A section of Indians has long been enamoured with our arch-enemy and neighbour, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, deluded into believing that a flourishing and stable Pakistan would prove to be a game-changer for the Global South, unlock endless opportunities for trade and commerce, and contribute immensely in mutual growth and establishing a lasting peace.
This wishful thinking, often championed by the Left-leaning intelligentsia in media, academia, and policy-making, resurfaces every so often in op-eds and television debates. Their argument? India should aid Pakistan in stabilizing itself, for a prosperous Pakistan would somehow translate into regional harmony and security.
Indian liberals still enamoured by ‘Aman Ki Asha’ delusion
To this end, Shekhar Gupta’s The Print recently published a YouTube video analysis of how a stable Pakistan augurs well for India, and how the Balochistan insurgency, which critics attribute to India, isn’t helping New Delhi’s cause, and causing more strain in an already frosty relationship between India and Pakistan.
But let’s be clear: the idea that ‘a stable Pakistan will be better for India’ is an irrational narrative propagated by the same lobby that has been selling the ‘Aman Ki Asha’ dream for decades.
Pakistan’s very foundation rests on the divisive Two-Nation Theory, an ideology championed by Syed Ahmad Khan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and other architects of partition. From its inception, Pakistan was built on an identity defined in opposition to Hindu-majority India, ensuring that enmity towards its eastern neighbor would remain a key tenet of its national psyche.
Since then, Pakistan and its successive leadership have endeavoured little to rise above their anti-Hindu bigotry, infuse progressive ideals among their populace, and steer the country on the path to development and growth.
Instead, the animus for India has only grown, as witnessed by several wars waged by Pakistan against India, be it in 1948, 1965, 1971, or recently in 1999. And since the early 1990s, it has launched a proxy war against India by formulating its military doctrine ‘Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts’—using non-state actors to carry out terror attacks in India.
And yet, a section of Indians is labouring under the belief that an economically and politically stronger Pakistan bodes well for India in increasingly uncertain times, with wars and military conflicts being the order of the day.
As such, The Print is not the only Indian media outlet to harbour fallacies of a stronger Pakistan complementing India’s rising stature in geopolitics and its emergence as a growing regional power. The same erroneous sentiment has been echoed by several policymakers, academics, and business leaders who fail to acknowledge the fundamental ideological differences between the two nations. An opinion piece published in The Tribune in October 2024 contended that resuming trade with Pakistan will also help India.
How flourishing Pakistan threatened India’s internal security and peace
What’s even more damning is that Pakistan’s period of relative economic and political stability—from the 1980s to the early 2010s—coincided with some of the worst attacks against India. These decades saw a sharp escalation in Pakistan-backed terrorism, culminating in the forced exodus of Kashmiri Hindus from their homeland, a continuous stream of terror attacks across Indian cities, and unprecedented violence in Jammu & Kashmir.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, when Pakistan was politically and economically stable under military rulers like General Zia-ul-Haq and later Pervez Musharraf, it aggressively funded and trained Islamist radicals to spread terror in India. The ISI played a key role in radicalising Kashmiri youth and equipping militant groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, leading to the 1990 genocide and exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. Thousands of Hindus were either killed or forced to flee under threat of execution and mass rapes, as terrorists openly declared their intent to create an Islamic state in Kashmir.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s economic growth allowed it to fund extensive networks of sleeper cells and terrorist groups that carried out devastating attacks on Indian soil. The 1993 Mumbai bombings, the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and numerous bomb blasts in Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, and Bangalore through the 2000s were all orchestrated by Pakistan-based outfits with full backing from its military apparatus.
In contrast, as Pakistan’s economy deteriorated over the past decade, so has its ability to wage terror against India. Since the late 2010s, with Pakistan struggling to pay its debts, its state machinery weakening, and terror groups splintering due to infighting, India has seen a sharp decline in major terror attacks. Islamabad’s financial crisis has led to the collapse of its ability to fund large-scale operations against India. The rise of the Balochistan insurgency and growing internal conflicts in Pakistan-occupied territories have forced its military to divert resources inward, weakening its external misadventures.
A stable Pakistan does not mean a peaceful Pakistan. It means a Pakistan with more resources to pursue its decades-old objective of undermining India, be it through state-sponsored terrorism, diplomatic hostility, or radicalising segments of Indian society. A weakened Pakistan, on the other hand, diminishes its capacity to be a menace to India, reducing the security threats emanating from across the border, and also unburdening New Delhi from devoting significant resources to counter cross-border threats.
Those advocating for Pakistan’s stability should ask themselves: Has a stable Pakistan ever resulted in a friendlier Pakistan? The historical evidence overwhelmingly suggests the opposite. A strong Pakistan has always meant a more aggressive and terror-exporting Pakistan, while a weakened Pakistan has translated into relative peace for India.
India must remain clear-eyed about its adversary. While diplomatic engagement and economic interactions have their place, they must be guided by realism rather than wishful thinking and romanticised illusions of mythical harmony. The notion that Pakistan’s stability is a prerequisite for India’s progress is not just naive—it’s dangerously misleading. India must focus on its growth and security, without being encumbered by the fallacies of amity with a nation whose raison d’être is an unending enmity with India.
India’s strategic indifference to an imploding Pakistan
In the wake of Balakot airstrikes, PM Modi made a striking speech stating that Pakistan will die its own death—a thought that reflects a pragmatic approach to India’s geopolitical strategy. For decades, India’s Pakistan policy has oscillated between engagement and confrontation, but Modi’s assertion signals a shift towards strategic indifference. Instead of being consumed by Pakistan’s internal crises, India is better served by focusing on its development, economic growth, and global aspirations. The comments were also a scathing indictment of Pakistan’s self-destructive policies—its economic mismanagement, military overreach, and internal instability—will naturally lead to its decline, rendering India’s active intervention unnecessary.
This paradigm of strategic indifference delivers a body blow to the banal narrative that a stable Pakistan is in India’s best interest. As Pakistan reels under economic collapse, political chaos, and intensifying internal insurgencies—crises of its own making—its capacity to orchestrate cross-border terrorism has significantly waned. Modi’s stance is one of pragmatic realism: rather than expending resources to stabilise an inexorably hostile neighbour, India must remain focused on its own strategic priorities, allow Pakistan to bear the consequences of its self-inflicted decline.
