, no one claimed that India’s calibrated response amounted to complicity. No one accused the government of moral abdication.
The UPA understood that Libya was in turmoil, that NATO powers were directly involved, and that India had already adopted a cautious position in the Security Council. It chose diplomatic restraint because that served India’s interests. That approach was described as prudence and maturity.
If restraint in 2011 was prudent statecraft, why is restraint today described as moral collapse?
The 2012 Israeli diplomat car blast and the reality of calibrated statecraft
The answer to Sonia Gandhi’s question becomes clearer when the incidents and the aftermath of the attack on the Israeli diplomat in February 2012 in New Delhi are examined. On 13th February, a sticky bomb was attached to the car of the wife of an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi. The incident took place barely 200 metres away from the Prime Minister’s residence.
It cannot be seen as a distant conflict. It was a direct security breach on Indian soil, that too in the heart of the capital. The attack had immediate diplomatic implications involving Israel and potentially Iran.
Under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India responded firmly. The Ministry of External Affairs condemned the attack and later issued a statement in March 2012 about arrest warrants being issued against Iranians in the matter. However, they were never brought to India.
The External Affairs Minister assured Israel that the law of the land would take its course. Security around diplomatic missions was tightened. India gave a clear message that it would not tolerate violence on its soil.
As the investigation progressed, Delhi Police identified Iranian nationals as suspects. Israel claimed that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were behind the attack. Later, Delhi Police also asserted the same during investigation. Media reports indicated that phone records and financial transactions were being examined.
Letters rogatory were sent under Section 166A of the Criminal Procedure Code to Iran, Georgia, Malaysia, Israel and Thailand. A Delhi Police team travelled to Tehran seeking cooperation. The matter was raised through diplomatic channels. Parliament was informed of investigative progress and recoveries, including vehicles and electronic devices allegedly linked to the case.
During the investigation, Delhi Police arrested Indian journalist Syed Mohammad Ahmed Kazmi, alleging that he had facilitated contacts linked to Iranian operatives. The arrest was placed on record in Parliament. Letters rogatory were sent to Iran and other countries seeking cooperation. The government pursued the case through legal mechanisms. When the Supreme Court granted Kazmi procedural bail on statutory grounds relating to remand timelines, the UPA government filed a review petition.
However, as time passed, the kind of pressure that the Indian government under PM Singh, with Sonia Gandhi in the background, should have built, in line with what Gandhi now wants the Modi government to do, did not take shape. The UPA government did not escalate into public diplomatic confrontation with Iran at the highest political level.
While accused of similar incident in Bangkok got life imprisonment, the cases involving Kazmi in India are still ongoing. OpIndia checked the status of the cases in both Delhi High Court and in a Session Court in Delhi and found that the Delhi High Court is listed for final disposal in May 2026 and in Sessions Court, it is listed for hearing in March.
It did not issue sweeping condemnations of the Iranian state. It did not convert the investigation into a moral crusade. Instead, it pursued legal and diplomatic processes while maintaining broader strategic engagement. That was not silence. It was calibrated statecraft.
Balancing Iran, Israel and global pressures
The 2012 episode unfolded in a delicate geopolitical environment. India had longstanding energy ties with Iran and relied significantly on Iranian crude. At the same time, defence and intelligence cooperation with Israel was deepening. The United States was increasing scrutiny of countries engaging with Tehran amid sanctions linked to Iran’s nuclear programme. The Non-Aligned Movement summit was held in Tehran that year, and India participated despite Western reservations.
No one at the time suggested that attending NAM in Tehran while investigating Iranian suspects was appeasement. It was understood as strategic balancing. If we equate the Modi Government’s current stand with the UPA one, the government neither surrendered to Iran nor publicly humiliated it. It navigated a complex terrain through institutional channels. This is exactly what the PM Modi-led government is doing.
If that approach was called strategic autonomy in 2012, how does similar calibration now become abdication?
The selective outrage in the present moment
Against this backdrop, Sonia Gandhi’s present charge appears inconsistent. She suggests that failure to publicly condemn certain developments amounts to moral abdication. Yet her own party’s record shows that calibrated diplomacy has long been India’s approach in complex international crises.
When Gaddafi was killed, restraint prevailed. When Iranian suspects were named in a bombing in Delhi, investigation and diplomacy proceeded without rhetorical escalation. When geopolitical tensions were high, India preserved room for manoeuvre. The UPA did not equate silence with complicity. It equated restraint with strategic space.
Foreign policy under the Congress was guided by national interest, not by public moral theatre. It is guided by national interest now, and it is in a much better state compared to the UPA-led government before 2014.
Foreign policy is not a platform for selective memory
The core problem with the present criticism is not that it demands moral clarity. It is that it applies that demand selectively. Calibrated response is portrayed as weakness only when exercised by a political opponent. The same calibrated response, when exercised by one’s own government, is described as prudence and maturity.
India’s foreign policy tradition across governments has emphasised sovereignty, strategic autonomy and measured language. It has avoided rushing into public moral binaries in matters involving major powers. It has relied on legal mechanisms, diplomatic engagement and institutional process. That continuity can be traced from the Vajpayee years through the UPA and into the present.
Selective memory cannot become the basis of selective outrage. If restraint in 2011 was not abdication, if calibrated engagement with Iran in 2012 while investigating Iranian suspects was not surrender, then similar calibration today cannot be branded moral failure simply because the political leadership has changed.
Foreign policy is not about who speaks louder. It is about who protects India’s interests more effectively. It is about managing competing relationships without narrowing strategic options. It is about balancing values with realism.
On that metric, consistency matters far more than sermons. Sonia Gandhi’s present moral lecture does not reveal weakness in current policy. It reveals an uncomfortable continuity, the Congress-led government practised the same calibrated realism that it now seeks to criticise.
Nepal is expected to hold elections for the House of Representatives (HoR) on the 5th of March. The first national elections since youth-led protests brought down the previous government in September 2025. The Election Commission has directed Election Code of Conduct Monitoring Officers to strictly enforce the Election Code of Conduct, 2082 BS, until the end of voting.
The campaigns were ordered to end on the midnight of March 03, Tuesday, 48 hours before voting. This is followed by the silence period. During this time, political parties and candidates are not allowed to campaign, hold political rallies, or promote themselves. This is to give voters enough space to think freely and decide who to vote for.
Since the fall of the previous administration, Nepal has been governed by an interim government led by former chief justice Sushila Karki, which had promised fresh elections within six months.
It is notable here that India has been steadfast in support of free and fair elections and has been helping the interim government in Nepal with election-related assistance. In January this year, India gifted Nepal 250 SUVs and pick-up trucks to be used for elections.
#WATCH | The second tranche of election-related assistance from India, which includes more than 250 SUVs and double-cab pickups, was ceremonially handed over to the Government of Nepal today by the Charge d’affaires of the Embassy of India, Kathmandu, in the presence of the… pic.twitter.com/voBOQUemPP
Some major Political parties are contesting the election. The Communist Party of Nepal (UML), led by former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, remains a strong force. Oli resigned last September due to growing public anger over corruption and inequality. His party secured the maximum number of seats in the previous election.
Nepali Congress is another major party in the country. This party nominated its new leader, Gagan Thapa, in place of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. This party has assured to deliver good governance in the country and has proposed to conduct an inquiry into the assets of public servants since 1990.
The Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) is another party gaining strong attention. Its prominent face is 35-year-old Balendra Shah, popularly known as Balen. The former Kathmandu mayor is contesting from Jhapa 5, which has traditionally been Oli’s stronghold. Shah is seen as the RSP’s prime ministerial face and represents a younger leadership style.
The Nepali Communist Party, under the leadership of former Maoist leader Prachanda, is also in the contest and continues to hold influence.
How Gen Z is responding
Young voters, especially Gen Z, are playing a major role in this election. This is because they were part of the protests that led to the collapse of the government last year. They are now closely watching how political parties address issues like corruption, unemployment and fairness.
A significant number of young voters, particularly Gen Z, feel that the traditional leaders did not listen to them. While some are supporting new faces such as Balendra Shah, others are seeking clear plans from traditional parties. This is because there are about 800,000 new voters in this election. This is likely to affect the outcome of the elections, particularly in constituencies such as the Kathmandu Valley.
Voters and the Election process
The number of people eligible to vote in this election is almost 19 million. These voters will elect 275 members of parliament.
Nepal is using a mixed electoral system. This system was introduced in the country’s Constitution of 2015. In this system, out of a total of 275 members of parliament, 165 are elected through the First Past the Post (FPTP) system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins.
In the remaining 110, the winner is elected through the Proportional Representation (PR) system. In this system, winners are elected based on the share of votes received by parties. In this election, more than 3,400 candidates are contesting, and over 1,000 candidates are below the age of 40.
The Voting will begin at 7:00 am local time and continue until 5:00 pm on March 5, although polling booths in remote areas may remain open later if needed. The mixed system makes it difficult for a single party to win a clear majority, and coalition governments are likely to be formed.
The Gen Z protests
The background of this election dates back to 5th September 2025, when the government banned 26 social media apps, including Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter. Officials said the move was aimed at controlling misinformation and hate speech.
The ban sparked massive protests across the country by Gen Z. Gen Z claimed they had been ignored for years. They were frustrated with corruption, rising unemployment and slow economic growth. The social media ban was a clear indication that the government was not listening to the people.
Protests quickly spread across the country. It was reported that 77 people lost their lives during the protests. The deaths were caused by police shooting the protesters. The protesters also burned key government buildings, including parliament, the Supreme Court, and the secretariat.
The protests forced the government to resign, paving the way for the interim administration and fresh elections.
Key issues in the Election
Corruption, unemployment and economic slowdown are the major issues in the election campaign. The major parties have emphasised their agendas of better governance and transparency.
The Nepali Congress has promised to investigate the assets of public servants since 1990. Other parties have spoken about job creation, fair opportunities and reducing inequality.
Key constituencies include Jhapa 5, where Oli and Balendra Shah are competing, while the 15 seats in the Kathmandu Valley are a major factor in the election.
Regional and global attention
The election also has regional importance. India is paying close attention to the election because past communist governments have displayed a pro-China stand.
China also has significant influence in Nepal and hopes the next government will remain supportive of projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative.
Both India’s neighbours, Bangladesh and Nepal, saw violent protests that resulted in the fall of elected governments. After a 2-year uncertainty and a caretaker government, elections were finally held and Bangladesh with peaceful transfer of power. With a stable elected government in Nepal, India can hope for meaningful diplomacy and better regional cooperation.
When will the results be announced?
The Election Commission has promised that results for the 165 elected members will be announced within 24 hours after ballot boxes are collected. Results for the proportional representation members may take two to three days to come out. This was announced by the officiating Chief Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari.
Why this Election is important
The election on 5th March is a turning point in Nepal’s history. This election is not about making a change in government but about rebuilding trust between the people and their leaders.
For Gen Z, this election is a chance to move from protest to participation. For traditional political parties in Nepal, this election gives them a chance to prove their capability to effect change. With nearly 19 million voters and active youth involvement in the process, the outcome of this election will determine Nepal’s future and its relations with neighbours.
The US-Israel war against the Mullah regime in Iran is having global implications. First, Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, and on 2nd March 2026, Qatar announced a full halt to the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products. The decision came after Iranian drone strikes targeted an energy facility of Qatar’s state-owned energy giant, QatarEnergy, in the massive Ras Laffan Industrial City and a water tank at a power plant in Mesaieed Industrial City.
While the world’s largest LNG producer confirmed that no casualties occurred in the Iranian strikes, the production of LNG and related products has been halted for “security reasons”. The Ras Laffan Industrial City is home to the world’s largest LNG export plant.
QatarEnergy declared force majeure on its energy shipments. This is a legal clause excusing delivery failure due to extraordinary situations like drone attacks. The move will have serious implications as Ras Laffan alone accounts for the bulk of Qatar’s LNG output.
“Due to military attacks on QatarEnergy’s operating facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City in the State of Qatar, QatarEnergy has ceased production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products,” a statement issued by QatarEnergy reads.
Global impact of Qatar halting LNG production
Qatar supplies approximately 20% of the global LNG exports. With Qatar’s 82% clients based in Asia and a significant chunk in Europe, Qatar played a balancing role. Qatar supplies 42% of India’s LNG requirements. An indefinite discontinuation of LNG production and removal of this massive volume would essentially create an immediate global supply shock, further exacerbating the fragility of global energy security.
If we look at the immediate market reaction, the European benchmark gas price (Dutch TTF) skyrocketed 46-54% in a single day. Similarly, Asian LNG spot prices surged 39%. Oil prices recorded a spike as high as 13% intraday.
In Asia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, among others, rely heavily on Qatari cargoes. Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Akazawa Ryo Masa, has reportedly said that although Japan’s immediate supply is protected by stockpiles and spot-purchasing, Tokyo may seek to diversify its LNG imports.
Meanwhile, Indian importers like GAIL and Petronet also face direct contract risks. If the situation persists for long, Asian LNG buyers will scramble for replacement cargoes, which would essentially mean not only higher prices but also open the risk of power plants and industries cutting output or switching fuels.
Indian companies are reported to have reduced LNG supplies to industries after Qatar announced a production halt. Petronet has informed GAIL and other companies about reduced supplies. GAIL and Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) have informed customers about the gas supply cut, which ranges from 10% to 30%.
Meanwhile, India may also turn to its trusted supplier and partner, Russia, for short-term LNG imports, much to America’s disappointment.
For Europe, the situation only gets worse as its energy security was already exposed after the loss of the Russian gas pipeline in 2022. A dramatic surge in prices will raise household electricity bills and industrial costs. While the European Union’s gas coordination group will convene on 3rd March to discuss the overall impact of the escalating war in the Middle East, Europe’s storage is relatively healthy and since winters are also ending, it may not face an immediate crisis.
Israel’s pursuit of eliminating the ‘existential threat’, America’s ‘regime change’ ambition, and Iran’s revenge collectively bleeding global energy markets
None of this ends at just Asia and Europe; there will be ripple effects. While the US and Australia may witness higher prices and export opportunities, being among the top LNG exporters, they are reported to have limited spare capacity.
The US has already grabbed the opportunity, with Venture Global, offering uncontracted cargoes to help “stabilise” the markets as Qatar turns the tap off.
QatarEnergy halting LNG production only worsens a potential crisis triggered by Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait’s blockade has already resulted in a surge in oil prices. The IRGC has threatened to attack any vessels, compounded by tanker strikes, insurance cancellations, and suspensions by major shipping lines like Maersk, which has effectively brought commercial traffic to a near standstill. A desperate and vengeful Iranian Mullah regime, in its pursuit to disrupt global energy supply and gain leverage, has choked off roughly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil and a significant share of LNG exports, including from Qatar.
Appearing on Iranian state television, Iranian Brigadier General Ebrahim Jabari, the adviser to the IRGC commander, said, “The price of oil has reached $81/bbl, and the world is certainly waiting for it to reach at least $200. The Strait of Hormuz is closed. Our heroes in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy and the Army will set fire to any ships that wish to pass through this strait.”
Various media reports also indicate that the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered energy price spikes, with oil rising toward or beyond $100 per barrel and the European gas benchmark jumping over 50%.
It must be recalled that the fresh wave of anti-regime protest in Iran had hyperinflation and consistent economic downslide as its immediate trigger. Now, an intransigent Iranian Mullah regime seems to be deliberately exporting the same crisis through the Strait of Hormuz blockade and Gulf energy strikes, ‘punishing’ its adversaries and the wider world with global energy supply disruptions, price spikes and inflation.
Besides Qatar’s halt on LNG production, and the Strait of Hormuz blockade, Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery, Israeli gas fields, and Iraqi Kurdistan oil output are also seeing a precautionary shutdown amidst Iran’s retaliatory strikes. On 2nd March, an Iranian drone targeted Aramco’s refinery in Ras Tanura on Saudi Arabia’s east coast, triggering a fire.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, companies like DNO, Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Dana Gas and HKN Energy have halted their production as a precautionary measure. The companies used to export 200,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) through pipeline to Turkey’s Ceyhan port in February this year.
In Israel, the Netanyahu government has directed Chevron to temporarily halt the giant Leviathan gas field. Israeli gas field shutdown has put its exports to Egypt to a standstill.
On 28th February, there were two explosions at Iran’s Kharg Island, which processes 90% of Iran’s crude exports. Although Iran is heavily sanctioned, the country is the third largest producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, pumping roughly 4.5% of global oil supplies. Iran’s output is about 3.3 million barrels per day of crude, in addition to 1.3 million bpd of condensate and other liquids.
The Middle East remains volatile, and even a short halt would inflict massive damage; the disruption extending to months would trigger a global energy crisis. Although other producers are stepping in, they cannot instantly replace 20% of the global supply. The return of normalcy in global energy supplies remains contingent on the return of normalcy in Iran and the Gulf countries.
Following an amicable settlement between the parties, the Bombay High Court quashed a First Information Report (FIR) under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses (POCSO) Act, 2012 in a recent ruling that has spurred discussion on the convergence of justice, compassion, and legal rigor. Mohan Maruti Jadhav was charged by his young niece with crimes under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO, as well as provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
The survivor later affirmed that she had no complaints about her uncle, whom she characterised as treating her like a daughter, and the court remarked that the accusations were the result of a ‘misunderstanding.’ The offender was ordered to deposit Rs 1.5 lakh in order to buy a MacBook to support the survivor’s education as part of the resolution.
This decision, which was made on February 13, 2026, is an example of a developing trend in which Indian courts have the authority to halt criminal proceedings based on settlements, even in situations that are not compoundable. But why do these results happen, and what do significant rulings from the Supreme Court tell us about their legitimacy? Let’s discuss.
The legal framework: Power to quash under Sec. 482 of CrPC
The fundamental authority of High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, lies at the core of these agreements. In order to safeguard the interests of justice or avoid misuse of the legal system, this clause gives courts the authority to revoke FIRs or criminal actions. Non-compoundable crimes, such as those under POCSO or rape, usually cannot be settled privately, in contrast to compoundable charges under Section 320 CrPC, where parties can formally compromise. Nonetheless, courts have increasingly used Section 482 to permit quashing when prosecution would be pointless, especially in private disputes that have been settled amicably.
This discretion must be in line with the public interest, it is not unrestricted. Quashing is uncommon, as the Supreme Court has stressed, and should only be used in situations where accusations are absurd or continuation would be more detrimental than beneficial. Courts consider reconciliation vs child protection in POCSO situations, frequently permitting quashings if the survivor (upon majority) agrees or marries the accused, provided the case meets certain criteria.
Systematic pressure and pragmatism
The courts are overburdened. Approximately 70% of the roughly 54 million pending cases as of early 2026 are criminal in nature. Litigants are forced to criminalise conflicts in order to gain more leverage due to civil court delays, which frequently last decades. For example, what starts out as a family or contractual dispute might evolve into formal complaints (FIRs) claiming sexual offences, assault, or cheating, utilising criminal proceedings as a shortcut to compel settlements. This is made worse by police inefficiencies, investigations take a long time, witnesses become hostile, and evidence deteriorates with time, making convictions difficult. Settlements in these situations prioritise victim care, clear the backlog, and restore harmony, particularly if the victim marries the accused or retracts accusations.
Guiding Principles
Through significant rulings, the Supreme Court has issued important guidelines that emphasised caution while quashing non-compoundable offences.
Under India’s CrPC, non-compoundable offences, those not covered by Section 320, cannot be handled privately between parties. Instead, the State prosecutes them as crimes against society. These grave crimes, such as POCSO child exploitation instances, necessitate full court trials without exception, in contrast to compoundable ones, where victims and accused can compromise.
The Court listed seven grounds for quashing FIRs in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), including situations in which the charges are ludicrously unlikely or reveal no crime. This laid the groundwork for court action to stop pointless prosecutions.
This was extended in the landmark Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012), which held that settlement ensures justice and that High Courts have the authority to invalidate even significant offences if they are predominantly civil or private in origin. In contrast to marital or business conflicts, the Court cautioned against quashing horrible crimes like rape or those that have an impact on society.
Building on this, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) defined the parameters for quashing in situations such as murder attempt (Section 307 IPC), emphasizing the assessment of the seriousness of the offense, the sincerity of the settlement, and the likelihood of conviction. The Supreme Court reaffirmed limitations in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017), quashing is not allowed for economic violations or those with societal repercussions, even after settlement.
The Courts, however, have been very watchful for sexual offences, because sexual crimes have a larger impact on society. In Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra (2025), it was decided that a rape FIR might be quashed in ‘exceptional circumstances’ when the parties reached a voluntary settlement, and the prosecution did not serve the public interest.
However, in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan (2024), the Supreme Court rejected quashing POCSO proceedings based merely on compromise, emphasising the Act’s objective to protect children from exploitation. Courts are guided by a four-step test from Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2024): Determine if the allegations, on their face, constitute a crime, assess the legitimacy of the settlement, take into account the impact on society, and make sure there is no abuse of process.
Patterns of allowance or refusal
Other situations reflect this approach. In POCSO cases, quashing frequently happens when victims become married to the accused and enjoy stable lives. For example, in a 2025 Supreme Court decision, the proceedings were dismissed to prevent tormenting a married couple with children. In order to promote family peace, the Kerala High Court dismissed two POCSO cases in 2025 after settlements resulted in marriages. In a similar vein, a POCSO FIR was dismissed by the Delhi High Court in 2023 following a settlement between juvenile parties. But rejections are frequent, Despite reaching a compromise, the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused quashing a rape POCSO case in 2026, considering the victim’s body to be ‘her temple‘ and the crime to be social.
In 2024, the Supreme Court upheld child protection by reinstating a POCSO FIR against a teacher, overturning a High Court quash based on family settlement.
POCSO cases are occasionally overturned by courts when the victim marries the accused and has a stable life, but only in circumstances where there is unmistakable proof that there was no actual crime, such as forceful assault, and the relationship was consensual between near adults.
Conclusion: Justice or compromise?
These settlements continue because they provide workable answers in the face of structural problems, such as court vacancies, procedural adjournments, and evidentiary obstacles that impede justice by delaying trials. However, detractors contend that they weaken deterrence against serious crimes and commodify victims, particularly children. The MacBook order in the Bombay case emphasises a victim-centric approach, but also raises questions. Does financial aid actually restore dignity, or does it run the risk of encouraging forced compromises?
In the end, Supreme Court precedents require that settlements not take precedence over public accountability, even as they humanize the law by promoting reconciliation. Maintaining a balance between equity and empathy is crucial as India struggles with judicial changes. In order to ensure that quashing promotes justice rather than expediency, courts must carefully consider the facts of each case.
On 2nd March, the National Investigation Agency was granted permission by a special court in Jammu to issue a Letter Rogatory to the competent judicial authority in China. The request seeks assistance in identifying the purchaser and end user of a GoPro camera which was allegedly used to reconnoitre Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley ahead of the deadly Pahalgam terror attack.
The premier counter-terror agency of India had sought permission from the court to contact Chinese authorities to get information about the GoPro camera, as it was linked to a distributor in China.
The development came in connection with the 22nd April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 people, including a Nepalese tourist, were killed.
Camera traced to Chinese distributor
According to the court order accessed by OpIndia, a GoPro Hero 12 Black camera was identified as a “crucial electronic device” in the investigation. The court recorded, “One such crucial electronic device is a GoPro Hero 12 Black Camera, bearing serial No. C3501325471706, which is relevant for establishing pre-attack reconnaissance, movement and operational preparation of terrorist module involved in Pahalgam attack.”
The NIA had issued a notice under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita to the Netherlands-based manufacturer, GoPro BV, seeking details regarding the supply chain and activation of the device. In its official response, the manufacturer informed investigators that, “The said camera was supplied to AE Group International Limited, a distributor based in the People’s Republic of China; and the camera was activated on 30.01.2024 at Dongguan, People’s Republic of China.”
Souce: Jammu Sessions Court
No end-user data with manufacturer
However, GoPro BV told the agency that it did not hold downstream transaction or end-user details of the device. The order noted, “The manufacturer has further stated that it does not possess downstream transaction details or end-user records of the said device.”
It further added that the “activation, initial use and commercial trail of the said device lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, and the information necessary to trace the purchaser, end-user and associated technical records can only be obtained through judicial assistance of the Chinese authorities.”
Notably, India and China are not signatories to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The court observed that recourse was being taken to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which both countries have ratified. Furthermore, the Ministry of Home Affairs has given its concurrence for issuance of the Letter Rogatory in the case.
Court allows Letter Rogatory
Allowing the application under Section 112 of the BNSS, Special Judge Prem Sagar held that the information sought was critical to the case. The court observed, “Since the information sought for is very important so far establishing the chain of custody, user, attribution and evidentiary linkage of seized device i.e. camera, GoPro BV, which was supplied to AE Group International Limited, a distributor based in the People’s Republic of China.”
Source: Jammu Sessions Court
The judge ordered that the Letter Rogatory be issued to the competent Chinese judicial authority “for seeking assistance and tracing the purchaser, end user and associated technical records to unearth the larger conspiracy”.
The investigating officer has been directed to upload a soft copy of the Letter Rogatory, along with Chinese translations, to the MLAT portal, and to send three physical sets, one original and two copies, to the International Police Cooperation Unit of the Central Bureau of Investigation for onward transmission through diplomatic channels.
What is a Letter Rogatory in simple terms
A Letter Rogatory is basically a formal request sent by an Indian court to a court or authority in another country asking for help in a criminal investigation. It is used when important evidence is located outside India. For example, if a device was activated abroad or a company is based in another country, Indian investigators cannot simply demand that information. They must ask through a legal process.
Under Section 112 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), the investigating officer first approaches an Indian court. If the court is satisfied, it issues a formal letter to the foreign country. That country can then question people, collect documents, or gather technical data and send it back officially. The request is sent through the Central Government and diplomatic channels.
If there is no treaty between the two countries, the process still works, but it is slower. The foreign country is not automatically bound to help. It decides under its own laws whether to cooperate. In simple terms, it is a legal way of asking another country, through courts and governments, to share evidence needed in a criminal case.
Background to the attack
On 22nd April 2025, Pakistan-backed terrorists attacked tourists at Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam. They killed 26 innocent Hindus after confirming their religious identity. The terrorist attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink of a wider conflict. In response, India launched Operation Sindoor in early May and targeted terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan retaliated, but its missile and drone attack was neutralised. India further retaliated and attacked military infrastructure deep inside Pakistan. On 10th May, a ceasefire was announced. In July 2025, the government informed Parliament that the three terrorists involved in the attack had been eliminated in an encounter in the Dachigam forest area.
The latest development shows that investigators are now seeking to establish the full chain of custody and international trail of the camera allegedly used to carry out reconnaissance before the terrorist attack. It is being seen as part of efforts to uncover what the court described as the “larger conspiracy” behind the attack in its order.
Even as it has been established that Muslim mobs set two coaches of the Sabarmati Express on fire in a premeditated plot to burn 59 Hindu karsevaks alive on 27th February 2002, even after 24 years of the horrific crime, some people continue to peddle conspiracy theories about it. Some time back, former Chief Minister of Gujarat, Shankarsinh Vaghela, whose political relevance has faded, gave a similar statement. The pro-Muslim conspiracy theorists who claim that hundreds of Muslims were massacred in the riots that broke out across Gujarat after the Godhra train burning and that all this happened under Modi’s rule, do not say what happened in Godhra before these riots (in which both Hindus and Muslims died) took place? (In which only Hindus were killed, as part of a premeditated conspiracy.)
For many years, there have been clever attempts to erase the anti-Hindu Godhra incident and shift focus only on the riots and to blame the Hindus of Gujarat and the then Modi government for it. In this, the so-called secularists from Gujarat and outside Gujarat, along with some of their NGOs and organisations, have played a major role.
One group is the ‘Movement for Secular Democracy’. The ‘Secular Democracy Movement’ activists gather in Ahmedabad every year on 28th February and wave banners of ‘Justice’, ‘Peace’, ‘Ekhlas’ and ‘Communal Unity’. They keep talking about establishing ‘communal unity’ in Gujarat and maintaining ‘communal harmony’. They take pictures and go home. This year too, a group of these people gathered on 28th February.
Here, the date is important. February 28th is the day when the riots in Gujarat started. But what happened the day before is not discussed. The day before, on the 27th, two train coaches were set on fire at the Godhra railway station, and 59 Hindus, including 27 women and 10 children, were burnt alive. This was an ‘unprovoked attack’. What happened next was a reaction to this heinous incident.
These pretentious secular democrats mention the ‘Godhra massacre’ in their social media posts, but they hold these demonstrations on the 28th. Even on that day, they don’t bother to remember those 59 innocent karsevaks, to light a candle for them. Because if they do that, they will have to discuss the Godhra incident as well.
If we really want ‘justice’ here, we should ask for it for the 59 Hindus, whose only crime was that they went to the temple of their God for Karseva. Who were burned alive by Islamists dur to their hatred for Hindus. Those 59 innocent people were killed for being Hindus and devotees of Lord Ram. They were punished for their devotion to Ram. Let alone asking for justice for them, either their names and plight is suppressed, or somehow those Hindus are villainised by the secular-liberal coterie. Is this ‘secularism’?
If lectures on ‘community unity’ are to be given here, they should be given to the radical Muslims of Godhra and others like them, who could not tolerate the existence of Hindu Karsevaks. The ‘bhaichara’ sermons should be given to those who still have this mentality like the Muslims of Godhra, and even today they go to a Hindu tailor’s shop and cut his ‘head and body’ just because he supported a woman’s freedom of expression.
If these mobs, thirsty for the blood of Hindus, learn all this, then ‘peace’ will come automatically. The secular mentality of always portraying Muslim perpetrators as victims by putting the responsibility of maintaining ‘peace’, ‘fraternity’ and ‘communal harmony’ on the shoulders of Hindus is very old, and that is why this secular-liberal group in Gujarat and outside, whenever they talk about ‘Gujarat Riots’, they start the discussion from the 28th. The horror of 27th February was not mentioned, where the roots of the incident that happened later in reaction were. A gang is sitting ready to formulate some conspiracy theories from above, so that the discussion can be diverted elsewhere, and the blame is not placed on Muslims.
In fact, the ecosystem has this habit that they never talk about the action, hold back the reaction and portray the Hindu community as guilty. Those who created a stir over Nupur Sharma’s comments, those who raised slogans of ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’ in many cities of the country, and those who killed Nupur’s supporters never mention what was said about Lord Shiva in the same debate, before the same comments. Whatever the incident, they always find some Hindu to blame and some Muslim to portray the victim.
Such demonstrations and demonstrations may seem small and worthless, but in the long run, their results may be opposite. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss it. It is also necessary to remind them of the incident of February 27th, 2002, frequently. Some dates in history should not be forgotten; this is one such date.
Few ties are as cherished in the fabric of international relations as the one between Iran and India. Ancient civilisations linked by shared languages, poetry, and trade routes generate feelings of timeless brotherhood. The Mughal architecture, food, and even lexicon of India are influenced by Persian. Terms like ‘dost’ (friend) are used in both languages.
However, this story frequently obscures a more nuanced reality that is characterised by strategic hedging, geopolitical differences, and shared mistrust. India and Iran are far from being staunch allies; their relationship is tense, particularly since Iran became a theocratic state in 1979 as a result of the Islamic Revolution.
Based on historical examples, voting trends in international forums, and current hotspots like the Chabahar port project, the idea of unbreakable friendship is more myth than reality.
Ancient ties meet modern rifts
From the Indo Aryan migrations around 2000 BCE to the spread of Persian literature in colonial India, India and Iran have a long history together. The linguistic foundations of Sanskrit and Persian are similar, and historical interactions have ranged from Zoroastrian exiles seeking asylum in India to joint anti-colonial campaigns against the British Empire.
The 1950 Treaty of Friendship established perpetual peace after independence, but Cold War tensions strained relations. Under the Shah, Iran’s pro-Western posture clashed with India’s non-aligned but Soviet leaning stance.
Relations were momentarily improved by the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and established the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini. India saw it as a setback to imperialism, and relations briefly improved. But Iran’s shift toward pan-Islamism and its backing of Pakistan in the Indo-Pak disputes soon deteriorated the situation.
India’s close ties to Iraq, a Soviet ally at the time, further strained relations with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Iran denounced India’s 1990 response to the Kashmir riots as ‘unjustified’ and even cancelled an invitation to India’s foreign minister. These incidents demonstrate how theocracy sparked ideological conflict in a partnership that had previously been pragmatic.
Clashing votes: From Kashmir to nuclear ambitions
These divisions have been exacerbated in international forums, where voting trends indicate divergent agendas. In the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Iran has continuously supported resolutions denouncing India’s purported breaches of human rights in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, has denounced Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA, voting against Tehran for non-compliance in 2005 and referring it to the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2009.
Iranian authorities condemned this as ‘backstabbing,’ particularly in light of Iran’s 1994 objection to an OIC resolution on Kashmir that exempted India from sanctions. Recent human rights divergences underscore India’s hedging. In January 2026, India voted against a UNHRC resolution criticising Iran’s protest crackdowns, emphasising stability, but abstained from a 2024 IAEA censure of its nuclear operations.
The Ayatollah’s anti-Hindu barbs
The personal and ideological imprint of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose speech has frequently swung into explicit criticism of India’s Hindu majority framework, is at the heart of Iran’s post revolution differences. Through the prism of Islamic solidarity, Khamenei’s remarks have depicted India as a place where Muslims are persecuted, repeating clichés that pit ‘extremist Hindus’ against the faithful. This anti Hindu attitude, which is nuanced in diplomacy but abrasive in public statements, has frequently caused tensions in bilateral relations and exposed the theocratic state’s preference for pan-Islamic narratives above practical alliances.
A stark example occurred in March 2020, during the Delhi riots, when Khamenei tweeted, ‘The hearts of Muslims all over the world are grieving over the massacre of Muslims in India. The govt of India should confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam.’ The hashtag #IndianMuslimsInDanger magnified the message, prompting swift Indian condemnation as inflammatory meddling. Similarly, in August 2019, when Article 370 was revoked in Kashmir, Khamenei encouraged India to ‘adopt a just policy towards the noble people of Kashmir and prevent the oppression & bullying of Muslims,’ while using good relations as a diplomatic fig leaf.
The trend accelerated in September 2024 when Khamenei declared, ‘We cannot consider ourselves to be Muslims if we are oblivious to the suffering that a Muslim is enduring in #Myanmar, #Gaza, #India, or any other place,’ adding that India was among the countries where Muslims face suffering. India’s Ministry of External Affairs responded, calling the remarks misinformed and unacceptable, and urging Tehran to look at their own record on minorities. In 2010, during his Haj speech, Khamenei asked for global support for Kashmiri Muslims, comparing their predicament to that of other oppressed populations.
These initiatives, which frequently coincide with domestic Indian flashpoints, highlight a deeper ideological divide. Khamenei’s theocratic worldview, which is based on exporting the Islamic Revolution, sees India’s democracy as a fight between Hindu extremism and Muslim suffering. While India has responded gently, summoning envoys and delivering rebukes, such rhetoric has fueled Iranian perceptions of India as an antagonistic state, straining efforts to maintain even normal cooperation. It further reinforces the myth of friendship by disregarding how Iran’s leadership intentionally undermines India’s internal narrative on pluralism.
Chabahar: A port of promises and pitfalls
The Chabahar port is both a beacon of potential synergy and a source of friction, perpetuating myths of genuine friendship. The 2016 trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan saw India promise $500 million for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, which was intended to serve as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia by avoiding Pakistan. A 10 year pact signed in 2024 pledged an additional $370 million, demonstrating strategic alignment. However, US sanctions have consistently hindered development. India postponed investing for fear of sanctions, causing Iran to threaten Chinese engagement. India was forced to shut down its operations and pay $120 million without full returns after Trump rescinded the sanctions relief in September 2025.
Broader stains
Although unsubstantiated, Iran’s claims that Indian tech firms supported Mossad during the Israel-Iran clashes in 2025 add espionage drama and erode trust. Iran’s criticism of India’s Islamophobia through the CAA and Kashmir policies is one example of a broader tendency. Once a lifeline, the oil trade crumbled after India was forced to stop importing due to U.S. sanctions in 2019, moving to Saudi Arabia and Iraq instead. The U.S.-Israel strikes in February 2026 caused a 20% increase in oil prices, endangering the safety of India’s diaspora and its import dependent economy. India’s energy concerns are heightened by Iran’s threats to attack tankers or block the Strait of Hormuz.
A partnership, not a friendship
India’s strategy exemplifies pragmatic neutrality by maintaining connections with Iran for oil and connectivity while strengthening ties with Israel and the United States for defense and technology. Although it avoids Shia Sunni divisions and U.S.-Iran conflicts, this dehyphenation, treating relations independently, increases Iranian discontent over alleged Western biases. Misconceptions arise from overemphasizing cultural ties while neglecting post revolutionary changes: India’s secularism clashes with Iran’s Islamic solidarity, which frequently unites with Pakistan. New Delhi treads gingerly, putting independence first in a multipolar world as tensions in West Asia rise, potentially leading to oil shocks and economic disruptions.
The story of India and Iran is not one of unshakable friendship but rather one of strategic interaction. Historical links serve as a basis, but geopolitical realities such as nuclear aspirations, positions on Kashmir, and outside influences cause enduring divisions. New Delhi needs to exercise caution as West Asian tensions rise, and there is a chance of oil shocks and trade disruptions for India. The truth is more nuanced: two nations split by strategy and bonded by history. The fiction of perpetual brotherhood serves narrative purposes. That is frequently the cost of independence in a multipolar world.
The Middle East today stands on the edge of another historic rupture. With the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in US-Israel strikes and Tehran launching retaliatory attacks across the region, the Islamic Republic appears to be entering one of the most uncertain moments in its four-decade history. Iranian missiles targeting American bases and urban centres like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha are a reminder that the geopolitical aftershocks of this event could reshape the region for years.
Yet to understand the present crisis in Iran, one must revisit a profound historical irony. The theocratic regime that came to power in Tehran in 1979, one that would eventually become the standard-bearer of militant Islamist politics, was not merely the product of religious mobilisation. It was also aided, legitimised, and politically enabled by an unlikely alliance: Leftists, Marxists, and secular revolutionaries who believed the Islamic clergy represented a revolutionary anti-imperialist force.
This alliance, built on ideological delusion and tactical opportunism, proved fatal. Within a few years of the revolution, the very Leftists who had supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini found themselves imprisoned, tortured, and executed by the Islamic regime they helped create.
The story of this betrayal is one of the most striking examples of political self-destruction in modern history.
The Revolution that united strange allies
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not a purely Islamist uprising. In fact, it was a broad coalition of forces united by one objective: overthrowing the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
The Shah’s regime had ruled Iran with an iron hand, backed by Western powers, particularly the United States. Opposition to him came from many directions, religious clerics, liberal nationalists, student movements, trade unions, and Marxist organisations.
Communist groups like the Tudeh Party, leftist guerrilla organisations, secular intellectuals, and Islamist revolutionaries all found themselves fighting the same enemy. According to contemporary accounts, the revolution was driven by “a wide range of class and social forces, united on a program of democracy and anti-imperialism.”
For many Leftists, Khomeini appeared to be an anti-imperialist leader capable of mobilising the masses against Western influence. The Islamic clergy, in turn, used the revolutionary fervour generated by workers, students, and intellectuals to overthrow the monarchy.
Source: AP
It was a tactical partnership born of convenience. But history would soon show that it was also a catastrophic miscalculation.
The Left’s ideological blindness
To understand why so many Marxists and secular revolutionaries supported Khomeini, one must examine the ideological climate of the 1970s.
Across much of the world, particularly in the developing world, anti-Western sentiment was the dominant political narrative. Any movement opposing a regime perceived as aligned with the United States was automatically viewed as progressive.
In Iran, the Shah was widely seen as a Western puppet. His government had come to power with the help of the CIA-backed coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.
This historical memory deeply shaped Iranian political discourse. For many Leftists, the primary contradiction was not between secularism and religious authority but between imperialism and national sovereignty.
Khomeini understood this sentiment well. During his exile in Paris, he carefully crafted rhetoric that appealed to secular revolutionaries, promising democracy, freedom, and independence.
He even suggested that the future government would not be dominated by clerics.
Many believed him.
The moment the revolution changed
When the Shah fled Iran in January 1979, celebrations erupted across the country. Millions poured into the streets as Khomeini returned from exile.
For a brief moment, it appeared that Iran might embark on a democratic transformation. But within months, the direction of the revolution began to shift dramatically.
The Islamic clergy rapidly consolidated power. Revolutionary courts were established. Secular institutions were dismantled. The new regime began enforcing Islamic laws across society.
Universities were closed. Independent political organisations were banned. Women were pressured into adopting Islamic dress codes.What had begun as a multi-ideological revolution was becoming a theocratic state.
The purge of the revolution’s allies
The real turning point came in 1981. As opposition to clerical rule grew, the Islamic Republic launched a massive crackdown on dissent. Revolutionary courts conducted rapid trials and issued death sentences with alarming speed.
Between June 1981 and March 1982, thousands of political opponents were executed across Iran. The victims included communists, socialists, liberals, nationalists, monarchists, and members of religious minorities.
Ironically, many of them were the same revolutionaries who had helped overthrow the Shah.
The massacre became one of the largest waves of political executions in modern Iranian history. Estimates suggest that thousands of dissidents were killed in a matter of months.
These executions were not merely acts of repression; they were foundational acts of state formation.The new regime used violence to eliminate alternative centres of political power.
The role of revolutionary courts
Central to this purge were the Islamic Revolutionary Courts.These courts operated without due process. Defendants were often denied lawyers, trials lasted minutes, and verdicts were predetermined.
Judges used vague religious charges such as “waging war against God” (moharebeh) or “spreading corruption on Earth” (ifsad-fi-alarz) to justify executions.
These concepts were later codified into Iran’s legal system, forming the basis of the Islamic Penal Code adopted in 1982.
When revolution devours its children
The irony of the Iranian Revolution is that the Left helped create the conditions for its own destruction.
Communist groups that had once celebrated the overthrow of the Shah soon found themselves banned and persecuted.
The Tudeh Party, which had supported the Islamic Republic in its early years, was eventually outlawed. Thousands of its members were arrested, tortured, or executed. The revolution had devoured its children.
This pattern is not unique in history. Many revolutions eventually turn on their early supporters. But the Iranian case stands out because the ideological divide between the allies was so stark.
Marxists who believed religion was an instrument of oppression had allied themselves with a clerical movement seeking to establish religious rule. The contradiction was bound to explode.
The cost paid by Iran’s youth
One of the most disturbing aspects of the 1981 purge was the age of many victims.
A significant percentage of those executed were between eleven and twenty-four years old. Some were teenagers or high-school students accused of sympathising with opposition groups. Some were executed after brief interrogations and forced confessions.
Mass graves were created across the country to bury the victims, and many families were never informed about the fate of their relatives. Even today, the Iranian state continues to conceal the full scale of these killings.
The silence of the global Left
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this story is how little attention it received internationally.
While human rights organisations documented the atrocities, large sections of the global Left remained reluctant to criticise the Iranian regime.
The reason was ideological.
The Islamic Republic positioned itself as a force resisting Western dominance in the Middle East. For many activists in Europe and America, that narrative overshadowed the regime’s internal repression.
Thus, the massacre of thousands of Leftists by an Islamist regime received far less attention than similar atrocities elsewhere.
The long shadow of the revolution
The political system that emerged from this violence has defined Iran for more than four decades. The doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist, placed ultimate authority in the hands of a Supreme Leader.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini in 1989, ruled Iran for nearly four decades. His tenure saw repeated domestic uprisings and confrontations with the West.
According to reports following the recent US-Israel strikes, Khamenei’s death could push Iran into a new phase of instability. But, regardless of what happens next, the foundations of the current Iranian state were laid during those early years of revolutionary violence.
Lessons from a tragic alliance
The Iranian Revolution offers a powerful lesson about political alliances built on short-term calculations. Many Leftists believed they could cooperate with religious revolutionaries to defeat a common enemy and then shape the future state.
Instead, they became the first victims of the new order. The Islamic Republic consolidated power by eliminating them. History has repeatedly shown that ideological movements driven by absolutist doctrines rarely tolerate pluralism once they seize power.
Yet the Iranian case stands out because the warning signs were visible from the beginning.
The irony of revolutionary politics
Today, as Iran faces another historic moment following the death of its Supreme Leader, the legacy of the 1979 revolution still looms large.
The clerical regime that emerged from that upheaval was not an inevitable outcome of Iranian history. It was the product of political alliances, ideological miscalculations, and brutal consolidation of power. Among the most tragic elements of that story is the role played by Leftists and Communists who believed they were participating in a progressive revolution.
Instead, they helped usher in one of the most enduring theocracies of the modern world. And when the revolution was over, they were the first to be eliminated.
Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada appears to be more eager than ever to salvage ties with India, undoing the profound damage his predecessor, Justin Trudeau, inflicted through years of diplomatic blunders motivated by domestic Khalistani appeasement politics. With a change in leadership, there has been an evident shift in the Canadian approach towards India. On his maiden bilateral visit to India, PM Carney met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and proclaimed that India and Canada are entering “a new era of partnership.”
During the India–Canada CEOs Forum in Mumbai on Monday, PM Modi announced that India and Canada have entered a long-term nuclear deal.
Marking a significant and pragmatic departure from Trudeau-era distrust and diplomatic bitterness, Canada and India are now strengthening cooperation in various sectors, particularly space, technology, energy, and critical minerals. PM Carney’s India visit is centrally aimed at expediting a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India. This agreement would be aimed at doubling two-way trade, increasing trade to $50bn by 2030.
Change in leadership, change in rhetoric? Canadian PM acknowledges that “natural partner” India is not a “middle power”
The Canadian Prime Minister’s recent speeches and statements during his four-day visit reflect a pivot in Ottawa’s foreign policy from levelling preposterous allegations of transnational repression to buttering up the economic giant that is India. In an interview with News18 on 1st March, PM Carney acknowledged that India is “not a middle power” but a nation on an entirely different trajectory of global influence and economic dynamism.
When asked if ‘middle powers’ like India and Canada are resetting ties, PM Carney said that while he is content with Canada being called a middle power, India cannot be called that. Earlier, PM Carney had hailed India as a “natural partner”.
“Not to be too picky about the rhetoric, but I wouldn’t call India a ‘middle power’. I’m happy for Canada to be called a middle power. But India’s trajectory and ambition is totally different,” the Canadian PM said.
Journalist: Are "middle powers" like India and Canada resetting ties as part of a global resistance?
Canadian PM Carney: I wouldn't call India a middle power. I'm happy for Canada to be called a middle power. But India's trajectory and ambition is totally different. pic.twitter.com/AIRcDwOpZ8
Reappointment of High Commissioners, appointment of liaison officers, changing rhetoric about India’s so-called ‘transnational repression on Canadian soil’ to more: Carney government’s consistent steps salvage a ruined India-Canada bilateral relationship
Clearly, Canada has learned the hard way that India is not the country it would want to antagonise for domestic appeasement politics. Carney’s rhetoric and actions indicate that Canada is now prioritising unlocking the full potential of India-Canada relations, especially at a time when Ottawa is seeking to diversify away from an unpredictable United States under renewed tariff pressures and constant ‘51st state’ mockery by President Donald Trump.
After assuming office in 2025, Carney has made gradual but consistent efforts to salvage the India-Canada bilateral relations that had been left in tatters since the 2023 diplomatic rupture over the killing of Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. India had strongly rejected the allegations, but the fallout led to the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats, a suspension of trade talks, and eventually the withdrawal of high commissioners.
However, in August 2025, India and Canada announced the appointment of new high commissioners to each other’s capitals. Since Canada initiated hostilities at the government and diplomatic level, it was for Canada only to take the first step towards mending ties with India. With Trudeau out and Carney in, the new Canadian Prime Minister did not waste time and invited PM Modi to the G-7 Summit.
PM Modi decided not to carry forward any grudges and attended the summit. The shift in India-Canada relations began take shape from hereon, with both countries agreeing to reappoint high commissioners.
In February this year, India and Canada agreed that each country would establish dedicated security and law-enforcement liaison officers on each other’s soil. The decision was announced following high-level talks during the visit of India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval to Ottawa on February 6–7, 2026. Doval held meetings with Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor and Deputy Clerk to the Privy Council, Nathalie G. Drouin, as well as Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree.
According to official statements from both governments, the two sides agreed to a shared workplan to guide cooperation on national security and law enforcement. A central element of this plan is the mutual posting of liaison officers. “During the meeting, it was agreed that each country would establish security and law-enforcement liaison officers and that their respective agencies would build on working relationships,” the statement said.
These officers would work as dedicated points of contact, facilitating faster and more direct coordination between Indian and Canadian security agencies on counter-terrorism, organised crime, and other transnational threats.
Before the first bilateral visit by a Canadian Prime Minister to India since 2018, the Carney government officially stated that India is no longer involved in violence, extortion, or transnational repression on Canadian soil.
Ottawa said that it is confident that India is no longer linked to violent crimes in Canada and points to renewed security dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. Despite Trudeau himself admitting that there was no evidentiary proof of India’s involvement in Nijjar’s killing, the Canadian government’s recent “India no longer linked to violent crimes in Canada” statement indicated a pragmatic recognition that managing security concerns and rebuilding diplomatic and economic ties do not have to be mutually exclusive. It would have been understandably embarrassing for Canada to hand an outright vindication to the Indian side, given that there has only been a change in Prime Minister and not the elected liberal government.
These steps taken by Canada have indicated a significant de-escalation that clears the air for deeper cooperation in critical sectors, including nuclear energy. Canada’s shift in approach and the flattery have yielded results, as on 2nd March, India and Canada signed a $1.9 billion Uranium deal.
The Canadian Liberal government’s shift in tone is still facing pushback from anti-India Liberal MPs and Khalistani extremists. However, the political reconfiguration following the 2025 federal election has played a key role in the gradual but mutually beneficial India-Canada relations reset.
Khalistani Jagmeet Singh’s NDP lost 17 of their 24 seats to Liberal and Conservative candidates. Singh enjoyed immense influence in the Trudeau government and constantly peddled the Khalistani narrative. However, Singh lost his own seat in the elections last year and had to step down as NDP chief. NDP’s drubbing resulted in the political arm of the anti-India Khalistani cabal losing its outsized influence in the Trudeau minority for years as it no longer held leverage within the governing coalition.
Although the Khalistani menace cannot be destroyed within a year or two, Canada appears to understand that territorial integrity is India’s red line finally, and Ottawa’s tolerance of those who intend to violate that redline will only cause a rift with India. While the Carney government may have not taken any dramatic measures to discontinue Canada’s decades-old practice of harbouring Khalistani terrorists, in fact, it too, tolerates anti-India ‘protests’ by Khalistanis in the name of ‘free speech’, a reduced domestic pressure, offers a conducive environment to (re)build strong ties with the emerging superpower and economic powerhouse – India.
