On Thursday (20th February), Samajwadi Party (SP) leader Akhilesh Yadav announced that he would send a Hindi copy of a ‘Harvard study’ on the 2013 Kumbh Mela to Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav.
Yadav suggested that Yogi Adityanath did not know how to read English and was therefore sending a Hindi copy of a study, which the Samajwadi leader believed praised his administration for organising the Kumbh Mela 12 years ago.
“The Kumbh study by Harvard University was sent to the Chief Minister through the Speaker…It was in English…Now, I am sending a Hindi version for him to read.”
Failure to prevent the infamous stampede during the 2013 Kumbh Mela
OpIndia reviewed the 448-page book [pdf] titled ‘Kumbh Mela: Documenting the Ephemeral MEGACITY.’ Conducted by the Harvard University South Asia Institute (SAI), it found several lapses and mismanagement on the part of the then-state government.
For instance, the study noted that the government failed to prevent the stampede which took place on 10th February 2013 and claimed 42 lives.
At that time, Samajwadi Party leader Akhilesh Yadav was the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Congress was in power at the Centre. The criticism is highlighted in Pages 162-167 of the study. The relevant text is highlighted below:
Page 162
A great number of resources were once again marshaled to prevent stampedes at the 2013 Kumbh Mela. Yet, on February 10, on Mauni Amavasya, the most auspicious bathing day, when thirty million visits were reported at the Sangam, a stampede at the Allahabad railway station resulted in thirty- six dead and twice as many injured.
Page 163
A significant number of additional trains had been deployed on previous auspicious bathing days prior to this date, but had not been utilized to capacity. Fearing further financial losses, the federally run Railway Ministry had cut back on the number of trains requested by the Kumbh Mela police for the main bathing day.
Page 164
The security forces policing the city belonged to four different units—the city police, the state police, the federal Rapid Action Force, and the Indian Army, each of which functioned independently without a joint incident commander coordinating response at the scene, as is warranted during such mass casualty incidents.
The lack of coordinated triage and dispersal resulted in all patients arriving at the nearest tertiary facility. Since the government had instructed the hospital that no one be turned away, less acute cases often blocked up the hospital beds, and sicker patients, arriving later had to be sent forth to more distant hospitals.
The stampede was not a freak accident as it was made out to be, but was rather the inevitable result of rigid, centralized planning. The lone footbridge that bore the crush of pilgrims on February.
Page 165
The lone footbridge that bore the crush of pilgrims on February 10, 2013, quite literally represented the weak link between various arms of government, each individually committed to the Kumbh Mela’s success, yet inefficient together
Page 166
The 2013 Kumbh Mela stampede was a highly visible and highly reported event.
Page 167
The crowd mitigation strategies worked successfully throughout the Kumbh Mela except on the day of the stampede, when they probably mattered the most. Again, the system collapsed under stress. Weighed down by its bureaucracy and inflexibility, the administration was unable to generate the rapid and efficient response the injured warranted.
Poor sanitation at the 2013 Kumbh Mela
The book noted that sanitation facilities provided by the State government during the 2013 Kumbh Mela did not cover a significant number of devotees. As a result, there was large-scale prevalence of Open Defecation. Here are some of the observations made in the study.
Page 84
Needless to say, it is unlikely that the sanitation facilities serve all attendees. If we consider that they were used sixteen hours a day, then each person would need to evacuate in 2.5 minutes. It is for this reason that we can assume that much of the defecation will be done out in the open, leading to major health concerns.
Page 154
In spite of reasonably fairwater and sanitation facilities, the threat of the spread of food-borne disease was real and high. People ate in close quarters, shared very large communal meals, ate with their hands, and had poor hand hygiene.
Large-scale pollution at the event organised by Akhilesh Yadav govt
The book by Harvard University South Asia Institute (SAI) noted how Swami Chidananda launched his own initiative after witnessing the effectiveness of the Ganga Action Plan (GAP), which is headed by PM and CM of States (including Akhilesh Yasdav) where Ganga flows.
It further pointed out the failure of the State government to provide adequate sanitation and minimise pollution and waste. The book acknowledges that the Akhilesh Yadav government failed on the front of tackling pollution despite dubbing the festival as ‘Green Kumbh.’
Page 44
The internationally known teacher, Swami Chidananda from Paramarth Niketan ashram in Rishikesh, launched a series of green initiatives. Noting the ineffectiveness of the Government of India’s Ganga Action Plan, Chidananda took the GAP acronym for the Ganga Action Parivar (parivar meaning “family”).
Page 349
The 2013 Kumbh Mela was also coined the “Green Kumbh.”…But there was also much physical waste revealed ex post, and much room for improvement, as the numerous activists made vociferously clear. The extensive electrical power and the universal use of pit toilets, plus the millions of humans bathing in the two rivers, were not particularly sustainable.
Page 352
Minimal sanitation, as witnessed by environmental pollution and waste
Page 354
Sadly, no action on pollution despite rhetoric that this was the “Green Kumbh.” Massive debris left over after Kumbh ended. (FAILING IN OUR VIEW)
Failure in combating health challenges
The book noted that despite spending a sizeable budget on providing healthcare facilities at the 2013 Kumbh Mela, much of the effort was wasted on ‘sub optimal care.’ It highlighted the need for an extensive arrangement to meet supply and demand of public health needs.
The study also pointed out how the government missed the opportunity to track data on the patients, which could have had a positive impact on the healthcare system in the State. Here are some of the excerpts from the book.
Page 159
A sizeable portion of the mela budget is spent on healthcare; yet, most of it is wasted on providing sub-optimal care. The large healthcare infrastructure could perhaps be better utilized to implement much needed public health interventions
Page 167
Healthcare delivery may be improved by paying closer attention to matching supply with demand, adopting clinical or public health policies backed by evidence, and taking advantage of the access to the mela’s captive population by implementing much needed public health messaging and interventions.
Page 349
The overarching thought we hear most is if you had real-time numbers about location, personal profiles, and individual health, what would you do with the knowledge? India could use the information from the largest group of people ever assembled. This was christened the “Big Data Kumbh,” in that the authorities were awash in data, although data management seems to have played a minimal role in orchestrating the event.
Conclusion
While it is true that a section of the book praises some of the actions of the State government, it in no way eulogies Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav for organising the 2013 Kumbh Mela. The Samajwadi Party leader seems to be under the impression that the study found no evidence of mismanagement across health, pollution, security and sanitation. As such, he is seen challenging incumbent Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath with his own make-believe inferences about what the book by Harvard University entails.
