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From ‘Mile Mulayam Kanshi Ram, Hawa Ho Gaye Jai Shri Ram’ to ‘Pandit is also PDA’: Akhilesh Yadav and SP’s election-season reinvention

As Uttar Pradesh heads towards the 2027 Assembly election, Samajwadi Party (SP) chief Akhilesh Yadav appears to be attempting one of the biggest political image makeovers of his career. After years of projecting himself as the face of backward caste politics under the ‘PDA’ (Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak) banner and routinely accusing the BJP of practising divisive politics, Akhilesh has suddenly discovered a new constituency that he now claims has always been part of his social justice formula: Pandits.

Addressing a Brahmin/Prabuddh Varg Sammelan in Lucknow on August 5, Akhilesh declared that the “P” in PDA also stands for “Pandit”, accused the BJP of victimising Brahmins, invoked Swami Avimukteshwaranand, and even alleged that the BJP had “stolen” offerings made to Lord Ram at the Ayodhya Ram Mandir.

For a politician whose party has long been associated with antagonising Hindu sentiments and whose politics revolved around minority consolidation, the sudden embrace of Brahmins and overt Hindu symbolism is difficult to miss. It raises an obvious question: what changed?

The answer appears less ideological than electoral.

The mathematics behind the makeover

Political analysts view Akhilesh’s outreach as a recognition of changing electoral realities in Uttar Pradesh. Brahmins constitute roughly 10-14% of the state’s population and have traditionally voted overwhelmingly for the BJP. Winning even a fraction of this vote could significantly improve the SP’s prospects in a closely fought election.

The PDA slogan itself was unveiled only in 2023, replacing the SP’s earlier emphasis on Yadav-Muslim arithmetic with a broader coalition of backward classes, Dalits and minorities. The formula helped the SP improve its performance in the 2024 Lok Sabha election.

Now, however, Akhilesh appears to believe that the coalition alone may not be sufficient against a BJP led by Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, whose popularity among Hindu voters remains strong. Hence, the latest attempt to reinterpret PDA by retrospectively adding “Pandit” to it.

The timing is hardly accidental.

A remarkable departure from the SP’s political legacy

The outreach also sits uneasily with the Samajwadi Party’s own political history.

The party’s founder, Mulayam Singh Yadav, remains synonymous with one of the most contentious episodes in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. In October-November 1990, as Chief Minister, Mulayam ordered police firing on kar sevaks attempting to reach the disputed site in Ayodhya.

The official death toll stood at 16, although several organisations have disputed that figure over the years. Mulayam later expressed regret over the firing but continued to defend the decision, arguing that it was necessary to reassure the Muslim community.

That episode earned him the political nickname “Mullah Mulayam” among his critics.

The political messaging did not stop there.

Following the demolition of the disputed structure in 1992, the SP-BSP alliance famously campaigned in the 1993 Assembly election with the slogan:

“Mile Mulayam Kanshi Ram, Hawa Ho Gaye Jai Shri Ram.”

The slogan explicitly positioned itself against the Ram Janmabhoomi movement and the BJP’s mobilisation around it.

Today, however, Mulayam’s son invokes Lord Ram in nearly every election campaign.

Akhilesh’s own record

The ideological shift is not confined to Mulayam’s era.

During Akhilesh Yadav’s tenure as Chief Minister, his government banned the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s proposed 84-Kosi Parikrama in 2013, citing law and order concerns. The decision drew sharp criticism from Hindu organisations, which accused the SP government of selectively restricting Hindu religious activities.

Over the years, the SP leadership repeatedly portrayed the BJP’s emphasis on Hindutva as communal politics while simultaneously cultivating Muslim vote banks through identity-based mobilisation.

Even after launching PDA in 2023, the formulation itself conspicuously referred only to Pichhda, Dalit and Alpsankhyak, backward classes, Dalits and minorities. This was around the same time that Rahul Gandhi was strutting around demanding “Jiski Jitni Aabadi, Uska Utna Haq” and a caste census. Mr Yadav perhaps thought of cashing in on the sentiments and launching his own initiative to reach out to the Dalits and the minorities.

So predictably, there was no mention whatsoever of Brahmins or Pandits back then.

Three years later, Akhilesh has suddenly declared that Pandits were always part of PDA.

The reinterpretation appears less like an ideological evolution and more like political improvisation.

Why the change now?

The answer lies in the transformation of Indian politics over the past decade.

The Ram Mandir movement has culminated in the consecration of the Ayodhya temple. Public celebration of Hindu identity has become increasingly mainstream across caste lines. Even parties historically uncomfortable with overt expressions of Hindu religiosity now routinely invoke temples, festivals and Hindu icons during election campaigns.

The Congress has already undergone its own version of this transformation, with Rahul Gandhi frequently highlighting temple visits and describing himself as a “janeu-dhari Hindu.”

Regional parties now appear to be following the same trajectory.

A political observation often attributed to Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was that if Hindus united politically, parties opposing Hindutva would eventually be compelled to display their Hindu credentials openly to remain electorally relevant.

Whether one agrees with Savarkar’s politics or not, the present political landscape increasingly resembles that prediction.

Tactical adjustment, not ideological conversion

Akhilesh’s latest statements about Brahmins, Lord Ram and Hindu religious figures should therefore be viewed in their broader political context.

His outreach comes after years of identity politics centred around caste and minority consolidation. It comes months before a crucial Assembly election. It comes at a time when the BJP continues to enjoy significant support among Hindu voters in Uttar Pradesh.

None of this necessarily proves insincerity. Politicians are entitled to evolve, revisit old positions and broaden their appeal.

But genuine ideological shifts are usually accompanied by sustained changes in political conduct, introspection about past positions and consistency over time.

So far, Akhilesh’s latest embrace of Brahmins appears driven more by electoral arithmetic than philosophical transformation.

The SP’s sudden attempt to redefine PDA by inserting “Pandit” into a slogan that originally stood for backward classes, Dalits and minorities is less a reinvention of ideology than an acknowledgement of political reality.

In today’s Uttar Pradesh, no party can afford to appear indifferent or hostile to Hindu sentiment.

That, perhaps, is the most significant political message behind Akhilesh Yadav’s latest reinvention.

Abaan Ahmed, son of slain gangster-politician Atiq Ahmed, dies in road accident: Read about his criminal history

Abaan Ahmed, the 21-year-old youngest son of slain gangster-turned-politician Atiq Ahmed, died in a road accident in Uttar Pradesh’s Jhansi while he was travelling to meet his jailed brother on 6th August 2026.

The accident took place after the speeding car he was travelling in crashed into a road divider. His friend, identified as Sonu, also lost his life in the crash.

According to police, the impact of the collision was so severe that both Abaan Ahmed and his friend died on the spot. Preliminary findings suggest that overspeeding may have caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle.

The police, however, have launched a detailed investigation to ascertain the exact cause of death.

Who was Abaan Ahmed?

Abaan Ahmed was the fifth and youngest son of slain gangster-politician Atiq Ahmed and his wife Shaista Parveen. Although he largely remained away from public attention, he entered the national spotlight after the sensational murder of lawyer Umesh Pal in Prayagraj in February 2023.

At the time of the Umesh Pal murder, Abaan and his elder brother Mohammad Ahzam were minors. Following the killing, both brothers were taken into police custody and lodged in a juvenile home. Their mother, Shaista Parveen, had moved court alleging that the police had not informed the family about the whereabouts of her sons before shifting them to a child reform home.

The two brothers spent more than seven months in the Rajrooppur Children’s Home after police found them wandering alone in Prayagraj’s Chakia area following the massive crackdown on the Atiq Ahmed gang.

After attaining adulthood, they were released into the custody of their aunt, Parveen Qureshi, in October 2023. Soon after their release, they visited the graves of their father Atiq Ahmed and uncle Ashraf Ahmed before reportedly moving to a relative’s house in Prayagraj’s Hatwa area.

How Abaan Ahmed first came under the police scanner

Abaan Ahmed first came under the police scanner after the murder of Umesh Pal, the main witness in the 2005 murder case of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) MLA Raju Pal.

On 24th February 2023, Umesh Pal was shot dead outside his residence in Prayagraj by armed assailants. CCTV footage showed multiple attackers firing at him while others hurled crude bombs to ensure he could not escape. Two government-appointed security personnel accompanying Umesh Pal were also attacked, and one later succumbed to injuries.

The killing triggered a massive investigation by the Uttar Pradesh Police. Umesh Pal’s wife, Jaya Pal, lodged an FIR naming Atiq Ahmed, his wife Shaista Parveen, brother Ashraf Ahmed and several others. The FIR also named Atiq’s sons, including Ahzam and Abaan.

Police constituted multiple special teams to investigate the conspiracy behind the murder and launched a statewide crackdown on members of the Atiq Ahmed gang.

Later, the Uttar Pradesh Police’s chargesheet revealed that Abaan Ahmed and his elder brother Ahzam Ahmed had attended meetings related to the conspiracy while they were still minors.

According to investigators, they were present during meetings held in a Muslim hostel before the murder and were also part of the reconnaissance (reki) carried out three days before Umesh Pal was killed. 

The chargesheet further revealed that they accompanied Atiq’s son Asad Ahmed during the surveillance of the victim and were linked to the broader conspiracy surrounding the attack. These allegations form part of the police investigation and legal proceedings in the case.

FIR over controversial social media reel

Abaan again found himself in controversy in 2025 after a video recorded during a wedding function surfaced on social media. The reel featured him travelling in a convoy of luxury vehicles while a background track carried threatening dialogues and provocative lyrics glorifying violence.

Police said that the video attempted to create fear and spread intimidation in society. An FIR was registered at Prayagraj’s Dhoomanganj Police Station against Abaan Ahmed, his associate Hamza and several unidentified persons under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) relating to statements likely to disturb public peace.

The viral video sparked sharp reactions online, with many social media users claiming that despite the deaths of Atiq Ahmed and Ashraf Ahmed, members of the family were still attempting to project an image of power and intimidation. Police also began investigating who created the video and whether it was uploaded with the intention of threatening people.

Brother Asad Ahmed was a key accused in the Umesh Pal murder case

Abaan’s elder brother, Asad Ahmed, was one of the main accused in the Umesh Pal murder case and was considered a key member of the conspiracy. The Uttar Pradesh Police accused Asad of coordinating the attack and maintaining communication with members of the gang before the murder.

He was carrying a reward of ₹5 lakh when he was killed in an encounter by the Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force (STF) near Jhansi in April 2023. His death came just days before Atiq Ahmed and Ashraf Ahmed themselves were shot dead while in police custody.

Atiq Ahmed’s evil empire built on crime and fear

The story of Abaan and his brothers is inextricably tied to the broader history of Atiq Ahmed’s criminal syndicate, known in police records as Inter-State Gang 227. Atiq Ahmed’s entry into the underworld began in 1979 with a murder charge. Over four decades, he built a terrifying empire across Prayagraj, Kaushambi, Lucknow, and Noida, eventually accumulating over 100 criminal cases that ranged from land grabbing, extortion, and kidnapping to murder.

He successfully translated his local muscle into a political career, serving as a five-time MLA from the Allahabad West constituency and winning a Lok Sabha seat from Phulpur in 2004 under the Samajwadi Party. 

However, his political standing began to unravel following the daylight murder of BSP MLA Raju Pal in 2005, a crime in which Atiq and his younger brother Khalid Azim, alias Ashraf, were the prime accused. 

Ashraf himself had over 40 criminal cases registered against him. Over the years, the family’s extensive properties, valued at well over ₹150 crore, were attached by state authorities under the Gangster Act.

Today, the family’s criminal footprint has left its remaining members either dead, incarcerated, or facing ongoing legal action.

Atiq’s eldest sons, Mohammad Umar and Mohammad Ali, remain in separate high-security prisons, while his wife, Shaista Parveen, continues to evade law enforcement as an absconding suspect in the Umesh Pal conspiracy.

The killing of Atiq Ahmed 

The long reign of Atiq Ahmed came to a dramatic and violent end in April 2023, just two days after his son Asad was killed in the STF encounter. On the night of 15th April, 2023, Atiq Ahmed and his brother Ashraf were being escorted in police custody for a routine medical examination at a hospital in Prayagraj.

While the brothers were responding to questions from reporters on live television, three assailants posing as journalists suddenly pulled out firearms and shot both Atiq and Ashraf at point-blank range. The assailants surrendered to the police immediately on the spot. The televised killing marked the end of a gangster who had once dominated politics and crime in eastern Uttar Pradesh

With Atiq dead, Asad killed in an encounter, Umar and Ali behind bars, Shaista Parveen absconding, and now Abaan Ahmed losing his life in a road accident, the family that once dominated the criminal landscape of eastern Uttar Pradesh has steadily disintegrated. What was once considered one of the state’s most feared criminal empires has now largely collapsed under sustained police action, legal proceedings and a series of violent tragedies.

Sonam Wangchuk fasted for 26 days to revive Rahul Gandhi’s political career: Here is how it was squandered away because of his petty ego and false grandiose

Sonam Wangchuk, the climate activist and education reformer who gained national attention for his 26-day hunger strike at Jantar Mantar during the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest in July, has said he wanted Leader of the Opposition (LoP) Rahul Gandhi to end his fast unto death. Sonam Wangchuk said that his wife Geetanjali Angmo pursued Rahul Gandhi to break his fast. However, the Congress leader gave no positive response.

Speaking to India Today, Sonam Wangchuk said, “Actually, we were pondering on breaking my fast through the Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi, and Geetanjali was working on that. She was not against Rahul. She was working hard to see if Rahul Gandhi could break my fast. She didn’t get a positive response.”

The Ladakh-based activist said that giving this context of Rahul Gandhi’s nonchalance towards efforts to get him on board to end his hunger strike was important, since Geetanjali Angmo was brutally trolled by Congress supporters over her later criticism of the Congress leadership.

It must be recalled that Sonam Wangchuk ended his hunger strike on 24th July 2026, at Medanta Hospital in the presence of Union Ministers JP Nadda and Jitendra Singh.

Sonam Wangchuk wanted to hand over the political momentum to Rahul Gandhi?

Sonam Wangchuk has maintained that he has no political ambitions and that his hunger strike was only an act of civic responsibility to seek accountability from the government. However, Wangchuk was concerned and invested in the political optics surrounding the end of his hunger strike.

The climate activist said that he wanted the end of his hunger strike framed as a joint effort involving figures from the ruling dispensation, the Opposition, and student leaders.

It is apparent that there is no way Rahul Gandhi could have delivered the demands Sonam Wangchuk had raised, be it resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan as Education Minister, or compensation for students who allegedly committed suicide over NEET paper leak, etc, since Gandhi is not a part of the ruling dispensation.

Logic says Wangchuk’s fast could have only ended if he voluntarily gave up, was force-fed, or if the government agreed to consider his demands. Neither any student leader nor the LoP could have made this possible.

Beyond the missed ‘joint effort’ framing that Sonam Wangchuk is now talking about, a question arises here: Did Sonam Wangchuk want to hand over the political momentum of the CJP-Wangchuk protest to Rahul Gandhi and secure a heroic off-ramp?

As Sonam Wangchuk talked about a Ladakhi custom, which says that the person who offers water, juice or soup, or formally breaks the fast, signals acceptance, moral endorsement or a shared ownership of the outcome.

Rahul Gandhi preferred manoeuvring to hijack the CJP protest momentum rather than sharing credit with Sonam Wangchuk

While Sonam Wangchuk may have pursued an off-ramp that linked the resolution with cross-party validation, such anti-status quo optics are unattractive to a leader like Rahul Gandhi, whose brand depends primarily on being the main face of the Opposition.

It is perhaps for this reason that Rahul Gandhi did not respond positively to Geetanjali Angmo’s efforts to get him to end Sonam Wangchuk’s fast. Instead, Rahul Gandhi treaded the path of a parallel protest at the right moment.

Sonam Wangchuk began his hunger strike over the NEET paper leak issue on 28th June 2026; weeks passed, but he received no major political support beyond the online rhetoric. It was only when the Monsoon Session of the Parliament neared that key Opposition leaders, including Samajwadi Party’s Dimple Yadav, Azad Samaj Party’s Chandrashekhar Azad, and Aam Aadmi Party’s Arvind Kejriwal, began flocking to Jantar Mantar.

Rahul Gandhi has proven to be a disappointment in elections while he and his party continue to seek out fresh or controversial platforms in the hope of a miracle that will transform him into a real “JanNayak” and not merely in their social media campaigns.

However, Rahul Gandhi remained distant from the CJP protest throughout and extended only performative support. Instead of joining or visibly amplifying the ongoing CJP protest as a supporting force, Rahul Gandhi deliberately pursued a parallel track. The Congress party launched a “Chhatron Ki Goonj” student outreach program, and pressed the overlapping demand for Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation from its own platform.

The Congress party had even faced criticism from the anti-BJP ecosystem for choosing a measured separation rather than fully integrating into the CJP momentum. On 20th July, when the CJP proceeded with its announced “Chalo Sansad” march to Parliament, Rahul Gandhi and Congress leaders staged a parallel protest over the same demands the CJP raised.

The timing of Rahul Gandhi’s ground protest was interesting. While Congress supporters argue that Gandhi waited for the Parliament session to begin to escalate his demands for Pradhan’s resignation, Congress’s protest was staged a protest outside Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s residence.

If Congress had to protest near PM Modi’s house only, they could have done it way earlier. However, Congress and Rahul Gandhi apparently waited for the CJP protest to build momentum, earn wider public support against the Modi government and hijack the political momentum when it reached its peak on 20th July.

The choice of location was deliberate as Congress did not want to play a supporting role in the CJP protest, which clearly had the participation of workers of Samajwadi Party and other anti-BJP parties.

Following Sonam Wangchuk’s revelation that he wanted Rahul Gandhi to break his fast and that the Congress leader purportedly refused, many opined that Gandhi missed a golden opportunity to naturally become the political hero of the CJP-Wangchuk-led protests that enjoyed wider youth attention if not support.

However, Rahul Gandhi does not operate this way. Throughout his career, Rahul Gandhi has undergone numerous failed relaunches, and none of these relaunch manoeuvres has ever involved Gandhi relying on support from outside elements or by playing a supporting role in an anti-Modi government show pulled off by someone else.

Rahul Gandhi’s whole idea behind attempting to hijack the CJP protest was to avoid credit-sharing, knowing that the protests have peaked to a point that the Central government will have to give concessions, if not fully capitulate before the CJP’s violent street veto.

The Congress party has long itched for a Nepal-like violent regime change in India. And perhaps, Congress did not want to be completely absent from the theatre when there was a possibility of its dream coming true.

Call it petty ego or political selfishness, Congress and Rahul Gandhi would always prefer to sit back and wait for an anti-government agitation to grow big and eventually hijack, rather than play a supporting role and share credit. For Congress, playing a supporting role in a protest orchestrated by CJP, the B-team of the Aam Aadmi Party, would have meant an admission that the party failed to raise the issue concerning youth, and is only backing it for political mileage.

Being a national party that still positions itself as the main opposition to the BJP despite three consecutive setbacks in general elections, Congress cannot afford to lose this ‘principal opposition’ status, for the party will then be at risk of losing its relevance fully.

When Travancore king Marthanda Varma challenged the Dutch monopoly on the Malabar Coast spice trade

India, has historically been renowned for its immense wealth, both natural and otherwise. Its fertile land, spices, textiles, indigo and an abundance of natural resources made it exceptionally prosperous. The country bounded by the Indian Ocean enjoyed a significant advantage that further enhanced its appeal with its strategically located peninsular geography and extensive coastline.

India controlled the trade in luxury goods and held nearly unrivalled monopoly in commodities such as cotton, silk and spices. However, its glorious past also bears the scars of numerous invasions and attacks by imperialists and marauders who sought to exploit its wealth and influence for their own benefit.

From the Muslim invaders and eventually the Europeans, foreign occupiers arrived in the country with the intent to loot, dominate and ultimately conquer it by any means necessary. The colonial era was characterised by profound losses, but it was also marked by extraordinary moments of brilliance from certain kingdoms, warriors and freedom fighters who fought valiantly to protect their homeland and humbled the colonisers.

India has witnessed many such scenes throughout its recorded civilisational history and a confrontation involving the Kingdom of Travancore stands among the most remarkable of them.

The arrival of Vasco da Gama near Calicut (Kozhikode) on the Malabar Coast in 1498 set in motion an unprecedented chain of events that transformed not only the fate of the Indian subcontinent but also that of the wider world. The Portuguese established the first direct maritime route between the two sides, opening the door for other European entities to follow in the hopes of changing their fortunes by abusing India’s tremendous riches.

Image via Endless Explorer

Among them, the British emerged as the most successful, setting up a vast empire that ruled the subcontinent for nearly two centuries. However, another European power landed in India 107 years after the Portuguese with the ambition of challenging their authority and replacing them as the leading colonial force in the region.

The Dutch East India Company

The Dutch Republic (Netherlands) founded the United East India Company also known as the Dutch East India Company (VOC), on 20th March 1602 and consistently fought with the Portuguese, English and French over India’s wealth. The local kings on the Malabar Coast understood the potential of pepper to buy weapons, raise armies, construct palaces and increase their dominance. Hence, they also made agreements with the Europeans and switched allegiances when it suited them.

Dutch coins used in the 18th century (Source: Endless Explorer)

The Dutch wanted to expand their hold in the Indian Coast from their base in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), however, their ambitions were short-lived as a formidable resistance inflicted a crushing humiliation upon them bringing their aspirations to an abrupt end.

The Battle of Colachel, where the Travancore kingdom met with the Dutch, was the first time an Indian kingdom had defeated a naval power from Europe and demonstrated that the courage of a native monarch and his army could surpass the might of the Europeans.

The rise of Marthanda Varma: A fierce challenge to Dutch monopoly

Kerala in the early 18th century was a tumultuous blend of troubled monarchies, warring nobility and broken territorial dreams. Travancore (Thiruvithamcode) was a member of a loose network of temple states and colonies in south Malabar. The small state was split into 3 parts: Venad, Jayasimhanad and Odanad which were presided over by various branches of the royal dynasty who had difficult ties and frequently targeted one another.

Travancore kings like Aditya and Ravi Varma made repeated initiatives to bring the kingdom together and create a centralised government but in vain. Fear and distrust only exacerbated the divisions. Internal confrontations threatened to disfigure Travancore’s spirit while the Dutch East India Company aggressively bared its teeth.

However, unbeknownst to everyone, the tide was about to turn, setting the stage for an unprecedented incident. The royal house of Thirappur Swaroopam welcomed Anizham Thirunal Marthanda Varma, popularly known as Marthanda Varma in 1706. This new addition took on the role of a custodian of a profound legacy that altered the trajectory of the throne of Venad.

A depiction of Marthanda Varma. (Source: Wikipedia)

He had two essential tools at his disposal: the political insight of his mother, Karthika Thirunal Uma Devi and the martial traditions rooted in Kilimanoor. The Malabar Coast region was split up among several small chiefdoms at the time. Venad’s divided and fighting royal lineages sent the kingdom into a never-ending cycle of plots, conspiracies, schemes, betrayals and succession struggles. The common people were trapped in a whirlwind of uncertainty as assassinations, betrayals and switching alliances became routine.

On the other hand, the insatiable Dutch East India Company was keen to stake its claim on commodities including pepper and cardamom. 23-year-old Varma ascended the throne in 1729 after his maternal uncle and initiated a campaign of ruthless efficiency to consolidate his power with the help of his strong army and subjugated multiple of these tiny states. He shut down the internal feud and then set his sights on the lush, spice-rich areas that European powers had long coveted.

Varma gained command of marine trade by capturing Kollam, a crucial port and pepper source. He also took over Attingal which was inherited by his mother. Venad was unified by his iron will as he surged toward Kochi (Cochin). He affirmed Travancore’s supremacy over the heartlands that produced spices and contested the Dutch presence there.

As a result, the company’s leadership in Malabar, whose trade relied on obtaining spices from these locations was put in jeopardy. The resounding call for economic liberation from Travancore was evident, provoking anger among the feudal middlemen and the white expansionists.

The company flag (1630) (Source: Wikipedia)

Varma’s soaring banner above the spice-rich coast alarmed the VOC which realised that it was no longer an unwavering maritime overlord of the Indian Ocean. He was also interested in the kingdom of Odanad, famous for its pepper production. However, the Dutch maintained a firm grip on the pepper trade there. Furthermore, Varma was also making deals with the British East India Company which set off warning bells.

The Dutch were losing their exclusivity on pepper, cardamom and cinnamon as Marthanda Varma refused to maintain the monopoly accords they had made with the areas freshly absorbed by Travancore. To add insult to injury, this action was not perpetrated by a European but rather by an Indian monarch who steadfastly refused to comply with their demands. Varma had dared to upset the power equilibrium, much to their chagrin.

The tensions between the Kingdom of Travancore and the Dutch: The beginning of the rivalry

The king of Deshinganad (Quilon or Kollam) asked the Dutch for help against an anticipated Travancore onslaught, threatening to submit to Varma if they failed to assist him. The states of Maruthurkulangara, Eledattu Svarupam (Kottarakkara) and Peritally or Perakattavali (Nedumangad) also had monopoly agreements with the Dutch. Travancore annexed them in 1733-1734 and the company’s trade in Malabar was hurt greatly as their procurement from the trio ceased entirely.

The Dutch commander at Kochi, Julius Valentyn Stein van Gollenesse, asked Varma to stick to the monopoly treaty with Peritally in 1736. It was inked between the company and the state in 1688. He emphasised that its exiled ruler had promised his entire territory in exchange for protection, but they had refused to stand with him against Travancore.

Julius Valentyn Stein van Gollenesse (Source: Wikipedia)

Varma consented to send his envoys to meet the Dutch delegates in August 1736 but denied it after they arrived at the place while Peritally’s black pepper continued to be supplied to other international traders. Julius urged the queen of Maruthurkulangara to enforce the monopoly arrangement with the Dutch in September of that year, but she did not consent either because her state was also under Travancore’s suzerainty.

The prized spice trade was gradually slipping away from the clutches of the worried Dutch. Thus, they attempted to coerce Varma through their Governor of Ceylon, Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff. Varma was advised to curtail his military ambitions. This diplomatic manoeuvre was essentially a veiled intimidation move that could not impact Varma.

Scared of assimilation into Travancore, Dutch-backed smaller kingdoms entered the standoff to hold onto their authority. However, they had chosen the wrong side and would understand it sooner rather than later. The company strengthened coastal outposts, set up naval blockades and made an effort to mobilise local opposition, but they could not beat Varma’s forces which were trained in modern combat and adhered to a centralised leadership.

Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff (Source: Wikipedia)

The Dutch were desperate to put a lid on Travancore’s expanding borders before it devoured their spice trade, and Gustaaf travelled to Kochi for this purpose in January 1739. He visited as a representative of the highest authority of the Dutch East India Company at Batavia (Jakarta), the headquarters of the Dutch East Indies, to review the operations of their command in Malabar.

Gustaaf, like a true imperialist, accused Varma of inciting the Dutch to abandon their comparatively “peaceful” stance and held the English accountable for corrupting his mind. He dispatched a report in July and highlighted that Varma’s expanding power endangered their trade interests in the area due to his support for their opponents.

Gustaaf advocated for military action to pressure the coastal authorities to carry out their contractual assignments and dismissed a recommendation to pay market price for pepper procurement, citing it as unprofitable. The region was such a valuable asset in Dutch commercial interests that they did not grant it “ordinary” status, which would have required its residents to pay additional taxes.

They could not risk losing the lucrative black pepper trade that was substantially filling their coffers. Gustaaf argued for “violent redress” to save Dutch colonisation in a December 1739 report, asserting that the company was in “complete ruin.” They were on the lookout for a chance, and the ousting of the princess of Elayadathu Swarupam created that opening.

Pepper harvesting (Source: Endless Explorer)

Gustaaf wanted Varma to reinstate her when she showed up in Thekkumkur after escaping from captivity in Travancore. He presented himself as an adjudicator and a champion of her rights, while in reality, he merely desired to use her as a stepping stone for an ulterior motive. However, Varma likely perceived his true intentions and declined.

The Dutch official personally met with him in the name of peace but soon revealed his cards in a subsequent negotiation, announcing war if their proposals were rejected. The resolute king brushed aside the threat, asserting boldly that he had been considering the possibility of invading them someday.

He retorted that “should the Dutch lose the war, he would invade the Netherlands and Europe itself one day with fishing boats” and stood undaunted in front of his adversary.

An intense encounter was clearly on the horizon, and the Dutch who were motivated by their successful factory establishments and the internal disputes engaged in political intrigues with the rulers hostile to Varma. Kochi, Thekkumkur, Vadakkumkur, Purakkad, Kollam and Kayamkulam forged a coalition with the colonisers while the action was planned on multiple fronts, including Nedumangadu and Karunagapally.

The simmering confrontation explodes: The Dutch taste initial successes

The Dutch command in Malabar made the decision to wage war on Travancore without receiving authorisation or waiting for supplies from Batavia after the talks with Varma were unsuccessful. A contingent of their soldiers was deployed from Ceylon under the leadership of Captain Johannes Hackert.

They pressed Varma to return the acquired territories, but he turned down the submission. Afterwards, the Travancore army, which was positioned close to Kollam, a strategically important port, was struck by the Dutch and their allies on 12th November 1739.

Deshinganad, Kayamkulam and Kochi were among those who joined the Dutch camp. The Travancore soldiers were chased by the invaders till Tangasseri (Quilon de Sima) after a hand grenade detonated their gunpowder storage during the ensuing altercation.

The Dutch captured 16 cannons there and marched to Paravur. They were congratulated on their success by their fellow colonisers, the British EIC, at Anchuthengu and requested to spare their factory at Edava. The Dutch and their partners advanced on Attingal and Varkala at the beginning of December 1739.

Image via Endless Explorer

Travancore put up a stockade manned by 5,000 Nair men as Kayamkulam and Kollam marched against the defenders. Varma, who was occupied with repelling the Dutch attack, was caught off guard by a new front when Chanda Sahib, the general and son-in-law of Nawab Dost Ali Khan of the Carnatic Sultanate, orchestrated an incursion against his army.

Travancore army retreated to thwart the offensive while the Dutch seized Elayadathu Swarupam and reinstated the princess. She then gifted them Ayiroor village, where they erected a modest fort to solidify their position. However, Travancore soon surrounded it after which she ran away to Kochi.

Attingal was the next target for the Dutch, but they were driven back. They halted the charge until they were supported by troops from Ceylon and retreated to Ayiroor, burning and pillaging the region en route.

Travancore had to vacate Navaikulam on 30th December 1739 and Attingal on 25th January 1740 due to the Nair regiment of Kollam. However, the continuous violence exacted an extensive toll on the Dutch-led bloc, primarily the Indian kingdoms. They managed to take down the Travancore troops at the Attingal ferry on 20th February 1740, but the victory was attained at a steep cost. Kollam lost half of its men and left the battlefield alongside Kayamkulam.

The British EIC factory at Anchuthengu, who had their own colonial interests in the region, also conveniently intervened to safeguard the same. They gave 150 soldiers, weapons and ammunition to Travancore. The Dutch were compelled to withdraw but they acted to prevent Varma from capitalising on the opportunity.

They persuaded the distressed ruler of Kollam to gather a fresh army of 10,000 Nair warriors. Furthermore, Varma had to endure defeat at the hands of Chanda Sahib, and the Dutch strived to exploit this situation but clashes in Batavia obstructed their expected reinforcements.

These early successes emboldened the Dutch, convincing them that they had weakened Varma and could overwhelm him with their forces. However, fortune favoured the brave as this overconfidence proved to be a grave miscalculation and went down in history as the first massive defeat of a European naval power by an Indian king.

Note: This is a two-part series on the Battle of Colachel. The battle will be comprehensively discussed in the next segment. Read the next article here.

Why did the Stock Market suddenly reverse on Wednesday? Inside SEBI’s new closing auction system that has traders on edge

India’s benchmark indices looked set for another day of gains on Wednesday.

Crude oil prices had softened, easing concerns over inflation. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) kept the repo rate unchanged at 5.25 per cent, a move that reassured investors. The Sensex climbed nearly 450 points in early trade, and optimism appeared to be building.

Then, the rally disappeared.

Within hours, the Sensex had slipped into negative territory while the Nifty also lost momentum. The abrupt reversal puzzled many investors because there was no major geopolitical shock or disappointing economic data to justify the sell-off.

The answer lay elsewhere. It lies in a new trading mechanism introduced just two days earlier.

A major overhaul in the way India’s official closing prices are determined has unsettled traders, triggered unusual movements in benchmark indices and exposed market participants to risks they had never encountered under the old system.

What exactly changed?

Beginning August 3, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) rolled out the Closing Auction Session (CAS) for the cash market of stocks that have futures and options (F&O) contracts.

It may sound like a technical change, but it fundamentally alters how India’s markets behave during the final minutes of trading.

Until last week, the official closing price of an F&O stock was calculated using the Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) of trades executed during the last 30 minutes of continuous trading. Since prices kept updating until the closing bell, traders had a fairly good idea of where the market was likely to settle.

That is no longer the case.

Under the new framework, continuous cash trading in eligible stocks ends at 3:15 pm. From there, exchanges shift to a dedicated 20-minute auction, during which orders are collected rather than executed immediately. Once the auction concludes, the exchange determines a single equilibrium price, the level at which the highest number of buy and sell orders can be matched. That becomes the official closing price.

In other words, the closing price is no longer an average of trades. It is now a price discovered through an auction.

Why did SEBI change a system that was already working?

The old method had long attracted criticism from institutional investors and market regulators.

Large passive funds that track benchmark indices often have to buy or sell shares near the market close so that their portfolios mirror the index. Under the VWAP system, these sizeable transactions could themselves move prices while they were being executed, making it harder for funds to replicate the index accurately.

There was another concern.

Since futures and options contracts are settled using official closing prices, concentrated buying or selling during the last few minutes of trading had the potential to influence settlement values. Even small price changes could significantly affect derivatives positions worth thousands of crores.

The auction system seeks to reduce that vulnerability by gathering all orders first and matching them together at one equilibrium price instead of executing them one after another.

Several developed markets, including the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, already use similar closing auction mechanisms.

How does the new closing auction work?

For F&O stocks, the last 25 minutes of the trading day now follow a completely different sequence.

Between 3:15 pm and 3:20 pm, continuous cash trading ends, and the market transitions into the auction session.

From 3:20 pm to 3:25 pm, traders can place both market and limit orders.

Between 3:25 pm and 3:30 pm, only limit orders are accepted. The exchange randomly closes order entry sometime during the last two minutes to prevent traders from attempting last-second manipulation.

Finally, between 3:30 pm and 3:35 pm, the exchange matches all orders and discovers a single equilibrium price, which becomes the official closing price.

Meanwhile, trading in stock and index futures and options continues until 3:40 pm, allowing derivatives traders a short window to respond after the cash-market closing price has been determined.

Importantly, the new mechanism applies only to the cash market of F&O-eligible stocks. Shares that do not have derivatives contracts continue to follow the old VWAP-based closing system until 3:30 pm.

Why are traders suddenly nervous?

The issue is not that the auction is inherently flawed.

It is that traders are adjusting to a market where they no longer know with certainty where prices will settle.

During continuous trading, investors can monitor bids, offers and executed trades in real time. During the closing auction, however, orders are merely collected until matching takes place. Although indicative prices are displayed, the final settlement price can still change before the auction concludes.

That uncertainty matters enormously because the official closing price is used to:

  • Settle futures and options contracts.
  • Calculate benchmark index values.
  • Value mutual fund portfolios.
  • Determine mark-to-market gains and losses for institutional investors.

A stock that appears comfortably profitable during regular trading can end up settling at a significantly different price after the auction, changing the economics of an entire derivatives position.

Why did the Nifty and Sensex suddenly stop moving together?

One of the biggest surprises after the rollout has been the unusually large gap between India’s two benchmark indices.

Traditionally, the Nifty and Sensex move almost in tandem because they share most of their constituent stocks.

This week has been different.

The reason lies in the auction itself.

The National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) conduct separate closing auctions using separate order books. As a result, the same company can finish at different prices on each exchange.

Heavyweights such as Reliance Industries, ICICI Bank and Infosys have already recorded noticeably different closing prices on the NSE and BSE under the new mechanism.

Those differences become more visible because the Nifty contains 50 stocks, while the Sensex tracks 30, and the weight assigned to common stocks also differs between the two indices.

The result has been a rare divergence in benchmark performance that has surprised even experienced market participants.

Who has been winning, and who has been losing?

The biggest beneficiaries have been arbitrage traders.

Temporary pricing gaps between the cash and derivatives markets have created opportunities that sophisticated funds have been quick to exploit.

Retail traders, however, have had a tougher experience.

Many entered positions based on prices visible during the regular trading session only to find that the official closing price used for settlement differed materially once the auction concluded.

The resulting swings in options premiums and futures settlements caught many participants off guard, particularly around derivatives expiry.

Other changes traders should know

The new auction has also changed several everyday trading practices.

Open Stop-Loss (SL), Stop-Loss Market (SL-M) and Iceberg orders do not carry forward into the auction session for eligible stocks. Traders therefore need to manage such positions before continuous trading ends.

Similarly, market orders are accepted only during the initial phase of the auction. After 3:25 pm, only limit orders can be placed.

Intraday traders using MIS products should also verify revised auto square-off timings with their brokers, as broker cut-off times may now differ from the old market schedule.

Will the confusion last?

Probably not.

Most analysts believe the current volatility reflects a market adjusting to a fundamentally new closing mechanism rather than a permanent structural problem.

As institutional participation in the auction increases and traders become more familiar with the process, liquidity is expected to improve, and pricing anomalies should reduce.

SEBI, too, appears confident that the transition period will smooth out over time and is not expected to revisit the framework immediately.

What’s the crux of the matter?

Wednesday’s market reversal was less about the economy and more about market mechanics.

Strong macroeconomic cues had initially lifted investor sentiment, but uncertainty surrounding SEBI’s new Closing Auction Session ultimately overshadowed those positives.

The reform is intended to make India’s closing prices more transparent, improve price discovery and reduce opportunities for manipulation. Yet, like many structural market reforms, it has produced short-term disruptions before participants have had time to adapt.

For now, the familiar assumption that the market effectively ends at 3:30 pm no longer holds true for F&O stocks. In India’s new trading landscape, the most important price of the day is no longer discovered during continuous trading; it is determined only after the closing auction ends.

Meta’s PM Modi video controversy explained: What is Safe Harbour and how Facebook, Google could lose their protection?

The parliamentary committee has asked Meta owner Mark Zuckerberg to apologise within three days over Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s video being removed from Facebook for a few hours. The committee has said that if Zuckerberg does not apologise within the given time, Facebook’s safe harbour protection could be revoked.

In fact, Meta, Google and other platforms are no longer limited to playing the role of mere intermediaries. They have gone beyond this by taking actions such as blocking and promoting content. This also increases their accountability.

The PM Modi Video Case

The Information and IT Committee has warned that if its direction is not followed within three days, the government could consider withdrawing Facebook’s safe harbour protection. This could expose Facebook officials to criminal prosecution, as FIRs could be registered against company officials if this protection is removed.

The controversy began over a video released by PM Modi late at night on July 23, 2026. PM Modi had posted it on Instagram, and it was later shared on Facebook. The video was made in a selfie-style format. It had disappeared from Facebook for five hours.

In this case, an Information and IT Committee was formed under the chairmanship of BJP MP Nishikant Dubey. The committee held a meeting with officials of Meta, X, Google and other digital platforms. Meta officials admitted that PM Modi’s video had disappeared from the platform for some time because of a technical error. The officials expressed regret over it, but the committee and the government considered this expression of regret insufficient.

The Information Technology and Communications Committee called the removal of the PM’s video an ‘attack on democracy’ and said that Meta should take action against the officials responsible for it. Apart from this, Zuckerberg himself should apologise, and that too within three days.

What is Safe Harbour?

Safe harbour protection is a legal protection under which internet platforms (Intermediaries) are not automatically held responsible for content posted or activities carried out by their users. In India, this protection is provided under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000.

This does not mean that platforms are above the law. It means that if they are only platforms and follow the law, they cannot be held responsible for every action of every user. In other words, safe harbour legally protects websites and platforms from liability so that they are not held responsible for content shared by users.

In fact, this was introduced in the early years of the internet to encourage online navigation, so that platforms could avoid unnecessary legal troubles. Safe harbour protection is therefore quite important because of this. It means that sites cannot face criminal action simply because of material posted by users.

In the United States, safe harbour was included under Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934. It was added with a new provision in 1996, while in India it was included under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

According to this, if companies follow the rules set by the Indian government and courts, they cannot be held responsible for illegal posts made by users, and no case can be filed against them. However, India has become strict about removing objectionable and deepfake content through the amendments to the new IT Rules, 2021, and 36 hours are given for this in certain cases.

What is the difference between a publisher and an intermediary?

A publisher is someone who selects, edits and publishes content. For example, a news channel or newspaper creates its own news, edits it and then shows or publishes it. In such a situation, it is responsible for that content. Therefore, if false news is published or shown, the publisher is responsible for it.

On the other hand, the role of an Intermediary is different. It only provides a platform, such as Instagram, Facebook, Google, X, YouTube, Telegram and other platforms used by users. In other words, intermediaries do not create content. They host content uploaded by users. This is why they receive safe harbour protection.

Now the question is, when companies give preference to specific content through algorithms, promote it and make money from it, do they still remain only intermediaries or do they become like publishers?

What are the rules in India?

In India, safe harbour can also be removed. If a platform does not take action even after being informed about illegal activity, its safe harbour protection can be removed. If it does not follow an order of the court or government, or promotes cybercrime, its safe harbour protection can be ended.

This can be decided on the orders of the government or a court. Apart from this, if a platform itself starts controlling content in the way publishers do and makes money from it, its safe harbour protection can be removed. In such a situation, the platform can lose its “legal shield”.

Under the IT Rules, 2021, large social media platforms have been given several responsibilities in India. Platforms are required to appoint a governance officer. If a complaint is filed, it has to be dealt with on time. They are required to cooperate with law enforcement agencies and remove content when required. They are also required to provide information related to major cybercrimes.

A platform cannot be held guilty simply because a crime started on Instagram, Facebook or another platform. For example, if a person meets someone on Instagram and later commits fraud offline, the primary responsibility will remain with the accused person. But if the platform does not take action even after receiving a complaint, or repeatedly allows fake accounts to operate, legal action can be taken against it. The same applies if it ignores a court order.

This is not the first time that the Indian government and a digital platform have had a dispute. There have been several disputes with X, WhatsApp, Google and Meta in the past as well. These disputes have involved orders to remove objectionable content, fake news and matters of national security. Questions have also been raised over content related to Shaheen Bagh and the farmers’ protest. There have been several disputes over compliance with the IT rules issued by the government.

In the case of alleged AI-generated and morphed videos of Prime Minister Modi being circulated on social media, Hyderabad Cyber Crime Police registered an FIR in July 2026 against Meta India head Arun Srinivas and several social media users. The police are now investigating what Meta did to stop such deepfake and misleading content. They are also examining why a content moderation system was not in place on the platform.

A similar thing happened in the case involving Union Minister Nitin Gadkari. AI-generated deepfake videos were made involving his family and claims about them benefiting from E-20 petrol. He has approached the Bombay High Court over this. The Bombay High Court allowed Gadkari to file a case against Meta, X, Google and all other platforms. The court also ordered these platforms to remove all such links.

In several cases, companies have approached courts, while the government has said that every platform operating in India must follow Indian laws.

Safe Harbour Has Become A Global Controversy

The controversy over safe harbour has grown across the world. Under US law, Section 230 gives internet companies safe harbour protection. But over the past few years, Meta, Google and X have faced allegations of allowing fake news to spread, not stopping content that could influence elections and not taking sufficient action against hate speech. Because of this, both Republicans and Democrats have demanded changes to Section 230 for different reasons.

The European Union had introduced the Digital Services Act. Through this, large platforms were given responsibilities such as maintaining transparency in algorithms, quickly removing illegal content and ensuring the safety of children. This means tha,t along with safe harbour, their responsibilities are also significant.

There was also a dispute between the United States and the European Union under a Safe Harbour agreement over controlling data transfers. European countries had objected that US agencies could easily access the data of European citizens, which meant that they could potentially be spied on. Cases were also filed in the European Union’s court over this issue. During this period, the court also held that US laws did not protect the misuse of the personal information of European citizens. After these disputes, Europe cancelled the Safe Harbour agreement in 2015.

Australia told Meta and Google that if they make money from news content, they should pay media organisations for it. After this, Meta stopped news sharing on Facebook for some time. The dispute arose because if a platform is an intermediary, how can it make money from content like a publisher?

After this, Australia proposed that platforms should either pay local media organisations for news content or pay a 2.5 per cent tax on digital advertising. Companies would have to enter business agreements with at least six local publishers to avoid this. These rules would apply to platforms whose annual income is more than 250 million Australian dollars.

Canada introduced the Online News Act in 2023. After it came into effect on June 22, 2023, Meta largely stopped making news available on Facebook and Instagram. In fact, through this law, platforms such as Meta and Google were required to pay media outlets for news content shared on their platforms.

After this, these platforms stopped sharing news content altogether. Google agreed to pay money after reaching an agreement with the Canadian government, following which restrictions on Google were avoided. But Meta continues to face a ban on news content in Canada.

The entire world is now struggling with the question of whether these platforms should continue to get safe harbour protection. Social media platforms are no longer playing only the role of intermediaries because of their algorithms and content recommendations. They have gone much further and have started playing the role of publishers as well.

If they remain mere intermediaries, they should get safe harbour protection. But when questions arise about what content will be shown, who will see it, what will be promoted and what will make money, their responsibility should also increase. The removal of PM Modi’s video from Facebook for a few hours is also a case of this kind.

Who is SDPI leader Riyaz Farangipete, sentenced to jail for the 2015 ‘PFI will slaughter cows, sell beef’ hate speech case

A Principal Civil Judge and JMFC Court in Karnataka’s Belthangady has sentenced Mohammed Riyaz Farangipete, the National General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), the ‘political’ front of the outlawed Islamic terror group, Popular Front of India (PFI), to six months in jail in a 2015 hate speech case. The court has also imposed a fine of ₹10,000.

Mohammed Riyaz Farangipete delivered ‘PFI will slaughter cows’ hate speech

The case against Mohammed Riyaz Farangipete stems from a speech he delivered on 23rd July 2015 at a PFI protest meet near the Belthangady Taluk Office.

The police chargesheet said that Riyaz Farangipete had said that “If assaults of Muslims in the name of cows continued, PFI workers will slaughter cows in public and, on Bakrid, we will sell beef in front of the Belthangady bus stand.”

He also threatened to “teach a fitting lesson” to anyone who tried to stop PFI jihadis.

The police had registered a case against Riyaz Farangipete, who remains an active politician in Karnataka’s Dakshina Kannada, under Sections 153A and 295A of the IPC.

In a 33-page judgment delivered on 4th August 2026, the court held that Farangipete’s speech had the potential to disturb communal harmony even though no violence occurred. The court noted that the SDPI leader’s offence cannot be dismissed as trivial.

From inciting anti-Hindu Delhi Riots, to defending pro-Pakistan sloganeering: Islamist activities of Riyaz Farangipete

Serving as the National General Secretary of the Islamist outfit SDPI, Riyaz Farangipete has been embroiled in many controversies, and has several police cases against him.

During the violent 2020 anti-Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) protests in Mangaluru in December 2019, Riyaz Farangipete and another SDPI leader were accused of inciting people via WhatsApp messages despite the imposition of Section 144. Police subsequently registered cases against them under IPC sections for sedition (Section 124A) and promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion.

Back in September 2022, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) had raided Farangipete’s residence in Mangaluru. The raid was linked to a case involving a conspiracy to create disruption during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rally in Bihar in July 2022. Riyaz Farangipete was serving as the SDPI in-charge for Bihar at the time. The NIA interrogated him for hours and seized certain documents and mobile phones.

Back in July 2022, the NIA had raided his houses in connection with the Phulwari Sharif terror module case busted by the Bihar police. In 2023, Farangipete contested the election from Mangaluru (Ullal) on an SDPI ticket and also lost the deposit, receiving little over 15,000 votes.

Farangipete also has a record of defending pro-Pakistan sloganeering by SDPI members in 2021. In January 2021, during the vote counting for local panchayat elections in Dakshina Kannada, certain SDPI members were accused of raising pro-Pakistan slogans. Defending the members at the time, Riyaz threatened the police that his supporters would create unrest if the arrested members were not released.

In mid-July 2026, Riyaz Farangipete was peddling disinformation about the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise. In a video posted from the SDPI’s official account, Farangipete incited people not to trust the SIR process and claimed that the BJP was “using it” to win elections. He claimed that voters’ names were being deleted from Bihar to Bengal and alleged that the BJP was not winning elections through democratic means.

Riyaz Farangipete has seven criminal cases against him registered at Belthangady, Mangalore South, Konaje, Mangalore North, Mangalore East police stations, and one case in Delhi. His alleged crimes range from promoting enmity between religious groups to waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India.

The charges against him have been filed under sections 153A, 295A, 143, 147,332, 341, 353, 427, 504, 149, 511, 124A, 121A, among others.

SDPI: The political front of the banned Islamic jihadist group PFI

Founded in 2009, the SDPI is active in electoral politics. However, the activities of the PFI’s political front are not confined to just politics. Several SDPI leaders and workers have been involved in various crimes, ranging from Islamic terrorism, murder of Hindus, to love jihad.

In 2018, SDPI Jihadis hacked an ABVP worker, Shyama Prasad, to death. Prasad was a student of Kakkayangad ITI and also served as the mukhya sikshak of the RSS shakha at 17th Mile in Kannavam, was murdered on the evening of January 19, 2018, under the limits of the Peravoor police station. Later, police arrested four SDPI activists, Parakkandam native Muhammed, Minikkol Salim, Neeveli Ameer, and Palayod native Shahim, in connection with the murder. 

Earlier, the SDPI had fielded Shafi Bellare as its election candidate. Bellare is an accused in the brutal murder of BJYM leader Praveen Nettaru in Karnataka.

In 2025, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) had revealed that the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI) relied on the banned organisation Popular Front of India (PFI) for its daily operations, policy decisions, and candidate selection for election campaigns. 

The revelation came after the authorities arrested SDPI President Moideen Kutty K, alias MK Faizy, from Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002.

The ED said they raided premises linked to the arrested SDPI and recovered some documents that provided insight into the true objectives of the PFI, describing it as an organisation committed to advancing an Islamic movement in India by “endorsing the principles of Jihad in all forms.”

“It positions itself internally as an Islamic movement and externally as a social movement. To achieve these goals, the PFI has established SDPI and several front organisations.

Several copies of minutes of meeting and handwritten documents revealing evidence of PFI funding elections contested by SDPI, approval by the National Executive Council (NEC) of PFI for SDPI to collect funds in Gulf countries, and PFI covering legal expenses for SDPI members accused in criminal cases registered by the police which have seized during the searches conducted at Unity House, Kozhikode (PFI’s Kerala State HQ). It also emerged that  PFI had funded SDPI to the tune of Rs 3.75 crore for election-related purposes.

While the PFI was outlawed by the Modi government in September 2022 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the Islamic jihadist outfit is furthering its agenda of converting a Hindu-majority India into Dar-ul-Islam, or an Islamic country, by 2047 through various violent and non-violent methods executed via its various fronts, including the SDPI.

OpIndia reported earlier about how the PFI had a long-term plan, code-named “India 2047”, which aimed at establishing Islamic rule in the country. The agenda was discovered during an earlier investigation by the Delhi unit of the investigating agency into a case first registered in Phulwari Sharif of Bihar in 2022. A six-page document outlining the plan was recovered from accused Muhammed Jamaludheen.

The NIA asserted that the murder of RSS leader Sreenivasan in Palakkad was not an isolated act but part of the broader conspiracy aligned with the India 2047 goal. Audio clips and witness testimonies reportedly confirm the dissemination of the plan among PFI cadres. The PFI had prepared a hitlist comprising hundreds of names, mainly of prominent Hindu leaders.

The PFI believed that even 10% of India’s Muslim population would suffice to “subjugate” the majority Hindu community. The PFI had chalked a phased roadmap which involved uniting Muslims under PFI and providing arms/physical training; selective use of violence to exhibit strength and terrorise Hindus. It also pushed for infiltration of institutions and outreach to SC/ST/OBC groups to create divisions among the Hindu community. Through the SDPI, the PFI aimed to establish beneficial political alliances and electoral gains. The PFI wanted to assert its dominance, filling key institutions with loyalists, declaring a new constitution based on Islamic principles, and eliminating remaining adversaries.

Red Fort blast-linked Al-Falah case: Delhi court rejects every plea by accused Jawad Ahmed Siddiqui, refuses ‘sterling documents’, and ED records demand

Jawad Ahmed Siddiqui, an accused in the money laundering case linked to the Al-Falah Group, which came into the spotlight after the Red Fort blast, has suffered a setback from Delhi’s Saket Court. The court has dismissed two separate applications filed by him.

In the first application, Siddiqui had sought permission to place certain documents on the court record, describing them as being of “sterling quality” and of an “unimpeachable character”. Jawad had argued that examining these documents was extremely necessary for arriving at a just decision. In the second application, he had sought a list from the ED of those documents collected during the investigation on which the agency was not relying for its case (unrelied documents).

Additional Sessions Judge Sheetal Chaudhary Pradhan dismissed both applications in a 48-page order passed on August 4, 2026. The court said that at the stage at which the matter is currently pending, the court primarily has to examine the ED’s prosecution complaint and the material filed along with it and determine whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused.

Understand the Stage at Which the Case Is

The case is being pursued under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). The ED has filed a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. However, the court has not yet taken cognisance of the complaint.

In simple terms, it is still to be decided whether, upon examining the ED’s complaint and the material placed along with it, the court finds a case sufficient to initiate further criminal proceedings against the accused or not.

The present order dated August 4, 2026, is mainly concerned with the manner and extent to which the accused can be heard before cognisance is taken. The court also noted that arguments on the question of cognizance from the ED’s side had already been completed, while arguments from the accused’s side were yet to be made. In the meantime, these two applications were filed, and it was necessary to decide them first.

Siddiqui is facing a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) involving approximately Rs 415 crore. His institution has also been accused of providing shelter to those accused in the Red Fort blast that took place in November 2025.

What Had Jawad Ahmed Siddiqui Sought?

The basis of both applications filed by Siddiqui was a provision contained in Section 223(1) of the BNS, under which a court cannot take cognisance of an offence without hearing the accused.

In the first application, Siddiqui told the court that certain documents related to his business had come from official sources. These were stated to include documents connected with various Indian government authorities and banks. Siddiqui described them as being of “sterling quality” and of an “unimpeachable character” and asked the court to take them on record.

Siddiqui argued that examining these documents would help the court understand the alleged contradictions in the ED’s allegations and would make the hearing taking place before cognisance more effective and meaningful.

Siddiqui’s second demand was that the ED be directed to provide a list of unrelied documents, that is, documents which the investigating agency had obtained during the course of the investigation but had not relied upon in its case.

In the second application, Siddiqui had sought that important questions of law arising in the matter be referred to the High Court under Section 436 of the BNSS. His main argument was that the first “proviso” to Section 223(1) is a new provision that gives the accused a right to be heard before cognisance is taken, but the “limits, nature and scope” of such a hearing are not yet completely clear.

The court’s order states, “In view of the facts emerging from the record of the present case, certain important questions concerning public interest, law and the Constitution arise. These questions have a direct bearing on the manner and extent to which a proposed accused should be afforded an opportunity of hearing at the stage preceding the taking of cognisance of the case.”

It further states, “Since these issues are complex in nature and have so far not been decided by any High Court in the country or by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is of utmost importance that these questions be resolved by a constitutional court before the hearing preceding cognisance takes place. Or, at the very least, these important questions may be kept in mind when this Hon’ble Court affords the applicant an opportunity of hearing.”

What Are Relied, Unrelied and Sterling Documents?

When an investigating agency seizes a large quantity of documents, devices, bank records and other material during raids or searches, it presents only some of these before the court along with its complaint/chargesheet. These are called “relied upon documents”, meaning documents on which the prosecution is relying.

The remaining documents which the agency does not submit along with the complaint are called “unrelied upon documents”. The accused side has always maintained that these “unrelied” documents may contain material that could be helpful to the defence and, therefore, at least a list of such documents should be provided to the accused.

Meanwhile, by “sterling quality documents”, the accused meant those documents that were already in the possession of the accused himself and which he wanted to place before the court himself.

What Arguments Did Jawad Ahmed Siddiqui Make?

According to the court order available with OpIndia, the defence initially claimed that Siddiqui was being subjected to serious harassment and persecution for completely baseless, malicious and irrelevant reasons, and that he was confident that in the further proceedings he would expose the hollow foundation of the case.

Through this application, an important question of law was also raised as to what exactly would be the nature, context, scope and limits of the hearing to be afforded to an accused before the court takes cognisance of an offence.

On behalf of Siddiqui, it was argued that a Magistrate cannot take cognisance of an offence without giving the accused an opportunity of hearing. The defence argued that the Supreme Court and various High Courts across the country have already interpreted this provision and that it is now an established legal position that an opportunity of hearing cannot be merely a formality. The accused must be given an effective, purposeful and meaningful opportunity to put forward his case.

The defence also said that when the law gives an accused an opportunity of hearing, it cannot mean merely that the accused should be allowed to appear before the court and be heard. It argued that in the interests of justice, the court should adopt a procedure through which the accused gets a real and effective opportunity to present his case.

It was argued that unless the accused knows how much material the investigating agency has withheld and what kind of material it is, he cannot properly prepare his defence. It was also said that such withheld material may contain evidence that favours the accused and may directly affect or weaken the allegations. The prosecution cannot be given the liberty to select only the material that establishes the guilt of the accused and keep back material that may assist the defence.

Attempt to Prolong the Proceedings: ED

The ED strongly opposed Siddiqui’s demands before the court. The ED described the entire application as a calculated attempt to deliberately delay the proceedings. According to the ED, the accused wanted to compel the court to undertake an inquiry that was completely outside the scope of a hearing preceding cognisance.

The ED argued that at the stage of taking cognisance and issuing process (summons), the court only has to see whether a prima facie case is made out based on the complaint and the material filed along with it by the prosecution. At this stage, the accused does not have the right to demand consideration of his defence material.

The ED also informed the court that a detailed order had already been passed on March 27, 2026, in the same case regarding Siddiqui’s demand concerning unrelied documents. In that order, the court had said that at the stage preceding cognisance, it was not necessary to provide a list of unrelied documents. The court had also held that the investigation was still underway at that time and that providing such a list could affect the ongoing investigation. On this basis, that application had been dismissed.

The ED said there was no need to refer the matter to the High Court. The agency also described the demand under Section 436 as incorrect and premature. According to the agency, the questions that Siddiqui wanted to have referred to the High Court were not necessary for deciding cognisance in the present case. They were broad questions of law and had no direct connection with the limited hearing currently taking place.

Regarding the ED’s arguments, the court order states, “This application is an abuse of the process of law and its sole purpose is to delay the consideration to be undertaken on taking cognisance of the case. For this purpose, the proceedings are being diverted towards other issues which have no connection with the limited proceedings to be undertaken by this Court at the stage preceding the taking of cognisance.”

The ED said that the scope of the hearing under the provisions of Section 223(1) of the BNSS is limited. The purpose of this hearing is not to examine the merits of the case in detail, decide disputed questions relating to facts, examine the defence arguments or give a final decision on questions of law.

The ED argued that Article 228 does not confer upon a subordinate court the power to invoke this provision or direct the Hon’ble High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under it. The power to exercise jurisdiction under Article 228 is vested only in the Hon’ble High Court. Its exercise entirely depends on whether the High Court is satisfied that an important constitutional question exists which requires determination.

According to the ED, there is no basis for referring the matter under Section 436 of the BNSS or invoking Article 228 of the Constitution of India. Article 228 does not confer upon a subordinate court the power to refer a case to the High Court or direct the High Court to exercise its constitutional powers under the provision.

What Did the Court Say in Its Order?

In her order, Judge Sheetal Chaudhary Pradhan said, “The demand made by the accused for providing a list of unrelied documents has already been decided by the Court in its detailed order dated March 27. The issue as to when and at what stage such documents should be provided to the accused has already been decided by the Supreme Court. The demand made by the accused is without any legal basis and is not liable to be accepted.”

The order further states, “At the stage of taking cognisance, the Court has to look only at the material placed by the complainant. The purpose is only to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out, based on which process may be issued for summoning the accused before the court. There is no legal basis for permitting the documents in the possession of the accused to be taken on record.”

While dismissing both applications filed by Siddiqui, the court said, “Section 436(2) of the BNSS provides that a Sessions Court trying a case may, if it thinks fit and the case does not fall under sub-section (1), refer any question of law arising during the trial of such case for the decision of the High Court. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the alleged questions of law raised by the accused are neither invalid nor ineffective.”

The court said, “The interpretation of these provisions has already been made in several judgments of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no need for the present Court to refer the matter to the Hon’ble High Court for its opinion on these questions. Accordingly, there is also no legal basis in the application filed by the accused.”

Meta admits to being paid to boost certain types of content: How it amounts to an admission of deliberate content manipulation and misuse of Indian laws

Meta’s reported admission before senior officials of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) that “a lot of money was paid to boost certain types of content” has opened up a much larger debate than the temporary removal of PM Modi’s video. The social media giant acknowledged during a meeting with government officials that “significant sums were spent to boost certain categories of content” and also admitted that illegal content had been promoted on its platforms. CEO Mark Zuckerberg apologised for lapses relating to child sexual abuse material (CSAM), deepfake content and operational errors.

These disclosures by Meta are a damning indictment of deliberate content manipulation practised by the social media behemoth for its India operations. For years, the company has maintained that it functions as an “intermediary”, a platform that merely hosts user-generated content and therefore enjoys legal protection from liability for what users post. However, with the platform’s admission that it decides which content deserves greater visibility, especially in return for payment, the line between a neutral intermediary and an active publisher begins to blur, and it is a brazen content manipulation practice.

The admission goes beyond ‘selective technical glitches’

Public attention initially centred on the brief removal of PM Modi’s video from Facebook and Instagram. Meta later described the takedown as an operational error, restored the video and apologised.

However, the disclosures made during Wednesday’s meeting have shifted the focus from a single moderation mistake to the company’s broader content amplification practices.

According to sources, Meta officials admitted that substantial amounts of money were paid to boost certain kinds of content on its platforms. They also acknowledged that illegal content had been promoted. While the exact categories of content being referred to have not been publicly disclosed, the admission itself has raised questions about how Meta’s algorithms and paid promotion systems operate, something that was widely known but never publicly admitted by the company.

Unlike a simple hosting service, a platform that selectively amplifies content is making editorial decisions about what millions of users are more likely to encounter in their feeds. That distinction lies at the heart of the legal debate.

What does “boosting content” actually mean?

On platforms such as Facebook and Instagram, not every post receives equal visibility. Sophisticated algorithms determine which posts are shown to which users, in what order, and how frequently.

Boosting refers to increasing the reach of content beyond its natural audience. This may happen through paid promotion, recommendation algorithms or other amplification tools that push selected posts before significantly larger audiences.

Such amplification can dramatically alter the public visibility of a post. A piece of content that might otherwise have reached a few thousand users can suddenly appear before millions.

If money is involved in deciding which narratives receive wider distribution, critics argue that the platform is no longer functioning as a passive technological intermediary. Instead, it is actively influencing the information ecosystem by determining what users are encouraged to consume.

That distinction becomes even more significant if, as sources claim, some of the amplified content was illegal.

Why India’s intermediary law matters

The legal debate revolves around the concept of “safe harbour” under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The law grants intermediaries protection from liability for content uploaded by users, provided they comply with prescribed due diligence obligations and do not play an active role in creating or selecting unlawful material.

The rationale behind this protection is practical. A platform handling billions of daily posts cannot realistically examine every image, video or comment before it goes online.

However, safe harbour was designed for entities that merely transmit information rather than actively shaping public discourse.

The government officials informed the Meta delegation that the company cannot automatically seek protection under the intermediary provisions because its systems determine who receives particular content.

If a platform’s own algorithms decide what users should see, and especially if those decisions are influenced by commercial arrangements, it raises legitimate legal questions about whether the platform continues to satisfy the conditions necessary for intermediary protection.

Hosting content and promoting content are not the same

There is an important legal and practical distinction between hosting content and promoting it.

A passive intermediary simply provides digital infrastructure where users can upload information. It neither endorses nor selectively amplifies that content.

Promotion, however, involves deliberate choices. Recommendation engines identify posts that are likely to receive greater engagement and display them more prominently. Paid boosting enables content to reach audiences far beyond those who would ordinarily encounter it. Trending systems and personalised feeds similarly influence what users consume.

When a platform undertakes these functions, it is exercising a degree of editorial discretion over the visibility of information.

Meta’s admission that money was paid to boost certain content strengthens the view that the company performed a far more active role than that of a neutral intermediary.

Why this matters in India

India is Meta’s largest market by user base. Hundreds of millions of Indians rely daily on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp not merely for social interaction, but also for news, political discussions, entertainment and business communication.

The visibility decisions made by Meta’s algorithms therefore influence what a substantial proportion of India’s internet users see every day.

Most users assume that viral posts have become popular because of genuine public engagement. However, algorithmic amplification and paid boosting can significantly alter that perception by artificially increasing the reach of selected material.

If particular narratives receive disproportionate visibility because they have been boosted rather than because users naturally engaged with them, it can influence public debate without users necessarily recognising that commercial amplification has played a role.

This is precisely why governments around the world are increasingly demanding greater transparency regarding recommendation algorithms and paid promotions.

The PM Modi video controversy became the trigger

The government’s scrutiny intensified after PM Modi uploaded a vertical video message on July 23 during the height of protests led by the online Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). The video was temporarily removed from Facebook and Instagram before being restored.

Meta attributed the incident to a technical error and apologised for the removal.

The explanation, however, reportedly failed to satisfy the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, which summoned senior Meta executives, including Global Affairs Chief Joel Kaplan, for discussions.

According to reports, the meeting extended well beyond the Prime Minister’s video. Officials also questioned Meta over the spread of child sexual abuse material, deepfake content and broader failures in content moderation.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology, chaired by BJP MP Nishikant Dubey, also reportedly sought an apology from Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg and pressed for stronger action against platforms carrying child sexual abuse material and content demeaning women.

Questions over Meta’s moderation systems

The admission that illegal content had been promoted has inevitably brought Meta’s moderation systems under renewed scrutiny.

The company has repeatedly stated that it invests billions of dollars in artificial intelligence, automated detection technologies and human moderators to identify harmful content before it spreads.

Despite these investments, Meta has frequently faced criticism globally over the continued presence of child sexual abuse material, deepfake videos, financial scams, misinformation, hate speech and other forms of unlawful or harmful content.

If illegal material was nevertheless amplified through recommendation systems or paid promotion mechanisms, critics argue that it raises serious questions about whether existing moderation safeguards are adequate and whether commercial incentives sometimes conflict with platform safety.

A global debate that extends beyond India

The concerns being raised in India mirror debates taking place across the world.

Regulators in the European Union, the United States, Australia and several other jurisdictions have increasingly focused on algorithmic accountability rather than merely content removal.

The European Union’s Digital Services Act, for instance, requires very large online platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks arising from their recommendation systems and to provide greater transparency about how algorithms influence users.

Governments globally are recognising that recommendation algorithms do not simply organise information—they shape public opinion by determining what receives visibility and what remains unseen.

Meta to be called again for further discussions

For Meta, the issue is far from over. It is expected to be called again for further discussions with Indian authorities.

Whether the meeting ultimately results in regulatory action remains to be seen. However, the controversy has already revived a fundamental legal question: can a platform that actively amplifies content through algorithms and paid promotion continue to claim the same protections as a passive intermediary?

At present, there has been no judicial determination that Meta has forfeited its intermediary status or violated Indian law in relation to these reported admissions. The claims regarding boosting certain content and promoting illegal material are based on sources quoted by NDTV and have not yet been tested through any formal legal process.

Even so, the episode has intensified scrutiny of one of the world’s largest technology companies. As social media platforms increasingly influence political discourse, public opinion and access to information, the debate is shifting from what users post to what platforms choose to amplify.

For policymakers, that distinction may ultimately prove to be the defining issue in the next phase of India’s digital regulation.

How Khalistani terror pushed Punjab Police to brutal retaliation after over 1800 personnel were killed

At 12:12 pm on 10th January 1990, a powerful explosion tore through the office of Commandant Gobind Ram at the headquarters of the 75th Battalion of the Punjab Armed Police in Jalandhar.

The bomb had not exploded at an isolated checkpoint or beside a police vehicle passing through a vulnerable village road. It had been planted inside a heavily guarded police establishment, close enough to the commandant to kill him at his desk.

Three personnel working alongside him were also killed. Sub-Inspector Prem Kumar, Head Constable Chhotu Ram and Constable Madan Lal. At least four others were seriously wounded, and a substantial part of the office building was destroyed.

Investigators examined whether the explosive had been concealed inside an object and whether it had been detonated remotely or through a timer. However, the immediate significance of the attack went beyond the method used.

The terrorists had demonstrated that they could reach the commandant of a Punjab Armed Police battalion inside his headquarters. After that, no police station, office, barrack or guarded compound could automatically be considered secure.

The bombing did not transform Punjab Police by itself. The force had already spent years watching officers being assassinated outside religious places, attacked near their homes, ambushed during patrols and killed while acting on intelligence. The attack inside Gobind Ram’s office was another step towards an institutional breaking point.

The brutality later associated with Punjab’s counterterrorism campaign did not emerge in a vacuum. It developed within a force whose personnel were being killed at work, on leave and inside their homes. Their parents, spouses and children were increasingly being dragged into the conflict.

Understanding that progression is essential to understanding what happened during the insurgency. It does not absolve unlawful killings, torture, disappearances or fake encounters. It does, however, explain why sections of the police had stopped viewing the insurgency as a conventional law-and-order challenge by the beginning of the 1990s. For many within the force, it had become a struggle for institutional and personal survival.

A DIG was murdered after offering prayers

On 25th April 1983, Deputy Inspector General of Police for the Jalandhar Range Avtar Singh Atwal visited the Golden Temple in Amritsar. He was in plain clothes and had gone to offer prayers.

At around 11:10 am, as the 40-year-old officer stepped out of the complex through the entrance facing Ghanta Ghar, an armed terrorist opened fire. Atwal died on the spot. A young boy was also fatally wounded, while another person suffered serious injuries.

In a statement in Parliament, then Union Home Minister PC Sethi said the attacker had reportedly emerged from inside the Darbar Sahib complex, fired at Atwal and escaped back inside. Sethi stated that the state authorities’ request for the terrorist to be handed over was not accepted. The investigation was subsequently transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

Atwal was off duty when he was attacked. He was neither commanding an armed operation nor leading a police convoy. He had just offered prayers at Sikhism’s holiest shrine.

He was also a Sikh officer, a fact that exposed the falsehood at the heart of Khalistani terrorism. The terrorists did not represent Sikhs as a whole. They were prepared to kill Sikh officers, politicians, journalists and civilians who opposed their methods or stood between them and their separatist objective.

According to media reports, Atwal’s body remained near the entrance for more than two hours because fear had paralysed those present. His bodyguards reportedly fled, as did policemen positioned nearby. KPS Gill later wrote that more than 100 policemen were present in the vicinity, many of them armed, but nobody intervened when the attack occurred.

It was more than the murder of one officer. The killing showed that terrorists could assassinate a senior police official in full public view and remain confident that the state machinery would hesitate to respond.

Contemporary media reports described the murder as a serious blow to police morale and an exposure of the government’s inability to confront armed extremists operating from within the religious complex. Atwal had reportedly been warned that he was under threat. He nevertheless maintained that, as a Sikh, he had every right to visit the Golden Temple and offer prayers.

For police personnel across Punjab, the lesson was devastating. A senior officer had followed the law, entered the shrine without conducting a police operation and returned unarmed from prayer. He had still been killed, while those responsible escaped into a space the government appeared reluctant to enter.

The force had seen one of its most senior Sikh officers murdered. It had also seen the limits of the state’s response.

Headquarters could be breached and uniforms copied

Three years later, terrorists entered another supposedly secure police establishment. On 3rd October 1986, armed terrorists wearing police uniforms arrived in a jeep at the Punjab Armed Police headquarters in Jalandhar. They passed through the main gate and opened fire on Punjab Police chief Julio Ribeiro and his wife while they were walking near the officers’ mess.

A paramilitary guard was killed. Ribeiro’s wife and several police personnel were wounded. Ribeiro survived with minor injuries after dropping to the ground as the firing began.

Ribeiro was the intended target, but the guard paid the price of standing beside a senior officer whose assassination would have delivered a major psychological victory to the Khalistani terrorists. Like many guards and drivers killed during the insurgency, his death became a subordinate detail in accounts centred on the prominent officer who survived.

The use of police uniforms made the attack particularly damaging. The appearance of authority had itself been weaponised. A jeep and khaki uniforms had enabled armed terrorists to approach the centre of Punjab’s police establishment before opening fire.

Walls and sentries were no longer sufficient. Terrorists could study police routines, imitate police personnel and enter a compound under the protection of the uniform they intended to attack.

Officers were followed to their homes

By January 1987, even senior officers’ residences had become hunting grounds. On 10th January, Inspector General of Prisons Trilok Chand Katoch was returning to his Chandigarh home after visiting a market when two terrorists confronted him. Katoch attempted to escape but was shot. The attackers fled on a scooter. Media reports described the 57-year-old as the highest-ranking police official killed by terrorists until that point.

Katoch’s murder extended the threat beyond offices and official movements. A policeman did not become a private citizen after leaving his workplace. His residence, local market, route home and family routine could all be studied. The distinction between duty and personal life was disappearing.

The same pattern later reached constables who had neither Katoch’s rank nor the security ordinarily attached to a senior officer. Chandigarh Police records the case of Constable Shamsher Singh, who returned home at around 11 pm on 25th January 1991 after completing duty. Armed terrorists wearing khaki clothes entered the house, threatened his family and took him away.

They then went to the nearby home of his cousin, Punjab Police Constable Mohan Singh, and abducted him as well. Their arms were tied together. Gunshots were heard later, and Shamsher Singh was found dead the following morning. Chandigarh Police linked the abductors to the Khalistan Liberation Force.

Shamsher Singh was not killed in an encounter or while guarding a police post. He was taken from his home after finishing his duty. By then, wearing the uniform could endanger a policeman even after he had removed it.

The figure of 1,784 represents a force under prolonged attack

Punjab Police has repeatedly stated that 1,784 of its officers and personnel lost their lives during the terrorism period. In 2016, then Punjab DGP Suresh Arora said that 1,784 officers and officials had died while the force was fighting terrorism in the state.

The same year, Punjab Police began preparing individual citations for the dead because adequate written accounts of their stories did not exist. Teachers from Police DAV schools were given FIRs and other records to document personnel across ranks, from DIGs to Special Police Officers.

These were not casualties from one disastrous operation or a single particularly violent year. The toll accumulated through assassinations, bombings, patrol ambushes, raids, encounters, attacks on police facilities and murders committed while personnel were travelling or staying at home.

The dead included senior commanders whose assassinations reached national newspapers. They also included ASIs, head constables, constables, drivers, guards, Punjab Home Guards and locally recruited Special Police Officers whose stories rarely moved beyond an FIR or district memorial page.

The policemen who entered the doors first

On 17th July 1988, Inspector Jagjit Singh of Chandigarh Police led a raid at a house in Sector 45 after receiving information that armed terrorists were sheltering there.

According to the official Chandigarh Police memorial, Jagjit Singh broke open the door and entered the building. Three terrorists were killed in the encounter, but the inspector suffered fatal gunshot injuries. The official record notes that he was posthumously awarded the President’s Police Medal for Gallantry.

Intelligence-led raids were among the most dangerous assignments undertaken by local police. Information could be incomplete. The number of terrorists inside might be unknown. Officers entering a house had no certainty about its layout, escape routes, weapons or explosives. The first policeman through the door was often exposed before those behind him could respond.

Jagjit Singh’s case represents the operational risk borne by station-level officers acting on local information. Their deaths did not always result from elaborate assassination conspiracies. A routine raid could become a close-range gun battle within seconds.

ASI Amarjit Singh faced a different but equally routine danger. On 8th December 1989, he was patrolling near Kajheri village when two terrorists riding a motorcycle ambushed him. Chandigarh Police records state that Amarjit Singh was pursued and attacked while travelling on a scooter during patrol duty.

Such personnel spent their shifts on roads, village tracks and at exposed police posts. They did not have fortified offices or large escorts. Their work required predictable movement through areas where an attacker could watch, wait and disappear. For lower-ranking policemen, everyday duty created repeated opportunities for assassination.

Bombs entered offices and travelled beneath convoys

The January 1990 bombing that killed Gobind Ram carried another layer of fear. His son had reportedly been assassinated only months earlier.

Media reports described the commandant as a controversial officer accused of ruthless methods, including serious abuse of detainees and relatives of suspected terrorists. Those accusations form part of the record and cannot be erased. They also do not diminish what the bombing revealed about the terrorists’ ability to penetrate a police institution and kill everyone standing near their chosen target.

The accused apprehended in connection with the case were later acquitted. It therefore remains unclear who was responsible for the attack on Gobind Ram.

Barely a month later, another bomb reportedly exploded inside a police establishment. Inspector Harcharan Singh Soori and ASI Ram Moorti were killed on 11th February 1990 in an explosion at the Police Training College in Phillaur. Two other personnel were reportedly wounded. Several Khalistani organisations were said to have jointly claimed responsibility days later.

The location was significant. A police training college was supposed to prepare and protect the personnel through whom the force would replenish itself. Killing officers inside such an institution demonstrated that even training establishments and guarded rooms could be reached.

On 24th November 1990, SP Operations Harjit Singh was travelling near his home in Tarn Taran when an explosive placed beneath or along the route of his vehicle detonated. Harjit Singh and three bodyguards were killed. The driver was seriously wounded. Police attributed the bombing to the Bhindranwale Tiger Force (BTF), which had reportedly threatened the SP a month earlier.

A later Supreme Court judgment referred to the FIR registered on 24th November 1990. It was based on the statement of Head Constable Hardev Singh, who had been posted as Harjit Singh’s gunman. The FIR recorded that the jeep carrying the SP and other police personnel was blown up, killing Harjit Singh and several officers accompanying him.

The attack showed why ordinary road travel had become terrifying. Terrorists did not need to confront an officer directly. They could study his route, plant an explosive and wait for the convoy to arrive. Harjit Singh received the headline. His three bodyguards largely disappeared into the phrase “and others”.

Drivers and guards died in somebody else’s assassination story

The guard killed beside Ribeiro was remembered chiefly as the man who died during an attack on Ribeiro. Harjit Singh’s bodyguards became supporting casualties in the account of an SP’s assassination. Drivers killed or injured in convoy bombings were frequently mentioned only after the senior officer’s name.

ASI Lalu Ram and ASI Amin Chand provide a rare case in which official memorial records preserve the roles of the men accompanying a senior officer. On 29th August 1991, an explosive booby trap targeted the vehicle of Chandigarh SSP Sumedh Singh Saini. Lalu Ram was serving as the SSP’s personal security officer, while Amin Chand was his driver.

The official account states that the convoy was travelling from police headquarters towards the SSP’s residence for lunch when a remote-controlled device containing approximately five kilograms of RDX exploded inside a parked Ambassador car.

Lalu Ram and Amin Chand were killed. Saini suffered minor injuries, while several others were wounded. Both ASIs occupied the positions most exposed during an attack on a protected vehicle. The driver had to remain with the car. The security officer had to remain close to the principal target.

Their deaths were not less consequential because another officer had been the intended victim. Their families did not lose “supporting personnel”. They lost Lalu Ram and Amin Chand.

District memorial pages preserve those national memory forgot

The Barnala Police memorial shows how much of the force’s loss survives only through names, dates, villages and FIR references.

Havaldar Bhupinder Singh was killed on 5th March 1991 while fighting terrorists at Sudhar. The memorial connects his death to a case registered at Police Station Sudhar. Twelve days later, on 17th March, Sepoy Karnail Singh was killed during an operation at Maur. A case was registered at Police Station Sehna.

Sepoy Baldev Singh, who had joined the force in November 1989, was killed at Rureke Kalan on 22nd March 1992. He was around 22 years old. The official memorial states that a case was registered at Police Station Tapa.

ASI Jarnail Singh was killed while fighting terrorists at village Phool on 29th April 1992. The memorial identifies his parents as Nihal Kaur and Veer Singh and refers to an FIR registered at Police Station Phool.

Constable Gurjit Singh was killed at Bakhtgarh on 9th August 1992. The memorial names his mother as Har Kaur and his father as Khion Singh. The corresponding case was registered at Police Station Sehna.

Jarnail Singh had served since 1964. Baldev Singh had been in uniform for less than three years. Gurjit Singh had joined in 1971. They belonged to different generations, but each died in district-level operations far removed from the national attention given to a DIG or SP.

Special Police Officers carried the danger into their villages

Special Police Officers were recruited locally to assist the regular force in areas affected by terrorism. Their familiarity with local families, village routes and social networks made them useful for guarding, intelligence gathering and identifying unfamiliar movement.

That local knowledge also made them vulnerable. Unlike senior officers, many SPOs lived close to the people against whom they were expected to provide information. Their homes, relatives and daily routines were known. They had limited institutional protection and could not disappear into a distant cantonment after completing duty.

The Barnala memorial records several such deaths. SPO Mukhtiar Singh and SPO Rajwinder Singh were killed on 26th February 1992 during an operation at Guram. Other local personnel, including SPOs and Punjab Home Guards, appear across the memorial with little more than dates, locations and FIR references.

Special Police Officer Balwant Singh was killed during an encounter at Bhadaur on 21st May 1995. His death came after the insurgency’s most violent phase had passed, showing that local police personnel continued to die even as the state moved towards normalcy.

Local recruitment strengthened police presence in the villages. It also brought the conflict to the homes of men who had few resources to shield their families.

When terrorists began killing police families, the conflict changed

The most consequential shift came when terrorists stopped limiting themselves even notionally to armed personnel. They began threatening policemen’s parents, wives, children and siblings. The objective was not merely revenge. It was to make the force collapse from within.

KPS Gill later wrote that policemen, Home Guards and SPOs were ordered to resign or face death along with their families. According to his figures, 506 policemen were killed in 1990, most while at home on leave. He stated that 19 members of police families were killed that year and 134 in 1991.

These numbers come from Gill’s account and should be treated as his institutional record rather than an independently audited dataset. According to an India Today report, Khalistani terrorists killed 26 relatives of policemen on 2nd October 1991 alone. Families began leaving villages for cities. Some published notices in Punjabi newspapers seeking forgiveness from terrorist organisations and pleading that their relatives in uniform had committed no wrongdoing.

Those notices reveal the emotional turning point more clearly than any official statement. The families were not defending police operations. They were begging armed organisations not to punish parents, wives and children for the profession of one household member.

Police service no longer endangered only the person drawing a salary. A constable’s posting could determine whether his father remained safe in the village. An SPO’s cooperation could place his siblings at risk. An officer’s participation in a raid could be answered with an attack on somebody who had never entered a police station except to meet him.

The force was being told that it could neither work nor withdraw safely. Resigning did not necessarily erase what a policeman knew. Abandoning a posting did not remove his family’s connection to the state. Leaving the village meant uprooting an entire household, often without secure accommodation elsewhere.

The pressure was intended to break morale, obstruct intelligence gathering and make personnel refuse dangerous assignments. It also changed the psychology of the force. A policeman facing an armed terrorist during duty could understand the encounter as an occupational risk. A policeman whose relatives had become targets would see the conflict differently. Fear became personal and could rapidly turn into vengeance.

That did not make vengeance lawful. It did mean that the emotional distance required for restrained policing was collapsing.

Punjab Police was pushed from fear towards retaliation

The police did not move from ordinary law enforcement to aggressive counterterrorism in a single moment. The transition was built through accumulated shocks.

Atwal was murdered after offering prayers, while the state appeared unable to retrieve his killer. Terrorists wearing police uniforms entered the PAP headquarters and nearly assassinated Ribeiro. Katoch was followed to his home. Gobind Ram was bombed inside his office. Jagjit Singh died entering a terrorist hideout. Amarjit Singh was ambushed on patrol. Harjit Singh and his guards were blown up on a road. Shamsher Singh was abducted after duty. Lalu Ram and Amin Chand died beside the officer they were protecting. Then the terrorists went after police families.

Taken individually, each incident was an assassination, bombing, abduction or encounter. Taken together, they formed a campaign intended to convince the force that no location and no relationship remained outside the conflict.

Headquarters were penetrated. Uniforms were imitated. Homes were entered. Officers on leave were killed. Relatives were threatened. Guards and drivers were treated as expendable extensions of senior targets. By the early 1990s, sections of Punjab Police began retaliating with a ferocity that would later become inseparable from accounts of the insurgency.

Fear hardened into institutional rage. Colleagues were no longer merely colleagues. They were men whose funerals officers had attended. Suspects were not always seen as defendants to be processed through a slow legal system. They were increasingly viewed as participants in a network capable of killing an investigating officer or his family before a trial could begin. This was the dangerous emotional turning point.

A police force that believes the legal process cannot protect its personnel may begin treating procedure as an obstacle. A force that sees its families being killed may begin confusing punishment with prevention. Counterterrorism can then cross into retaliation, and retaliation can become collective or indiscriminate.

Sikh policemen disproved the terrorists’ claim to represent Sikhs

The dead also expose attempts to frame Punjab’s insurgency as a simple conflict between Hindus and Sikhs.

Avtar Singh Atwal was Sikh. Jagjit Singh, Amarjit Singh, Shamsher Singh, Harjit Singh, Jarnail Singh, Gurjit Singh, Karnail Singh, Bhupinder Singh and numerous SPOs commemorated on district police pages carried Sikh names and came from Punjab’s villages.

They were targeted because they wore the uniform of the Indian state, resisted separatist violence, participated in police operations or helped the authorities gather local intelligence. Their service weakened the Khalistani claim that the separatist campaign spoke for the Sikh community. Consequently, Sikh police personnel were not treated as members of a community to be protected. They were treated as obstacles to be eliminated.

Khalistani terrorists killed Hindus, but they also killed Sikhs who rejected their authority. The divide was not between Hindus and Sikhs. It was between armed separatist organisations seeking to impose their command through violence and those, including large numbers of Sikhs, who refused to submit.

Explanation cannot become absolution

The scale and nature of the campaign against Punjab Police help explain why the force hardened. They cannot become a blanket defence for everything done in the name of defeating terrorism. There have been reports of serious human rights violations that require separate examination.

Explaining the pressure that produced a brutal police response is not the same as declaring that response legal or morally justified. Terrorism cannot legitimise the killing of an innocent person by the state. Nor can police excesses erase the deliberate campaign of assassinations, bombings, abductions and attacks on families that preceded and accompanied them. Both truths must be documented.

The police force that eventually crushed the insurgency was not operating from a position of emotional neutrality. It had been wounded repeatedly and personally. Ignoring that history produces an incomplete account of why Punjab’s counterterrorism campaign became so severe.

For years, the uniform exposed not only the policeman wearing it, but also his guards, driver, home and family. Eventually, a force that had been hunted in all those places began hunting back.