On 19th January, Iran’s police chief announced a limited surrender window for those involved in “riots”. It was not just a law and order message. It was Tehran’s way of signalling that the Islamic Republic believes it has weathered the most dangerous phase of the unrest.
In his statement, police chief Ahmad Reza Radan promised leniency for “deceived” youth while issuing a warning to organised hostile elements. He framed the protests as a contained security challenge rather than an existential threat to the regime.
This framing is central to how Iran is presenting events, especially in response to aggressive rhetoric from the President of the United States, Donald Trump, whose public calls for Iranians to remain on the streets have been dismissed in Tehran as reckless provocation rather than support for genuine dissent.
From surrender call to claim of restored control
Radan’s announcement came after several days of relative calm in the country. Iran had witnessed violent unrest for weeks. Armed patrols, checkpoints, and a visible security presence across major cities, including sensitive locations such as Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, showed the state had gone on full throttle to reassert control. According to Iranian officials, thousands were arrested and the streets are no longer witnessing mass mobilisation.
This sense of control is being projected deliberately by Tehran to counter international narratives portraying the protests as an unstoppable uprising against clerical rule.
How economic anger turned into nationwide unrest
The protests in Iran initially erupted after a sharp fall in the Iranian rial. This triggered anger among shopkeepers and traders in commercial districts. Rising prices, unemployment, and economic hardship further pushed the protests to flare up. However, within days, slogans moved beyond economic grievances to direct calls for regime change. Demonstrations were reported in major Iranian cities including Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Shiraz.
On the nights of 8th and 9th January, the most violent phase of the protests unfolded. In a statement, the head of Iran’s forensic medicine authority, Abbas Masjedi Arani, said that many victims were shot in the head or chest at close range or stabbed. His statement indicated intent to kill rather than crowd control gone wrong. State media reported that most of the dead were young Iranians, many in their twenties.
Internet blackout and information war
As violence escalated, Tehran imposed a near total internet and mobile communication shutdown. The blackout severely restricted coordination among protesters. It also prevented images and videos of the protests from reaching the outside world.
Amid the chaos, Elon Musk’s satellite powered internet service, Starlink, provided some hope to protesters, as Musk has repeatedly claimed his service cannot be blocked. However, Iran reportedly did the “unimaginable” and blocked almost 80% access to Starlink services, allegedly with the help of Russian tech and Chinese research.
While some services have since been restored in the country, the episode showed how tightly the state controls information during crises. For Tehran, the blackout was not merely about internal security but also about countering the narrative war playing out in international media.
Tehran’s accusation, Trump and foreign backing
Iranian leaders have been blunt in assigning blame for the protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly described Trump as a criminal and held him responsible for casualties and destruction caused by “foreign linked armed elements”.
In an op ed for Russia’s TASS news agency, Iran’s ambassador to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, accused Trump of being the architect of the “maximum pressure” sanctions regime while simultaneously issuing contradictory messages about protecting the Iranian people. According to him, provocative statements from Washington encouraged violence and enabled groups seeking to turn protests into riots.
Trump’s own remarks fuelled this perception. At the height of the unrest, he warned Iranian authorities against using force and claimed that “help is on the way”, language Tehran interpreted as open encouragement of regime change.
Competing narratives on casualties
Khamenei has acknowledged that “thousands” were killed during the unrest, which is an unusually direct admission. US based Human Rights Activists News Agency claimed more than 3,300 were killed and tens of thousands were arrested. Reuters cited regional sources suggesting an even higher toll, particularly in Kurdish majority areas.
Iranian authorities reject claims that security forces carried out mass killings or coerced families over burials. They insist that armed groups backed by hostile foreign powers were responsible for much of the bloodshed.
Why this matters for India
Beyond Iran’s internal politics, the unrest has wider regional implications that are not necessarily in India’s interests. Trump backed destabilisation in Iran is not a moral crusade but a strategic gamble that risks reshaping the region to India’s disadvantage.
Iran is central to India’s access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Chabahar port, a project designed explicitly to bypass Pakistan. Any shift towards a US aligned or unstable Iran could restrict India’s use of Chabahar under American pressure. This would weaken India’s already diminished footprint in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s return in 2021.
There is also historical context that informs India’s caution. A Western backed Iran under the Shah was not friendly to Indian interests. Tehran openly supported Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars, supplying arms, oil, and military equipment. The idea that a pro Western Iran would automatically align with India ignores this record.
Pakistan’s leverage and Afghanistan’s fault lines
A weakened or US aligned Iran could indirectly strengthen Pakistan’s hand in Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan share a long border, and closer coordination under Western influence could further isolate regions where India once had influence. For New Delhi, this would compound an already unfavourable strategic environment in the region.
Trade corridors are also at stake. India’s ambitions through the International North South Transport Corridor, which runs via Iran to Central Asia and Russia, could be affected if Iran is pressured to prioritise alternative routes aligned with US or Pakistan backed interests.
Has the regime dealt with the protests?
By issuing a surrender ultimatum rather than escalating threats, Tehran’s leadership is projecting confidence that it has contained the unrest. Street protests have largely died down, and the security apparatus is mostly in place.
However, the deeper question is not just whether Tehran has restored order, but at what cost. What will be the regional consequences of the recent protests in the longer run? For India, the lesson remains unchanged. US driven regime change narratives in West Asia do not automatically serve Indian interests. Even if stability in Iran is imperfect, it is strategically preferable to chaos encouraged by external powers whose priorities do not align with India.
The United States President Donald Trump’s favourite foreign policy tool to dominate both allies and adversaries alike appears to have more profound effects on his own citizens than on the respective nations. On 19th January (Monday), a report released by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy found that Americans are paying nearly all of the costs associated with US tariffs. “America’s own goal: Americans are largely responsible for funding Trump’s tariffs” highlighted the tangible effects of this policy.
The sweeping tariffs slapped by the Trump administration have been determined to empty the pockets of his country’s citizens in stark contrast to the bold declarations of “tens of billions of dollars flowing into America.” The strategy in reality hurts the US economy, despite the administration’s intention for the tariffs to go after foreign companies, the study suggest.
Julian Hinz, who co-authored the report, stated, “The tariffs are an own goal. The claim that foreign countries pay these tariffs is a myth. The data show the opposite: Americans are footing the bill.” He is an economics professor at Germany’s Bielefeld University and research director at the institute. The tariffs function similarly to a consumption tax for imported items and simultaneously leave fewer options in terms of both variety and quantity.
A lot has been said about the Greenland tariffs in the past couple of days. We've been looking at the broader picture: who actually pays the tariffs?
We analyzed 25 million shipments worth nearly $4 trillion.
The answer: Americans pay 96%. Foreign exporters absorb just 4%.
The research team examined over 25 million shipment records totalling nearly $4 trillion in US imports between January 2024 and November 2025. It uncovered that the customs income of the country rose by almost $200 billion in the last year “paid almost exclusively by Americans in additional tariff revenue.” According to Hinz, this will eventually lead to stronger inflation in the United States.
Likewise, just 4% of the tariff burden was borne by foreign exporters as the remaining 96% was shifted to US consumers. Moreover, the export prices did not decline while trade volumes plummeted. “There is no such thing as foreigners transferring wealth to the US in the form of tariffs,” he reiterated.
India reduced import volumes without any alteration in prices
The analysis also looked into the unanticipated tariff spikes that were applied to Brazil and India in August of last year. The tariffs on Brazilian imports were unexpectedly hiked to 50%, while those on Indian imports reached 50% from 25% under the guise of trade imbalances and domestic manufacturing priorities. It also included the so-called penalty for ‘failing to halt the purchase of Russian oil’ and “aiding” the war in Ukraine.
However, the information demonstrated that overseas exporters did not cut their prices to compensate for the higher duties. If exporters had absorbed the taxes, the rates in the US would have fallen in comparison to other markets but this did not happen.
“We compared Indian exports to the US with shipments to Europe and Canada and identified a clear pattern. Both export value and volume to the US dropped sharply, by up to 24 per cent. But unit prices, the prices Indian exporters charged, remained unchanged. They shipped less, not cheaper,” Hinz outlined.
These results indicated that US businesses have to deal with declining profit margins and eventually higher charges for consumers. There is going to be pressure on nations that export to the US to find other markets as their sales would shrink. “Tariffs ultimately disadvantage everyone,” Hinz noted.
The findings are consistent with the latest results from economists at Harvard Business School and Yale’s Budget Lab. Furthermore, the tariffs represented as a leverage mechanism to cease hostilities in the name of trade deals to boost Trump’s self-proclaimed image as a “global peacemaker” or yield to US interests have left the Western power in a compromised position.
It also raised the possibility that the US might be at a disadvantage in a potential trade war with Europe. The US has imposed 10% tariffs on eight European and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) allies for opposing its control of Greenland. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has warned against any retaliatory measures, calling them “very unwise.”
What came out of Trump’s tariffs
Trump repeatedly insisted that outsiders would pay the bill for his historic tariffs, which have been aggressively implemented over the past year as an instrument for both international policy and revenue-raising. These assertions even pushed some countries to enter into agreements with the United States.
However, sovereign nations like India resisted the pressure and now another report has shattered the illusion of the inflated effect of the tariffs. On the other hand, India’s growth persisted at an unprecedented scale, even in the face of tariffs. India’s real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) climbed at the fastest pace in six quarters during the second quarter of FY (Fiscal Year) 2025-2026, attaining an outstanding high of 8.2%, greatly outpacing predictions of 7.3% growth.
The nation keeps retaining the title of major economy with the fastest rate of growth in the world which surged from 5.6% in the same time last year and 7.8% in the last quarter, highlighting its resilience despite encountering challenging circumstances.
China, which was also at the receiving end of the tariffs leading to a series of retaliatory moves and trade war also announced that it has achieved the highest trade surplus in history.
Beijing declared on 14th January that it had the largest trade surplus in history, with $1.19 trillion in goods and services sent outside compared to its imports which is a 20% increase from 2024 even after accounting for inflation. The country’s monthly export surpluses surpassed $100 billion seven times in 2025. It meant that its overall trade with the rest of the world was hardly hurt by Trump’s tariff push.
Trump has reduced foreign policy to weaponised tariffs, utilising them as devices of both punishment and reward. Any country that refuses to comply with his unreasonable and outrageous demands is subjected to them, while those that do comply receive reductions. However, the aforementioned research has established that Trump has seemingly harmed his own country while attempting to punish others, including New Delhi. Similarly, the tariffs did not significantly impact the trade or growth of its targets as they progressed beyond expectations.
A ceremonial custom has once again sparked a controversy in the hallowed halls of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Governor RN Ravi left the House without giving his customary address on January 20, 2026, for the third year in a row. What’s the trigger?
The Lok Bhavan’s stinging 13 point statement of response, which turned the protocol of debate into a harsh critique of the state administration, intensified the situation just minutes after the Governor’s departure. The statement explained that in addition to the anthem dispute, Governor Ravi’s unwillingness to read the message was due to the text’s numerous unsubstantiated claims. The governor said that in an act of ‘Emergency era censorship,’ his microphone was turned off, making it impossible for him to voice his disapproval on the floor.
Beyond protocol, the statement criticised the government’s performance, disputing the claimed ₹12 lakh crore in investments by pointing to a decline in FDI rankings from fourth to sixth place and denouncing the speech for ignoring serious shortcomings like a reported 55% increase in POCSO cases, widespread drug abuse, and an increase in atrocities against Dalits.
The governor’s abrupt departure has exposed a growing fault line in the name of federalism, despite the ruling DMK administration framing this as adherence to a decades old Dravidian tradition in which the Tamil Thai Valthu (Invocation to Mother Tamil) takes precedence at the beginning. It is now a symbolic struggle that many observers worry is planting the subtle, perilous seeds of division, undermining the Indian Union’s basic unity and integrity. It is no more merely a conflict of egos or formalities.
The incident unfolds
As the year’s first session got underway, the controversy broke out. The Governor is required to address the Assembly in accordance with Article 176 of the Constitution. Governor Ravi, however, insisted that the National Anthem be played at the start of the proceedings, either right before or after the Tamil Thai Valthu, in order to give the national anthem the respect it deserves.
When the Speaker of the Assembly, M. Appavu, and the state administration followed their tradition of playing only the state invocation at the opening and the National Anthem at the end, the Governor declined to read his prepared address. He walked out of the chamber, allowing the government to declare the address as, ‘read’ via a resolution, a procedural band-aid over a major political wound.
Governor Ravi’s position was straightforward, it is disrespectful to begin a constitutional function without playing the National Anthem. The Governor could not participate in an event where the National Anthem is insulted and a basic constitutional obligation is ignored, according to a statement later released by Raj Bhavan.
Historical context: The roots of protocol
One must delve into the history of the Dravidian movement and its intricate connection to Indian nationalism in order to comprehend why a song might spark a constitutional crisis.
Playing the Tamil Thai Valthu at the start and Jana Gana Mana at the end is a new political invention rather than an old custom. In 1970, then Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi designated the song Tamil Thai Valthu, written by Manonmaniam Sundaram Pillai, the state song (prayer song). The DMK’s ideology, which highlighted Tamil identity, language, and culture as unique and occasionally crucial, was symbolised by this action. But later on, the Assembly’s particular protocol became clear. The current model was strictly formalised in 1991 under J.Jayalalithaa’s term (AIADMK in alliance with Cong). The reasoning was that the state song opens the assembly and the National Anthem closes it, serving as a vote of thanks or last seal of national sovereignty.
Critics point to the optics, while the state government claims this shows respect for both. The ritual quietly perpetuates a Tamil Nadu First, India Second mentality by prioritising the regional invocation and delaying the National Anthem until the very end, when members are eager to depart. In a country founded on the idea of Unity in Diversity, constitutionalists view this reversal of hierarchy as a concerning indication of regional nationalism.
The constitutional and judicial perspective
The controversy is both legal as well as emotional. The Governor’s demand is based on how Fundamental Duties are interpreted and how important national symbols are.
Article 51A (a): The fundamental duty
Article 51A (a) of the Indian Constitution, which declares that each citizen has an obligation to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem, is the strongest argument in the Governor’s toolbox. Although respect is a broad phrase, the Governor’s office contends that it is against the spirit of this article to deny the Anthem its proper position at the start of a solemn constitutional function, such as the Governor’s Address. The Governor represents the President of India in the Assembly, which is a constitutional assembly rather than a private club.
The Bijoe Emmanuel precedent
On this matter, the judiciary has exercised caution. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) is a landmark case concerning the National Anthem. The Supreme Court decided that it was illegal to expel Jehovah’s Witness students for declining to sing the anthem because of their religious convictions as long as they stood up respectfully.
The current dispute in Tamil Nadu, however, is different. This is about a state institution’s reluctance to play the anthem, not about an individual’s right to remain silent. The courts have consistently maintained that the Anthem deserves the highest level of protocol, even though they have stated that singing is not required. Despite the Governor’s request, the Anthem was purposefully left out at the beginning, which might be seen as a institutional violation of the principles outlined in Article 51A.
Ministry of Home affairs (MHA) guidelines
The MHA published directives pertaining to the National Anthem, outlining when it should be played (such as when the President or Governor arrives at official state functions). In a legislative calendar, the governor’s speech is possibly the most formal governmental event. The state government may be avoiding the spirit of federal protocol by treating the Assembly proceeding as a state-only affair until the very last minute.
The seeds of separation: A dangerous precedent
This persistent conflict suggests a problem that goes beyond procedural disagreement. It poses unsettling queries regarding Tamil Nadu’s future in federalism. A state government sends a message that goes beyond procedure when it adamantly demands that its regional anthem take precedence over the national one and refuses to make accommodations for the governor, the Indian Union’s representative, on the subject of national pride. One interpretation of this behaviour is that it is sowing the seeds of the state first and the nation second.
The normalisation of othering the Centre poses a subtle threat. The political narrative implies that the state’s identity is the fundamental loyalty, while the Indian identity is a formality, by presenting the National Anthem as an imposition or a secondary ritual to be recited only at the exit. Regional pride is essential in a diverse democracy. However, India’s unity and integrity are undermined when regional pride is used as a weapon to marginalise national symbols. The Constitution’s preamble pledges to protect the unity and integrity of the nation. A psychological gap between the citizen and the country is created by acts that symbolically diminish the National Anthem’s importance in a constitutional house.
India would cease to resemble a Union and begin to resemble a loose confederation of conflicting identities if every state adopted this State First model, refusing to play the National Anthem at the beginning of legislative sessions in favour of regional tunes. Therefore, the governor’s exit serves as a warning against this tendency. It emphasises that the National Anthem’s sacredness cannot be compromised and that the ‘Union of India’ rather than the ‘United States of India’ is the constitutional reality.
Conclusion
The Tamil Nadu Assembly standoff serves as a sobering reminder that symbols are important. They are the unseen strands that unite a billion disparate individuals into a single country. The governor is defending constitutional hierarchy by declining to take part in a session that ignores the national anthem. While the state administration hides behind tradition and federal rights, one must wonder who benefits from rigorous devotion to a practice that devalues the National Anthem? It contributes to a story of divide. It fosters a mentality in which the parts are larger than the whole.
The unification of India’s states is crucial as the country moves closer to becoming a global giant. The Tamil Nadu government’s refusal to play Jana Gana Mana at the beginning of the Governor’s address is a test of Indian unity, not a victory for Tamil pride. This modest but powerful act of resistance runs the risk of transforming the intricate fabric of Indian federalism into a patchwork of separatist beliefs. Instead of being an afterthought, the National Anthem should come first.
The University Grants Commission’s Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions Regulations, 2026, notified on January 13, arrives at a moment when the global experiment with Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) is visibly collapsing. These regulations mandate Equal Opportunity Centres, Equity Committees chaired by vice-chancellors with reserved representation, 24/7 helplines, mobile Equity Squads patrolling campuses, demographic audits, and Equity Ambassadors in every department and hostel.
Framed as a decisive intervention against caste discrimination faced by SCs, STs and OBCs, while loosely gesturing at gender, religion and disability, the intent appears noble. The design, however, is deeply troubling.
What the UGC has proposed is not a modest reform but a sweeping bureaucratic architecture that closely resembles Western DEI frameworks, models that promised inclusion but instead delivered polarisation, litigation, and institutional paralysis. India is at risk of importing a failed ideological export at precisely the wrong moment.
Globally, DEI is in retreat. In the United States, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, launched in May 2025, has begun probing race-based preferences in federally funded institutions under the False Claims Act. More than 35 major corporations, including Walmart, Ford, Meta and McDonald’s, have rolled back DEI programmes amid shareholder lawsuits, declining productivity, and internal unrest. High-profile scandals involving financial improprieties in DEI offices have further eroded credibility. Even Europe and parts of Asia have quietly moderated DEI rhetoric to avoid regulatory and commercial fallout, recognising that rigid identity frameworks often fracture diverse societies rather than heal them.
The UGC’s regulations mirror precisely this flawed logic. By instituting enforcement squads, anonymous complaint mechanisms, punitive audits and grant-linked penalties, the Commission has moved far beyond its statutory remit under the UGC Act, 1956, which limits it to maintaining academic standards and coordination. These rules verge on executive and quasi-judicial overreach, particularly for state universities that require legislative adoption under India’s federal structure. Legal challenges are inevitable, and uneven enforcement across States could fracture the higher education system itself.
More worrying is the asymmetry built into the framework. The regulations explicitly protect only certain categories, with no equivalent safeguards against false or malicious complaints. India has already witnessed the consequences of such imbalance under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, where courts have repeatedly intervened to curb misuse and restore due process. Anonymous complaints, “vulnerable area” patrols, and committee structures weighted by reservation invite grievance weaponisation. In a university setting, even unsubstantiated allegations can irreparably damage academic careers, reputations and mental health.
The social consequences could be corrosive. Campuses thrive on trust, debate and informal interaction. A regime of constant monitoring risks converting universities into grievance factories, chilling speech, encouraging self-censorship, and hardening identity boundaries. Rather than reducing caste consciousness, institutionalising it through audits and reporting mechanisms may entrench precisely what constitutional jurisprudence has sought to dismantle. Articles 14 and 15 emphasise equality before law, while Indra Sawhney warned against permanent group entitlements disconnected from present disadvantage.
The economic implications are no less serious. India’s demographic dividend depends on a globally competitive higher education ecosystem. Any perception, real or imagined, that merit is being diluted will accelerate brain drain, weaken flagship institutions, and deter research investment. Bureaucratised equity does not produce inclusion; it produces mediocrity.
Equity cannot be enforced through permanent suspicion. It must be built through fair opportunity, due process, and universal capability-building. The UGC should pause implementation, pilot reforms transparently, restore symmetry in safeguards, and shift focus to needs-based assistance, academic mentoring, and institutional accountability, rather than identity policing.
The world is already learning from DEI’s collapse. India would be wise not to repeat the experiment on its campuses. The UGC’s 2026 regulations risk not ending discrimination, but institutionalising distrust, at a time when the nation can least afford it.
On 20th January, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) launched extensive raids across Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu as a part of the investigation into the alleged money laundering in the Sabarimala gold theft case. The raids are underway at 21 locations linked to the accused persons, including their residences and institutions linked to them.
The ED sleuths are raiding the premises linked to Unnikrishnan Potti, former Travancore Devaswom Board President and CPIM leader A Padmakumar, N Vasu, Murari Babu, and gold traders Govardhan and Pankaj Bhandari. The raids are being conducted under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).
VIDEO | Ballari: The Enforcement Directorate (ED) conducts raids at multiple locations in connection with the Sabarimala gold theft case.
Meanwhile, raids are also being conducted at Smart Creations in Chennai and at the residence of Bellary-based gold trader Govardhan.
Reports say that an ED team has arrived at the Devaswom Board headquarters in Thiruvananthapuram. Searches are being carried out at Murari Babu’s residence in Kottayam, Unnikrishnan Potti’s house at Pulimath near Kilimanoor, N Vasu’s residence at Pettah, and A Padmakumar’s house in Aranmula.
The ED is also searching the house of Unnikrishnan Potti’s sister in Valiyakattakkal, Venganoor, in addition, the Thiruvananthapuram residences of K P Shankaradas, N Vijayakumar and S Baiju, are also being raided.
Based on the outcome of the multi-state raids, the Enforcement Directorate may proceed to attach assets.
It must be recalled that in December 2025, the court allowed the ED to conduct its own investigation into the Sabarimala gold theft and the linked money laundering, while the SIT would conduct its own probe. Initially, the SIT has opposed ED’s involvement in the case. However, the court overrode their opposition.
Meanwhile, the SIT is set to visit the Sabarimala shrine today to conduct on-site evidence collection. This comes after a report by the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC) showed that the high-quality original gold cladding from the year 1998 was replaced during a 2019 ‘renovation’ with copper and low-quality plating containing nickel and acrylic polymers.
Kerala High Court notes “organised and systematic” pilferage of Sabarimala gold
On the 19th of January, the Kerala High Court observed that an organised and systematic process went into the theft of gold from the Dwarapalaka idols and door frames of the Sabarimala temple. The court’s observation came after the SIT submitted its progress report coupled with the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre’s chemical analysis report.
The division bench comprising justices Raja Vijayaraghavan V. and K.V. Jayakumar noted that the original high-quality gold-clad plates were replaced with low-quality copper plates, and platting containing nickel and acrylic polymers. In illegally replaced plates, the VSSC chemical analysis report showed an absence of Mercury.
Taking note of this, the court said, “”On examining the summary of the chemical analysis, we find that the apprehensions earlier expressed by this Court stand prima facie reinforced…These analysis reports not only disclose the manner and modus operandi of the alleged tampering and substitution, but also provide critical evidentiary pointers for correlating past transactions with subsequent activities.”
Amidst the separate investigations by the SIT and the ED, Akhila Tanthri Pracharak Sabha chairman M S Sreerajasekharan recently moved a plea before the Kerala High Court, seeking a CBI investigation into the Sabarimala gold theft case.
The plea argues that the investigation into the matter is surround with ‘political clouds’, with some media reports suggesting that top political leaders from the ruling LDF may be involved in the gold heist. In addition, the petition cites media reports to allege that the local authorities are not arresting influential persons in the case.
The petition further highlighted that despite the court’s previous observation that the SIT’s investigation was proper so far, the SIT inducted two additional officers. The Thanthri Sabha alleges that the SIT is shielding real culprits due to the political influence of the ruling front. The petitioner further alleges that there is a conspiracy to make Thanthris and Pujaris the scapegoats.
“According to the petitioner the said investigation is not conducting in a proper manner and the team is not identifying the real culprit, instead they are trying to shoulder upon the blame on the Thantris and Poojaris of the famous Temple, whereby the devoteeís religious feelings are seriously been hurt and creating a black mark for Thantris and Poojaries. The petitioners are not saying that if they are the real culprits they should not been arrayed as accused or arrested but the way in which the investigation is being conducted, putting charge upon the Thantri and Poojaris are really shameful…,” the petition reads.
It further mentioned the case of Thanthri Kandararu Rajeevaru, who was arrested by the SIT in this case. However, despite the SIT’s alleged failure to furnish any direct evidence against the arrested Thanthri, the SIT named him as an accused based on the allegation that Rajeevaru had allowed the removal of gold-clad copper coverings without obtaining the ‘anunja’ or permission of Lord Ayyappa.
The petitioners argue that the SIT is causing a deliberate delay in filing chargesheet in the case, to expand the scope of the investigation into the gold plating of the flag post in the Sabarimala Temple as the SIT understood that the arrest and arraignment of Thantri Kandararu Rajeevaru in the case will not “sustain in a court of law”.
According to the Akhila Tanthri Pracharak Sabha, there is no connection in the misappropriation of Dwarapalaka idols and the door frames, and thus, another probe agency should separately investigate the same.
They are now trying to investigate another pilferage of gold allegedly taken place in the gold plating of Dwajam (Flag Post) of Sabarimala Temple, which is carried out in the year 2017, whereby the enquiry could be extended to other political leaders of the opposition and delay in submitting the Charge Report in the present case. They now seized the Vaji Vahanamí (idol of horse), from Thantri’s residence, which was removed from the top of the ‘Dwajam’ before the gold plating and trying to connect the same to the present case,” the petition states.
The petition moved by the Thanthri Sabha also pointed out that aside from a few arrests made, the SIT has not been able to trace the stolen gold that belongs to the deity of the Sabarimala Temple even as it has been four months since the investigation began.
However, the Kerala High Court division bench of Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V. and Justice K.V. Jayakumar questioned the motives of the petitioners behind seeking a CBI probe at this stage.
The court orally remarked, “Without even understanding what is transpiring, you have raised certain allegations trying to protect the accused from the crimes. There is no reason why you should file a writ petition saying, at this particular point of time after we have passed 10 orders, that the gold plating of Dwarapalaka idols…You are saying that all these persons who have been arrayed as accused are innocent people. You are saying that the Dwarapalakas were not gold-cladded, it was gold plated. We have the analysis report here…”
However, the court decided to consider the Thanthri Sabha’s plea along with similar petitions seeking a CBI investigation into the matter, on 6th February.
Sabarimala gold theft case
The SIT, formed after the directions of the Kerala High Court, has been probing two cases relating to the theft of gold from the Dwarapalaka idols and the loss of gold from the Sreekovil door frames at Sabarimala temple.
Several Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) members and officials have been indicted in the cases arising from the handing over of gold-clad copper plates from the Dwarapalaka idols and Sreekovil door frames to Potty for electroplating in 2019. Potty has been named as the main accused in the case.
In September 2025, the Kerala High Court pulled up the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) for removing the gold-plated copper coverings of deities in the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. While examining the records relating to the gold plating of temple items, the High Court observed several inconsistencies in the decision-making process. The court noted that the Thiruvabharanam Commissioner initially recommended the traditional method for gold coating using 303 grams of gold (costing around ₹31 lakhs), but later reversed his stance after discussions with the sponsor and recommended that the items be sent to Chennai for electroplating.
The court pointed out that this violated the TDB Sub Group Manual, which requires such works to be carried out at Sannidhanam itself. It ordered the seizure of all records relating to the gold-plating and cladding of the idols, including details of a former pair of Dwarapalaka idols reportedly kept in the strong room for possible gold extraction. Besides, the court impleaded Unnikrishnan Potty and Smart Creations (where the coverings were sent to be repaired) as additional respondents, requiring them to furnish all financial and communication records linked to the repairs and sponsorships.
The caste politics in the country know no bounds. The denigration of the upper castes (savarna) concerning the adverse situations of those from scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes is a grim truth, as those who perpetuate this victimhood narrative leave no stone unturned in disseminating falsehoods.
All things are depicted as tools of oppression devised by the upper castes to dominate those they regard as beneath them. Now, after proclaiming that everything from education to bureaucracy and the complete democratic framework, including institutional bodies, has a caste bias, the focus has shifted to technology. ChatGPT is painted as the perceived foe of the caste warriors, as it is asserted to be partial towards their all-time preferred targets, the upper castes.
Vijender Singh Chauhan, an Associate Professor at Delhi University, known for conducting mock Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) interviews for Drishti IAS, used artificial intelligence to direct his malice against the upper castes in front of a cheering audience during the recent launch of a book.
He stated, “Provide a brief prompt to ChatGPT and examine the data it generates. There is a higher likelihood that the information will lean towards the upper castes due to the individuals who have trained it. ChatGPT stands for Generative Pre-trained Transformer. It is trained on existing content that favours the upper castes and the people in power. It is trained by excessively represented individuals from this group.”
“Consequently, if there is a machine with a flawed foundation, how can it be anticipated to deliver justice? Therefore, the battle is not only with the vice chancellors of universities, chief ministers, prime ministers, or bureaucrats, but also with an algorithm. In fact, the challenge is more pronounced with the algorithm because it strips away your ability to discern right from wrong,” he further alleged.
While the remarks might initially seem amusing and only worthy of ridicule on the surface, they uncover a significant and worrying trend of consistent denunciation of the upper castes without any fear of repercussions. These statements are made to further divide Hindu society along caste lines, consistently pitting two communities against each other, vilifying one and portraying the other as a perpetual victim.
This also illustrates how fault lines are exploited for political or personal gain, as has been done repeatedly by colonisers, imperialists and invaders to establish their control over the indigenous people of India and later by “secular parties” for electoral advantage.
Netizens slam the comments with a comedic flair.
The video has been widely disseminated, attracting criticism from netizens. A UPSC aspirant inquired about the benefits of introducing “caste angles into something as neutral as AI.” He also expressed concern over the persistence of these narratives being circulated in 2026. He outlined how shocking it is to be still confronted with such persons peddling this propaganda to divide communities.
He pointed out, “As someone prepping for UPSC myself, I expect educators to unite us, not spread hate under the guise of observations. This kind of talk is harmful and sets a bad example for aspirants. We need better from our mentors.”
Hey everyone, I just came across this ridiculous statement from Vijender Chauhan, that UPSC teacher who's always popping up in interviews and talks. He basically said that ChatGPT is biased towards "savarns" like, what? Claiming an AI tool is somehow made for upper castes? That's… pic.twitter.com/pSKHWBX29r
“The Skin Doctor” opted for a hilariously sarcastic approach, writing that Chauhan was indeed right, as the family of Sam Altman (CEO of OpenAI) was actually from the Maithil Brahmin lineage in Bihar’s Samastipur. He added that they relocated to the United States at the time of India’s independence because they “would no longer be able to exploit Dalits” and altered their surname.
He then wryly remarked that Altman continues to wear janeu (sacred thread), practice Brahminism and has trained ChatGPT based on the principles of the Manusmriti, leading to ChatGPT’s inclinations towards the upper castes. “Sam thought he was too smart and wouldn’t be caught, but the eagle-eyed watchfulness of our UPSC coach Vijender Singh Chauhan exposed him,” the doctor humorously mentioned.
He is right.
ChatGPT’s founder Sam Altman’s family was actually Maithil Brahmins from Samastipur, Bihar.
When they realised the country was about to get independence and they would no longer be able to exploit Dalits, they moved to America and changed their surname to blend in… pic.twitter.com/xU29xB8mlT
A person labelled Chauhan a “clown” as well as questioned his knowledge and common sense. The user insinuated, “Anyone can understand how he would have got his degrees. This country is becoming a place of clowns because of these social justice schemes.”
He is Vijender Singh Chauhan, Associate Professor, Delhi University.
He holds degrees in BA, MA, B.Ed, M.Phill, PhD.
Now look at his knowledge and common sense. Anyone can understand how he would have got his degrees. This country is becoming place of clowns because of these… pic.twitter.com/CECuO4jVzp
Another individual described the statements as “outlandish” and asked, “Should there be reservations in ChatGPT teams?”
Vijender Chauhan, UPSC educator, makes outlandish claims about how ChatGPT produces answers coloured by caste.
He asserts, due to lesser representation of people of lower castes among teams for these apps, ‘savarna’ people, i.e., upper caste people determine somehow, how apps… pic.twitter.com/sB5jLFoSWS
On the other hand, the professor invoked the “intrinsic bias” of AI and ascribed his statement to “several studies” in a following video after observing the increasing backlash.
If the world were genuinely tilted in favour of the upper castes, as is often suggested, these remarks would at least result in some legal action for the profound impact on society and the unjust targeting of a community. However, these issues do not garner a response beyond social media outrage from certain sections, as hostility towards the upper castes is often disregarded.
Meanwhile, the attention of the entire country and online discourse is primarily focused on generalising discrimination against lower castes based on sporadic incidents, with some instances where the SC/ST Act is weaponised to settle personal scores.
Anti-upper caste hate is a norm, not an exception
The characterisation of upper castes as the ultimate adversaries is not an exception but a widespread norm, present not only in the political fabric of the country but also in the coaching centres that are tasked with cultivating bureaucrats in the country.
Vision IAS Academy faced flak in 2022 when its faculty member, Smriti Shah, referred to the Bhakti movement as a “cult” and insisted that it was founded in response to the emergence of “Liberal Islam,” absorbing its concepts of speaking out against discrimination and promoting universal brotherhood.
She claimed, “It was nothing but Islam arriving in India in the seventh century. It was very liberal and talked about equality. There was no caste system either.” Notably, the institution not only defended her but also doubled down on her preposterous statements in the name of clarification.
Shah also made generalisations, casting women as commodities on the subject of polyandry and dragged Draupadi into her argument in another video.
“In the agricultural communities from Punjab and Haryana, the livelihood depends on land. If you have five sons, you have to purchase a wife. You must have that much money to take a bride for each of your sons. Once you get her, the chances of property division are also high, since now there would be five different families. To avoid the fragmentation of land-holding, you instead buy one bride for all your sons,” she stated.
She then stressed, “Polyandry solves two purposes, one, you have to purchase one woman instead of five and second, your economic assets would be retained. When you question if this is illegal, the reference is then made to Draupadi, your culture.”
“We never had this culture of giving gifts during Diwali. It was always about lighting diyas and cleaning your homes because Goddess Laxmi arrives. Nowadays, that Sonpapdi (sweet) Box travels from one household to another until the expiry date doesn’t come,” Shah even imparted the quintessential Diwali sermon to her Hindu students.
Moreover, Vikas Divyakirti, the founder of Drishti IAS, came under fire in the same year for his controversial comparison of Goddess Sita to “ghee contaminated by a dog.” He indicated that Lord Ram told his wife, “that just as food licked by a dog becomes unfit for consumption, you are no longer acceptable to be my wife,” blatantly distorting the Valmiki Ramayana.
Afterwards, netizens uncovered clips from his other lectures and charged that he has been gradually brainwashing and instilling Hinduphobia under the pretence of coaching. Divyakirti was shown openly misrepresenting the Ramayana and disparaging Lord Ram by calling him a casteist in another video. He contended that Tulsidas left out the alleged occurrence related to Dalit Shambuk only to protect Ram. However, the instance is not referenced in the original Sanskrit epic.
Conclusion
It is undeniable that these UPSC coaching centres have transformed into hubs of Hindutva as both their founders and the staff they hire to produce the future leaders of the nation harbour a similar resentment towards the religion and the upper caste community, which is only escalating with time.
Hence, it is hardly surprising that these people have recently discovered a new enemy in ChatGPT. However, it is crucial to recognise that their comments closely resemble the anti-Hindu sentiments promoted by the Islamo-leftist cabal under the pretext of opposition to Brahminical patriarchy, as they try not to straightaway attack Hinduism to uphold a facade of neutrality.
The motivation for Chauhan’s recent outburst could also have stemmed from the declining interest in the mock interviews that previously garnered him millions of views, or it could be an outcome of his increasing irrelevance on social media platforms, as provoking Hindus and upper castes is the easiest way to remain in the news without any apprehension of “sar tan se juda.” Nonetheless, it is a fact that these remarks have tangible effects on the ground.
The slogan “Bhura Baal Saaf Karo” (eliminate upper castes) by Lalu Prasad Yadav exemplified the same and prompted very real and deadly effects on the community, especially during the Rashtriya Janata Dal’s (RJD) Jungle Raj. However, the aversion towards the upper castes is extremely normalised and permeates the consciousness of these people to such an extent that the implications of their rhetoric never affect them.
As Wikipedia marks 25 years, The Times of India has published an interview with Wikimedia Foundation’s outgoing CEO, Maryana Iskander on 18th January. In the interview, Iskander positioned the platform as a neutral, volunteer-driven encyclopaedia committed to factual accuracy and diversity of views.
While responding to criticism from India over anti-Hindu bias, Iskander leaned heavily on familiar defences such as the claim that the platform takes information from “reliable sources”, has a neutral point of view policy, and follows consensus-driven editing.
However, a closer examination of Wikipedia’s own practices, editing histories, and documented interventions shows a very different picture. Wikipedia’s claims of neutrality are constrained by ideological source filtering, marginalisation of dissenting editors, and the exclusion of inconvenient facts, particularly on India-related issues. Wikipedia manages to get away with its ideological tilt through policy, privilege, and power.
‘Reliable sources’, as claimed by Wikipedia, versus how the system actually works
In the interview, Iskander repeatedly claimed that Wikipedia relies on “reliable sources”. According to her, sourcing information from such sources is the cornerstone of the platform’s credibility. She presented this framework as a neutral safeguard and argued that Wikipedia’s content is “fact-based, neutral, and based on reliable sources”. She further claimed that the content is moderated transparently by volunteers who correct errors through open debate and consensus.
However, the interviewer failed to interrogate the platform’s fundamental flaw, which lies at the heart of this claim. Wikipedia’s own definition of a “reliable source” is not ideologically neutral. It is a closed, self-referential system that disproportionately privileges a narrow set of publications, most of which lean in one ideological direction.
In practice, Wikipedia mostly considers left-liberal or “progressive” sources as reliable. On the other hand, sources that challenge the left-liberal narrative, especially those emerging from India or representing non-left perspectives, are either downgraded or rejected outright. Wikipedia, on its “Reliable Sources” page, says, “Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published sources, making sure that all majority and significant minority views that have appeared in those sources are covered”.
Source: Wikipedia
This means that whatever the source that Wikipedia considers “reliable” becomes the truth, not the actual truth. It further says that if the information is not found in “reliable sources”, Wikipedia “should not have an article on it”. This is not a theoretical concern, but a documented pattern observed across politically sensitive pages.
Wikipedia’s sourcing policy is not based on whether a source presents factual or evidence-based information. It is based on the sources it recognises and approves within its ecosystem. Once a publication is labelled “unreliable” or “generally unreliable”, its reporting is excluded irrespective of the underlying facts. This creates a circular authority loop, that is, sources are reliable because Wikipedia says they are, and Wikipedia is neutral because it relies on those same sources.
Interestingly, The Times of India interview framed this system as a defence against misinformation. However, it completely avoided acknowledging that this framework allows ideological filtering to be presented as “editorial caution”. When entire categories of sources are excluded at the policy level, neutrality becomes impossible, not because editors are careless, but because the rules themselves narrow the range of acceptable facts.
Neutral point of view, as claimed by Wikipedia, versus neutrality as enforced through sources
During the interview, Iskander invoked Wikipedia’s “neutral point of view” policy as a central defence against allegations of bias. She claimed that Wikipedia is “written to inform, not persuade”, and that it does not promote any specific ideology but instead reflects consensus built around facts, policies, and reliable sourcing.
However, neutrality on Wikipedia does not mean presenting all sides of a story. It means summarising what Wikipedia-approved “reliable sources” have already published. This distinction is not semantic, it is structural.
The page on “neutral point of view” on Wikipedia reads, “All encyclopedic content on Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic.”
Source: Wikipedia
Had the phrase “that have been published by reliable sources on a topic” not been included in the definition, it could have been a neutral platform. However, when Wikipedia’s reliable sources are mostly left-leaning, how can one expect it to be neutral? In effect, if a perspective is absent from or marginalised within this narrow pool of approved publications, it is deemed unworthy of inclusion, regardless of its factual relevance or importance.
This is where the claim of neutrality begins to unravel. When the same ideological ecosystem determines which sources are reliable, what they publish, and how much weight their narratives receive, neutrality becomes derivative rather than independent. Wikipedia does not evaluate events directly. It reproduces the worldview of its preferred sources, while presenting the outcome as neutral encyclopaedic knowledge.
While The Times of India presented this system as an objective safeguard, in reality, it functions as an exclusionary filter. Facts, rebuttals, and alternative interpretations that do not pass through the approved source pipeline are not debated on merit, they are excluded at the threshold. Editors are not asked whether a claim is accurate or relevant, but whether it originates from a source Wikipedia has already deemed acceptable. This has direct consequences for politically and communally sensitive topics in India.
Events are framed through the lens of a limited set of publications, many of which share similar ideological leanings. When Indian institutions, subject matter experts, or first-hand participants attempt to correct or contextualise narratives, their inputs are often rejected not because they are false, but because they do not meet Wikipedia’s restrictive sourcing criteria.
Indian editors and the myth of local balance on Wikipedia
Further, Iskander highlighted Wikipedia’s large contributor base in India. She presented it as evidence that diverse participation naturally leads to balanced and representative content. India, she noted, is among the top contributors in terms of page views and editor participation. By making this point, she sought to reassure readers that India-related topics are not shaped from afar, but by local voices themselves.
However, what was ignored in the answer is a far more uncomfortable reality. The presence of Indian editors does not automatically translate into fair or nationally representative coverage. In fact, in several politically and communally sensitive areas, it has had the opposite effect.
When editing patterns, administrator actions, and long-running disputes are examined, it becomes clear that a section of India-based Wikipedia editors hold adversarial views towards the Indian state, its institutions, and Hindu civilisational perspectives. This is evident in the discussions that take place in the “Talk” sections on the platform. These views directly shape what information is included, excluded, emphasised, or dismissed.
Wikipedia operates on reputation, longevity, and policy familiarity. Editors who spend years navigating its complex rules gain disproportionate influence, particularly on contentious pages. In India-related articles, this has resulted in a small but entrenched group of editors exercising outsized control over narratives on topics such as communal violence, national security, media credibility, and political developments.
In many cases, their personal ideological leanings may not be explicitly stated in articles, but they are reflected in sourcing choices, framing, and selective omissions.
While TOI treated editor diversity as a statistical measure, it failed to address editorial power concentration. Not all editors are equal. New contributors, especially those attempting to introduce alternative viewpoints or challenge dominant narratives, often find themselves outmatched by experienced editors who are adept at invoking policy language to block, revert, or discredit edits. Far from correcting bias, local participation has, in several cases, entrenched it.
Editors who align with prevailing ideological currents within Wikipedia’s global community find it easier to build consensus, while dissenting Indian voices are isolated, discouraged, or eventually pushed out. Over time, this leads to self-selection. Only those willing to operate within a narrow ideological corridor remain active.
Consensus, page locking, and how dissent is structurally filtered out
During the interview, Iskander emphasised the ideal of “consensus” as a safeguard against bias. She suggested that Wikipedia articles evolve only when editors reach agreement, and that this collaborative process ensures fairness, accuracy, and balance. According to her, if there is no consensus about a change in the text, it does not pass and is not published on the platform, thus protecting the content from manipulation.
However, this is not how the consensus mechanism functions on Wikipedia. OpIndia’s dossier on Wikipedia detailed the process and showed how bias is deeply rooted in the system. Rather than facilitating open debate, consensus often becomes a tool for exclusion, enforced through policy familiarity, administrative privilege, and selective enforcement of rules.
Editors who attempt to introduce sources outside Wikipedia’s approved “reliable sources” ecosystem are frequently warned, reverted, or blocked. This happens not because the information is demonstrably false, but because it violates internal sourcing hierarchies, which, as explained, are left-liberal leaning.
This pattern has been repeatedly observed in coverage related to the Delhi riots, where editors attempting to add material from non-approved publications or official rebuttals found themselves facing sanctions.
Consensus, in such cases, is not formed through discussion on the merits of evidence. It is pre-determined by who is allowed to participate meaningfully in that discussion. When one side is systematically disqualified at the source level, consensus becomes procedural rather than deliberative.
Furthermore, page locking is a major issue on Wikipedia and is used to cement this imbalance. When editors object to the inclusion of certain facts or perspectives, particularly those that challenge dominant narratives, articles are often locked under the pretext of preventing edit wars or the inclusion of unreliable, unverifiable, or manipulative information.
The OpIndia dossier documented how page locking has become a tool for Wikipedia’s left-liberal leaning editors. For instance, the 2020 Delhi riots page is also locked, which means that thousands of editors across the world have no access to edit the page. As noted in OpIndia’s dossier, “Articles under extended confirmed protection (ECP) can be edited only by extended-confirmed accounts, accounts that have been registered for at least 30 days and have made at least 500 edits, or have been manually granted extended-confirmed rights by an administrator, usually because the account is a legitimate alternative account of a user who has extended-confirmed rights on another account. Extended confirmed (30/500) protection is therefore a stronger form of protection than semi-protection.”
This has a chilling effect. New editors and dissenting contributors are effectively shut out, while a small group of experienced editors gains complete control over how the article is framed and maintained.
One of the most striking examples highlighted in OpIndia’s documentation is the repeated resistance to including the role of Tahir Hussain in the Delhi riots. Despite court proceedings, investigative developments, and extensive coverage, attempts to incorporate this aspect into Wikipedia articles were either delayed, diluted, or rejected altogether. Editors citing alternative sources faced reversions and policy-based objections, while the article’s core framing remained intact.
The level of bias can be seen in the first line of the Wikipedia article on the Delhi riots itself, which reads, “The 2020 Delhi riots, or North East Delhi riots, were multiple waves of bloodshed, property destruction, and rioting in North East Delhi, India, beginning on 23 February 2020 and brought about chiefly by Hindu mobs attacking Muslims.” Even the court has categorically noted that the riots were anti-Hindu.
Source: Wikipedia
OpIndia’s dossier on Wikipedia talked about how the platform cunningly presented Hindus behind Delhi Riots when it was the opposite. According to the OpIndia dossier, Wikipedia’s presentation of the 2020 Delhi riots systematically framed Hindus as the primary aggressors, despite investigative findings, court observations, and eyewitness accounts indicating the opposite. The very first line of the Wikipedia article declared that the riots were “chiefly brought about by Hindu mobs attacking Muslims”, setting a narrative tone that persisted throughout the page.
Source: Dossier on Wikipedia by OpIndia
The dossier documented how this framing selectively amplified Muslim victimhood while minimising or diluting violence against Hindus. Brutal killings of Hindus, including IB officer Ankit Sharma and labourer Dilbar Negi, were omitted, delayed, or reduced to vague references, while claims such as “corpses found in open drains” were cited using foreign media reports, even though the only documented case involved a Hindu victim.
Court records and police investigations had noted that stone pelting by Muslim mobs began on 23rd February 2020, with the first fatality being police constable Ratan Lal. These findings were repeatedly rejected or removed from Wikipedia on the grounds that the Delhi Police was an “unreliable source”, even as left-leaning media narratives were retained without similar scrutiny.
Source: Dossier on Wikipedia by OpIndia
The dossier further showed that when editors attempted to correct the narrative or add evidence pointing to targeted anti-Hindu violence, their edits were reverted, discussions were shut down, and the page was placed under extended confirmed protection, effectively freezing a distorted version of events as “consensus” and preventing meaningful correction.
Similarly, the dossier recorded the outright rejection of references to the Tek Fog investigation, even as it gained prominence in public discourse. Editors opposing its inclusion did not merely question its credibility; they invoked Wikipedia’s sourcing rules to exclude it entirely, preventing readers from even being informed that such allegations or investigations existed. When there was a dispute among Wikipedia editors in the Talk section of The Wire article, OpIndia tracked how Wikipedia’s left-leaning editors intervened to defend The Wire, which can be checked here.
Perhaps most revealing is the case of a rebuttal issued by a senior Indian Navy Commodore in response to an article published by The Wire. As detailed in the OpIndia dossier, Wikipedia editors refused to accept the rebuttal on the grounds that it constituted a first-person source and therefore did not meet reliability standards. The paradox is evident.
Source: Dossier on Wikipedia by OpIndia
An institutionally authoritative response from the individual concerned was rejected, while the original media report remained unchallenged within the article. It exposes the limits of Wikipedia’s consensus model. First-person authority, even when coming from a senior military official, is subordinated to media narratives produced by publications already accepted within Wikipedia’s reliability framework. In this context, consensus is not about truth or completeness, but about adherence to a closed source hierarchy.
Grants, codified sources, and how bias is institutionalised
Another aspect that went missing in the interview was the role of funding and formal projects in shaping how Wikipedia defines and enforces “reliable sources”. While Iskander framed Wikipedia as a volunteer-driven platform guided by community consensus, this portrayal leaves out how editorial hierarchies and source preferences are increasingly being codified, standardised, and technologically enforced.
One such case, as documented in OpIndia’s dossier on Wikipedia, is that of Newslinger, an Indian Wikipedia editor. He reportedly received a Wikimedia-linked grant for a project aimed at codifying sources and developing a Chrome extension to assist editors in identifying which publications are considered reliable or unreliable. On the surface, this may appear to be a technical aid designed to improve consistency. In reality, it formalises an already skewed sourcing ecosystem. Details on how Newslinger recieved money and created an ecosystem of “reliable sources” can be chacked in OpIndia’s dossier on Wikipedia.
Source: Dossier on Wikipedia by OpIndia
By translating subjective editorial judgements into coded tools, Wikipedia moves from informal bias to structural bias. Editors no longer need to debate whether a source should be trusted; the decision is pre-loaded into systems and guidelines. This reduces editorial discretion and further entrenches the dominance of a fixed set of publications, many of which share similar ideological leanings.
Such decisions have a significant impact on content. When reliability is no longer contested on a case-by-case basis, but embedded into extensions, documentation, and training material, dissenting editors face an even higher barrier. Challenging a narrative becomes not just a disagreement with fellow editors, but a challenge to the platform’s formalised infrastructure. This makes meaningful correction increasingly difficult, especially on politically sensitive topics.
Anti-Hindu bias, minimised as criticism, documented as pattern
In the Times of India interview, concerns about bias are mentioned briefly and cautiously. They are described as criticism from “some commentators in India” who allege an “anti-Hindu bias”. This wording creates distance and downplays the issue. The concern is acknowledged only to be deflected, followed by assurances about neutrality, volunteer moderation, and openness to feedback.
What is missing is any serious engagement with the substance of the criticism. The issue is not that Wikipedia has faced allegations, but that these allegations point to clear and recurring patterns across many articles and over several years.
For instance, in the page related to the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus from the valley, Wikipedia downright refuses to call it a genocide based on scholars like Mohita Bhatia and Alexander Evans have said. OpIndia checked the sources mentioned quoting both scholars and interestingly, they only vaguely mentioned “genocide” in their book and article respectively. Evans claimed he interviewed Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu who held Pakistan responsible “suggest suspicions of ethnic cleansing or even genocide are wide of the mark”.
Source: Wikipedia
On the other hand, Bhatia wrote, “The dominant politics of Jammu representing ‘Hindus’ as a homogeneous block includes Pandits in the wider ‘Hindu’ category. It often uses extremely aggressive terms such as ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ to explain their migration and places them in opposition to Kashmiri Muslims.The BJP has appropriated the miseries of Pandits to expand their ‘Hindu’ constituency and projects them as victims who have been driven out from their homeland by militants and Kashmiri Muslims.”
Another example is the Gujarat riots of 2002, which have been marked as an “anti-Muslim pogrom” based on what “scholars” have stated. Interestingly, one of the scholars cited is Harsh Mander via an article on The Wire. The article also claimed that the train burning, in which 58 Hindus were killed, was “actually a staged trigger”.
Source: Wikipedia
This is not about isolated wording problems or the actions of a few editors. The pattern appears in how articles are framed, what is emphasised, and what is questioned. Hindu religious practices, organisations, and civilisational history are often discussed through the lens of caste, extremism, or majoritarianism. Similar scrutiny is often missing or softened elsewhere. Violence against Hindus is frequently downplayed or reframed, while allegations against Hindu groups are highlighted with strong language and wide sourcing.
This bias is not accidental. It follows directly from the system already described, a narrow definition of reliable sources, rejection of first-person or institutional rebuttals, page locking on sensitive topics, and editorial control concentrated among a small group of ideologically aligned editors. Once these mechanisms are in place, the outcomes are predictable.
The OpIndia dossier on Wikipedia has recorded several instances where Hindu perspectives, factual corrections, or clarifications were resisted or excluded, not because they were incorrect, but because they challenged narratives supported by Wikipedia’s preferred sources. Instead of prompting correction or review, such attempts were often met with procedural objections, policy citations, or outright dismissal.
Conclusion
The Times of India interview presented Wikipedia as a transparent, self-correcting platform guided by neutral policies and volunteer consensus. In practice, however, its outcomes are shaped by narrow ideological boundaries. Wikipedia’s sourcing rules, neutrality doctrine, and editorial hierarchies reveal a systemic failure, not isolated bias. When reliability is defined by a closed set of publications and dissent is constrained through policy and page locks, consensus becomes enforced conformity. Until these structural issues are addressed, claims of neutrality will remain rhetorical, not real.
OpIndia’s dossier on Wikipedia can be checked here.
In Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly district, the police detained 12 Muslim men for offering namaz in a private vacant house without obtaining administrative permission. The detained persons were also allegedly using the house as a makeshift mosque and madarsa. On social media, Islamists and their liberal allies peddled a Muslim victimhood narrative, framing mere detention and questioning of the Muslim men as ‘arrest’ and ‘persecution’.
This particular incident aligns with a broader issue of informal religious activities in residential and public spaces, especially by Islamists and Christian missionaries, which are often the precursor of encroachment, land grab and eventual conversion attempts.
What begins as a seemingly harmless practice of religious rituals soon evolves into de facto religious structures, and religious sentiments are weaponised to hold on to the illegally encroached properties as well as conversion activities in the name of the right to practice one’s religion. Although the Islamo-leftist cabal dismisses these concerns as mere Hindutva conspiracy theories, excuses to persecute ‘minorities’, and whatnot, several cases in the past demonstrate the blurring of the line between innocuous religious practice and strategic expansion and dominance.
The Sanjauli Mosque case in Shimla perfectly exemplifies this. What started as a modest structure in the 20th century magnified into a five-storey building via illegal expansions by encroaching on government land. In 2024, local Hindus protested, and the matter reached the court. The court ordered the demolition of the illegal floors. In December 2025, the Himachal Pradesh High Court ordered the resumption of the demolition of the top three illegal floors, and by January 2026, the court ordered the demolition of all five stories. The Himachal Pradesh State Waqf Board appealed against previous demolition orders; however, the court upheld the order.
This was not only a case of the illegal expansion of a small mosque. With the expansion of the mosque, the dominance of Muslims in Sanjauli also increased. OpIndia’s ground reports revealed that the local Hindus feared a demographic change in the area with an influx of Muslims there. It was reported that the harassment that Hindu females have been experiencing harassment from those coming to offer namaz at the mosque. Multiple incidents of voyeurism and stalking have been reported by locals, stating that some mosque visitors even peek inside Hindu houses and pass comments on women.
In fact, the whole outrage over the illegal constructions in the Sanjauli Mosque escalated after a group of 5 to 6 Muslim immigrants assaulted a local youth and injured his head. The accused were sheltered in a mosque, from where they were nabbed by the police. Incidents like this have exhausted the patience of local Hindus. The peace of the hills had been plagued by rising crime committed by the Muslim immigrants. The illegal mosque in Sanjauli had become a haven for such criminals.
OpIndia reported earlier how one man, Mohammed Salim, arrived in Sanjauli in 1990, occupied a piece of government land after a school built on it was shifted, constructed a single-story structure on it, which gradually transformed into a multi-storey building. He gradually turned it into a mosque and managed to obtain NOC fromthe Waqf Board. This one-storey structure expanded to a five-storey mosque, Namazis increased, and so did the harassment of local Hindus.
A similar modus operandi was seen in the case of Al-Mateen Mosque in Delhi’s Seelampur. In March 2025, a dispute erupted over the expansion of this mosque. The local Hindus said, back then, that Muslims first come quietly, buy flats, then buy houses, build mosques, and gradually occupy the entire area. Following that, one day, as soon as they get a chance, the whole community unites and attacks the Hindus.
The Al-Mateen Mosque began from a residential flat in 2013. Soon after, Muslims began offering Namaz there. Gradually, they converted that flat into a four-storey mosque. This flat-turned-mosque was used by Muslims during the 2020 anti-Hindu Delhi riots. It was reported that bullets were fired from the mosque during the riots, leaving three Hindu boys injured. After the anti-Hindu 2020 riots, the migration of Hindus has increased from Brahmapuri. In 2023, efforts for the mosque’s expansion intensified. The mosque-linked Muslims bought a nearby house from a Hindu. This was done to open a new gate for the mosque right in front of a Shiv Mandir built in 1984.
As Hindus opposed this, tensions escalated, and the local Hindus were compelled to put up posters of ‘House for sale’. In one incident, Muslims allegedly threw animal bones and blood outside the houses of Hindus. Just as it was seen in the case of Sanjauli, in Seelampur too, one house was bought by a Muslim man, initially used for Namaz, then converted into a mosque, and then expanded and used as a fort or an attack base during riots.
The mosque structure expands, and so does the number of visitors, along with the exertion of Islamic dominance and suppression of local Hindu and other non-Muslim communities.
Another recurring pattern of small land patches, markers, etc, on public, forest, and government land, being converted into illegal Mazars, has been a menace seen across the country. Beginning with a piece or stone, they evolve into a raised cemented slab, with one person covering them up with green religious chadar and lighting incense sticks (Agarbatti), and in no time, these structures expand into permanent mazars without a permit. Be it illegal mazars built near the Ranjit Sagar Dam in Gujarat, or the ones inside Uttarakhand’s Rajaji Tiger Reserve, or the countless small mazars and dargahs popping up on railway stations, even between railway tracks, near airports, government land, and even in the middle of roads, etc.
Be it Gujarat, Assam, Uttar Pradesh or Uttarakhand, the state governments there have demolished hundreds of such illegal mazars and dargahs and freed the occupied land. In many cases, when investigated, these mazars were found to be just cemented slabs, having no real burials of any Muslim revered figure.
In many cases, Muslims offer namaz on roads, claiming a lack of space inside mosques; however, these have mostly been excuses to assert religious dominance in the area, a show of strength, and even a step in the direction of gradual land encroachment. Back in December 2022, a massive row erupted in Haryana’s Gurugram, after a group of Muslims started offering namaz in public places instead of going to Mosques or offering prayers at their own homes. Hindu rights groups staged a protest against namaz in public places and stopped six such prayers.
Similar incidents of Muslims offering namaz in public places in Gurugram were reported in 2021. It was reported that with the rise in incidents of Muslims coming in groups and offering namaz in public places, incidents of eve-teasing and chain snatching. Muslims argued that they offer Namaz at public places because they don’t have spaces, and the Jumma Namaz has to be congregational. However, in many instances, Muslims travelled 50 km to offer Namaz at public places at Gurugram, indicating that Namaz in public places was not a necessity or compulsion, but rather a deliberate tactic of asserting Islamic dominance.
Clearly, “offering namaz” is not an innocuous exercise; it is rather employed as a tactic for dominance and gradual encroachment. These are but small steps in the direction of what may potentially become ‘Muslim areas’. OpIndia has reported how these Muslim areas are created by either importing Muslims from outside into a Hindu-majority area or gradually by increasing population, or by driving out the non-Muslims using street veto, since Muslim ‘minorities’ largely enjoy political patronage of ‘secular’ political parties. Once ‘Muslim-dominated’, localities become ‘Muslim areas’, which essentially become no-go zones for Hindus. There have been incidents of Islamist mobs attacking Hindu religious processions passing in front of mosques in ‘Muslim areas’, or even cricket match victory celebrations, triggering attacks on Hindus from mosques.
Interestingly, this pattern of using a foothold to seize control and execute nefarious agendas is not confined to Islamists alone. Many Christian missionaries, out with the mission of luring non-Christians to Christianity using myriad tactics, also do the same. In February 2025, it was reported in Lucknow’s Gomti Nagar Extension area that local Hindus staged a protest against Christian prayer meetings in a residential house in Chhota Bharwara, after it was found to be operated as an unregistered church. This illegal house-turned-church was hosting up to 200 people weekly, and conversion activities were taking place there. The Christian missionaries were found to be purchasing properties in the area at inflated rates to establish influence and create a Christian-dominated locality. It was reported that if the Hindus refused to convert, the Christian missionaries put pressure on the locals to sell their houses.
The local Hindus were being instigated to convert to Christianity. The house in question was a church-like structure with no explicit religious symbols.
In Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, Christian missionaries were earlier found to be encroaching on government and tribal lands and using the same for conversion activities. In many tribal areas. Christian missionaries have earlier been reported to have encroached on Hindu temple lands in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Be it Muslim immigrants or Christian missionaries, outsiders infiltrate tribal areas, establish residence, and engage in conversion activities to alter local demography, often beginning with innocuous prayer meetings or gatherings or benign private worship, but eventually resulting in land grabs, encroachments, and even religious conversion attempts.
This may or may not have been the eventuality in the recent Bareilly namaz-without-permission case; however, covering up such cases with the fake Muslim victimhood propaganda is a deliberate act of turning a blind eye to what may be a part of a prevalent pattern that poses a serious threat to national security and the Hindu-majority India’s demography.
A few days ago, a bright red full-page advertisement splashed across the front pages of multiple newspapers made a bold declaration: Kerala has eradicated extreme poverty. According to the ad, it achieved what no other Indian state could. However, this narrative has not remained confined to print media. Across social media, a growing number of influencers have begun aggressively pushing the claim that Kerala is a communist state and that its “outstanding performance” is proof that communism works. High literacy rates, low poverty figures, and better health indicators are repeatedly cited as evidence that communist governance delivers superior outcomes.
But behind this carefully narrated image lies a more uncomfortable question: “Is Kerala actually a communist state or is the term being loosely used to market welfare outcomes achieved within a capitalist framework?” And more importantly, “Do Kerala’s selective social indicators truly validate communism as an economic and governance model?”
This article cuts through the propaganda for both printed and viral claims to examine the data, the economic reality, and the ideological claims surrounding the so-called Kerala Model.
Is Kerala really a communist state? Defining communism vs reality
Before accepting Kerala’s social indicators as proof of communist success, it is essential to address the fundamental question that is deliberately blurred: Is Kerala actually a communist state?
Classical or traditional communism is not a vague label or a welfare slogan. It has clear defining features, including state ownership of the means of production, the abolition of private property, the elimination of free markets, and centralised economic planning. In the past, wherever this model was implemented, from the Soviet Union to Maoist China, it required strict control over industry, labour, media, and individual movement. However, Kerala does not fit this definition by any serious standard. Kerala offers complete protection for private property. Private companies dominate the economy. A market-driven environment governs the operations of hospitals, schools, banks, travel agencies, and service sectors. The state government does not govern trade, price, or production.
Most importantly, Kerala operates within India’s capitalist constitutional framework. It depends heavily on central government tax transfers, national financial institutions, private-sector employment, and foreign remittances in capitalist economies. But none of this comes under the actual communist economic system.
What Kerala has is a left-led government running welfare-heavy policies within a capitalist economy, not a communist state. Calling Kerala “communist” in the ideological sense is therefore misleading. It is a political branding exercise, not an economic reality.
This difference matters because you cannot credit communism for the outcomes achieved without communism. Investments in public health, land reforms, and welfare spending are policy decisions rather than exclusive outcomes of communist philosophy. Democracies across the world, including non-communist ones, have achieved similar or better outcomes without dismantling markets or private enterprise.
Poverty eradication: A real breakthrough or a manufactured narrative?
The Left’s loudest defence is the claim that the state has “eradicated extreme poverty”, as the idea that Kerala is a communist state is already in jeopardy. This assertion has been portrayed as historic, unheard of, and distinctively communist. A closer examination of the data reveals an entirely different picture, according to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), which was conducted between 2019 and 2021.
Kerala’s extreme poverty rate stood at just 0.5%. In practical terms, extreme poverty in the state was already nearly eliminated before the Communist government launched its special poverty-eradication mission in 2021. This single statistic punctures the entire propaganda balloon. If poverty had already fallen to negligible levels before the much-publicised programme began, then what exactly is being celebrated now? The Communist government’s claim of lifting 64,000 families out of extreme poverty does not reflect a structural transformation; rather, it reflects rounding up an already declining figure. National data further exposes the exaggeration.
A NITI Aayog report shows that between 2016 and 2021, states like Uttar Pradesh reduced poverty by nearly 13%, while Kerala’s reduction during the same period was from 0.7% to 0.5%. In relative terms, Kerala’s change is marginal, not exceptional. Other states, like Goa, have also reached near-zero levels of extreme poverty without projecting the outcome as an ideological victory or branding it as a civilisational breakthrough. The difference lies not in outcomes, but in advertising. It becomes more concerning with the allegation of data manipulation related to Kerala’s claim.
The opposition party in the state has drawn attention to differences between the newly disclosed poverty lists, which claim that there are just 6,400 Scheduled Tribe families, and the 2011 Census, which recorded almost one lakh of these people. These stark differences raise valid concerns about political convenience, exclusion, and technique. Additionally, there are claims that the ₹1.5 crore spent on publicising this purported accomplishment was taken from funds intended for housing low-income people, turning charity into a marketing ploy. The broader truth is unavoidable: poverty has been declining across India, driven by national-level economic growth, welfare schemes, and infrastructure expansion. Kerala’s latest claim does not represent a unique communist intervention, but it means a state taking credit for a trend it did not create.
The financial reality: Supreme Court rebuke and a state running on borrowed time
Although the Kerala government uses public messaging and commercials to celebrate the eradication of poverty, the state’s actual financial situation paints a considerably less optimistic picture. In March 2024, the Communist-led Kerala government approached the Supreme Court by urgently seeking permission to borrow beyond its prescribed limits. This move alone punctured the image of a self-sustaining, model state. A government confident in its economic strength does not run to the country’s highest court for emergency borrowing approval. What followed was even more revealing.
The Kerala state would not be able to cover even its regular expenses without the more than 13000 crore as financial relief provided by the central government. The irony was apparent that the very system that left leaders routinely condemned became the lifeline keeping their government afloat. The Supreme Court did not mince words. In a pointed observation, the court stated that Kerala was responsible for its own poor financial condition. This was not a political allegation but a judicial assessment based on fiscal data and borrowing patterns. At the same time, reports emerged that the state government was unable to pay salaries to its employees on time, a basic obligation that any functional administration must meet before declaring ideological victories. This episode exposed a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the Kerala Model. On one hand, it is showcased as proof of superior governance; on the other, it survives on debt, emergency relief, and judicial leniency. Welfare spending without sustainable revenue generation does not represent economic strength, it represents financial stress deferred into the future.
A model that depends on repeated borrowing and external support may sustain political narratives, but it cannot sustain itself indefinitely.
Debt explosion under Left rule: The numbers behind the ‘Kerala Model’
If a government’s economic claims are so big, they must withstand scrutiny of debt, deficits and fiscal discipline. On this count, the Kerala model fares poorly. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, Kerala’s total public debt is projected to touch ₹4.5 lakh crore by the end of the 2024–25 financial year.
This figure alone places Kerala among the most heavily indebted states in the country. What makes this especially troubling is the speed at which the debt has accumulated. When the Communist government assumed power, Kerala’s debt stood at approximately ₹1.6 lakh crore. In just ten years, the figure has nearly tripled. This rapid expansion cannot be explained away as a national trend or a one-time crisis response, but it reflects structural fiscal mismanagement. It is more concerning that Kerala’s debt-to-GDP ratio is now around 34%. Economists generally consider a ratio of 25% or below to be fiscally sustainable for Indian states. Kerala has not merely crossed this threshold, but it has done so comfortably, with no credible roadmap for reversal.
If high debt is used for productive growth, it need not be automatically disastrous. However, Kerala’s borrowing has mainly been used to pay salary and pension liabilities, welfare commitments without revenue backing, and routine expenditure rather than capital creation. In other words, the state is borrowing to survive, not borrowing to grow. This is why fiscal stress keeps resurfacing in different forms, such as delayed payments, disputes over borrowing caps, and repeated appeals for central assistance. A model that relies on ever-expanding debt while advertising welfare outcomes is not an economic success; it is a postponement of accountability. The uncomfortable reality is that the celebrated Kerala Model is being sustained not by robust economic output, but by credit-fuelled consumption. And credit, unlike propaganda, eventually demands repayment.
Conclusion: Branding welfare as Communism, and failure as a ‘Model’
So, is Kerala really a communist state? The evidence says no. Kerala is not communist in structure, not communist in economics, and not communist in operation. It is a welfare-heavy state functioning entirely within India’s capitalist constitutional framework, surviving on central transfers and private enterprise. Most crucially, money is earned in capitalist economies outside the state. Calling it “communist” is less an economic description and more a political branding exercise. In reality, what is being portrayed as a “communist success story” today is a combination of strong PR, national welfare trends, and historical social reform. Even before the most recent Left government began its campaign, the decrease in extreme poverty was almost complete.
More than modern ideological administration, decades-old reforms and social movements are responsible for high literacy and health statistics. None of these results necessitated the elimination of capitalism, markets, or private property, the same foundations that communism purports to replace. At the same time, the economic costs of the so-called Kerala Model are becoming impossible to ignore. A state drowning in debt, dependent on borrowing for survival, unable to generate sufficient employment for its youth, and running on remittances sent by workers forced to leave home, cannot be held up as a sustainable governance ideal.
Exporting labour is not development. Borrowing endlessly is not prosperity. Advertising welfare is not economic strength. Instead of confronting these structural weaknesses, the Communist leadership, aided by influencers and a PR agency, chooses to manufacture a narrative that equates welfare delivery with ideological victory. The real danger of this narrative is not ideological, but practical. When propaganda replaces honest assessment, course correction becomes impossible. Kerala does not need more slogans about models and revolutions. It needs jobs, investment, fiscal discipline, and growth that allows its people to stay, not leave. Until then, the Kerala Model will remain what it increasingly looks like: a publicity-friendly story sustained by debt, remittances, and selective data, not a communist success, and certainly not a model worth replicating.
In Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly district, the police detained 12 Muslim men on Sunday (18th January) for performing Friday’s Jummah Namaz in a private vacant house. The incident unfolded on 16th January, in the Mohammadganj village under the Bishratganj Police Station precinct. As a video of the incident surfaced online and the police took action based on a local tip-off, Islamists and their liberal cheerleaders claimed that the Bareilly Police in the BJP-ruled state ‘arrested’ 12 Muslim men for simply practising their faith.
In this vein, Congress spokesperson Shama Mohamed claimed that 12 Muslim men were arrested by the Bareilly Police for offering Namaz at their “own” homes.
“Uttar Pradesh Police in Bareilly have arrested 12 Muslim people for offering namaz inside their own homes after a video surfaced. On what grounds were they arrested, @bareillypolice? Which law did they violate? Have all criminals in the state been neutralised that the UP Police is now busy terrorising its own citizens for praying inside their homes?” Mohamed wrote on X on 18th January.
One Islamist X user also amplified the claim that the arrested Muslim men were offering Namaz in private, in their own house, and wrote, “Twelve Muslims jailed for praying namaz inside a private house after a complaint. No violence. No crime, just faith. If praying inside your own house lands you in jail, this isn’t governance, it’s persecution.”
Another Islamist and notorious Hinduphobe, Karishma Aziz, wrote, “In Bareilly, 12 people were offering namaz in an empty house No weapons, no slogans, no violence, 12 arrested. Our faith becomes a crime even inside our own homes. But their faith, when they wave swords on the streets, is still called “culture.” Here, crime is not decided by the act, but by identity. Here, FIRs are not written on the basis of evidence, but on viral clips. Today arrest for namaz, tomorrow FIR for silence too, and you’ll keep watching the spectacle!”
Did Bareilly Police arrest Muslim men for offering namaz?
Social media is replete with posts by Islamo-leftists, peddling the claim that in Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath-ruled Uttar Pradesh, Muslims are being targeted and persecuted for practising their faith. However, this claim is a part of the Muslim victimhood playbook, where Islamist activities of asserting religious dominance are veiled with a victimhood narrative.
post by the Bareilly Police
Contrary to the claims made by the usual suspects on social media, the Bareilly Police only detained, not arrested, 12 Muslims, not for simply offering Namaz in their own homes, but for doing so inside a vacant private house without administrative permission. The police said that they have detained 12 individuals, while 3 fled the scene, adding that efforts are on to trace the absconding persons.
The video circulating online, which shows Muslim men offering namaz inside a vacant house, was reportedly shot by local Hindus, who informed the police about the illegal activity taking place there.
SP (South) Anshika Verma said that detaining the accused Muslim men was a precautionary action. This came after the police received information from locals in the Mohammadganj village that a vacant house was being used by Muslim men as a Madarsa for several weeks. The local villagers had raised a complaint that congregational namaz was being held regularly at that house without obtaining permission from the administration.
“Conducting any new religious activity or gathering without permission is a violation of the law. Strict action will be taken if such activities are repeated,” the officer said.
Speaking to TOI, SP Verma said, “We received a tip-off that a house has been turned into a makeshift mosque and madarsa. This was illegal. Those involved were told not to repeat such activity without proper permission.”
As per some media reports, the house in question belonged to one Hanif and was being used for Jummah Namaz temporarily. However, other reports say that the house belongs to one Resham Khan, whose husband, Haseen Khan, died a few years back. Resham and her two children are reported to be working in another state.
While the police only detained and questioned the Muslim men who conducted namaz inside a private house without permission, Islamists and their liberal cheerleaders peddled a narrative that they were ‘arrested’ simply for doing namaz.
Some media reports said that the accused were booked under Sections pertaining to breach of peace, and were produced before a magistrate on 18th January and that the accused have been granted bail by the magistrate.
Superintendent of Police (Bareilly) Anurag Arya said that while the 12 Muslim men were detained and questioned, they were not arrested. He added that the police issued warnings to them.
“Considering the sensitivity of the matter and apprehending the possibility of tension in the area, a team immediately rushed to the spot. After reaching there, the police spoke to the people and assessed the situation. To prevent any future disturbance or law-and-order issues, all the concerned persons were strictly instructed not to repeat such activities at the private place in the future,” a police officer said.
Thus, while Muslim men were indeed offering Namaz inside a vacant house, and allegedly using it as mosque and madarsa without administrative permission, the claim that they were arrested for doing namaz on their own homes is not true. They neither offered namaz in their own homes nor were they arrested. The police only detained and questioned them. All the detained persons were released, and only a warning was issued to them not repeat their actions in future.
