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As India is set to help in restoration of ancient Prambanan temple in Indonesia, read how the Modi govt is stepping up to preserve India’s civilisational heritage in many countries

On 6th July (Monday), Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Jakarta for a three-nation diplomatic visit to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. The six-day program is a crucial diplomatic move that is designed to strengthen New Delhi’s presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, the Modi government has also introduced heritage diplomacy to reinforce cultural bonds, as India and Indonesia have come together to restore the iconic Prambanan temple complex.

It is Indonesia’s largest Hindu temple site and is present in the Special Region of Yogyakarta in southern Java. PM Modi outlined, “The Prambanan temple, which is more than 1,000 years old, is a symbol of the shared cultural heritage between the two countries,” during a joint press briefing alongside Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. The two leaders are also going to visit the temple on 8th July.

Last year, a bilateral agreement was established for India to formally support the temple’s renovations. This marvel from the 9th century proudly holds the designation of a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) World Heritage Site since 1991.

Originally consisting of 240 large and small temples devoted to the divine trinity in Hinduism- Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva- the complex is regarded as one of the most outstanding masterpieces of Indic architecture outside of India. Its central feature is a towering temple dedicated to Lord Shiva.

The Siwagrha Inscription (856 AD) revealed that the complex was once known as Siwagrha, which translates to “House of Shiva” and was built during the reign of King Rakai Pikatan of the Mataram Kingdom. A stone interlocking method that does not involve cement or synthetic adhesives was employed for its construction.

The temple’s stone reliefs showcase scenes from the Krishnayana and Ramayana, serving as a breathtaking representation of the Hindu epic whose reach has extended across seas and borders. The esteemed Ramayana Ballet in Indonesia continues to bring the revered tale to life even today.

Many of the temples suffered damage over the course of centuries due to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and passage of time but a significant section of the complex was renovated through decades of conservation and repair. However, Indonesia and India are currently starting a new chapter in their shared history to take care of a common cultural legacy for future generations.

India and Indonesia join hands

Indonesian Culture Minister Fadli Zon recently met with an Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) team to finalise the details. The neighbouring Sewu and Plaosan temple complexes are also part of the larger cultural landscape that would be preserved in addition to the main temple.

ASI specialists decided to utillise the anastylosis process for the initiative after a preliminary inspection. It is a conservation technique that reconstructs monuments mostly with their original stones found on the location. New stones are only put in where they are structurally required and for the integrity of the monument, maintaining the historical authenticity.

Thousands of dispersed stone pieces will need to be meticulously catalogued to match stones to particular temples during the difficult procedure in light of the dispersed building blocks around the grounds. Indonesia is also investigating digital technology and artificial intelligence to “help identify and reassemble the temple stone components.”

India has earlier aided to preserve the 9th century Buddhist Borobudur temple which is in Magelang, Central Java. Notably, India has been proactively involved in cultural conservation measures at a number of ancient temples and monasteries from its immediate neighbourhood to Gulf and Southeast Asia. These include Buddhist, Hindu, and mixed-religious architecture in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia and other countries.

The aim of the Modi government extends beyond merely strengthening diplomacy. It seeks to reinvigorate the longstanding legacy of the Indosphere and rekindle the country’s civilisational links.

Joy Kali Matar temple and Ramna Kali temple in Bangladesh

India began to rebuild the 300-year-old Sree Sree Joy Kali Matar Temple in the northern Natore district of Bangladesh. The plan was executed with Indian grant support of Bangladeshi Taka 97 lakhs and a total cost of 1.33 crores under the Government of India’s High Impact Community Development Project (HICDP) Scheme following the signing of an MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) in 2016. It is among Bangladesh’s oldest temples, established by Shri Dayaram Roy in the 18th century. He was the prominent Dewan of Rani Bhahani of Natore and founder of the Dighapatia Royal Family.

Dhaka’s Ramna Kali temple which was destroyed by Pakistani forces during their brutal “Operation Searchlight” in March 1971, was inaugurated by President Ram Nath Kovind in 2021. It was reconstructed with India’s assistance after an announcement was made in 2017, when the then-Indian External Affairs Minister launched 15 development projects in Baridhara.

The 400-year-old religious place was reportedly built during the Mughal period by the Hindu saint Haricharan Giri. The temple grew in popularity in the early 20th century, when renowned saint Ma Anandamayi founded her ashram in its premises.

Thiruketheeswaram temple in Sri Lanka

India agreed to provide aide to the tune of LKR (Sri Lankan Rupee) 326 million to restore Thiruketheeswaram Temple in Mannar, Sri Lanka. It is one of the holiest Hindu shrines in the country’s north. Shaivites across the subcontinent regard it as one of the five sacred Ishwarams devoted to Lord Shiva.

Image via Hindu Temples of India

It was closed for 12 years during the armed war and reopened in 2002. ASI and the College of Architecture and Sculpture in Mamallapuram participated in the pivotal assignment after a joint declaration between the two nations in 2010. The repaired complex has not yet been officially inaugurated but the conservation task which commenced in 2012 has made progress toward completion.

Wat Phou temple in Laos

India has worked in Vat Phou in southern Laos since 2009. The UNESCO World Heritage Site was a Lord Shiva temple founded by the Khmer people in the 11th century before progressively changing into a Buddhist centre of worship. India has contributed technical expertise and funded several stages of structural conservation to protect the centuries-old edifice. The initial phase lasted between 2007-2017.

Image via Tripadvisor

The second phase of the venture began a year later and is predicted to be completed in 2028 at a projected cost of Rs 24 crore. Wat Phou is connected to both Shaivite religious customs and pre-Angkorian Khmer architecture. The location is a part of the Champasak cultural setting and is close to the Mekong River.

My Son Sanctuary in Vietnam

India undertook repair work at the UNESCO-listed My Son Sanctuary in Quang Nam province of Vietnam in 2017. The temple complex is mostly made up of Shaivite temples and was constructed between the 4th and 13th centuries. It was the religious hub of the Champa kingdom. It also has Cham Buddhist temple towers from the 7th to the 11th centuries.

Image via UNESCO World Heritage Centre

The E-F temple group has 11 structures that will be preserved between 2025 and 2029. A centuries-old Shiva Linga was discovered by Indian archaeologists during the conservation operation, asserting its historical relation to Hindu faith and traditions that were born in the Indian subcontinent. A, H and K group of temples were entirely restored by ASI in 2023.

Ta Prohm, Preah Vihear and Angkor Vat in Cambodia

Ta Prohm and Preah Vihear are UNESCO World Heritage Sites which were built by Khmer Empire in Cambodia. The former is a complex of temples from the 12th and 13th centuries situated in Siem Reap. India has been actively involved in its conservation since 20023, stressing on the preservation of its authentic fabric and structural stability.

Preah Vihear is a complex of temples dedicated to Lord Shiva that dates back to the 11th century on a 525-meter cliff in the Dangrek Mountains. An agreement was signed in 2018, after which India started to cooperate in its conservation. Preah Vihear has consistently remained a significant source of contention between Cambodia and Thailand, often leading to violent conflicts.

Angkor Vat (Source: Original Buddhas)

India was the first nation to respond to Cambodia’s request to save Angkor Wat which is also a product of the ingenuity of Khmer Empire. The ASI conducted a full 7-year restoration of the site between 1986 and 1993 including the central tower, the Samudra Manthana Gallery and the moat’s northern embankment. The action helped stabilise one of the most renowned archaeological sites in the world by removing vegetation, improving drainage and conserving elaborate stone bas-reliefs. It was the biggest conservation effort India had undertaken abroad.

ASI has also helped in the restoration of Ashram Maha Russei. It is a unique sandstone Hindu temple from the Funan or pre-Angkorian era that dates to the 7th century. It was set up during King Bhavavarman and has Gupta architectural elements from India.

Shrinathji temple in Bahrain

The 200-year-old Shrinathji (Lord Krishna) temple in Bahrain’s capital Manama was redeveloped for $4.2 million by India. It is the oldest temple in the region. The project was introduced when PM Modi visited the Arab country in 2019. He became the first Indian prime minister to land there. The total area of the land was 16,500 square feet and the four-level structure was scheduled to span 45,000 square feet, standing at an overall height of 30 meters.

The modern landmark complex houses the sanctum sanctorum and prayer rooms, highlighting its past and legacy. Additionally, there are facilities for customary Hindu rites and marriage ceremonies.

More proposals under review

Restorations are just one aspect of Modi government’s heritage conservation programs. For potential future restoration services, ASI has surveyed other cultural monuments in Vietnam, such as Dong Duong Buddhist Monastery and Nhan Tower. According to an agreement inked in December 2020, Indian experts offered restoration suggestions for the monastery.

ASI has also put together similar plans for Nepal’s Pashupatinath temple. India has helped preserve Buddhist monuments like Myanmar’s Ananda Temple and earthquake-damaged pagodas in Bagan along with ancient Islamic monuments. This exemplifies a comprehensive approach that might concentrate on civilisational and religious roots but is not confined to them.

The Ministry of External Affairs reported that India has finished over 50 cultural and heritage projects overseas and is collaborating on approximately 25 others at present.

The Prambanan temple project signifies another step in the direction of soliddifying civilisational lonkages with other nations, showcasing how historic and mutual ties have the potential to shape diplomatic relationships, a notion that India has clearly understood. Therefore, the Modi government has made regular efforts not only to reinvigorate the same but also to use them as a foundation broadening bilateral partnerships.

What the India-Indonesia Sabang port project is and why a complementary maritime hub with Great Nicobar serves India’s interests

Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached Indonesia for a 3-day visit on 6th July 2026. It was part of his 5-day visit to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. His visit to Jakarta came at a moment when the two countries are trying to widen cooperation in defence, trade, food security, health and digital systems.

It is the best time to revisit a quieter but potentially more transformative piece of the bilateral agenda, that is, Sabang Port. According to sources, Sabang Port’s development is one of the top items on the agenda of the India-Indonesia talks. In his press statement, PM Modi said, “As two close maritime nations, we have also decided to deepen our cooperation in the blue economy, port development, and maritime trade.”

Sabang was conceived as a connectivity project

The India-Indonesia Sabang initiative was never framed as a zero-sum strategic outpost in official documents. In the 2018 Shared Vision on Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the two governments committed themselves to deeper connectivity between India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Indonesia’s Sumatra provinces, which include Aceh.

The main goal was to promote trade, tourism and people-to-people links. The same document also called for building Andaman Sea tourism links between Sabang, Port Blair and Havelock for sail tourism, cruise traffic, diving and wellness travel.

In 2018, when PM Modi visited Jakarta, a Joint Task Force on Andaman and Nicobar Islands-Aceh connectivity was set up. Its first meeting was held in Banda Aceh in 2019 and the second in Port Blair in 2022.

According to the official India-Indonesia bilateral brief of the Consulate General of India in Bali, that second meeting reviewed trade and investment, tourism, marine resources, academic cooperation, cultural ties and, crucially, the development of port infrastructure around Sabang. In other words, Sabang Port was part of a broader connectivity vision linking Aceh and the Andamans, and not just a port-only template.

Sabang Port is not merely a berth, but is meant to be a multi-sector connector, that is, maritime infrastructure, fisheries, tourism, local commerce and island-to-island integration. Any serious discussion revolving around Sabang Port will include all these features, which are economic, civil and regional in character.

Great Nicobar changes the equation

Since 2018, things have changed in terms of India’s own maritime ambition. The Great Nicobar project is designed to turn the island into a major maritime and economic hub close to the East-West shipping route. The Government of India’s official explainer says the project includes a 14.2 million TEU international container transhipment terminal, a greenfield international airport, a 450 MVA gas-solar power plant and a township. All this will be developed in proximity to the shipping lane that is intended to reduce India’s dependence on foreign transhipment ports such as Colombo, Singapore and Klang.

The locations of The Great Nicobar Project and Sabang Port

Notably, the Great Nicobar Project is far ahead of being just a concept on paper. In March 2026, India’s Public-Private Partnership Appraisal Committee gave final approval to the Galathea Bay international container transhipment port component at Great Nicobar. The appraised project cost is around ₹48,862 crore for the PPP port package. It means Great Nicobar has moved from strategic aspiration into implementation mode.

With the Great Nicobar Project, the commercial geography around Sabang Port has become harder to ignore. According to Malaysia’s Marine Department, more than 1,02,500 vessels transited the Malacca Strait in 2025. It shows the scale of maritime demand in the wider neighbourhood.

Great Nicobar is being built to capture a slice of that traffic through container transhipment. However, that does not exhaust the commercial opportunities around the chokepoint. A high-volume transhipment terminal mainly moves containers from one ship to another. It attracts large vessels, sorts cargo and feeds it into onward routes. But the wider maritime economy still needs bunkering, ship repair, marine services, cruise handling, warehousing, shorebase support and value-added logistics.

This is why Great Nicobar is not a threat to Indonesia’s Sabang port but a market signal. The creation of a successful large maritime node at Great Nicobar will make the wider Andaman Sea more commercially active, not less. For Sabang, that can mean demand spillover.

Why complementarity suits Indonesia

Recent official messaging from Sabang itself points in exactly that direction. In June 2026, BPKS, the Sabang Free Trade Zone and Free Port Authority, said Sabang’s next development phase would focus on building a “marine hub” ecosystem comprising shorebase functions, a logistics centre, bunkering services, maritime industry and tourism.

The same statement said Indian interest in a Sabang transhipment port remained one of the strategic opportunities under discussion and described Sabang as Indonesia’s maritime gateway to the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait.

It means that Indonesia does not need to imitate Great Nicobar to benefit from it. In fact, Sabang’s smarter path is differentiation. Great Nicobar is being built first and foremost around container transhipment, large-scale logistics and supporting infrastructure.

In contrast, Sabang’s own institutional vision is broader and more service-oriented, that is, transhipment where viable, but also cruise, marine logistics, bunkering, fisheries and tourism. BPKS has repeatedly described its mission in those terms, including its ambition to develop port transhipment and cruise services and to position Sabang as an international trade and tourism centre.

This is why “complementarity” works for Indonesia. A port that tries to replicate Great Nicobar’s full role risks becoming a weaker copy. A port that specialises in the functions Great Nicobar cannot fully absorb becomes indispensable. Sabang’s free port status, its maritime location and the policy push now coming from BPKS and Aceh give Jakarta a practical basis for that strategy.

China’s economic presence in Indonesia and BRI

China has a large economic presence in Indonesia. However, Sabang is not part of that story. Beijing’s major BRI-linked projects in Indonesia have been elsewhere, especially the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway and industrial projects linked to minerals and manufacturing. The geography of these projects is different and they serve different purposes with no direct link to Sabang in Aceh.

There were reports in the past that China had shown interest in Sabang, but that interest did not turn into a visible project. A National Maritime Foundation paper notes that Chinese interest in Sabang was discussed at one stage. A high-level Indonesian naval official reportedly said the Chinese side had offered to develop Sabang infrastructure in 2015, but Indonesia did not show interest due to security reasons. The proposal did not move forward and Sabang never entered the Indonesia-China BRI framework.

Sabang’s current relevance comes from the India-Indonesia maritime track that began in 2018, when both sides started looking at connectivity between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Aceh.

Why India gains from a dual-hub approach

From India’s perspective, a complementary Sabang is better than a competitive Sabang for three main reasons.

First of all, it gives New Delhi a wider maritime ecosystem near the western entrance of the Malacca Strait. Great Nicobar can anchor transhipment. Sabang can support the surrounding service economy. When they work together, they will create network effects that a single port cannot.

Second, it makes the 2018 India-Indonesia maritime vision real in commercial terms. The original framework was about connectivity between the Andamans and Aceh, not merely port access. If Sabang and Great Nicobar evolve as complementary nodes, India gains a friendlier, more functional maritime neighbourhood across the Andaman Sea, with concrete links in tourism, trade, logistics, fisheries and local businesses. It is far more durable than a relationship defined only by security headlines.

Third, it improves the political sustainability of India’s maritime presence. Indonesia has consistently emphasised economic value in Sabang, and BPKS’s own recent messaging is overwhelmingly commercial, that is, tourism, logistics, bunkering, marine industry and job creation.

A complementary model therefore aligns better with Indonesian preferences than an overtly strategic frame would. That does not mean it is a constraint for India. It is in fact an advantage. Maritime partnerships last longer when they are profitable, locally visible and politically unthreatening.

What Jakarta should do with Sabang now

Indonesia should treat Great Nicobar as the catalyst for Sabang’s overdue commercial take-off. The first step is strategic clarity. Sabang should market itself not as another Galathea Bay, but as the Andaman Sea’s maritime-services, cruise, logistics and shorebase counterpart to Great Nicobar’s container hub.

The second is institutional momentum. New Delhi and Jakarta should reactivate the Sabang-Andaman tourism circuits, academic links and business-to-business corridors.

Third comes the branding. BPKS is already floating the idea of sister-port relationships involving Sabang, Chennai and Port Blair, and that should now be pushed from concept to implementation. These recommendations are policy inferences, but they are grounded in the official bilateral framework and the current BPKS economic roadmap.

When seen this way, the India-Indonesia joint Sabang project is a connectivity and maritime-economy initiative born out of the 2018 shared vision for the Indo-Pacific and carried forward through the Aceh-Andaman task force.

Great Nicobar does not diminish that logic but strengthens it. If Jakarta moves early, Sabang can become the commercial partner port that makes India’s Great Nicobar gamble more valuable to both countries. And that is precisely why a complementary maritime hub in Sabang is in India’s interests too.

From BrahMos and Astra Mk1 deals to Sabang Port cooperation: How PM Modi’s Indonesia visit advances India’s strategic and defence interests

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is in Indonesia on an official visit. PM Modi’s visit is advancing major defence deals, continuing the momentum gained by Indian defence exports since Operation Sindoor. Indonesia is set to sign an agreement with India for phased procurement of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. Indonesia will become the first country to import India’s indigenous Astra Mk1 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM). India and Indonesia have given a nod for an air-to-air missile (AAM) procurement agreement between Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and Republikorp.

DRDO-developed Astra Mk1 goes international as India and Indonesia bolster defence ties

The Astra Mk1 has been indigenously designed and developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), catering for both Beyond Visual Range and Close Combat Engagement. With the Astra Mk1, Indonesia gets a modern, active-radar-guided BVRAAM for air superiority, compatible with its fighter jets. The Indian BVRAAM offers a cost-effective, reliable, and battle-tested alternative to expensive Western suppliers.

Astra Mk1 has been integrated with platforms like Su-30MKI and Tejas; the fully indigenously developed BVRAAM is combat-proven. It has a range of 110 km in head-on mode, with post-Operation Sindoor optimisation pushing effective range toward around 160 km in certain conditions. Astra Mk1 has a speed of up to Mach 4.5, with a 15kg high-explosive pre-fragmented wita h laser proximity fuse. The BVRAAM comes with mid-course inertial navigation and terminal active radar homing, making it fire-and-forget capable and resistant to electronic countermeasures.

The Indian BVRAAM’s other features include a solid-fuel motor, high off-boresight launch capability, operating up to 20 km altitude, handling high-g manoeuvres, and smokeless propellant.

Indonesia will also be buying the BrahMos supersonic missile, jointly developed by India and Russia. BrahMos is a long-range supersonic cruise missile. It is an unmanned payload rocket that has a warhead, precision-guided weaponry, an aerodynamic frame, a propulsion system and a guidance system. It is renowned for its exceptional accuracy. BrahMos has a solid propellant booster engine and is a two-stage missile. Its initial phase accelerates the missile over the speed of sound, or supersonic speed, before it separates. The BrahMos missile was utilised in strikes against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.

While India is securing a massive boost for export of its indigenous weaponry and “Make in India” credibility, Indonesia gets a reliable and non-aligned partner in India for modernisation of its forces, and advanced weaponry to secure sea lanes and sovereignty amidst a volatile global geopolitical scenario.

India is bolstering the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia, a key ASEAN and Indo-Pacific ally. New Delhi’s deepening partnership with Indonesia advances India’s Act East policy, forming a de facto BrahMos belt, and a direct counter to Chinese assertiveness.

Besides exporting weaponry, India will also cooperate with Indonesia for the development of Sabang Port. This port’s strategic location holds immense significance as Sabang Port is located near the Strait of Malacca and around 100 miles from India’s Great Nicobar port project. India-Indonesia cooperation in this direction would enhance regional security and maritime connectivity.

India’s defence exports skyrocket after Operation Sindoor

In response to the Pakistan-backed Islamic terror attack in Pahalgam, India launched Operation Sindoor, involving targeted missile and drone strikes of Pakistani terror infrastructure linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and PoK. A combination of BrahMos, Astra Mk1, Akashteer ADS, and other indigenous missiles and air defence systems proved successful in both launching attacks against Pakistan and in defending India from the hostile neighbour’s retaliation.

India’s victory over Pakistan significantly boosted global confidence in Indian weaponry. For FY 2024-25, India’s defence export figures stood at ₹23,622 crore; however, FY 2025-26 registered a 62% jump, with the numbers skyrocketing to ₹38,424 crore.

India has now expanded its defence exports network to over 80 to 100 countries.

In addition to Indonesia, India is also in talks with Vietnam and the Philippines for the sale of BrahMos missiles.  The BrahMos package for Vietnam is estimated to be worth around Rs 6,000 crore (approximately $629 million) and is expected to include missile systems, training and logistical support. 

Before Vietnam, the Philippines became the first foreign customer of the Indo-Russian co-developed BrahMos missile system. Manila received the first batch of missiles in 2024, followed by a second delivery in April 2025, showcasing India’s growing ability to fulfil large-scale defence export commitments.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is also reported to be in talks with India for the purchase of BrahMos missiles and other flagship air defence systems, including Akashteer

India has supplied Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, 155mm ATAGS towed howitzers, and MArG 155 self-propelled guns, Akash-1S surface-to-air missile systems, anti-tank missiles, surveillance radars and anti-drone systems.

Overall, Prime Minister Modi’s Indonesia visit marks yet another milestone in India’s emergence as a strong and credible defence exporter and top strategic Indo-Pacific player. With its wide range of combat-proven weapons, India is accelerating export deals with partner countries, and is aiming for over ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029.

2,000-year-old Indian gold rings found in Thailand: The Brahmi inscription, Vaishya link, and what archaeologists discovered

A team of archaeologists working in western Thailand has uncovered two gold rings believed to be around 2,000 years old at a newly identified archaeological site. The discovery has drawn attention because one of the rings carries an inscription in Brahmi script, which was used in ancient Indian texts and inscriptions from approximately the 3rd century BCE to the 5th century CE.

Experts say the find offers fresh evidence of cultural and trade connections between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia during the Iron Age.

The rings were recovered from the Don Yai Thong archaeological site in Phetchaburi province, about 130 kilometres southwest of Bangkok. They were found alongside human skeletal remains during an ongoing excavation led by Thailand’s Fine Arts Department. The department believes the burial site belonged to people of high social standing, based on the valuable objects found with the dead.

One ring carries an ancient Indian inscription

Of the two rings, one has attracted special interest because it is engraved with characters that experts have identified as Brahmi script. After an initial study, specialists read the inscription as “pusarakhitasa,” which means “the one protected by Pushya.”

Ring engraved with Brahmi script

According to the Fine Arts Department, Pushya is considered one of the most auspicious zodiac signs in Indian astronomy. The inscription is expected to be studied further, as researchers hope it may provide more information about the identity, background and cultural links of the person who once wore the ring.

The second ring is a simple gold band without any design or inscription. Even though it appears plain, archaeologists believe it is equally important because it adds to the overall picture of the burial customs and wealth of the people buried at the site.

Clues about the owner’s identity

Based on the style of the jewellery and the inscription, experts believe the rings may have belonged to a merchant connected with the ancient Indian Vaishya community, traditionally associated with trade and commerce. While more studies are needed to confirm this idea, the discovery supports the long-held view that merchants played a major role in linking India with Southeast Asia through ancient maritime trade routes.

The presence of Brahmi script in Thailand also suggests that ideas, language and cultural traditions travelled alongside goods. Historians have long believed that trade between India and Southeast Asia helped spread writing systems, religious beliefs and artistic styles across the region. This latest discovery adds another piece of evidence to that history.

Burial site reveals lives of the affluent

The gold rings were not the only valuable objects recovered during the excavation. Since work began in February, archaeologists have uncovered the skeleton of eight individuals buried with bronze and gold jewellery, pottery and several other artefacts.

The collection of burial goods suggests that the site was used for ceremonial burials of wealthy or upper-class people. Researchers say such burials often reflected the social status of the deceased and showed the importance of honouring them with valuable possessions.

The careful placement of ornaments and other objects also gives archaeologists useful information about how people lived, what they valued and the customs they followed nearly two thousand years ago.

Site discovered after villagers found bronze drum pieces

The Don Yai Thong archaeological site came to the attention of experts earlier this year after residents found fragments of ancient bronze drums in a rice field. The discovery prompted Thailand’s Fine Arts Department to begin a full-scale excavation, which soon revealed a much larger burial ground hidden beneath the surface.

Since then, the site has continued to produce important discoveries that are helping researchers understand the history of the region. Every new artefact recovered adds to the picture of life in ancient Thailand and its links with neighbouring civilisations.

Dating back to Thailand’s Iron Age

Experts have dated the burial site to Thailand’s late prehistoric period, also known as the Iron Age, which lasted roughly between 1,500 and 2,500 years ago. During this period, communities across the region witnessed major developments in metalworking, agriculture and long-distance trade.

The quality of the gold jewellery and the variety of objects found at the site show that some communities had already achieved considerable wealth. The discoveries also point to clear social differences, with certain individuals receiving elaborate burials that reflected their status.

Researchers say the craftsmanship seen in the rings demonstrates the high level of skill possessed by artisans of that time. Future studies will also examine how the rings were made and where the gold may have come from, helping experts better understand ancient production methods and trade networks.

More studies planned

Scientists plan to carry out detailed research on the Brahmi inscription using advanced methods to better understand its language and historical importance. Archaeometallurgical studies are also expected to examine the composition of the gold and the techniques used to shape the rings.

Researchers hope these investigations will provide deeper insights into ancient economies, trade routes and cultural exchanges that connected India and Southeast Asia centuries ago. They also expect further excavation around the burial ground to uncover additional graves and artefacts that could reveal more about the people who lived in the region.

Museums, universities and cultural institutions are likely to work together to preserve the discoveries and share them with the public through exhibitions and research publications.

Discoveries to be displayed after the excavation ends

The ongoing excavation at Don Yai Thong is expected to conclude within the next month. After conservation work is completed, Thailand’s Fine Arts Department plans to display the rings and other recovered artefacts for the public.

Archaeologists believe the discoveries from the site are among the most significant recent findings in Thailand because they highlight not only the burial traditions of ancient communities but also the long-standing connections between India and Southeast Asia. The gold rings, especially the one bearing the Brahmi inscription, provide an important reminder that people, ideas and trade travelled across the region thousands of years ago, leaving behind evidence that continues to reshape our understanding of ancient history.

Bloomberg calls the Indian govt’s notice directing Meta to remove child sexual abuse content a ‘regulatory headache’: How the focus shifted from protecting children to compliance burden

When it comes to India, the same Western media that cannot help but sermonise human rights, sensitivity, justice, child protection, and whatnot, forgets to practice what its own unsolicited sermons preach. Bloomberg has received backlash for calling the Indian government’s notification to Meta for the removal of child porn, a ‘regulatory headache’ for the US tech giant.

On 5th July, Bloomberg published a news item, written by Sankalp Phartiyal, headlined, “India Tells Meta to Remove Child Abuse Content from Instagram”.

The article covered the notice issued by the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) to Meta Platforms ordering it to take down the Instagram ads promoting child sexual abuse content and give a detailed explanation on the matter within seven days.

Despite being a short and straightforward news item, Bloomberg triggered an online backlash with its insensitive “regulatory headache” framing.

“India notified Meta Platforms Inc. that it needs to remove sexual content involving children from its platforms, including Instagram, marking the latest regulatory headache for the US tech giant,” the Bloomberg article reads.

Bloomberg calling a government order to remove child sexual abuse content a “regulatory headache” is utterly tone-deaf and insensitive reporting. Child sexual abuse is not some usual corporate gripe about data rules, competition policy, or free speech tussles; it involves real sexual abuse of minors.

Neither Bloomberg nor its reporter Sankalp Phartiyal need to be apprised that child sexual abuse is one of the most serious crimes imaginable. Despite the apparent seriousness of the matter. Bloomberg demonstrated sheer lack of editorial ethics and framed the Indian government’s notice seeking removal of child porn ads and explanation from Meta as an inconvenience to the social media giant.

Advertently or inadvertently, Bloomberg ended up deflecting the focus from the harm of creating and publicising child porn ads on Instagram and made Meta’s compliance responsibility come across as a ‘burden’ even as it profited from such degenerate paid ads, and a bigger issue than child porn advertisements itself.

Calling out Bloomberg’s insensitivity, one Indian X user wrote, “Headache? Removal of sexual content involving children is a Headache to you.”

Another one questioned, “Why would removal of child sexual content from a social media platform be a regulatory headache for an American tech giant? Does the US allow child sexual content on Meta platforms?”

One X user wrote, “Bloomberg’s problem isn’t that child sexual abuse content exists on Meta’s platforms – it’s that India is forcing Meta to remove it. They call this moral duty a ‘regulatory headache’. Bloomberg is getting Pakistanified and now acts like pedophilia isn’t even an issue.”

It appears that Bloomberg took this insensitive liberty and minimised the gravity of the issue, since the issue is from India. Bloomberg has earned notoriety for peddling anti-India propaganda through its opinion pieces, often by Indian brown sepoys; however, exhibiting such insensitivity in a child abuse-related incident is a new low. OpIndia has reported earlier how the Western media comes up with unimaginably weird narratives, contributing to an already all-time-high anti-India racism and hatred.

Babu Jagjivan Ram: The Dalit leader Congress and the Left never truly embraced because he refused to abandon Hinduism

Every year on July 6, the nation remembers Babu Jagjivan Ram on his death anniversary, one of the tallest Dalit leaders. Politicians cutting across party lines pay tributes to him, recall speeches he made during India’s freedom struggle and his contribution to the country in the following decades.

Then, almost as quickly as the commemorations begin, they end.

Unlike Dr BR Ambedkar, Jagjivan Ram seldom becomes the subject of serious intellectual debate or editorial commentary. He is remembered as an efficient administrator, a long-serving Union minister, the Defence Minister who oversaw India’s victory in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, or the Deputy Prime Minister in the Janata government. Rarely is he remembered as a political thinker who articulated an entirely different roadmap for Dalit emancipation.

This neglect is curious.

Jagjivan Ram was among the longest-serving members of independent India’s political establishment. He entered Jawaharlal Nehru’s Interim Government in September 1946, before Independence itself, and remained a Union minister almost continuously until 1977. He handled Labour, Railways, Communications, Agriculture, Food and Defence, each among the most consequential portfolios in government. He was Congress President during the tumultuous split of 1969.

Twice, he came close to becoming the President of India. In 1979, after the fall of the Morarji Desai government, he also came within touching distance of becoming India’s first Dalit Prime Minister.

Few leaders have occupied so much executive power for so long.

Yet Jagjivan Ram’s intellectual legacy remains strangely underexplored.

Perhaps one reason lies in the fact that Jagjivan Ram refused to fit neatly into any ideological framework that dominated Indian political discourse in the decades following India’s independence, where Marxist ‘historians’, backed by successive Congress-led governments, wrote and edited history to their liking.

Ram fought caste discrimination uncompromisingly, yet refused to reject Hinduism. He remained deeply rooted in the Sant Ravidas tradition and believed that Hindu society had to be transformed from within rather than abandoned altogether. While Ambedkar eventually concluded that caste was inseparable from the Hindu social order and embraced Buddhism, Jagjivan Ram insisted that Dalits were equal inheritors of Hindu civilisation and should claim it as their own.

This was perhaps one of the most significant reasons Marxist ‘historians’ that shared Congress’ ideological moorings did not celebrate Ram as much as he should have been.

History has largely remembered one vision.

The other deserves renewed attention.

A Dalit who reached the highest offices, but never the highest honour

Born on 5 April 1908 in Chandwa village of Bihar’s Shahabad district, Jagjivan Ram experienced untouchability from childhood. One famous episode from his school days illustrates both the discrimination he endured and the temperament that would define his public life.

Separate earthen pots were kept for Hindu, Muslim and “untouchable” students. Jagjivan Ram repeatedly broke the pot reserved for Dalits until the school administration finally abandoned the discriminatory practice altogether. 

The episode was symbolic.

Throughout his political life, Jagjivan Ram preferred dismantling discriminatory institutions rather than merely protesting against them.

After graduating from Calcutta University in 1931, he emerged as one of the most articulate voices for the Depressed Classes. He organised Ravidas Sabhas, mobilised Dalit youth, founded the All India Depressed Classes League and soon entered the national movement under Mahatma Gandhi’s influence.

His rise thereafter was extraordinary.

At the age of just thirty-eight, he joined the Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru. He remained among independent India’s most trusted administrators for three decades.

As Labour Minister, he helped lay the foundations of India’s labour welfare architecture. As Communications Minister, he expanded public infrastructure. As Agriculture Minister, he navigated India through food shortages and played a pivotal role during the Green Revolution. As Defence Minister, he oversaw India’s armed forces during the Bangladesh Liberation War.

Yet administrative excellence alone does not explain why Jagjivan Ram matters.

His true importance lies elsewhere, in the distinctive political philosophy that guided these achievements.

The forgotten letter that changes the story

Contemporary political narratives often portray Jagjivan Ram and Dr B.R. Ambedkar as if they stood permanently on opposite sides of Indian politics.

The historical record is considerably more nuanced.

One of the least discussed documents relating to Jagjivan Ram is a confidential letter he wrote to Dr Ambedkar on 8 March 1937. Preserved in the Government of Maharashtra’s published collection of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, the letter offers a fascinating glimpse into a relationship that was initially marked not by hostility but by cooperation.

Jagjivan Ram had recently led the Depressed Classes League to a respectable electoral performance in the provincial elections. Writing to Ambedkar, he updated him on developments in Bihar, responded to an earlier communication from Ambedkar, and invited him to attend the Provincial Conference of the Depressed Classes League in Patna.

The tone is striking.

It is not that of a rival writing to another rival. Nor is it a formal exchange between two distant politicians.

Instead, Jagjivan Ram appears almost like a younger activist reporting developments to a senior leader whose opinion mattered.

The letter also reveals another important historical fact.

It shows Ambedkar actively reaching out to regional Dalit organisations beyond his own political movement. Before their ideological paths diverged, both leaders recognised the necessity of building broader platforms for the uplift of the Depressed Classes.

This forgotten correspondence reminds us that history did not begin with disagreement.

It began with dialogue.

Where Jagjivan Ram and Ambedkar parted ways

The divergence between Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram was neither personal nor rooted in different objectives. Both devoted their lives to ending untouchability. Both sought dignity, equality and political empowerment for Dalits.

Where they differed was in diagnosing the nature of the problem and prescribing the remedy.

Ambedkar increasingly came to believe that caste was not simply a social distortion but an organising principle of Hindu society itself. The annihilation of caste therefore required structural rupture, with inherited social arrangements, with orthodox Hindu authority, and eventually with Hinduism itself. His politics consequently emphasised constitutional safeguards, independent Dalit political organisation and, ultimately, conversion to Buddhism.

Jagjivan Ram accepted neither this diagnosis nor this prescription. He agreed that untouchability was a civilisational disgrace. He agreed that Hindu society required radical transformation. He even agreed that cosmetic reforms would never suffice.

Where he differed was in believing that Hindu civilisation itself remained worth reclaiming.

Jagjivan Ram’s religious convictions were not incidental to his politics but foundational to them. His lifelong devotion to Sant Ravidas and broader Sant traditions shaped a worldview that rejected caste hierarchy while simultaneously affirming a Dalit identity within Hindu civilisation. Rather than seeking liberation through religious rupture, Jagjivan Ram envisaged liberation through moral, political and institutional transformation. 

In that sense, Jagjivan Ram was no less radical than Ambedkar. His radicalism simply operated in a different direction. Ambedkar sought to dismantle caste by rejecting the social order that sustained it. Jagjivan Ram sought to dismantle caste by forcing that very social order to reform itself.

This distinction becomes evident in one of his earliest speeches.

Addressing a gathering in Patna in 1931, Jagjivan Ram criticised upper-caste reformers who merely advised Dalits to give up meat, alcohol or supposedly impure habits. Such sermons, he declared, were no longer sufficient. Dalits demanded equality, not lectures.

It was a remarkably modern intervention.

He rejected paternalism while simultaneously rejecting separatism. His politics sought dignity without disengagement. That philosophy would soon bring him into one of the most consequential intellectual disagreements in modern Indian history.

The Hindu who refused to leave, the reformer who refused to compromise

If the correspondence between Jagjivan Ram and Dr B.R. Ambedkar in 1937 demonstrates that the two leaders once shared a common platform, the years that followed also mark the point where their political philosophies decisively diverged.

By the mid-1930s, Ambedkar had reached a conclusion that would permanently alter the trajectory of Dalit politics. At the historic Yeola Conference in 1935, he declared that though he had been born a Hindu, he would not die one. For Ambedkar, caste was not merely a social practice but a structural feature of Hindu society. Consequently, the liberation of the Depressed Classes demanded not only constitutional safeguards and political assertion but eventually an exit from the religious framework that sustained caste hierarchy.

Jagjivan Ram could not agree.

Not because he underestimated caste oppression. His own life was testimony to it, but because he diagnosed the problem differently. He believed untouchability was a moral degeneration of Hindu society rather than the essence of Hindu civilisation. Therefore, the solution was not civilisational rupture but civilisational reform.

It was perhaps the most fundamental ideological disagreement in twentieth-century Dalit politics.

“We are born Hindus, we shall die Hindus”

Long before Ambedkar embraced Buddhism in 1956, Jagjivan Ram had publicly articulated his opposition to religious conversion.

Speaking at a convention of the Untouchability Society in Patna in 1931 in the presence of Rajendra Prasad, Jagjivan Ram delivered a speech that deserves to be remembered alongside the landmark speeches of the era.

He rejected the patronising attitude of caste Hindus who advised Dalits to improve themselves by abandoning meat, alcohol or supposedly “impure” habits.

“Dalits no longer want sermons,” he declared. “They demand to be treated properly.”

He then made a statement that would define his political philosophy for the rest of his life:

“We are untouchable Hindus. We are born Hindus, will remain Hindus and die Hindus. We created the nation; we were not created by the nation.”

In the same speech, he opposed all forms of religious conversion while simultaneously demanding the complete abolition of untouchability and calling upon every caste and religion to unite in India’s freedom struggle. 

The chronology matters.

This was 1931, years before Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism.

Jagjivan Ram’s opposition to conversion was therefore not merely an anti-Ambedkar position. It was an independently evolved philosophical conviction rooted in his own understanding of religion, society and nationhood.

Years later, when debates over conversion intensified, Jagjivan Ram expressed himself even more forcefully.

An Indian Express report carried the striking headline: “Only cowards will leave Hinduism.”

Addressing a conference of the Depressed Classes League, Jagjivan Ram declared:

“We are Hindus and those of us who want to get out of the Hindu religion are cowards.”

He insisted religion was “a matter of faith and not an instrument for bargaining for political rights.” While acknowledging that differences of opinion existed between him and Dr Ambedkar, he refused to personalise the disagreement, observing that “time alone will tell who is on the right path” and adding that “we are not among those who abuse and throw mud on others.”

Equally significant was the other half of his message.

Having appealed to Dalits to remain within the Hindu fold, he turned towards caste Hindus and warned that they had an equal responsibility to treat the Depressed Classes on the same footing as every other Hindu.

This dual appeal captures Jagjivan Ram’s politics perfectly.

His message to Dalits was: do not abandon Hindu society. His message to caste Hindus was: transform Hindu society. Both demands were inseparable.

Radical, but in a different direction

It would be a mistake to describe Jagjivan Ram as a moderate reformer.

His methods were often remarkably radical.

The difference lay not in the intensity of his objectives but in the instruments he employed.

Ambedkar’s strategy centred upon constitutional restructuring, autonomous Dalit politics and ultimately religious conversion.

Jagjivan Ram sought equally transformative outcomes through institutional intervention, administrative reform and social integration.

Perhaps no episode illustrates this better than one of his least remembered innovations as Railway Minister.

During his tenure, the Railways created the post popularly known as “Paani Pandey”, employees responsible for distributing drinking water to passengers on railway platforms. Preference for these positions was deliberately given to Scheduled Castes. 

At first glance, this appears to be an ordinary employment measure. It was anything but ordinary.

Jagjivan Ram understood that untouchability was sustained not merely by laws but by everyday habits. On a scorching Indian afternoon, when a thirsty traveller arrived at a railway platform, caste prejudice collided with human necessity.

The traveller now had two choices: Drink water served by a Dalit employee or refuse water altogether. Jagjivan Ram had effectively forced Indian society to confront its own hypocrisy.

This was reservation employed not merely for economic uplift but for social transformation. Instead of reserving only elite bureaucratic positions, he reserved an everyday human interaction.

The message was unmistakable.

If one believed touching a Dalit was polluting, one would have to deny oneself water in the Indian summer. Few administrative decisions have challenged untouchability so directly.

Integration, not assimilation

Academic literature has often misunderstood Jagjivan Ram because it has tended to evaluate him through an Ambedkarite framework.

Peter Friedlander’s reassessment of Jagjivan Ram argues that his politics cannot be understood without appreciating his grounding in the Sant Ravidas tradition and the broader Shiv Narayani movement into which he was born. These traditions rejected caste discrimination while remaining firmly situated within a Hindu devotional universe. They emphasised equality, spiritual dignity and social reform without demanding that believers abandon Hindu civilisation. 

This religious inheritance profoundly influenced Jagjivan Ram’s political philosophy.

Unlike many Congress politicians, religion was not merely a private matter for him.

Nor was it an obstacle to social justice. Rather, it became the moral foundation upon which he built his politics.

He organised Ravidas Sabhas across eastern India, promoted Ravidas Jayanti celebrations as platforms for Dalit mobilisation and worked for temple entry movements across the country. An Indian Express article published in 2016 noted that his efforts contributed to opening major temples, including Kashi Vishwanath, Meenakshi Temple and Jagannath Temple, to Dalits. 

His vision therefore was neither assimilation nor separatism. It was integration with dignity.

Dalits would neither remain permanently subordinate nor withdraw from Hindu society.

They would reshape it.

Congress’s indispensable man but never its first choice

For nearly three decades, Jagjivan Ram remained indispensable to successive Congress governments. Few ministers matched his administrative versatility.

Yet when the highest constitutional offices became available, he repeatedly found himself overlooked.

In 1969, Indira Gandhi reportedly wanted Jagjivan Ram to become President of India. Internal opposition within the Congress Parliamentary Board prevented that outcome.

A decade later, after the collapse of the Morarji Desai government, Jagjivan Ram again appeared poised to create history by becoming India’s first Dalit Prime Minister.

Jagjivan Ram himself reportedly remarked with deep bitterness that in India, “a chamar can never become Prime Minister.”

The remark reflected the disappointment of a man who had devoted almost his entire adult life to public service.

Why Jagjivan Ram never became an ideological icon

Today, Ambedkar occupies a central place in India’s constitutional imagination. Jagjivan Ram does not. Part of the reason lies in their respective legacies.

Ambedkar left behind a corpus of constitutional, economic and philosophical writings that naturally became the foundation of an intellectual movement. But more importantly, he urged his supporters to walk away from Hinduism citing the caste system. That became a philosophical anchor for Marxist historians to wield as a weapon against Hinduism and poison impressionable minds with their propaganda.

On the other hand, Jagjivan Ram’s legacy was expressed primarily through governance. Yet there is another reason. Jagjivan Ram is difficult to appropriate. On top of that, Ram was unapologetic about his Hindu roots.

Congress remembers him as a loyal administrator but seldom foregrounds his unapologetic Hindu convictions or his categorical opposition to conversion.

The Left celebrates Ambedkar’s critique ofthe Hindu social order but finds little room for a Dalit icon who believed Hindu society could reform itself from within.

Ironically, Jagjivan Ram falls between two dominant narratives. To reduce him merely to a Congress loyalist is historically inaccurate. To dismiss him because he remained Hindu is intellectually impoverishing.

His politics represented a distinct school of Dalit thought, one that combined fierce opposition to untouchability with an equally fierce refusal to surrender Hindu civilisational inheritance.

Remembering Jagjivan Ram in full

History does not require us to choose between Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram. Both worked towards social justice, expanded opportunities for millions of historically oppressed Indians. Both redefined social equality.

But where they differed was in their vision of how liberation could be achieved.

Ambedkar concluded that caste could not be annihilated without breaking decisively from the Hindu social order.

Jagjivan Ram believed that the battle had to be fought within that order until it yielded equality.

One sought transformation through rupture. The other sought transformation through reclamation.

On every July 6, therefore, India should remember Babu Jagjivan Ram not merely as its longest-serving Union Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister who almost became Prime Minister. He should also be remembered as the architect of an alternative intellectual tradition in Dalit politics, a tradition that insisted one could be uncompromising in the struggle against caste while remaining uncompromisingly Hindu.

India reclaiming its legacy is ‘Hindu majoritarianism’, Pakistan appropriating its pre-Islamic heritage is ‘maturity’: Read how The Wire resorted to mental gymnastics to find ‘Aman ki Asha’

Pakistan has launched an aggressive rebranding campaign aimed at positing the 78-year-old Islamic Republic as a ‘civilisational state’ through a selective embrace of the region’s pre-Islamic history. Pakistan’s sinister pursuits have found a supporter in Islamo-leftist rag The Wire.

On the 4th July, The Wire published an opinion piece headlined, “How the Two Partitioned Nations Choose to Remember Their Past”. The article is authored by ‘independent journalist’ Rohinee Singh, who was among the 61 Indian signatories of the joint Aman ki Asha letter signed by Indian and Pakistani ‘concerned citizens’ that sought revival of the pro-Pakistan Musharraf-Manmohan framework on Jammu and Kashmir and PoJK.

In her article, Rohinee Singh juxtaposes the renaming exercise of certain places, buildings, roads by the governments in Pakistan and India, and weaves a narrative that somehow, Pakistan’s newfound love for its pre-Islamic and pre-partition past as a sign of ‘maturity’ and ‘correction of history’ while the Modi government’s renaming drive is ‘ideological positioning’, ‘curation of history’, and everything abominable.

The article begins with how Lahore’s Laxmi Chowk remained Laxmi Chowk in people’s consciousness despite official renaming as Maulana Zafar Ali Khan Chowk, and Delhi’s GB Road was not forgotten despite official renaming as Swami Shraddhanand Marg.

It proceeds towards arguing how governments across the world use maps, monuments, and place names as instruments of power. Roads, cities, railway stations, airports, and public buildings as “political canvases” to “project their preferred version of history.

Author Rohinee Singh insinuates that the Modi government renamed the road named after Mughal tyrant Aurangzeb, whose reign witnessed killings of Hindus, demolition of temples and imposition of Jizya, to Dr APJ Abdul Kalam as BJP’s political statement.

“After 2014, Aurangzeb Road became Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Road. Mughalsarai Junction became Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Junction, and Rajpath became Kartavya Path. The Hall of Nations at Pragati Maidan, an architectural symbol of post-independence India, was demolished in 2017 and eventually replaced by Bharat Mandapam, inaugurated ahead of the G20 summit in 2023,” the article reads.

The article quotes a Delhi-based heritage conservationist, Sohail Hashmi, who says that “In this cycle of naming and renaming, people who made major contributions are often replaced by figures who are politically useful in the present.”

The Wire contends that while the ‘Hindu nationalist’ Modi government is changing names to erase India’s Muslim and British or pre-partition history, Pakistan is walking an absolutely opposite path. Rohinee Singh claims that Pakistan is ‘restoring’ Hindu-Sikh names of certain places in Lahore.

Rohinee Singh, however, did not apply Hashmi’s “politically useful in the present” argument in the context of Pakistan’s sudden embrace of its pre-Islamic and pre-partition history.

“Ironically, while India continues to rename roads and institutions associated with its medieval and colonial past, Pakistan’s Punjab province has begun moving in the opposite direction. The provincial cabinet met in May of this year and approved the Lahore Heritage Area Revival Project, aimed at restoring several older place names,” The Wire article that first appeared in Sapan News reads.

Singh cites the restoration of the Babri Masjid Road’s name as Jain Mandir Road, or Rahim Gali becoming Ram Gali, to insinuate that Pakistan is pivoting towards embracing pre-partition history and becoming secular and tolerant while India is deviating from secularism by changing names of roads and buildings from those of Mughal tyrants and Islamic fanatics to original Hindu names or after prominent political figures neglected for over six decades of Congress rule due to political-ideological opposition.

Rohinee Singh did not mention that Pakistan’s supposed pivot to secularism and embrace of pre-Islamic history is performative and driven by geopolitical interest rather than any genuine realisation that the Two-Nation Theory, rooted in Islamic intolerance of Hindus, is regressive and primitive.

Lahore restorations are a part of a tourism boost drive under a specific provincial government. They do not change Pakistan’s Islamic exclusivist nature and state ideology where Hindu and other religious minorities are subjected to brutalities and discrimination of all imaginable kinds just because of their non-Islamic faith. Pakistan has a documented history of demolishing temples, vandalising, encroaching on, and repurposing Hindu heritage sites, in addition to changing names favouring Islamic identity.

Interestingly, in its agenda of portraying the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a mature and tolerant nation in contrast to a ‘secular’ Hindu-majority India, Rohinee Singh did not reveal complete facts about the restoration of pre-partition Hindu names in Lahore.

Earlier this year, the Punjab government proposed restoration of pre-partition Hindu/Sikh names in Lahore, making Islampura as Krishan Nagar, Sunnat Nagar to Sant Nagar, Babri Masjid Chowk as Jain Mandir Chowk, etc, under the Lahore Heritage Areas Revival Project.

The Pakistani ruling dispensation and their online supporters widely boasted the move as ‘while India is descending into communalism, Pakistan is shining as a symbol of secularism and tolerance’. However, in the face of the slightest backlash from Islamic extremist groups, the government caved and Lahore Deputy Commissioner Captain (Retired) Muhammad Ali Ijaz publicly stated that no final decision on the name changes had been officially implemented.

The Wire platformed Rohinee Singh to peddle her pro-Pakistan propaganda based on half-truths, because for Islamo-leftists, facts are secondary and ‘narrative’ is the priority.

There is also a fundamental difference between the so-called renaming exercise in India and Pakistan. While Pakistan’s efforts to restore pre-Islamic names of certain roads or cities etc is a part of national rebranding, India is simply ditching the colonial hangover and unwarranted glorification of medieval-era Islamic invaders and tyrants whose supposed architectural contribution to Indian heritage is outweighed by their Jihadist mass killings and conversion of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and other communities following Indic faiths.

It makes no sense that Rohinee Singh is heaping praises on even Pakistan’s failed attempts at restoring specific original Hindu names of roads and places with Islamised names, but paints India as intolerant and bigoted for doing exactly the same.

“In India, recent renaming exercises largely reflect a broader project of cultural and political redefinition. Islamic and colonial references are being replaced with names rooted in Hindu mythology, indigenous traditions, or figures associated with contemporary nationalist narratives,” Singh writes.

Citing ‘experts’, Rohinee Singh claims that Pakistan is trying to reclaim a large South Asian identity and it wants to be seen differently on the international stage.

The 78-year-old Islamic Republic perpetually ignored and even destroyed pre-Islamic history and its archaeological remnants, be it Mohenjo-Daro, destroyed or vandalised heritage sites linked to Sikh king Maharaja Ranjit Singh, disregarded Bhagat Singh, an ‘Indian freedom fighter with no role in Pakistan’s liberation’, and Buddhist heritage as insignificant, and demolished ancient temples.

And yet, based on just one isolated ‘Hindu names restoration’ bid in Lahore, Rohinee Singh whitewashed Pakistan all past anti-Hindu hatred, bigotry and related crimes. One Laxmi Chowk does not erase all the past sins of the nation created on the hateful idea of Muslim exclusivity and superiority.

Pakistan is curating history, India is correcting it: Blinded by Aman ki Asha, Rohinee Singh fails to see the obvious

Either the delusional Aman ki Asha blinds Rohinee Singh, or she is a part of Pakistan’s concerted efforts to reinvent its image as a ‘civilisational state’, to not see that it is Pakistan that is curating history, not India.

From Aurangzeb Road, Mughalsarai Junction, Rajpath, Pragati Maidan’s Hall of Nations, Allahabad, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, bust of Edwin Lutyens, Mughal Gardens, Andaman Islands, to Kolkata’s Suhrawardy Avenue, discontinuing colonial-era Navy insignia, etc, all changed for the right reasons. A truly independent nation does not burden itself with the continuation of imposed identities and symbols from the era of its occupation.

Pakistan, on the contrary, has for over seven decades dismissed its pre-Islamic history as an era of ‘Jahilliyah’.

While in rhetoric, Pakistan is promoting Indus Valley Civilisation and Gandharan heritage as ‘ancient Pakistan’, the 78-year-old Islamic Republic has demonstrated historical neglect of the region’s ancient history and its archaeological remnants merely because of their Hindu or Buddhist influence.

From IVC sites like Mohenjo-daro and Harappa to Taxila and Buddhist sites in the Swat Valley area, the Pakistani governments over the decades have failed to prioritise principled conservation of these historical sites. Neither the absolute Hindu-hating Jihadist military dictators nor the military-backed ‘democratic’ governments cared much about the Indus Valley Civilisation, the pre-Islamic historical sites and their conservation.

Last week, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) formally asked Pakistan to reverse recent ‘reconstructions’ and “unnecessary interventions” at Mohra Moradu, a Buddhist monastery and stupa complex from the Kushan era, and Sirkap, the Indo-Greek city layer, in the Taxila/Takshashila archaeological complex.

Such is Pakistan’s sensitivity and seriousness about protecting its ‘ancient’ heritage that Pakistan’s Department of Archaeology and Museums used cement and modern masonry at Mohra Moradu and Sirkap, under its ‘conservation’ work. 

However, Rohinee Singh would come up with a counterargument that at least Pakistan has progressed from destroying heritage sites and statues using explosives, to applying cement for preservation.

Rohinee Singh portrayed one Laxmi Chowk and the failed bid to restore Hindu names of some roads in Lahore, as Pakistan’s massive ‘rediscovery and embrace of pre-partition history and culture’.

She, however, conveniently turned a blind eye to the fact that Hindu, Sikh, Christian and other non-Muslim girls continue to be abducted, forcibly converted to Islam and married off their Muslim abductors with courts and governments siding with jihadis, temples continue to rot either in utter neglect, demolished or repurposed for contemporary use by Muslims, and managing to stay alive without undergoing forced conversion and faith-based discrimination is still a luxury for Hindus in Pakistan.

On one hand, Pakistan is rebranding itself as a ‘civilisational state’ and promoting IVC sites as its national pride, labelling Pāṇini, Chanakya, Raja Purushottama and other historical Hindu Sanatani figures as ‘ancient Pakistanis’; on the other, it is destroying or damaging its pre-Islamic history.

Pakistan’s sudden embrace of the pre-Islamic history of the Indian subcontinent is pretentious, agenda-driven, a tactic of retrofitting facts to appropriate the history of ancient India. One or two pre-partition name changes do not change the fact that Pakistan’s foundation is still rooted in the Two-Nation Theory that essentially says that Muslims cannot co-exist with Hindus. Pakistan’s state ideology is tied structurally to Islamic exclusivity and intolerance of non-Muslims.

In February 2026, when the Hindus across the world celebrated Vasant Panchami, a kite-flying festival, Pakistan reintroduced the Hindu festival as Basant. The country’s political leadership marketed it as a return of freedom and tolerance, winning praise from a section of Indian people as well.

However, either driven by fear of Islamist backlash or their own moral indecency, they decoupled the Hindu religiosity and worship of Maa Saraswati from the festival, passing off Vasant or Basant as a ‘cultural’ or ‘regional’ festival just as Islamo-leftists in India de-Hinduise Hindu festivals like Onam, Pongal, and even gods like Murugan as regional or cultural festivals and deities.

OpIndia reported earlier on how Pakistan’s newfound love for Indus Valley Civilisation, pre-Islamic past, and concoction of the farce called ‘ancient Pakistan’, is all tied to the Indus Waters Treaty, and an image makeover from a Terroristan to a ‘civilisational state’.

However, someone like Rohinee Singh, who gleefully signed an ‘Aman ki Asha’ letter to PM Modi and Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif, which essentially sought India to relinquish its legitimate claim over PoJK, would not care much about the fact that India has, through civilisational continuity and Sanatan Dharma, preserved its ancient history and roots, while also accommodating other faiths, their rights and dignity. Rohinee Singh exemplifies what Dhimmitude truly means; no wonder she is, as per The Wire, “engaged in India-Pakistan Track II peace initiatives and reconciliation efforts.”

UP under CM Yogi has kept electricity tariffs unchanged for the 7th year in a row: Read how that has been achieved


For years, the monthly electricity bill was one of the consistent sources of household anxiety in Uttar Pradesh. Between 2012 and 2017, domestic consumers watched their tariffs climb almost every year, with little warning and less relief. In the years since 2017, that pattern has broken, and for the state’s roughly 30 million domestic power consumers. This shift has become one of the most tangible, if under-discussed, changes in daily economic life. 

The old pattern: 2012–2017

The five years before 2017 were defined by frequent and steep tariffs revisions. Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission(UPERC) approved a hike of roughly 30% in June 2013, followed by another of around 12% in October 2014. Households budgeting for the coming year had no real way to plan because the goalposts altered with nearly every tariff cycle. A brief pause came in FY2015-16 and FY2016-17, when no hike was proposed for LMV-1 (domestic) consumers specifically, but by November 2017, tariffs rose again. This time by about 8.49% for urban domestic consumers. 

Taken together, the experience for an ordinary domestic consumer across this period was one of near-constant upward pressure on bills, compounding year after year, with no real sense of predictability.

The turning point: A freeze since 2019

UPERC has not approved a single tariff hike for domestic(LMV-1) consumers since September 2019. That’s six consecutive tariff cycles through FY2026-27 in which the per-unit rate has stayed exactly where it was. For a household, that means the number printed on the bill for each unit of electricity hasn’t moved in over half a decade, even as fuel costs, transmission costs and inflation elsewhere in the economy have not stood still. This didn’t happen by accident. The state’s power distribution utility, UPPCL, has repeatedly filed petitions before UPERC proposing increases as large as 25-45% to cover its widening revenue gap. 

Each time, the Commission has either rejected these proposals outright or deferred them, keeping the retail tariff for domestic consumers unchanged year after year.

How the gap has been absorbed: Subsidy, not consumers 

The freeze has been made possible by a steadily rising state subsidy, not by any actual fall in the cost of supplying power. For FY2026-27, the Uttar Pradesh government’s electricity subsidy has been raised to ₹20,400 crore, up from ₹17,100 crore the year. Before a jump of nearly 20% in a single year. Within that, support for the poorest domestic consumers has been specifically increased that the subsidy for lifeline consumers has gone up to ₹3.75 per unit from ₹3.50, and rural consumers using 0–100 units now receive ₹3.70 per unit in subsidy compared with ₹3.30 earlier.

In practice, this is the difference between the cost of supply rate and the rate a household actually pays. A rural lifeline consumer using up to 100 units a month effectively pays around ₹3.00 per unit after subsidy, even though the underlying cost of that power is much higher. The state government is absorbing the gap for now, not the consumers. This approach differs from the states that provide free electricity. Instead of making electricity completely free for large sections of consumers, Uttar Pradesh continues to charge consumers while using targeted subsidies to reduce their burden. As a result, consumers retain an incentive to use electricity judiciously, while the state limits the fiscal cost by subsidising only part of the bill rather than the entire consumption.

Beyond tariffs: Metering and service reforms

Alongside the tariff freeze, UPERC has pushed process reforms aimed squarely at the consumer experience. Under the Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS), prepaid smart meters are being rolled out across the state. The Commission has directed that no security deposit be collected from consumers with prepaid connections, and has required distribution companies to reconnect prepaid meters within two hours of recharge, backing that requirement with financial penalties on UPPCL for delays.

UPERC has also pushed for 100% consumer and distribution-transformer metering, aimed at reducing billing disputes and improving accountability across the five discoms (PuVVNL, MVVNL, DVVNL, PVVNL, and KESCO).

The other side of the ledger

A balanced assessment also requires acknowledging the concerns raised by critics. The tariff freeze has been supported by a steadily rising subsidy bill. For FY2026-27, the Uttar Pradesh government’s electricity subsidy has increased from ₹17,100 crore to ₹20,400 crore, reflecting the state’s decision to absorb a larger share of the cost rather than passing it on to consumers.

UPPCL has repeatedly argued before the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (UPERC) that the gap between its revenue and expenditure continues to widen. In successive tariff petitions, it sought increases ranging from 25% to 45%, citing higher power purchase costs and mounting financial pressure on distribution companies. However, UPERC did not approve these proposals for domestic consumers. Instead, the Commission continued the existing tariff structure, while the state government increased budgetary support and used regulatory mechanisms to bridge the financial gap.

According to the critics, it argues that this approach shifts part of the financial burden from electricity bills to the state budget and raises questions about the long-term sustainability of rising subsidy commitments. However, it contends that protecting households from repeated tariff increases, particularly during a period of inflation and rising living costs, has provided meaningful relief to millions of consumers while allowing the government time to pursue distribution-sector reforms.

Conclusion

Whatever the long-term fiscal debate, one fact remains clear: domestic electricity consumers in Uttar Pradesh have not faced a base tariff increase since September 2019. Between 2013 and 2017, households experienced repeated tariff revisions, whereas the years since 2019 have been marked by tariff stability despite repeated requests from UPPCL for significant hikes. The Yogi Adityanath government chose to shield consumers by expanding targeted subsidies instead of allowing higher domestic tariffs. Whether this model remains sustainable over the long term will depend on future fiscal conditions, but for now, it has ensured six consecutive years of stable base electricity tariffs while advancing reforms in metering, consumer services, and the distribution sector.

Thousands are being sent back since BJP won Bengal: Financial Times whines over India’s strict push-back policy for illegal immigrants now finally being enforced at border

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s monumental success in the West Bengal assembly election, surpassing the 200-seat threshold to unseat Mamata Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress (AITC or TMC) signified an extraordinary political transformation and heralded a new era in governance. This included the crucial task of securing the porous India-Bangladesh border and implementing a strong policy against illegal immigration, which was previously handled with undue indulgence by the former government.

In fact, the TMC engaged in a relentless struggle with the central government to maintain the influx of Bangladeshi intruders in the state, with its leaders even boasting about facilitating the same, all to the detriment of national security and interests. However, this dangerous strategy for the aim of vote bank politics has been shut down by the Suvendu Adhikari government, which seems to have deeply frustrated the usual suspects.

The art of defending the intruders

On 1st July (Wednesday), Financial Times carried out a column, “India expels thousands of migrants in dead of night,” written by Andres Schipani to protests against the decisions of an elected state government of a sovereign nation that has taken crucial steps in the larger interest of its voters by making an effort to put a lid on the unlawful intrusions from the neighbouring country. The publication even opted for a sensational headline to provoke the readers, suggesting that a serious aggression is being inflicted upon legitimate citizens rather than on those who enter India in violation of its laws.

In a desperate bid to convey a dramatic narrative of supposed state brutality and injustice, the publication claimed, “Bangladeshi border guards use megaphones to tell their Indian counterparts not to push people across the border.” It referenced Bangladeshi officials who stated that the Indian side utilises darkness as a shield to advance its agenda which has only escalated after the saffron party stormed to power in West Bengal in May.

“They wait until it is dark to switch off the spotlights and for the right opportunity,” mentioned Lance Corporal Mahmud Masud. “They open the gates on the Indian fence and push people into the darkness. There are women, there are children and these poor people get stranded in the middle,” insisted Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui, director-general of the Border Guard Bangladesh.

The piece outlined that the state “has deported thousands of people, mostly Muslims of Bengali heritage, to Bangladesh, according to Indian and Bangladeshi officials.” It asserted that Bangladesh authorities complained about “dozens of people stuck in the zero line a narrow no man’s land between the Indian and Bangladeshi borders.”

It is apparent that instead of scrutinising Dhaka for denying the return of its own individuals, the media organisation cleverly tries to cast India as the antagonist for maintaining the laws of the land and added, “The deportation push has worsened fragile relations between the two countries, underscored fears about Hindu nationalism and heightened the sense of precarity for millions of Muslims in West Bengal and other border states.”

Of course, FT swiftly turned to “Hindu nationalism” otherwise it would have contradicted the fundamental principle for liberals to invoke Hindus, Hindutva or Hinduism to attack the Modi government merely for taking a stand for India, rather than succumbing to the victimhood propaganda peddled for even illegal residents because of their religion.

The effort to insert a religious element

Doubling down on his intentions, the author discussed the historical links between Dhaka and New Delhi along with the common language spoken in West Bengal and Bangladesh, to argue that the government should have allowed the rapidly increasing presence of illicit Bangladeshis in the country, essentially in “honour” of this background. India is effectively being called upon to accommodate them while Bangladesh just needs to remain passive as its people flood into its neighbourhood.

The unregulated and large-scale flow of Bangladeshis into states like Assam is depicted as a sentimental “history of migration” that lacks any foundation in either history or reality. Afterwards, the article reiterated its displeasure with the BJP for their actions against unlicensed Bangladeshi or Rohingya Muslims after achieving success in West Bengal.

It highlighted that the state has 30% Muslim population, implying that these actions could potentially affect them, echoing the conspiracy circulated during the anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) agitation, which declared that the law would be weaponised against the second largest majority. However, no such matter surfaced following its implementation.

Similarly, law abiding Indian citizens are immune to deportation irrespective of their religion, but the truth is conveniently masked by such rhetoric to diminish the government’s credibility and instigate doubt and division, ultimately leading to the incitement of violence.

FT stressed, “Critics say the deportation push reflects the BJP’s desire to turn India into a Hindu nation at the expense of its Muslim minority.” It then proceeded to quote Meenakshi Ganguly who is Human Rights Watch’s deputy Asia chief and “accused Indian authorities of cruelly dumping mostly Muslim families into Bangladesh or leaving them stranded at the border” as well as asked to “end this dismaying animosity towards Muslims.”

The government’s strategy to secure its borders and address elements that could endanger national security is labelled as a ploy to create a “Hindu nation” by the FT, indirectly insinuating that India should quietly observe while Bangladeshis and Rohingyas not only burden the nation’s economy but also infringe upon the rights of rightful citizens, including Muslims.

There is no such requirement imposed on Bangladesh, which not only refuses to accept its citizens but also has a disgraceful record of oppression against its minorities, especially Hindus. However, this faction’s warped ideology sees atrocities that do not exist and ignore them when the victims are Hindus.

The attack on BJP governments for executing laws, respecting judicial mandates

Schipani pointed to the “detect, delete and deport” approach of West Bengal government and mentioned Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari’s statement where he informed that around “10,000 illegal Bangladeshi immigrants have been expelled since he took office, while another 1,800 await deportation.”

Unsurprisingly, the platform also hit out at Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma for his unwavering approach towards the issue. It referred to his remarks that highlighted the policies of his government to tackle intruders who could instigate severe demographic changes in India and therefore, he intends to send them back to their homeland.

Notably, the precarious nature of demographic shift due to the significant figures of illegal immigration has been consistently emphasised by the Indian judiciary, ranging from high courts to the Supreme Court. Last year, the Gauhati High Court pronounced that Assam is experiencing a “silent and invidious demographic invasion” and conveyed that the central government possesses “absolute and unfettered discretion to expel foreigners from Indian territory,” while “the state has unfettered power to cause expulsion of a declared foreign national.”

Sarma has been pivotal in guaranteeing that intruders do not find refuge in Assam and has carried out a rigorous policy for their regular deportation. The matter was an integral part of his party’s manifesto that was launched ahead of the assembly polls in the state and vowed to take action against those recognised as foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal. He has also liberated acres of public properties, including forest and agricultural lands, from their occupation.

The unashamed duplicity

The government that complied with the court orders was bound to irritate FT because it was at odds with its agenda which was reinforced by highlighting the anger of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman over the developments in India as Bangladeshi officials expressed the failure to accept their citizens, given that they were already grappling with “1 million Rohingya refugees.”

Evidently, Bangladesh has the authority to reject its own citizens to mitigate a crisis, but India, the most populous country worldwide must overburden itself and permit the abuse of its resources by non-Indians.

The article outlined that Shama Obaed Islam, state minister for foreign affairs warned that the relationship would continue to be “strained” if New Delhi doesn’t alter its stance while his country has announced that it would not welcome even a single Rohingya, serving as a clear illustration of “have your cake and eat it too.”

On the other hand, India’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, maintained that illegal immigrants in India would be treated legally and New Delhi had sent more than 2,680 cases to Bangladeshi authorities for nationality verification. However, “this verification has been pending for more than five years” in multiple cases.

“Deportation is summary expulsion, but it requires co-operation from the country to which we are deporting. Unfortunately, that co-operation is never forthcoming in Bangladesh,” a senior Indian official disclosed to the FT and remarked that the country “was left with no choice but to push back the migrants.”

The article made yet another move to infuse sentimental value into their propaganda, ultimately concluding with the account of an intruder who had to surrender after living in the country for over a decade.

Conclusion

The article showed little concern for the truth and was dedicated to furthering a malicious agenda. Bangladesh has shown reluctance to cooperate with the Indian authorities. As a result, what alternatives do the latter have? The FT will predictably endorse inaction.

However, no rational government would or could keep its borders open for anyone to enter its country. Open borders are impractical for any nation, including India and Bangladesh. There is a reason why nations like Egypt and Jordan resolutely refuse to accept displaced Palestinians, despite their overwhelming support for them.

Even developed Western powers, including many in Europe and the United States, oppose such unrestricted immigration because they prioritise their interests. However, this sovereign right should not be exercised by India, according to Financial Times and risk everything from its stability to security.

Furthermore, India has been partitioned along religious lines, resulting in the Hindu community being persecuted for their faith in adjacent Islamic nations. Most importantly, the repercussions of major demographic modifications have been prominently visible from Kashmir to Murshidabad.

However, for organisations akin to FT, Hindus should be stripped of their rights to safeguard their culture and future similar to how India should not have the autonomy to set its own policies. These freedoms must only be bestowed upon those considered suitable by this Islamo-leftist lobby.

Diljit’s Satluj is a half-truth, now taken down by ZEE5 due to a legal loophole, not any govt ‘ban’: Explained


On the evening of 3 July 2026, after nearly four years of delays and three successive title changes from Ghallughara to Punjab ’95 and finally Satluj, Honey Trehan’s film about human rights activist Jaswant Singh Khalra appeared quietly on ZEE5, reaching audiences in India and across the world at the same moment. Within two days it had vanished from the Indian version of the platform while remaining fully available elsewhere, with ZEE5 citing only ‘current developments’ for the decision. 

Contrary to widespread assumptions, this was not the result of a government ban or any official prohibition. Instead, the removal stemmed from a single, obscure clause in India’s internet regulations, a provision that has largely remained suspended due to court orders and creates an uncertain environment in which platforms often choose caution when questions arise. ZEE5 has publicly affirmed its support for the film and stated that it is exploring all appropriate avenues to restore it, underscoring that the episode reflects the procedural complexities of digital content regulation rather than outright censorship. In essence, a story that had finally found its audience after years of waiting slipped from view again, not through an exercise of power but through the quiet mechanics of an unresolved legal framework.

Three years and 127 cuts

Certification troubles for the film began as soon as RSVP submitted it to the Central Board of Film Certification in late 2022. The initial six month process concluded with clearance granted only after 21 cuts and a mandated change in title, with the board expressing worries that the content displayed could provoke violence or influence Sikh youth. When RSVP challenged the decision in the Bombay High Court, the requirements reportedly intensified, climbing to as many as 127 cuts, as director Honey Trehan later recounted. The board is said to have sought the removal of ‘Punjab’ from the title despite the story being set in the state, objected to references to the Punjab Police, and requested that Indira Gandhi not be named, steps Trehan characterised as an attempt to erase elements of history. Amid these drawn out exchanges, the film was pulled from its scheduled world premiere at the 2023 Toronto International Film Festival, with reports pointing to political factors behind the move.

The real trivia: What rule 9 of Information Technology (Intermediary guidelines and and Digital Media Ethics code) 2021 says and why it is frozen still?

The story of Satluj’s release and removal has less to do with outright censorship and more to do with the actual plumbing of India’s content regulation. Films require certification from the Central Board of Film Certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, to play in theatres, yet streaming content has never fallen under this requirement. India’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting reaffirmed this position in a December 2025 Lok Sabha reply, confirming that the CBFC’s mandate is limited strictly to theatrical exhibition and does not extend to OTT platforms at all. 

What governs OTT content instead is Part III of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, specifically Rule 9. Rule 9(1) requires publishers of online curated content to observe a prescribed Code of Ethics, while Rule 9(3) creates the enforcement architecture through a three tier self-regulatory structure. 

Level I self-regulation by the publisher itself through an in house grievance officer who fields complaints, Level II through an industry wide self-regulating body, and Level III through an Inter Departmental oversight committee under the Ministry. This is the self-regulation framework that platforms are expected to follow when they certify or later pull content. 

The catch, however, is that Rule 9 has been under an interim court stay since almost the week it came into effect. On 14 August 2021, the Bombay High Court stayed Rules 9(1) and 9(3) in a challenge filed by journalist Nikhil Wagle and the digital outlet The Leaflet, holding that the Code of Ethics provisions were likely unconstitutional and beyond the government’s rule making power under the parent IT Act. The Madras High Court issued a similar stay weeks later and directed that the Bombay order should apply nationwide. The Supreme Court later transferred all pending challenges to the Delhi High Court in March 2024 for a consolidated hearing, but arguments on Part III of the rules only began there in November 2024. As of today, no final verdict has been delivered, which means the specific legal obligation for OTT platforms to self-regulate under the Code of Ethics has spent nearly its entire existence on hold, even as the government continues to cite it in Parliament as the governing framework for all streamed content in India. 

Speaking plainly, the very rule that supposedly requires platforms to self-certify content and the rule that supposedly allows them to pull content through their own grievance process are, on paper, the same paused and still litigated provision. Satluj was released on a regulatory shelf that courts have been debating for five years, and it was removed from the same shelf.

The removal is a platform call, not a government order

The makers chose to release the complete, uncut version of Satluj globally on ZEE5 from the first day rather than negotiate further cuts. Their statements make the intent clear. To place the full film, exactly as screened at festivals years earlier with nothing removed, in front of audiences worldwide before any additional domestic pressure could force changes. This mattered especially for a story that ends with Jaswant Singh Khalra’s killing by police, where any softening would have weakened its core purpose. Two days later ZEE5 removed the film from its Indian catalogue, offering only a vague explanation while promising to pursue every appropriate avenue through due process to bring it back. No government order has been made public. The platform acted instead under its own Level-I self regulatory authority, the same unsettled legal framework, still under court stay, that had allowed the uncut film to reach viewers in the first place.

What the record actually shows?

None of this touches the harder question the film dramatizes. Who was responsible for Punjab’s disappeared? The record on that question is genuinely two sided, and neither half cancels the other. Khalra, a bank manager in Amritsar, traced firewood purchase receipts at local crematoria and exposed what he described as mass illegal cremations of unidentified bodies. He was abducted by Punjab Police in September 1995 and murdered, six police officials were later convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The CBI’s December 1996 report confirmed 2,097 illegal mass cremations in Amritsar district alone, of which 582 were identified and 278 partially identified. 

The Supreme Court, hearing a petition from Khalra’s wife Paramjit Kaur, described this as a ‘flagrant violation of human rights on a mass scale’ and referred the matter to the NHRC, which eventually compensated 1,245 victims’ families by 2006. At the same time, Punjab’s counter insurgency followed roughly a decade of Khalistani militant violence that, by the movement’s own chronicler K.P.S. Gill’s count, claimed 21,469 lives before it was defeated, including close to 11,700 civilians killed by Sikh militant groups, among them thousands of Sikhs and roughly 4,500 Hindus. Human Rights Watch has documented both realities. Khalistani terrorists carried out civilian massacres and political assassinations, while government operations between 1984 and 1995 involved arbitrary detention, torture, and the disappearance of thousands. A film or an article that tells only one half of this record is not lying. It is simply presenting half the story.

Conclusion

The next time someone claims Satluj was banned, the sharper answer is not simply that a platform chose to pull it. The film reached audiences under Rule 9 of the Information Technology Rules, 2021, the very provision that requires OTT platforms to self-regulate, and was later removed under that same rule, a clause Indian courts have kept in legal limbo since 2021 without ever finally settling its validity. By launching the complete, uncut version globally on day one through ZEE5’s international service, producers Ronnie Screwvala’s RSVP Movies and MacGuffin Pictures ensured the film remained fully available to viewers worldwide even after its Indian availability ended within forty-eight hours. Five years on, with Rule 9’s legal footing still unresolved, platforms and creators continue to operate under it. 

This development has secured global access to one account of Punjab’s past at the moment when its reach inside India could be swiftly curtailed, allowing this half-told story to shape perceptions among audiences abroad without the counterbalance of the fuller record.