India is pushing to revisit the landmark Ganga water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh amidst shifting political currents and rising pressure on the river’s resources. Notably, following the deadly Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2025, New Delhi suspended the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan. Soon after, India indicated that it wants to renegotiate the Ganga treaty due to increased domestic water needs.
The Ganga accord, which governs dry season flows of the river to downstream Bangladesh, is set to expire in 2026. It must be renewed by mutual consent if Bangladesh wants to continue receiving water uninterruptedly. However, Indian officials have reportedly told Dhaka that a new deal should reflect India’s growing development requirements.
Currently, the treaty spans a 30-year term. However, Indian officials want it to span only 10–15 years. India’s stance on the treaty has made Bangladesh anxious, especially at a time when India has already suspended the treaty with Pakistan. These recent developments have put a spotlight on the water needs of both India and Bangladesh, governed by a three-decade-old treaty.
Historical backdrop to the Ganga treaty
The Ganga River is the lifeblood of people in India and Bangladesh. Sharing its waters has been a sensitive issue for both countries. Tensions over water distribution date back to the 1950s, when India began constructing the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal to divert water towards Kolkata. It alarmed then East Pakistan downstream.
After Bangladesh gained independence in 1971, the two nations attempted interim solutions. In 1972, India and Bangladesh formed a Joint Rivers Commission (JRC). A short-term water-sharing agreement was reached in 1977. The five-year pact (1978–82) guaranteed Bangladesh a minimum flow. However, when it lapsed, the countries managed only ad-hoc memoranda until 1985.
There was no formal agreement on sharing water resources between India and Bangladesh for around a decade. During those years, India often diverted Ganga waters unilaterally in the dry seasons, putting strains on the relations with Bangladesh. By the mid-1990s, both sides recognised a long-term treaty was needed to resolve the Farakka Barrage dispute and ensure fair division of the Ganga’s flow.
Signing of the 1996 Ganga waters pact
India and Bangladesh held negotiations that went on for a long time. Finally, on 12th December 1996, the then Prime Minister of India, H. D. Deve Gowda, and the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, signed a water-sharing deal. The accord was hailed as a breakthrough that ended decades of tensions between the two nations over the river.
Bangladesh saw the treaty as a crucial requirement for securing dry-season water for its farmers and ecosystems. On the other hand, India saw it as a way to maintain cooperation with a friendly neighbour and address West Bengal’s needs for irrigation and for flushing silt from Kolkata’s port.
Interestingly, the deal came at a time of warming ties. The newly formed Hasina government in Dhaka was interested in having a good relationship with India, and India’s United Front government was flexible in ensuring good relations with the eastern neighbour. The 1996 treaty was to last 30 years, through 2026, with the possibility of renewal by mutual consent. It was the first comprehensive water-sharing agreement between the two countries since Bangladesh gained independence.
Key provisions of the water-sharing deal
The Ganga water treaty laid out a formula for dividing the river’s flow at Farakka during the crucial dry season, which runs between 1st January and 31st May. Using historical flow data from 1949 to 1988 as a baseline, it allocated water based on measured availability in 10-day blocks.
To understand it in simpler terms, when the Ganga’s flow is low, India and Bangladesh split it equally. However, when the flow is higher, India gets a fixed share.
The flow is considered low at Farakka when it is 70,000 cusecs or less. In this case, both countries receive 50 per cent of the water.
When the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, it is considered to be medium, and Bangladesh gets 35,000 cusecs while India gets the remainder.
However, when the river flow exceeds 75,000 cusecs, India is entitled to 40,000 cusecs and the rest of the water goes to Bangladesh.
The treaty ensures each country gets a minimum of 35,000 cusecs of Ganga water in alternating periods during the direst part of the season, that is, between 11th March and 10th May. These guaranteed allotments in late spring are aimed at preventing extreme shortages of water, especially at the time of highest irrigation demand.
However, there is no absolute minimum flow guarantee if the Ganga’s volume falls abnormally low. Instead, Article II of the treaty says that if the flow drops below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, the two governments will immediately consult and “make adjustments on an emergency basis according to principles of equity and no harm to either party”. This clause to consult was a compromise that reflects the variability of the river, rather than promising water that might not exist. In case extreme shortfalls occur, both countries agreed to negotiate over division of water.
The treaty was built on the existing Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission to administer the arrangement. A Joint Committee of technical officials from both sides was tasked with monitoring daily flows, exchanging data, and ensuring the schedule is implemented properly.
The Joint Committee typically meets three times a year to supervise compliance and address any operational concerns. If there are disagreements, they are to be resolved diplomatically through the JRC or by mutual agreement on other means. There are no provisions for third-party involvement in the discussion, unlike some other international water pacts.
Three decades of cooperation and contention
Almost 30 years have passed since the treaty was signed. It has largely kept the peace over a contentious resource. Both India and Bangladesh have abided by the seasonal water-sharing schedules to a considerable extent. They regularly exchange flow data to ensure transparency. Officials from both sides often cite the treaty as an example of neighbourly cooperation.
However, on several occasions, Bangladesh has voiced frustrations, especially during years when water flow was considerably low. Dhaka has argued that the treaty’s formula is based on 20th-century flow averages and does not guarantee the country’s rightful share in practice.
Some studies reportedly revealed that the actual water deliveries were short of those promised. Between 1997 and 2016, in 94 out of 300 ten-day periods, Bangladesh reportedly received less water at its Hardinge Bridge point than was recorded upstream at Farakka. Bangladesh claimed that it did not always get the full amount due.
Bangladesh even accused India of sometimes withholding water at the peak of Bangladesh’s needs, that is, during March and April, and then compensating by releasing more water later. While this technically meets the treaty terms, it was claimed to have undermined Bangladesh during the planting season.
Environmental and regional groups in Bangladesh also point to ecological harm. They claimed that the treaty focuses on water allocation at Farakka but ignores downstream impacts. For example, reduced dry-season flows in the Ganga, which is called the Padma in Bangladesh, have been linked to increased river salinity and the degradation of wetlands in southwest Bangladesh.
However, from the Indian perspective, the treaty has at times been viewed as overly generous to Bangladesh. Politicians in West Bengal have complained that their own farmers and cities face water shortages while India honours its commitments downstream.
The West Bengal government under Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has even objected to the process of renewing the treaty, calling it “unilateral” and demanding greater say in any new allocation. Indian officials have noted that the 1996 arrangement forced a change in how the Farakka Barrage operates. It was originally designed to divert 40,000 cusecs into a canal to sustain Kolkata’s busy port.
However, it now must release much of that water to Bangladesh during the dry months. This has reportedly led to siltation and lower navigability in Kolkata’s harbour, as well as cooling water shortages at the power plant in Farakka. India needs to acknowledge the issue and determine how long it needs to oblige the needs of its neighbour while keeping Indian citizens’ needs at par.
Ironically, even within India there are divergent complaints. Officials in Bihar, upriver from Farakka, have occasionally blamed the barrage for too much water during monsoons. The Farakka Barrage’s gates, when opened in the flood season, have been accused of worsening silting and floods in Bihar’s Ganga basin.
These internal contradictions show that there is a need to rethink the treaty to ensure there is a balance in water sharing between Indian states and Bangladesh.
Renewal and renegotiation in a changing climate
As the date of expiration of the 1996 treaty draws closer, India and Bangladesh have been preparing to negotiate a fresh agreement. In late 2023, the Government of India formed a committee, including representatives from West Bengal and Bihar, to assess domestic water needs from the Ganga.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh has repeatedly emphasised that any reduction in its water share would result in a catastrophic situation in the country, as it depends on the Ganga for agriculture, fisheries, and drinking supply during the dry months. During Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Delhi in June 2024, her last before being ousted from office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi assured that talks on treaty renewal would begin, emphasising the importance of bilateral relations.
In March 2025, technical teams from both sides met in Kolkata to jointly measure flows at Farakka and kick-start expert-level discussions on a new accord. One of the major factors that will shape the upcoming renegotiation is climate change. Scientists have warned that the flow of the Ganga is becoming more erratic, with longer droughts and intense rains.
A 2019 study by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development projected that climate shifts could significantly alter the volumes of the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers in the coming decades. It could potentially cause an abrupt decrease in water flow during the dry season after 2050. In the coming decades, such changes in flow would affect millions of people downstream.
Both sides have acknowledged that any new treaty must be more climate-resilient and should incorporate adaptive water-sharing rules for extreme conditions. Experts suggest that the revised treaty should include improved data sharing, joint flood management strategies, and flexibility in allocation schedules that can adjust to real-time water flow.
Not to forget, political undercurrents will also have an effect on the upcoming negotiations for a new treaty between India and Bangladesh. Since August 2024, Bangladesh has been governed by an interim government. India has hinted that it prefers to conclude major agreements with an elected government in Dhaka for greater legitimacy.
Furthermore, the interim government under Mohammad Yunus has developed close relations with China, which has prompted India to be more cautious. Nonetheless, both countries have strong incentives to renew cooperation over the Ganga. The treaty’s terms will decide the future of diplomatic relations between India and Bangladesh for decades to come. Letting the treaty lapse in 2025 could usher in uncertainty and distrust between the two nations.
There must be a balance between India’s developmental demands and Bangladesh’s existential need for water. It is not possible for India to continue with terms that were decided in the 1996 deal. Water sharing between any two countries has always required deft diplomacy, scientific management, and a spirit of compromise. The waters of the Ganga have kept flowing peacefully for 30 years. The next version of the Ganga water treaty will thus be more than a dry legal document. It will be a litmus test of the two nations’ ability to share a lifeline river while keeping India’s changed requirements a priority. As a fast-growing economy, India cannot afford to lose a major chunk of water that has the potential to change the future of its people.
