On 23rd June 1985, Air India Flight 182, named Kanishka, disintegrated mid-air off the coast of Ireland after a bomb exploded in its cargo hold. There were 329 people on board, including the passengers and crew members, who were killed. Out of these, 268 were Canadians. Khalistani terrorists were behind the attack that still remains the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history.

Around one hour before the Kanishka bombing, a related suitcase bomb destined for another Air India flight blew up at Japan’s Narita Airport, killing two baggage handlers. Investigators quickly suspected Canada-based Khalistani terrorists were behind the attack to seek revenge for India’s 1984 military action on the Golden Temple, under codename Operation Blue Star, to weed out Khalistani terrorists, including their leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, from the Sikh shrine’s premises.

Following the Kanishka bombing, for two decades, Canadian authorities were widely criticised for mishandling the investigation. The saga of missteps that followed the terrorist attack remains a blot on Canadian investigation agencies.

Early clues and missed warnings

Canadian police and the intelligence service soon learned that the conspiracy had been planned on Canadian soil. Within months, two suspects were arrested in British Columbia. Talwinder Singh Parmar, a Vancouver-based Khalistani terrorist, was believed to be the mastermind. Another Khalistani terrorist, Inderjit Singh Reyat, who worked as an auto mechanic, was arrested for his links to Parmar.

Parmar was leader of the Khalistani terrorist organisation Babbar Khalsa. He was on CSIS’s radar since the early 1980s. Surveillance began in 1982, and by March 1985, CSIS had a warrant to wiretap his phone.

Despite these clues and critical intelligence, the action taken by the authorities was negligible. Former Supreme Court Judge John Major later reported that officials had received warnings from Sikh community members but failed to act on the information. Instead of coordinated action, agencies engaged in jurisdictional disputes.

In 1985, Parmar was detained for some time but released for lack of evidence. He was later killed in an encounter in India in 1992, but he never faced trial for the Kanishka bombing or any other terrorist act he was allegedly involved in. Reyat was convicted in 1991 of manslaughter for the Narita bombing and served ten years. In 2003, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role in the Kanishka bombing. He was sentenced to five years in prison. He was the only person ever convicted in connection to the attack.

Erased wiretaps and lost evidence

One of the most serious investigative lapses was the erasure of Parmar wiretaps. CSIS had recorded his phone calls in spring 1985 under court-authorised surveillance. However, many of the recordings were erased as part of “routine procedures”. These included tapes from weeks immediately before the bombing, even after the attack had taken place.

Above that, CSIS stopped physical surveillance on Parmar just two days before the bombing. CSIS claimed that the tapes were erased as part of protocol, but the RCMP was alarmed. CSIS neither promptly informed the RCMP about the wiretaps, nor preserved them. During legal proceedings, Justice Ian Josephson criticised CSIS for erasing the tapes and called it “unacceptable negligence”. A federal inquiry later deemed the tape destruction “indefensible”. Defence lawyers argued in court that the lost material could have included crucial evidence that might have cleared Parmar from the accusations.

Friction between intelligence and police

Behind the destruction of the tapes was a deeper issue, that was institutional dysfunction. The relationship between Canada’s spy agency CSIS and federal police RCMP was strained in the 1980s. CSIS was formed in 1984 and was still developing its role in counter-terrorism. Agencies operated in silos, did not share intelligence and actively guarded their own turf.

The 2010 Commission of Inquiry found that both CSIS and RCMP often worked at cross-purposes. It resulted in vital leads going cold. Witnesses described how promising lines of investigation were abandoned, as there was no trust between the agencies, and some investigators even resigned in frustration.

Some RCMP officers suspected that the tapes were destroyed not because of negligence but possibly to cover up an informant inside the Khalistani terrorist organisation. Whether true or not, the suspicion further drove a wedge between the agencies. A unified investigative response was absent when it mattered the most. Justice Major described the case as plagued by “a cascading series of errors”.

Intimidated witnesses and community fear

What added to the institutional failures was a consistent atmosphere of fear. Several potential witnesses from the Sikh-Canadian community were not willing to come forward. In 1988, newspaper publisher Tara Singh Hayer, a key prospective witness, was shot. The injury left him paralysed. After a decade, he was assassinated. His murder remains unsolved to this day. Two other potential witnesses were also killed before they could testify in court.

RCMP failed to provide proper protection. A 2005 report highlighted that there was a “culture of fear” that silenced crucial voices. Some witnesses who did testify later changed their statements or were deemed unreliable. The case was further weakened by such incidents, making it difficult for the prosecution to bring the culprits to justice.

A trial that fell apart

After 15 years of the incident, charges were brought. In 2000, Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri were charged with murder and conspiracy. The trial began in 2003 and ran for around two years. It became the most expensive case in Canadian history. More than 115 witnesses were called.

However, on 16th March 2005, Justice Josephson acquitted both of them, citing lack of credible evidence. He affirmed that the bombing was planned in Canada by Khalistani terrorists but ruled that the Crown failed to meet the burden of proof. “Justice is not achieved… if persons are convicted on anything less than the requisite standard of proof,” Josephson said.

The victims’ families were shocked by the verdict. Many felt that the acquittal confirmed that the Canadian government failed in both protecting its citizens and delivering justice.

Reyat remained the sole convict. He served time for both the Narita and Kanishka bombings and later additional time for perjury. He never named any co-conspirators.

A reckoning and an apology

The verdict led to public outrage. A full inquiry was launched in 2006. It was led by Justice John C. Major. Its 2010 report delivered a damning verdict that systemic failure by CSIS, RCMP and government agencies had enabled the bombing and failed justice.

The report detailed how agencies failed to share intelligence, mishandled evidence, and lacked coordination. It called for sweeping reforms including stronger oversight, better inter-agency cooperation, and improved aviation security protocols.

A formal apology was issued by the government. Then Prime Minister Stephen Harper admitted that Canadian authorities had “failed to act on information that could have prevented the attack or caught those responsible”. Compensation was also recommended for the families of the victims.

Conclusion

Forty years have passed since the AI Flight 182 bombing took place. It is a haunting chapter in Canadian history that is not going to fade away. The tragedy was not only in the loss of 329 lives but also in the failure of the institutions to respond with urgency, unity, and competence. The erased tapes, missed warnings, internal rifts, and frightened witnesses together ensured that justice was delayed and, in many respects, denied.