(The following is an extract from the book ‘Sanghi Who Never Went To A Shakha’, which is being republished here in wake of the death of SP supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav)
Further, I believe that this whole caste politics, especially the OBC caste politics, unwittingly might have only helped Hindutva. This could sound entirely counterfactual, given that conventional wisdom says that caste politics is antithesis to Hindutva, which aims at building a common identity beyond caste, but there are certain reasons why I believe it could have indirectly helped.
OBC politics, or the Mandal politics, indeed proved to be a counterweight to the ‘Kamandal politics’—the term was coined to refer to the Ram Janmabhoomi movement—and Uttar Pradesh is the biggest example of that, where caste politics weakened the pan-Hindu identity and hurt the BJP and Hindutva politics.
In Uttar Pradesh, once the Babri Masjid was demolished and a makeshift Ram temple made, the BJP support base progressively thinned. At the same time, both the SP and the BSP—with their own caste-based cadre—grew powerful and their support base swelled. It appeared as if the group that had worked together in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement thought that the ‘work was done’ on 6 December 1992, and thus they subsequently went back to their micro-identities of caste.
This could have convinced the ecosystem that identity politics around caste can checkmate Hindutva. Perhaps, they thought that the Mandal politics will do to the Hindi heartland what Dravidian politics did in Tamil Nadu, and the Gangetic plains will go barren for any Hindutva politics.
The Dravidian identity politics, or the caste politics in Tamil Nadu, especially the one championed by the likes of Periyar, was rooted in anti-Hinduism. Let us remember that it was born during the British era, when the “ecosystem” (originally shaped by the British and later inherited by the Congress) could afford to support overtly anti-Hindu ideas without needing the façade of anti-Hindutva (post-independence).
However, the OBC identity politics of the late 1980s or 90s was not rooted in anti-Hinduism. This is a very basic and obvious difference, and for sure the great minds of the ecosystem knew it. Perhaps they hoped that over time, with help of ‘alternative history’, they would be able turn the OBC identity into non-Hindu identity, and subsequently into anti-Hindu identity.
The usual first step in this process starts with the anti-Brahmin rhetoric. Every Hindu practice, custom and ritual is declared as ‘Brahminism’, and the non-Brahmin castes are encouraged to stop following them. That’s how they are weaned away from their roots, and then given an alternative history and identity to associate themselves with. Such histories and identities are invented in liberal laboratories, such as the JNU, and popular caste leaders are supposed to take those to the masses.
If you look at the earlier political statements by the likes of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Lalu Prasad Yadav, you will invariably find the rhetoric of anti-Brahminism. Even now many of their supporters keep abusing Brahmins. I remember Lalu Yadav in his early days, asking people not to believe ‘pandas’ and ‘ojhas’ (terms used for temple priests). He had made his supporters throw away ‘jantar’ (amulets) or other religious symbols they might be wearing. Maybe the next step, expected from the likes of Lalu by the ecosystem, would have been to ask his followers to stop going to temples and worshipping ‘Brahminical gods’. But that never happened.
The liberal project to de-Hinduize OBCs was always going to be pretty challenging. The backward castes were a central part of the Hindu identity, and castes like Yadavs have identified themselves with Lord Krishna. Not just the OBCs, almost every caste had some god, including ‘kuldevtas’, or some Hindu icon that they would associate themselves with.
On a societal level, many Hindu rituals and festivals in a place like Bihar require a rather honourable presence of various castes to consider them complete as per traditions. While no one can deny caste discrimination and inequalities, castes in North India, including the Brahmins, had a more symbiotic relationship than its southern counterpart in Tamil Nadu during the British era. Deracinating them from that symbiotic relationship was not going to be easy.
Mulayam Singh Yadav, too, had issued statements in his earlier years that were music to the liberal ears. He had once famously questioned that, how could one be sure that Lord Ram was born at the same spot in Ayodhya that is being claimed as his Janmabhoomi? He had also asked whether there was any ‘parchi’ (receipt) in the name of Ram that could prove the claim.
Such statements were pure insolence towards Hindu sentiments, and obviously he did worse by firing at the kar sevaks in 1990. But, even he had to mellow down as he realized that he had already won the Muslim support, thanks to his early utterings and deeds, and now his party needed to consolidate support among other Hindu backward castes.
While the ecosystem was building plans and blueprint on how to uproot the OBCs from their Hindu roots, and while those plans perhaps looked invincible in places like the JNU, the OBC politics on the ground essentially strengthened caste identities—identities that were Hindu after all.
Not just that, the support base and even the leadership of the parties founded by Lalu and Mulayam were not exactly ‘liberal’ in any sense. On issues of women’s rights, free speech and free markets, they were far more ‘conservative’ than what the BJP or RSS could be. You will find it easier to recall a statement by a sexagenarian RSS chief in support of women’s rights or gay rights than by young leaders like Akhilesh Yadav or Tejashwi Yadav — the sons of Mulayam and Lalu, respectively.
And how can I forget Tej Pratap Yadav, the other son of Lalu Prasad Yadav, who loves to dress up as Hindu gods? In fact, many of his pictures, where he is dressed up as Lord Krishna and Lord Shiva, have gone viral. He is reported to be quite religious. And I really like that aspect of him. Not kidding.
Anyway, the point is that while the rise of OBC politics clearly checkmated the rise of BJP and the rise of Hindutva, it didn’t really evolve the way the ecosystem would have wanted or planned it to be.
However, the ecosystem had to continue supporting parties that played OBC politics to keep the BJP at bay. But by supporting such parties in the hope that they will weaken Hindutva, the ecosystem was effectively strengthening identity politics and conservative values. So, basically, the Left-wing ecosystem was promoting the Right-wing value system.
Would it not have been easier for an OBC Modi to get this crowd to the ‘real’ Right wing? Hindutva as an ideology would not have been an impediment for this crowd, as they were already ‘conservative’ and proud of their identity, which was part of the Hindu identity.
