Home Blog Page 49

Madhya Pradesh: PFI’s ‘Mission 2047’ plot to overthrow the Indian government – ATS probe reveals Pakistani handlers, sleeper cells and target-killing tasks

Anurag
-
0
Madhya Pradesh: PFI’s ‘Mission 2047’ plot to overthrow the Indian government – ATS probe reveals Pakistani handlers, sleeper cells and target-killing tasks

On 12th June, the Madhya Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) arrested Mohammad Faraz for his involvement in terrorist activities. His arrest uncovered a wider network that was working to advance the Popular Front of India’s (PFI) plan to overthrow the Government of India and establish Islamic rule in the country. Codenamed “Mission 2047”, the plan was first revealed in 2022, months before the PFI was banned by the Government of India. During interrogation, the accused disclosed how they were radicalising youths.

According to investigators, members of the module were being radicalised through WhatsApp, Telegram and other messaging applications. Pakistani handlers administered some of these groups, assigned tasks to recruits and encouraged them to become “true jihadis” who would be prepared to kill designated targets and die in the name of jihad.

The four accused identified during the investigation are Mohammad Faraz alias Khalid Saifullah, Naim Abdullah, Shakir Mew and Izhar-ul-Haq. The ATS is examining their individual roles, Pakistani contacts, digital network, possible funding channels and efforts to recruit young men across different states.

‘Mission 2047’ and the plan to overthrow the government

Izhar-ul-Haq, who was arrested from Madhubani in Bihar, reportedly told investigators that he and others associated with the Pakistan-linked network were working towards “Mission 2047”. The objective was to implement the PFI’s agenda across India by 2047. According to the ATS, the mission envisaged replacing the existing system of governance with a radical Islamic order. Izhar told the agency that people being prepared as “mujahideen” across the country would emerge simultaneously when instructed and attempt to overthrow the government. Pakistani handlers had reportedly assured members that a large network was being built for this purpose.

The recruits were also made to take an oath that they would carry out target killings and create fear across the country when the time came. The investigation is now focused on identifying other people connected to this network and determining how far its activities had spread. The ATS secured Izhar’s remand until 22nd June to question him about the organisation’s structure and the methods used by its members.

Pakistani handlers pushed recruits towards jihad and martyrdom

The interrogation of Mohammad Faraz revealed that members of the module were in contact with Pakistani WhatsApp groups. Faraz told investigators that handlers used jihadist videos, religious material and video calls to influence recruits. They asked him to become a “true jihadi”, follow every instruction given to him and remain prepared to sacrifice his life while carrying out the mission.

The handlers reportedly promised that dying while following the path of jihad would earn him martyrdom. They also assigned tasks designed to produce fear and instructed members to act against designated targets when ordered. Faraz was told to obtain a passport. He was reportedly assured that he would be taken to Pakistan through another country and trained as a mujahideen. Separate inputs being examined by the ATS also refer to plans for specialised training in Afghanistan.

During searches, the ATS recovered jihadist documents and PDF files from Faraz’s mobile phone. Investigators believe that some of the material had been sent from Pakistan.

Faraz tasked with recruiting poor and unmarried youths

Faraz, who worked at a doctor’s clinic in Bhopal, had reportedly been assigned the task of building a network in Madhya Pradesh. Pakistani handlers wanted him to identify poor, unmarried and relatively young men who could be isolated from family influence and gradually radicalised.

The module specifically targeted unmarried youths so that concern for parents, spouses or children would not prevent them from carrying out dangerous assignments. Recruits were approached through social media and messaging platforms. Faraz created groups, shared videos linked to extremist activity and attempted to connect new members with the wider network.

The material gathered during the investigation indicates that young recruits were paid salaries of up to Rs 40,000. Meetings were held to identify suitable candidates and discuss how they could be drawn into the network. They were then provoked in the name of implementing Islamic Sharia and a blasphemy law. Radicalisation was reportedly carried out in stages. A recruit would first receive one task to complete within a limited period. The next assignment was shared only after the previous task had been completed.

Network operated through WhatsApp and Telegram

The four accused admitted during questioning that they remained in contact with people in India and Pakistan through Telegram and WhatsApp groups. Faraz had been active on such platforms for nearly four years. He was known as “Khalid Saifullah” in the groups and had also been given the identity of “Lashkar Commander” to help him expand the digital network.

Investigators say the online groups were used to circulate jihadist material, hold meetings, assign work and monitor recruits. Pakistani handlers decided what tasks would be given and when they had to be completed. The process was designed to ensure that members received only limited information at each stage. Once a task was completed, the handlers would issue the next instruction.

The ATS is examining Faraz’s mobile phone, chat records, social media accounts, call detail records and other digital activity to trace the people connected to him.

Roles assigned within the module

Investigators have identified the different responsibilities assigned to the accused. Faraz was engaged in adding new people through social media and expanding the network in Madhya Pradesh. Naim Abdullah helped strengthen contacts within the network and introduced Faraz directly to Pakistani jihadist handlers. Faraz told the ATS that he had known Naim, a resident of Deoband, for around five or six years.

Naim reportedly introduced Faraz and another Bihar-based suspect to foreign handlers. The ATS later arrested him following information provided during Faraz’s interrogation. Izhar-ul-Haq and Shakir Mew were involved in conducting closed-door meetings and delivering speeches to radicalise young men. Shakir was described as a second-level commander who played an important role in the module.

The network’s structure allowed different members to handle recruitment, communication, ideological indoctrination and contact with foreign handlers.

ATS arrests and investigation timeline

The ATS made its first arrest on 12th June 2026, when Mohammad Faraz was taken into custody from the Qazi Camp area of Bhopal. During questioning on 13th June, investigators examined his old contacts and social media groups. This led them to Naim Abdullah. Naim was arrested from Uttar Pradesh’s Saharanpur region between 13th and 14th June. The ATS questioned Faraz and Naim separately and also confronted them with each other’s statements.

Shakir Mew was arrested on 14th June from the Tapukara police station area of Alwar district in Rajasthan. He was produced before a court and remanded for questioning. Information regarding Izhar-ul-Haq emerged during the continuing investigation. He was arrested on 18th June and produced before a Bhopal court on 20th June. The court remanded him until 22nd June. The agency is now attempting to identify other members, local facilitators and people who may have attended radicalisation meetings.

Foreign links and funding routes under investigation

Material connected to the case identifies PFI-linked activity in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Investigators are examining whether Bangladesh and Nepal were used as routes for transferring funds into India. The material also refers to money being sent from Mauritius to PFI-linked channels in Uttar Pradesh after the Hathras gang-rape case.

The ATS is scrutinising the banking records of Faraz and the other accused to determine whether they received money from abroad or through intermediaries operating within India. Faraz told investigators that his father worked in battery repair and that he was the only son in his family. The agency is comparing his financial background with his digital activity and possible transactions linked to the network.

Faraz’s activities remained concealed behind his clinic job

Faraz had worked as a compounder at Khushboo Clinic for around 15 years. He was known in his neighbourhood as a deeply religious person. He and his wife also taught children at home and conducted Quran classes every Tuesday morning. A board outside the house mentioned classes between 10 am and noon.

The ATS operation at his residence was conducted in secrecy. Around 12 officials, including three women personnel, surrounded the house before entering through the roof and taking him into custody.

His house and the clinic where he worked were later found locked. Investigators are now examining whether anyone connected to his professional, religious or neighbourhood circles was approached for recruitment. The ATS is also investigating his martial arts training, use of lesser-known applications, objectionable social media comments and possible preparations to travel abroad.

The digital evidence, statements of the accused and their links with Pakistani handlers are being examined to establish the full scale of the network and whether sleeper cells had already been created in other parts of the country.

What is PFI’s ‘Mission 2047’?

In 2022, OpIndia accessed an eight-page internal document attributed to the Popular Front of India titled India Vision 2047. Carrying the tagline “Towards Rule of Islam in India”, the document laid down a phased roadmap to establish an Islamic government in the country by 2047, the centenary of India’s Independence.

The document claimed that political power had been “unjustly taken away” from Muslims by the British and declared that it should return to the Muslim community. It also asserted that PFI did not require the support of a Muslim majority to achieve its objective. According to the document, the organisation believed that support from even 10% of India’s Muslim population would be sufficient to bring the Hindu majority “to its knees” and restore what it described as the “glory of Islam”.

The plan was divided into four stages. The first stage focused on uniting Muslims of different sects under the PFI banner, expanding recruitment and creating an Islamic identity that superseded Indian identity. Cadres were to be trained in offensive and defensive techniques, including the use of rods, swords and other weapons. The document also called for repeatedly reminding Muslims of real or manufactured grievances to sustain anger against the Indian State and Hindus.

The second stage proposed the selective use of violence to terrorise opponents and demonstrate collective strength. Cadres showing potential were to receive advanced training in firearms and explosives. At the same time, terms such as the Constitution, the National Flag and BR Ambedkar were to be used as a cover to conceal the ultimate objective of establishing Islamic rule. The document also spoke about infiltrating the executive and judiciary, securing favourable outcomes and cultivating ties with Islamic countries for funding and assistance.

In the third stage, PFI planned to forge political alliances with Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes while creating divisions between these communities and the RSS. The organisation aimed to contest elections, discredit secular political parties and present itself as the principal representative of Muslims and marginalised communities. This stage also called for stockpiling weapons and explosives and using trained cadres to attack those considered hostile to the organisation’s interests.

The fourth stage envisaged PFI emerging as the undisputed leader of Muslims and acquiring enough political support to capture power nationally. Once in power, loyal cadres were to be placed in the executive, judiciary, police and armed forces. Those opposing the organisation were to be eliminated, while an Islamic Constitution would replace the existing constitutional order.

The document also proposed recruiting at least one person from every Muslim household, building secret training centres, maintaining depots for weapons and explosives and creating a dedicated armed force. Cadres were instructed to collect personal information about Hindu and RSS leaders before a “final showdown”.

PFI further envisaged seeking assistance from foreign Islamic countries during a confrontation with the Indian State. It specifically referred to its relationship with Turkey and called for similar links with other Islamic nations. Mission 2047, therefore, was not presented merely as an ideological campaign, but as a long-term programme combining radicalisation, recruitment, political infiltration, armed training, foreign support and organised violence to replace India’s constitutional system with Islamic rule.

What is PFI and why was it banned?

The Popular Front of India, or PFI, was an Islamist organisation that operated through a wide network of members, front organisations and political affiliates across several Indian states. It presented itself as a group working for the rights and empowerment of Muslims and other marginalised communities. However, investigations by central and state agencies linked the organisation to radicalisation, violent mobilisation, terror financing, arms training and attempts to build a covert network capable of challenging the Indian State.

The organisation had been under the radar for a long time, and the “India Vision 2047” document became one of the final nails in the coffin for PFI. The immediate chain of events leading to the ban began in 2022 after police unearthed a suspected network in Phulwari Sharif. Investigators arrested Athar Parvez and Mohammad Jalaluddin and recovered documents that revealed plans to radicalise Muslim youths, provide weapons training and work towards converting India into an Islamic state. Jalaluddin was also identified as a former member of the banned Students’ Islamic Movement of India, or SIMI, who had later joined PFI.

Further arrests and searches revealed WhatsApp groups, overseas contacts, digital material and links to the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” network. Investigating agencies also examined PFI’s suspected involvement in violent incidents, including the murder of BJP youth leader Praveen Nettaru, and a conspiracy to attack Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rally in Patna.

The government’s case against PFI rested on three broad findings: the organisation’s nationwide network, its funding channels and its involvement in violent and terrorist activities. The National Investigation Agency, Enforcement Directorate and state police conducted raids across several states in September 2022. Hundreds of PFI members and office-bearers were detained, while digital devices, documents and financial records were seized.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, PFI and its associates received funds from India and abroad through banking channels, hawala and donations. These funds were layered through multiple accounts to conceal their real purpose and were then used for unlawful and terrorist activities. The government also cited links between PFI members and terrorist organisations, including ISIS, as well as attempts to infiltrate organisations such as the RSS and gather sensitive information.

On 28th September 2022, the Union government banned PFI for five years under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Eight of its associated organisations were banned alongside it. The government concluded that PFI’s activities posed a serious threat to India’s sovereignty, security and public order. The ban was therefore based not merely on its ideology, but on accumulated evidence of radicalisation, foreign funding, violent conspiracies, terror links and an organised plan to undermine India’s constitutional system.

No account of 10 years of offerings at Salar Masud Dargah in Bahraich, ex-SP minister linked to ‘scam’: Here’s how the controversy unfolded and what the committee has said

पूजा राणा
-
0
No account of 10 years of offerings at Salar Masud Dargah in Bahraich, ex-SP minister linked to ‘scam’: Here’s how the controversy unfolded and what the committee has said

The Salar Masud Dargah in Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, has once again found itself at the centre of controversy. This time, the dispute concerns offerings made at the shrine and its financial records. Allegations have surfaced that a complete account of donations and offerings received over several years is unavailable. Even after the district administration sought records, financial details for multiple years could not reportedly be produced.

The missing records have fuelled suspicions of a major financial scam. BJP leaders have alleged embezzlement worth crores of rupees, while the name of former Samajwadi Party minister Yasar Shah has also been dragged into the controversy. The Dargah Management Committee, however, has dismissed all allegations as baseless.

Row over offerings and donations

The Salar Masud Dargah is among the country’s well-known shrines, attracting lakhs of devotees every year. Apart from cash donations, devotees also offer gold, silver and other valuable items.

Questions regarding the management of the shrine’s donations and properties intensified after certain individuals associated with the Dargah, along with BJP leaders, alleged that proper records of offerings had not been maintained. They further claimed that serious irregularities may have occurred in the handling of funds and assets accumulated over the years.

Some hereditary caretakers (khadims) also alleged that valuable gold and silver jewellery, once offered at the shrine, is no longer visible. They argued that if the ornaments remain safe, they should be publicly displayed.

BJP demands SIT probe

The controversy gained momentum after BJP Minority Morcha’s Uttar Pradesh president Kunwar Basil Ali met Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath and sought an SIT investigation into the matter.

Ali alleged large-scale irregularities in the management of the valuable properties and offerings associated with Waqf No. 19. He has demanded an impartial audit of financial transactions spanning nearly two decades, claiming that substantial misappropriation may have occurred in donations, offerings and contributions received by the shrine.

As the controversy escalated, Uttar Pradesh minister Dinesh Pratap Singh reportedly sought a detailed report from Bahraich District Magistrate Akshay Tripathi, asking for findings to be submitted within 15 days.

District magistrate seeks records

The issue gained further attention when District Magistrate Akshay Tripathi sought details of the shrine’s financial records. During scrutiny, it reportedly emerged that several records relating to offerings and expenditure over the past decade were unavailable.

According to reports, the Dargah management failed to provide a complete financial account, prompting concerns over possible financial irregularities. The District Magistrate has reportedly written to the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Waqf Board, highlighting the need for an investigation.

Questions have also been raised regarding staff appointments, with the committee claiming that around 170 employees currently work at the shrine.

Allegations involving the former SP minister

The controversy has also drawn in former Samajwadi Party minister Yasar Shah. BJP leaders have alleged that certain members of the Dargah Management Committee, along with individuals linked to the former minister, protected financial irregularities.

Kunwar Basil Ali has sought an investigation into Shah’s alleged role, arguing that his involvement in the shrine’s finances should be examined independently.

Dargah committee rejects charges

The Dargah Management Committee has categorically denied all allegations. Senior committee member Dilshad Ahmad described the accusations of corruption and embezzlement as completely unfounded.

According to the committee, all financial transactions are conducted in accordance with Waqf Board regulations. It claims that offerings are counted under CCTV surveillance and the entire process is recorded, making manipulation unlikely. The committee also maintains that staff appointments and administrative functions are carried out transparently.

Previous controversies

The Salar Masud Dargah has been embroiled in controversies on several occasions in recent years.

In 2025, a major dispute arose over the annual Jeth Fair and Urs celebrations after the Bahraich administration refused permission for the event, citing law-and-order concerns. The matter eventually reached the Allahabad High Court and became the subject of intense political and social debate.

Another controversy emerged in June 2026 when Uttar Pradesh minister Anil Rajbhar demanded that the Archaeological Survey of India conduct an archaeological survey of the shrine, arguing that its historical and archaeological aspects should be examined.

NYT triggers outrage for using Father’s Day to push ‘trans dad’ narrative: How Western media is pushing transgender activism into mainstream culture

Shraddha Pandey
-
0
NYT triggers outrage for using Father’s Day to push ‘trans dad’ narrative: How Western media is pushing transgender activism into mainstream culture

The New York Times has synonymised full-fledged activism with journalism. The NYT’s activism is so diverse that on one day, the newspaper humanises Islamists, on the other, it injects a woke agenda in days celebrating specific gender roles. On the occasion of Father’s Day this year, the New York Times published a guest essay normalising ‘trans dad’. The NYT’s trans activism on Father’s Day, however, did not sit well with many on social media.

Written by Zach Ellams, a biological female who identifies as a ‘trans’ man, the article appears in illustrated comic-strip format with drawings from Hannah Jacobs.

Zach Ellams, the author of the article headlined, “To My Daughter, My Gender Was Never Complicated”, is described as a London-based editor and motion designer. Ellams has lived as a trans man since the age of 18. In the NYT piece, Ellams recounted experiences parenting a daughter named Elliot, with his ‘wife’.

The NYT piece published on 21st June not only normalises biological females identifying as men, parenting children as fathers, but also furthers a victimhood narrative. The article frames ‘fatherhood’ as aiding Zach Ellams overcome personal shaming about ‘transitioning’ from a biological female to a trans male by undergoing a gender-change procedure, and embracing his self-imposed identity fully.

Ellams highlights how trans males need “thick skin” as a parent. The NYT piece portrays Ellams’s young daughter’s casual acceptance of her trans dad’s sexuality as supportive and progressive.

The article includes anecdotes of public or everyday moments wherein Ellams’s daughter asks questions about or comments on Ellam’s body and past. The key conversations include:

  • While walking down the street, the daughter asks, “How long did you have breasts, Dad?”
  • At a pool: “How did you grow a moustache if you were a lady?”
  • On a playground: The daughter says, “I want to grow a beard when I grow up.” Another child replies, “You can’t grow a beard. You’re a girl.” The daughter responds, “My dad did, and he was a girl.”

 While the New York Times emphasised the child’s supposed easy navigation of complex issues like gender transition or sex change procedures, and social acceptance of what is described as trans dads, people on social media questioned the timing and deliberate framing.

Many called out the NYT for using a major traditional holiday to centre a biological woman’s “transgender” identity and parenting experience while redefining “dad”. The use of comic format for soft peddling “trans people are dads and moms too” is interesting. This format made the gender-related questions from the child made if look ‘fun’ and shareable among children for ‘gender-sensitisation’, because what could be better than convincing young children that it is normal and desirable to undergo Gender-Affirming Surgery (GAS).

Criticising the NYT for bringing in transgender woke narratives into Father’s Day, End Wokeness wrote on X, “The New York Times on Father’s Day. We do not hate the media enough.”

Author Alex Berenson blended criticism with sarcasm and wrote, “I want to congratulate @nytimes for perfectly catching how the cultural elite view men and fatherhood this Father’s Day – yes, to the Times, being a dad is something you do to feel better about having your tits cut off. Cannot make it up.”

Popular podcaster Katie Miller wrote, “The New York Times published cartoons about being a trans dad for Father’s Day. This is how they envision corrupting our children.”

Meanwhile, Charles Gasparino, journalist with Fox Business, wrote, “The gulf between the progressive left and the rest of the country (say around 80% of Americans) has never been wider based on this nonsense from @nytimes on Father’s Day, no less. And you wonder why Trump got elected. To My Daughter, My Gender Was Never Complicated.”

Many others called the NYT’s piece an attempt at erasing men and turning Father’s Day into ‘Trans Dads Day’. The NYT has been joined by several other legacy media outlets in and outside the US, giving favourable coverage to non-biological/trans perspectives on Father’s Day. This is a blatant attempt by the New York Times at pushing and normalising the idea of ‘trans dad’, ‘trans mom’ or ‘trans parents’ into the mainstream by using traditional occasions associated with fatherhood or motherhood, essentially, days celebrating gender roles.

While trans activists have aggressively been pushing these narratives in schools across the US and many European countries, their media allies platform gender confused mothers and wokes to establish the use of cross-sex hormone injections, puberty blockers, GAS, and ‘trans parenthood’ as something equivalent to and as normal as the real biological genders and relations, sometimes better.

The strategy is to embed woke gender ideology into everyday cultural touchstones. Now the trans activists are using traditional holidays and roles as vehicles for normalising transgender identities, gender fluidity, and what could have been a better occasion than Father’s Day to decouple “parent” from biological sex. This is forced inclusion.

Conventionally, the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ have been used interchangeably, and it has been a scientifically and logically accepted fact that there are only two genders that could be considered normal. In contrast, transgender individuals are considered a deviation from the norm and anomalous.  The non-binary and ‘gender fluid’ people claim that they are not comfortable with conventional pronouns since they are associated with gender identities. This led to the coining of new pronouns like “They/Them” and Xe/Xhrer.”

The US and Europe have been the centre of this gender-affirmation and related political debates; the rot has metastasised to several countries across the world.

Clearly, Donald Trump’s return to power may have slowed the trans activism wave in the US. The ‘wokeness’ has not died down; rather, it is simmering beneath the surface. Once the Republicans are voted out, the normalisation of transgender identities will resume in full swing.

Revolutionary or Mentally Unstable: Who was Bharat Tiwari, whose encounter is sparking uproar in Bihar, and why CM Samrat Chaudhary ordered judicial inquiry

शिव
-
0
Revolutionary or Mentally Unstable: Who was Bharat Tiwari, whose encounter is sparking uproar in Bihar, and why CM Samrat Chaudhary ordered judicial inquiry

Questions continue to be raised over the death of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari, who was killed in a police encounter in Bihar’s Bhojpur district on 17th June. As the controversy grows, Bihar Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary has ordered a judicial inquiry into the incident.

The case has sparked intense debate both on social media and in political circles. While some people describe Bharat Tiwari as a man who fought for local issues, others point to his repeated threats against government officials and police personnel.

How the case began

The controversy started on 15th June, 2026, when Bharat Tiwari posted several messages on Facebook. In these posts, he spoke about starting a “revolutionary war” in the country and threatened to kill the SDM of Jagdishpur.

Police visited his house twice on 15th June, but he was not found there. He also did not appear before the police that day.

According to police, on 16th June, Shahpur police station received information that a man was moving around with a weapon. The man was identified as Bharat Bhushan Tiwari, a resident of Bilauti village. Several photos showing him holding weapons also surfaced on social media.

When police reached his home for questioning, Bharat was still carrying a gun. He even went live on Facebook while speaking to police officers.

In the live video and accompanying posts, Bharat accused the Bihar government and the administration of trying to kill him in an encounter. He claimed that officials were planning action against him and warned of a larger struggle against the system.

As videos and posts spread online, Bhojpur Police stated on social media late on 16th June that Bharat appeared to be mentally unwell and that steps were being taken to send him for treatment. They also stated that efforts were being made to recover the weapon in his possession and prevent any untoward incident.

Facebook live videos and firing at police

On the morning of 17th June, Bharat again went live on Facebook. In the video, he claimed that police wanted to declare him mentally unstable and take him away. He compared himself to freedom fighter Bhagat Singh and openly threatened police personnel.

During the live session, he fired shots toward police officers stationed outside his house and repeatedly spoke about killing them. In another Facebook post, he claimed that police had run away after he fired at them.

Later that morning, Bharat came out of his house and continued threatening police personnel. He also criticised the administration for calling him mentally ill.

On June 17, at around 9 a.m., Bharat went live once again from an open field. In the nearly 15-minute video, he was seen pointing a gun toward police officers and repeatedly asking them to leave.

When police appealed to him to surrender, Bharat replied that there would be a “war” and said either he or the police would survive. A gunshot can also be heard in the video as he fired at police personnel.

Speaking about his demands, Bharat said leaders and government officials should fulfil promises made to the public. He added that if promises were not kept, people would be forced to take up arms.

After saying this, he threw his weapon toward the police personnel present there.

Two different versions of what happened next

Soon after the surrender video, news emerged that Bharat had been shot.

According to Bhojpur Police, Bharat continued firing despite repeated requests to surrender. Police said he opened fire directly at officers when they moved closer to him. In response, officers fired in self-defence, hitting him in the leg. He later died during treatment at PMCH in Patna.

However, eyewitnesses quoted in media reports have given a different version.

According to one witness, Bharat had already thrown away his weapon before police caught him. The witness claimed that police took him some distance away and then fired at him. The witness further claimed Bharat was shot multiple times. These differing accounts have become the central issue in the ongoing controversy.

Protests and FIRs after Bharat’s death

Following Bharat’s death, angry villagers staged protests on 18th June. His body was placed on a highway, and demonstrators blocked NH-922. The protest turned violent, and police used a lathi charge to disperse the crowd.

Media reports say two FIRs have been registered in connection with the incident. One FIR names Bharat’s father, Kashinath Tiwari, and brother, Chandan Tiwari, on charges including possession of weapons and obstructing government work.

Another FIR has been filed against 14 named individuals and more than 50 unidentified people for road blockage and violence during the protest.

Meanwhile, Bharat’s mother, Suman Devi, has demanded that a murder case be registered against police personnel involved in the encounter. She maintains that her son had surrendered by throwing away his weapon.

Political reactions and judicial inquiry

The encounter soon became a political issue in Bihar. Several police personnel, including Shahpur police station in-charge Rajesh Kumar Malakar, were suspended as questions continued to mount.

Many political leaders visited Bharat’s family to offer condolences. RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav described the incident as a fake encounter and demanded accountability. Questions were also raised by leaders from ruling alliance parties. JDU leader Sanjay Jha called for a high-level investigation, while Bihar minister Mithilesh Tiwari also sought answers regarding the encounter.

Amid growing pressure, Chief Minister Samrat Chaudhary announced on 20th June that the incident would be investigated through a judicial inquiry headed by a retired High Court judge.

He said the aim was to ensure an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into all aspects of the case.

Revolutionary or criminal: Who was Bharat

The debate around Bharat Tiwari largely revolves around two very different images of him.

One side points to his social media posts, where he repeatedly threatened government officials, talked about encounters, and used aggressive language. Several posts show him warning officials that he would take violent action if development work was not completed.

Bharat Tiwari’s Facebook post

In posts made on 15th June, 12th June and 7th June, he repeatedly referred to launching a “revolutionary war” and threatened officials, including the SDM of Jagdishpur. His Facebook profile also contains posts criticising the Bihar government, former Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, and the administrative system.

At the same time, many villagers remember him differently. Residents from flood-affected areas near Bilauti village told media organisations that Bharat regularly raised issues related to roads, electricity, drinking water and rehabilitation of displaced families.

Some villagers described him as someone who frequently checked on public services and pushed authorities to address local problems. Several residents even referred to him as a person who always stood with the poor during difficult times.

The encounter has left Bihar deeply divided. Bharat Tiwari’s social media activity clearly shows his anger toward the government and administration, along with repeated threats of violence. At the same time, many villagers credit him with highlighting local issues and helping people in need.

Whether Bharat Tiwari was a social activist who crossed legal limits, a criminal who threatened public officials, or whether the police acted correctly during the encounter are questions that remain unanswered for now.

The judicial inquiry ordered by the Bihar government is expected to determine what exactly happened on 17th June and whether the police action followed the law.

The Delhi Police did nothing wrong: Here is how Abhijit Dipke is lying to instigate violence against police personnel

Anurag
-
0
The Delhi Police did nothing wrong: Here is how Abhijit Dipke is lying to instigate violence against police personnel

On 20th June, Abhijit Dipke, founder of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), published an alarming video on the social media platform X. “Police is about to arrest me. I appeal to you to not stop this peaceful protest nationwide even if I am arrested!” he said in the video. The message was designed to create a sense of urgency following the second round of the CJP protest at Jantar Mantar in Delhi. He claimed that the Delhi Police were about to crack down on a “peaceful protest” and arrest him merely for raising the “concerns of students”.

But there was one problem. Dipke was never arrested by the Delhi Police. Another video shared by CJP showed police personnel standing while the protestors shouting “Halla Bol”.

Within a few hours of the video, another video surfaced on social media in which he was seen enjoying bread pakodas with fellow protesters. The Delhi Police neither dragged him away nor used force against any protester. In fact, despite the permission for the protest having expired, which appeared to be valid until the evening of 20th June, the police allowed Dipke and his supporters to remain at Jantar Mantar overnight.

The sequence of events made it evident that the dramatic warning about his impending arrest was not borne out by what happened on the ground. It was clearly a false alarm used to portray the police as aggressors and mobilise more people against them.

In a charged protest environment, such claims can create hostility towards police personnel, encourage crowds to disregard lawful instructions and prepare supporters to view every police action as an attack on democracy. Basically, such false alarms can easily turn the atmosphere hostile, pushing the police to take action to maintain law and order, and this is what appears to be the plan of the “cockroaches”.

India has already witnessed the deadly consequences of sustained incitement against police personnel. Head Constable Ratan Lal was killed during the 2020 Delhi riots, while hundreds of police personnel were brutally attacked after protesting farmers violated the agreed conditions of their tractor rally on Republic Day in 2021.

Any attempt to incite the public, including what Dipke has been doing, must be viewed in the context of such precedents.

Permission was granted only until a specified time

The police never denied permission to protest at Jantar Mantar. On 6th June, when Dipke and his supporters tried to put the Delhi Police in a bad light by seeking permission for the protest at the last minute, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling that a 7-day notice is necessary to protest at Jantar Mantar in the national capital, permission was granted at the airport itself, putting a hole in the plan to create chaos at the Parliament Street Police Station.

On 20th June as well, permission must have been granted for a limited time. Any protest can take place at Jantar Mantar, but it cannot be continuous. Permission is always granted with a fixed closing time, and that too under specific conditions.

Once that period expires, the police ask the protesters to disperse. This is what must have happened at Jantar Mantar during the CJP protest. There is nothing unusual, illegal or undemocratic about this. The police were merely enforcing the terms under which the protest must have been allowed.

However, Dipke continued to stay at the protest site with his followers. A protest organiser cannot refuse to leave after the deadline and then accuse the police of repression for asking him to comply with the very conditions he had accepted while seeking permission. The right to protest does not include the right to unilaterally occupy a public space indefinitely.

Delhi Police showed restraint

The conduct of the Delhi Police completely contradicts Dipke’s attempt to portray himself as the victim of an impending crackdown. Almost 24 hours have passed since he claimed that the Delhi Police were going to arrest him at the protest site. By the time this report was published, he was still at the protest site amid a heavy police deployment, and he had not even been touched by the police, let alone arrested.

Ideally, when an authorised protest period ends and the protesters refuse to leave, the police have every right to remove them in accordance with the law. However, Dipke stayed, his followers stayed, and the propagandists who came to join the protest to further their agendas also stayed with their daflis and thalis.

This was far from the conduct of an oppressive force. The Delhi Police showed considerable restraint and cooperation. However, the police cannot be expected to abandon all restrictions simply because an organiser has announced that he will not leave until a Union minister resigns. Cooperation from the police does not mean surrendering public spaces to political groups for an unlimited period.

The water supply claim further fuelled the narrative

Dipke did not stop at making claims about his arrest. On 21st June, he published a post at around 7 am in which he claimed that the water supply had been stopped at the public restrooms at Jantar Mantar since the previous night. He said, “I request the authorities not to cut off the water supply to the restrooms at the Jantar Mantar protest site. Since last night there’s no water supply at the public restrooms.”

The statement again presented the authorities as deliberately mistreating protesters. He did not establish who was responsible for the lack of water, but he framed his message as a direct appeal to the authorities not to deprive protesters of a basic facility.

This post helped reinforce the impression that the police and the administration were collectively attempting to harass a “peaceful gathering”.

He urged the police not to stop additional protesters

Around 90 minutes after that video, he released another video asking the police not to prevent more people from reaching Jantar Mantar. In the video, he was seen standing in front of police personnel and making the request, with no response coming from the other side. On X, he wrote alongside the video, “I request the police to not stop people from coming at Jantar Mantar. We are not doing anything wrong, we are just seeking justice for the students who committed suicide.”

Dipke was effectively telling his supporters that the police should step aside and allow unrestricted mobilisation at a protest that had already crossed its permitted deadline.

Farmers and workers were called in as reinforcements

Another problematic appeal made by Dipke came from the protest site stage later on Sunday, when he asked farmers and workers across the country to join the protest. He said, “We appeal to the farmers, workers, brothers and sisters across the country: Your children are struggling at Jantar Mantar for their rights. More than 12 children have already taken their own lives. Please come to Jantar Mantar, stand with us.”

He further claimed that if the country’s farmers and workers stood with the youth, “no one can stop Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation”.

Dipke also invoked the previous farmers’ agitation, claiming that students had stood shoulder to shoulder with farmers when they were fighting for their rights and that students now needed the same solidarity.

This cannot be seen as a simple appeal for people to express support from their respective cities. It was a call for organised groups to converge at Jantar Mantar. Farmers and workers were effectively being summoned as political reinforcements to increase pressure on the government and overwhelm the restrictions imposed by the police.

Given Delhi’s history of protests turning violent, such mobilisation cannot be treated as harmless rhetoric.

Head Constable Ratan Lal was killed after police were demonised

The anti-Hindu Delhi riots of 2020 provide a grim reminder of what happens when police personnel are systematically portrayed as enemies of a community or movement. On 24th February 2020, a violent mob attacked police personnel near Chand Bagh. Head Constable Ratan Lal was among those who were on duty to control the mob. He was killed, while DCP Amit Sharma, an Assistant Commissioner of Police and several other police personnel suffered injuries.

Head Constable Ratan Lal was not sitting in an air-conditioned office making political decisions. He was on the streets performing his duty and attempting to control a violent mob that was instigated by the perpetrators behind the larger conspiracy. He never returned to his family.

The violence did not emerge in a vacuum. For weeks, provocative speeches, inflammatory mobilisation and calls to resist police action had created an atmosphere in which law-enforcement personnel were viewed as legitimate targets.

Once a crowd is persuaded that the police are oppressors, every lawful instruction is treated as provocation. Barricades become symbols of tyranny. Requests to disperse are described as attacks on democracy. Violence against police personnel is then rationalised as resistance.

Dipke’s posts follow the same dangerous pattern of delegitimising the police before a large audience.

He portrayed the possibility of enforcing a protest deadline as an impending arrest. He suggested that facilities were being deliberately denied. He asked the police not to regulate entry and appealed to farmers and workers to reach the site. His message to his supporters was clear: the police were standing between the protesters and justice.

Republic Day violence showed what happens when agreed conditions are discarded

A similar pattern was visible during the farmers’ protests. On Republic Day in 2021, protesters announced a tractor rally. Permission was granted by the police for a specific route, considering VIP movement on the day and the fact that Delhi is the national capital.

However, sections of the protesters entered Delhi before the agreed time, broke barricades and abandoned the authorised routes. The resulting chaos spread across the national capital. Protesters reached the Red Fort, attacked police personnel and engaged in clashes at several locations. Nearly 400 police personnel were injured.

Videos from the day showed protesters attacking policemen with sticks and swords, driving tractors dangerously through police barricades and chasing officers. Some police personnel were forced to jump from elevated structures to escape the mob.

The violence was not caused because the police had denied farmers the right to protest. It occurred after sections of the protesters violated the very conditions under which the rally had been allowed.

This parallels Dipke’s conduct at the CJP protest. This is precisely how authorised protests are pushed towards confrontation.

The police cannot be expected to surrender before every mob

India is a democracy, but the right to protest is not a licence to disregard rules, deadlines or restrictions imposed to maintain public order. A time-bound demonstration cannot become an indefinite occupation because organisers refuse to leave. Nor can they summon crowds to a site and then accuse the police of repression for regulating access.

While students have every right to raise concerns and protest, the gravity of those issues cannot be used to justify misinformation or hostility towards the police. A movement claiming to represent distressed students has a responsibility to remain truthful.

Despite the restraint shown by the Delhi Police during the 6th June protest and the 20th June protest, which continued into the next day, Dipke claimed that he was about to be arrested, claimed that the water had been cut off, asked the police not to stop more protesters and called on farmers and workers to reach the site. This was an attempt to manufacture police repression where none existed.

The rhetoric is dangerous. Such rhetoric can turn violent at any time and lead to a repeat of what happened during the Delhi riots and the tractor rally. Peace requires organisers to respect rules, avoid misinformation and prevent hostility towards the police. Dipke instead chose confrontation, leaving personnel to bear the risks created by his mobilisation.

PM Modi commissions three indigenously built Indian Navy platforms in Kolkata: Read what they are and why this is significant

Shriti Sagar
-
0
PM Modi commissions three indigenously built Indian Navy platforms in Kolkata: Read what they are and why this is significant

On Sunday, 21st June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi commissioned three indigenously built naval ships at Kolkata’s Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port, describing the occasion as a major milestone in India’s journey towards defence self-reliance and maritime strength. The three vessels, INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak and INS Agray, have been designed and built in India and are expected to significantly strengthen the Indian Navy’s capabilities in surface warfare, hydrographic surveying and anti-submarine operations.

The commissioning ceremony was held in the presence of West Bengal Governor RN Ravi, Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari and Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Krishna Swaminathan. The event came on a symbolic day, coinciding with International Day of Yoga as well as World Hydrography Day.

The three ships represent different dimensions of India’s maritime capability. INS Dunagiri is a modern stealth-guided missile frigate designed for multi-role combat operations. INS Agray is an anti-submarine warfare vessel meant to detect and neutralise underwater threats in shallow coastal waters. INS Sanshodhak is an advanced survey vessel tasked with mapping the seabed, collecting oceanographic data and supporting both military and civilian maritime operations.

The induction of the three vessels comes at a time when India is rapidly expanding its naval capabilities amid increasing strategic competition in the Indian Ocean region and growing concerns over maritime security.

India’s strength lies in Self-Reliance: PM Modi

Addressing the gathering after the commissioning ceremony, Prime Minister Modi said the three ships symbolised India’s growing confidence and determination to become self-reliant in defence manufacturing.

“These three vessels also symbolise three important national commitments. They have been built in India. They have been designed in India. The talent of Indian industries has contributed to their construction. The skills of Indian engineers and the hard work of Indian workers have gone into building them. This is the greatest strength of the new India,” he said.

The Prime Minister stressed that India could no longer remain dependent on foreign suppliers for its defence requirements.

“India no longer wishes to remain merely a buyer in the defence sector. Our military strength cannot become a market for the rest of the world. My strength cannot be defined by becoming a market for the world. The true measure of my strength and capability lies in my self-reliance,” he said.

Modi highlighted how India’s maritime future would shape its economic and strategic influence in the coming decades.

“The world has witnessed that no nation can become a major power without maritime capability. Development is connected with the sea. Security is connected with the sea. Prosperity is connected with the sea,” he said.

The Prime Minister also linked the commissioning of the three vessels to the broader transformation taking place within India’s defence sector.

“A few years ago, when we dedicated INS Vikrant to the nation, India announced the beginning of a new chapter in its maritime strength. The journey from INS Vikrant to the present day is not merely a journey involving new warships. It is also the journey of India’s growing self-reliance. Today, INS Agray, INS Dunagiri and INS Sanshodhak are giving fresh momentum to that journey,” he added.

A ceremony with strategic significance

The commissioning ceremony carried significance beyond the induction of three ships.

PM Modi used the occasion to underline India’s growing shipbuilding capabilities and the role of the maritime sector in generating employment and economic growth. He revealed that more than 40 indigenously built warships and submarines had joined the Indian Navy over the past few years and that another 45 major naval platforms are currently under construction.

The Prime Minister also highlighted the contribution of Indian industry, particularly small and medium enterprises, in strengthening the country’s defence manufacturing ecosystem.

According to him, more than 200 MSMEs contributed to the construction of the three ships commissioned on Sunday.

He further pointed to India’s ₹70,000 crore incentive package for the shipping sector and ongoing initiatives such as Sagarmala, which aim to modernise ports, expand logistics networks and strengthen India’s maritime economy.

Three ships, three different roles

While all three vessels were built in India and share the common objective of strengthening India’s maritime capabilities, each ship serves a very different operational purpose.

INS Dunagiri is designed for frontline naval combat and long-range maritime operations. INS Agray focuses on hunting enemy submarines in coastal waters. INS Sanshodhak is dedicated to hydrographic surveys and the collection of critical underwater data.

Together, they provide the Navy with a powerful combination of combat capability, underwater surveillance and maritime domain awareness.

INS Dunagiri: India’s new stealth combat frigate

Among the three ships commissioned, INS Dunagiri is perhaps the most powerful combat platform. It is the fifth warship under Project 17A and belongs to the Nilgiri-class of stealth-guided missile frigates. Designed by the Indian Navy’s Warship Design Bureau and constructed by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata, INS Dunagiri represents the next generation of Indian surface combatants.

It was delivered to the Indian Navy on March 30, 2026, at Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata. INS Dunagiri is the second Nilgiri-class ship built at GRSE. The ship was laid down on 24 January 2020, and it was launched on 15 July 2022.

Named after the Himalayan peak Dunagiri in Uttarakhand, the vessel carries forward the legacy of the earlier INS Dunagiri, which served the Navy for more than three decades.

At nearly 149 metres in length and displacing around 6,600 tonnes, the warship is built for modern naval warfare. The frigate incorporates advanced stealth features that reduce its radar signature, making it harder for enemy forces to detect and track.

It is armed with BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, MRSAM (Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missiles) complex with MFSTAR radar, 76mm Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM), close-in weapon systems (30mm and 12.7mm), and rockets and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. These weapons allow the vessel to engage enemy ships, submarines and aircraft simultaneously. The warship is equipped with sophisticated radars, electronic warfare systems and anti-submarine sensors, making it capable of operating across multiple domains.

One of its major technological features is the Integrated Platform Management System, which enables centralised monitoring and control of key ship functions.

INS Dunagiri is powered by a Combined Diesel or Gas propulsion system, consisting of two gas turbines and two diesel engines driving controllable-pitch propellers, paired with a state-of-the-art Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS), allowing commanders to balance fuel efficiency and speed depending on mission requirements. This configuration enables high-speed and high-endurance operations, with a top speed around 28–32 knots and a range of up to 5,500 nautical miles at economical speeds.

The vessel can also operate helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance and search-and-rescue missions. The ship was delivered in 80 months, significantly faster than the 93 months required for the lead vessel of the class, INS Nilgiri.

With increasing naval activity in the Indian Ocean region, particularly from China, INS Dunagiri is expected to become a key element of India’s future blue-water navy.

Project 17A frigates are versatile multi-mission platforms capable of addressing current and future maritime challenges. These represent a substantial upgrade over the earlier Project 17 (Shivalik-class) frigates. The ships also integrate a modern Combat Management System for rapid threat response.

INS Agray: The Navy’s submarine hunter

While INS Dunagiri is built for multi-role combat, INS Agray has a much more specialised mission. The vessel is part of the Arnala-class Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft programme approved by the government in 2013.

INS Agray is the fifth vessel under the programme and has been specifically designed for operations in shallow coastal waters where enemy submarines can attempt to operate undetected. Built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers in Kolkata, the vessel measures approximately 77 metres in length and is among the largest Indian naval warships powered by waterjets.

It is equipped with lightweight torpedoes, indigenous anti-submarine rocket launchers and advanced shallow-water sonar systems capable of detecting underwater threats. The vessel’s primary role is to identify, track and neutralise hostile submarines operating near India’s coastline.

This capability has become increasingly important as regional navies continue to invest heavily in submarine fleets. Pakistan, for example, is expanding its underwater warfare capability through the induction of new Hangor-class submarines.

Apart from anti-submarine missions, INS Agray will also support mine warfare and coastal surveillance operations.nThe vessel has more than 80% indigenous content, making it another major example of India’s growing defence manufacturing capability.

The ship also carries historical significance, as it revives the name of the earlier INS Agray, a patrol vessel that served the Navy before being decommissioned in 2017.

INS Sanshodhak: Mapping the Oceans for India

The third ship commissioned on Sunday was INS Sanshodhak, an advanced survey vessel designed to strengthen India’s hydrographic capabilities. INS Sanshodhak is the fourth and final vessel of the Sandhayak-class Survey Vessel (Large) programme.

Built by GRSE Kolkata and designed by the Indian Navy’s Warship Design Bureau, the vessel is approximately 110 metres long and displaces around 3,400 tonnes.

Its primary responsibility is to conduct coastal and deep-water hydrographic surveys. These surveys help identify safe navigational routes, map harbour approaches and produce accurate maritime charts that are critical for both naval and commercial shipping operations. The ship is also capable of collecting oceanographic and geophysical data for defence, scientific and civilian applications.

INS Sanshodhak is equipped with state-of-the-art systems, including Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), Digital Side Scan Sonar, Data Acquisition and Processing Systems and advanced positioning equipment.

Powered by two diesel engines, the vessel can achieve speeds exceeding 18 knots. The ship carries more than 80% indigenous content and represents India’s growing capability in specialised naval platforms.

Its commissioning on World Hydrography Day added further symbolic importance to the event.

Why the commissioning matters

The induction of INS Dunagiri, INS Agray and INS Sanshodhak is significant not merely because three new ships have joined the Navy, but because they represent the broader transformation taking place in India’s defence sector.

In his speech, Prime Minister Modi repeatedly emphasised that maritime power would play a decisive role in shaping India’s future economic and strategic influence.

India’s growing dependence on sea-based trade, undersea communication cables, energy routes and critical maritime resources makes naval strength increasingly important.

The three vessels strengthen key areas of capability, combat power, anti-submarine warfare and hydrographic surveying, which are essential for maintaining maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.

The commissioning also reflects the success of India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative in defence manufacturing. All three ships were designed and built domestically, with substantial participation from Indian industries and MSMEs.

“India wants to become a manufacturer. The day we become manufacturers, we will also become decisive players,” PM Modi said while highlighting the significance of the commissioning.

From AIMIM to CJP: US-based Osman Faizan Ali behind posters at CJP protests. Read how he is provoking youth to spark street unrest

Jinit Jain
-
0
From AIMIM to CJP: US-based Osman Faizan Ali behind posters at CJP protests. Read how he is provoking youth to spark street unrest

As Delhi’s Jantar Mantar became the centre of fresh protests over the contentious NEET issue on June 20, 2026, OpIndia uncovered the visible footprint of a US-based social media ‘activist’ whose influence extended far beyond the digital world and onto the streets of the national capital.

The protest, organised by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), was projected as a spontaneous youth-led movement against Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan and the government over alleged NEET-related grievances. However, what emerged from ground reporting was evidence suggesting that the agitation was being actively fuelled and amplified by those who had no skin in the game, provoking people from thousands of miles away. One such individual was Osman Faizan Ali, a self-styled activist based in the United States, who has been using social media platforms to provoke, mobilise and emotionally charge young Indians into confrontation with authorities.

Across Jantar Mantar, protesters were seen carrying professionally designed placards featuring social media commentator Dhruv Rathee, activist Abhijit Dipke and actor Rakhi Sawant. Yet a closer examination revealed a curious common feature. Printed prominently on many of these posters was the photograph of a bearded man identified as “Indian Osman Faizan Ali — From USA.”

The discovery immediately raised questions. Why was the image of an overseas activist appearing on posters at a protest supposedly driven by students and local activists? More importantly, how many of those carrying the placards even knew who he was?

When OpIndia spoke to several protesters at the venue, the answers were revealing. Many admitted they had no idea who Osman Faizan Ali was. One young protester openly stated that the poster had been handed to him by organisers and that he was unaware of the identity of the person whose photograph appeared on it. Similar responses from other demonstrators suggested that while they were being used to amplify Ali’s messaging, many were not even familiar with the individual behind it.

This disconnect points to a broader strategy. Rather than building a movement organically, Ali appears to be attempting to hijack it, manufacturing outrage and directing public anger through carefully designed propaganda distributed to impressionable participants on the ground.

A closer look at his social media activity reveals a pattern of deliberate provocation. Operating primarily through the Instagram account @bbm_india_, Ali has spent weeks pushing highly charged content related to the CJP protests. His videos are not limited to expressing support for demonstrators. Instead, they repeatedly seek to create a sense of impending confrontation, portraying the movement as a battle between angry youth and the Indian state.

His content relies heavily on emotionally loaded rhetoric, aggressive messaging and repeated attempts to convince young followers that they are part of a historic uprising. The objective appears clear: transform frustration over a public issue into a mass mobilisation driven by anger and confrontation.

One of the clearest examples came on June 1, 2026, when Ali uploaded a video directly addressing the Delhi Police. Rather than appealing for peaceful protest, the video carried an unmistakably threatening tone. He warned the police to deploy massive numbers of personnel before allowing CJP activists and Abhijit Dipke supporters to gather at Jantar Mantar. He repeatedly spoke about an unstoppable “tsunami” of people that would overwhelm any attempt by authorities to control the situation.

The language was significant. Instead of encouraging lawful democratic participation, Ali sought to create an atmosphere of confrontation. The message being conveyed to supporters was that they were part of a force powerful enough to challenge the state. Such rhetoric is a common tactic employed by agitators seeking to emotionally charge crowds and push supporters towards increasingly aggressive behaviour.

The fact that these messages were being delivered from the safety of a foreign country makes the situation even more troubling. While young Indians are encouraged to take to the streets, face police action and potentially risk legal consequences, the individual issuing these calls remains comfortably insulated from the fallout.

Ali’s efforts did not end there. He has been posting provocative content aimed at mobilising ‘Cockroaches’ ever since CJP started gaining online traction.

Earlier yesterday, he uploaded another video attempting to shape events on the ground. This time, he publicly appealed to the Delhi Police and security agencies to permit the demonstrations. However, the appeal came with an underlying threat. The video repeatedly suggested that stopping the protesters could lead to unrest and instability.

This form of messaging allows Ali to maintain plausible deniability while continuing to inflame passions. He does not explicitly call for violence, yet repeatedly frames confrontation as the likely outcome if authorities intervene. The practical effect is to heighten tensions, deepen mistrust of law enforcement and encourage supporters to view any administrative action as oppression. And to do all this from thousands of miles away, in the United States, is all too convenient for someone who positions himself as a crusader ‘fighting to save democracy in India.’

A review of Ali’s broader online activity suggests that this is not an isolated episode but part of a long-standing pattern. His social media presence consistently revolves around mobilising outrage, amplifying opposition narratives and encouraging followers to see political disagreements through the lens of conflict and resistance.

His YouTube channel, “Button Ballot Movement by Osman Faizan Ali,” provides further insight into his political objectives. While largely inactive today, archived content demonstrates that he has long sought to influence Indian politics despite operating from abroad.

One audio recording uploaded on May 13, 2024, featured an explicit appeal to voters in Hyderabad and Secunderabad. In the recording, Ali urged listeners to vote strategically for AIMIM and Congress candidates with the stated objective of defeating the BJP. The message was not framed around supporting particular policies or programmes but around defeating a political opponent through coordinated voting behaviour.

The recording demonstrates that Ali’s activism extends far beyond student issues or social causes. Rather, it reveals a pattern of attempting to influence political discourse and electoral outcomes in India while operating from abroad. His present-day support for the Cockroach Janta Party does not appear to stem from any long-standing ideological commitment to the movement. Instead, it seems to reflect an opportunistic effort to latch onto a viral internet phenomenon that has recently gained traction among sections of the youth. His political positioning has shifted with changing circumstances.

As recently as 2024, Ali was openly urging voters in Hyderabad and Secunderabad to support AIMIM and Congress candidates with the stated objective of defeating the BJP. His current embrace of the Cockroach Janta Party, therefore, appears less like an ideological commitment and more like political opportunism. Rather than being rooted in any consistent set of principles, his activism seems to follow whichever movement offers the greatest potential for mobilisation and visibility. Until 2024, Ali was actively rallying support behind AIMIM and Congress in their efforts to electorally challenge the BJP. Today, he has repositioned himself as a cheerleader for the CJP-led agitation, suggesting that his primary objective is not advancing a particular ideology but inserting himself into causes that act against the BJP and PM Modi.

The events at Jantar Mantar demonstrate how social media has transformed the nature of political mobilisation. In the past, protest movements were largely directed by individuals physically present on the ground and accountable for their actions. Today, however, activists sitting thousands of kilometres away can shape narratives, design propaganda, distribute campaign material, and influence the behaviour of large crowds with the click of a button.

What makes the current case particularly concerning is the apparent vulnerability of the young people being targeted. Many of the protesters carrying Ali’s posters did not even know who he was. Yet they were unknowingly helping promote his image and messaging in the heart of the national capital.

This raises serious questions. How many young participants are consuming such content without recognising the motives behind it? How many are being encouraged to view confrontation with institutions as a desirable outcome? And how many understand that those encouraging them to take risks are often individuals who bear none of the consequences themselves?

The Jantar Mantar protest offers a glimpse into a new model of political agitation in which overseas influencers attempt to weaponise local grievances to advance broader political objectives. By feeding young audiences a steady stream of inflammatory content, portraying institutions as enemies and framing protests as showdowns with the state, individuals like Osman Faizan Ali seek to transform public dissatisfaction into organised unrest.

While protesters on the ground face the possibility of detention, legal proceedings or violence if situations spiral out of control, those directing the outrage from abroad remain beyond the immediate reach of Indian law enforcement. The result is an unequal dynamic in which the risks are borne by impressionable youth while the rewards of political visibility accrue to digital agitators operating safely overseas.

The prominence of Osman Faizan Ali’s image at the Jantar Mantar protest is therefore more than a curious detail. It is evidence of how a foreign-based armchair ‘activist’ has attempted to insert himself into a domestic agitation, cultivate anger among young Indians and use digital platforms to push them towards confrontation. The incident serves as a reminder that in the age of social media, political unrest is no longer shaped only by those present on the streets. Increasingly, it is being influenced by individuals who may be thousands of kilometres away but are actively working to provoke, mobilise and radicalise audiences through the power of the internet.

Not just China, but in almost all of Asia and even in Europe: India is shamed and criticised for caste system, but similar systems existed almost everywhere

Shriti Sagar
-
0
Not just China, but in almost all of Asia and even in Europe: India is shamed and criticised for caste system, but similar systems existed almost everywhere

For decades, discussions around caste have almost always centred on India. International media, academics and activists frequently present caste as a uniquely Indian problem, often portraying it as an institution found nowhere else in the world. However, a growing India-China debate on social media has recently challenged that perception, with many users pointing out that rigid birth-based and occupation-based hierarchies existed across several societies, often under different names.

Over the past few weeks, Indian social media users have flooded platforms such as X and Instagram with posts, memes, videos and detailed threads exposing what many describe as China’s own caste-like social hierarchy. For years, the Chinese Communist Party projected itself as a society that had successfully eliminated social discrimination while simultaneously highlighting India’s caste issues. However, users began drawing attention to China’s historical social order and its modern Hukou system, which many believe continues to create institutional barriers between different groups of citizens.

The pursuit began gaining serious traction from around 11th June 2026 onwards with posts highlighting China’s ancient Four Occupations: Shi-Nong-Gong-Shang, as a hereditary hierarchy, and institutionalised discrimination within the modern Hukou household registration system, which traps millions of Chinese people in second-class status. While the Four Occupations created a structured hierarchy of scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants, the Hukou system continues to divide Chinese citizens into privileged urban residents and disadvantaged rural populations, restricting access to education, healthcare and employment opportunities.

The debate has reopened an important historical question: Was caste really unique to India, or did many societies create their own rigid social hierarchies that controlled people’s lives for generations?

The answer is that almost every major civilisation developed some form of hereditary or occupation-based social structure. While the names differed and the rules varied from country to country, the underlying principle remained strikingly similar. People were born into specific groups, social mobility was restricted, marriage often took place within the same community, and those at the bottom were frequently subjected to discrimination and poverty.

Caste was not unique to India

Modern discussions often associate the word “caste” exclusively with India. Yet historically, rigid social stratification based on birth existed across Asia, Europe and even parts of Africa.

Many societies divided people according to birth, occupation, wealth or perceived ritual purity. These divisions were often enforced by law, religion or state authority. In several cases, people born into lower groups could neither change their occupation nor easily improve their social standing.

The difference is largely one of terminology. In India, these divisions came to be known through the framework of ‘caste’, which, ironically, originated from the Portuguese ‘casta’. In other countries, they were called classes, estates, orders, ranks, serfdoms, outcast groups or hereditary occupations. But regardless of the name, they functioned in remarkably similar ways.

This reality becomes even more evident when examining some of Asia’s most advanced and admired societies, including Japan, Korea and Vietnam.

Japan’s rigid hereditary social order

Modern Japan is often viewed as one of the world’s most advanced nations. However, for centuries Japanese society operated under a rigid hereditary hierarchy that determined a person’s status, rights and opportunities.

During the Edo Period, which lasted from 1603 to 1868, the Tokugawa Shogunate institutionalised a strict social order known as Shinokosho. Society was divided into four principal groups: 

  • Shi – Samurai
  • Nō – Farmers 
  • Kō – Craftsmen 
  • Shō – Merchants.
Image via MGSC

At the top stood the Samurai class. These warrior-administrators enjoyed significant privileges and occupied positions of authority. Below them were farmers, who were valued because they produced rice, the foundation of Japan’s economy. Craftsmen came next, while merchants occupied the bottom rung because they were considered to generate wealth without producing essential goods.

This hierarchy was hereditary. A child born into a farmer’s family remained a farmer. A merchant’s child remained a merchant. Marriage between classes was restricted, and social mobility was severely limited.

The Tokugawa government repeatedly reminded citizens to “know your station in life.” People required permission to relocate, change occupations or marry outside their social category. Even clothing, hairstyles and daily behaviour were often regulated according to social rank.

Yet even below these four classes existed groups that suffered even harsher discrimination.

Among them were the Eta and Hinin communities, who later became known collectively as Burakumin.

The Eta were associated with occupations considered “impure,” including butchery, tanning and handling corpses. The Hinin included beggars, entertainers, low-status prostitutes and others considered socially undesirable.

These communities faced severe segregation. They were often forced to live in separate settlements, excluded from mainstream society and denied many opportunities available to other Japanese citizens.

Over time, the discrimination became codified in law. Occupations became hereditary, meaning the son of a tanner was expected to become a tanner. Social interaction between mainstream Japanese society and the Burakumin was discouraged and sometimes legally restricted.

Although legal discrimination was abolished during the Meiji era, the social stigma did not disappear overnight. Buraku rights organisations continue to fight discrimination even today, demonstrating how deeply entrenched these hierarchies once were.

Korea’s class system and the Nobi underclass

Like Japan, Korea also developed a highly structured and often rigid social hierarchy. During the Joseon Dynasty, Korean society was divided into several major classes. 

  • Yangban – Elite Scholar-Officials & Wealthy Landowners 
  • Jungin – Technical Middle Class (Doctors, Interpreters) 
  • Sangmin – Common Taxpayers (Farmers, Craftsmen, Traders) 
  • Cheonmin – Lowly Class (Shamans, Butchers) & NOBI (Slaves) 
Image via Pinterest

At the top stood the Yangban, who formed the ruling elite. They were scholar-officials who controlled government administration and owned significant amounts of land.

Below them were the Jungin, or middle people, who included technical professionals such as doctors, translators and administrators.

The majority of the population belonged to the Sangmin class, which consisted of farmers, craftsmen and merchants who paid taxes and supported the economy.

At the very bottom were the Cheonmin, meaning “lowly people.” This group included butchers, shamans, entertainers and the Nobi.

The Nobi occupied a particularly vulnerable position. They were considered property and could be bought, sold, inherited or transferred. In many respects, they resembled slaves or serfs. However, the Nobi system was complex. Some Nobi possessed property, accumulated wealth and lived independently. Nevertheless, their legal status remained subordinate to their owners.

For centuries, Korean society operated under this hierarchy. The Yangban enjoyed political and social dominance while lower classes faced significant barriers to advancement.

Only in the nineteenth century did these divisions begin to weaken. Economic changes, social reforms and political upheavals gradually eroded the old order. In 1894, the Nobi system was formally abolished.

Vietnam’s adoption of the Chinese social order

Vietnam presents another example of how caste-like structures spread across Asia through Chinese influence.

Historically, Vietnam adopted the Chinese Four Occupations model known locally as “Sĩ, Nông, Công, Thương.”

This system placed scholars and officials at the top, followed by farmers, artisans and merchants.

The arrangement reflected Confucian ideals that valued education and administration above commerce. Merchants often accumulated wealth, yet they remained socially inferior to scholars and bureaucrats.

Although the Vietnamese system was not as rigidly hereditary as some others, it still created a clear social hierarchy. Land ownership, education and government service became concentrated among elite families, reinforcing divisions across generations.

A key institution supporting this hierarchy was the Confucian civil service examination system. Introduced under the Ly Dynasty and continuing until 1919, these examinations selected government officials based on mastery of Confucian texts and classical literature.

In theory, any capable candidate could rise through the examination system. In practice, access to education was often concentrated among wealthy and influential families, giving them significant advantages. The examination structure elevated scholar-officials into a prestigious elite class while reinforcing the importance of bureaucratic status over commercial success. Over time, this helped create a durable social order that shaped Vietnamese society for centuries.

Caste-like hierarchies were not limited to Asia

The existence of rigid social hierarchies was not limited to Asian societies.

Europe, often portrayed as the birthplace of modern liberalism and equality, also spent centuries under systems that restricted social mobility and tied people to inherited status, even to slave-like conditions generation after generation.

For much of medieval Europe, society operated under feudalism. Feudalism was a governmental and economical structure that rose after that fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century. When the Roman Empire controlled large portions of Europe, it functioned as a large, central, stabilizing power. After its fall, local warlords began to assert their own dominance over small swaths of land. 

Image via Brewminate

At the top were kings, nobles and landowners. At the bottom were serfs, who worked the land but did not own it.

Europe’s serfs and lords

Serfdom was one of the defining institutions of medieval Europe.

Serfs were not technically slaves, but their lives were heavily controlled by local lords. They farmed land belonging to the lord and were required to surrender a significant portion of their produce as rent.

They could not freely leave the land. They often required permission to marry, relocate or change occupations. If the land changed ownership, the serfs frequently changed owners with it. In practical terms, their freedom was extremely limited.

The system was built around inherited status. Children of serfs generally became serfs themselves. Opportunities for advancement were rare.

Lords, meanwhile, exercised considerable authority. In exchange for labour and rent, they provided protection, housing and basic security. Yet the relationship remained deeply unequal. The institution survived for centuries and shaped the lives of millions of Europeans.

Only major disruptions such as economic transformation, urbanisation and the Black Death began weakening the system. The Black Death dramatically reduced Europe’s population, creating labour shortages that gave surviving workers greater bargaining power. Peasants increasingly demanded better conditions and greater freedom.

Over time, feudalism gradually declined and serfdom was abolished across much of Europe.

Scotland’s coal miners: Slavery by another name

Even after Britain began presenting itself as a champion of liberty and the abolition of slavery, forms of hereditary labour bondage continued to exist.

One striking example came from Scotland’s coal mining industry.

For centuries, Scottish colliers and salters were effectively tied to the mines where they worked. This included the colliers’ families as well. Mining was often a generational occupation, and even children would work in mines, some as young as four years old, although usually children were eight or nine if they were to work down in the pits. If conditions were better in other mines, colliers could not choose to leave and improve their situations, and any miner who did so was treated as a criminal and actively sought and retrieved. Some were punished severely for ‘absconding’ from their mines; they were treated as ‘vagabonds and sturdy beggars’; some were even sent to specific correctional facilities, created to deter miners from trying to leave their mines. 

They could not freely leave their employers and were often bought and transferred along with mining operations.

In practice, many historians describe the system as resembling slavery.

Image via Labourheartlands
Image via Historic UK

This brutal act was actually extended in 1641 to enslave other workers, such as trappers, watermen, windsmen, gatesmen and carriers, who also worked at the mines. This act also increased the working week to six days out of seven. The situation lasted until 1775, when the process of freeing the mining communities from these abhorrent conditions was begun with the Colliers and Salters (Scotland) Act of Parliament. This started the process of freeing miners from their bonds, in a top-down approach. This effectively meant that if the father of a family was freed then so were his family. 

A global reality often ignored 

The historical record shows that rigid social hierarchies existed across much of the world.

China had the Four Occupations and later systems that institutionalised social divisions. Japan enforced hereditary classes and segregated Burakumin communities. Korea maintained a hierarchy dominated by Yangban elites while millions lived as Nobi. Vietnam adopted Confucian social structures that privileged educated elites over other groups.

Europe had feudalism, serfdom and hereditary labour systems that tied generations of people to specific occupations and social positions in deplorable living conditions and almost no rights.

The names differed. The legal frameworks differed. The cultural justifications differed. But the outcome was often similar.

People born into lower groups faced restricted opportunities, social stigma, economic hardship and limited mobility. Their lives were shaped by structures they did not choose and often could not escape.

Looking beyond simplified narratives

None of this means that social discrimination did not exist in India or that caste-related problems should be ignored. However, history shows that hierarchical social structures, what has been called the ‘caste system’ in India, were not a uniquely Indian phenomenon.

Across continents, societies created systems that divided people according to birth, occupation, status or perceived purity. These systems controlled access to wealth, education, political power and social respectability.

Yet public discourse often treats caste as though it were an exclusively Indian invention while overlooking similar structures elsewhere.

The recent discussion surrounding China’s social hierarchy has therefore opened a broader conversation. It reminds us that rigid social orders were once common across the world.

Whether called caste, class, estate, serfdom, nobility, outcaste status or hereditary occupation, these systems shared a common feature: they restricted human freedom and concentrated privilege in the hands of a few while keeping those at the bottom poor, dependent and socially marginalised.

7 people granted life imprisonment, but was ‘cow vigilantism’ the motive? The judgment says motive not proven, yet the media fails to point it out

Aditi
-
0
7 people granted life imprisonment, but was ‘cow vigilantism’ the motive? The judgment says motive not proven, yet the media fails to point it out

Recently, an Additional District and Sessions court in Madhya Pradesh convicted 7 individuals in a rioting and murder incident that happened in the Narmadapuram district of Madhya Pradesh in August 2022. The incident resulted in the killing of a man named Nazeer Ahmed, while several others were seriously injured.

In a verdict passed on June 12, 2026, Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan convicted seven accused, namely, Deepak alias Baba Kewat, Ajay alias Ajju Rathore, Prakash Kaushal, Pawan Bathav, Amar alias Bhola Bathav, Kanhaiya Bathav and Ballu alias Anuj Raghuvanshi, under Sections 302, 307, 148 r/w 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The judge sentenced all the convicts to life imprisonment.

While the culprits were convicted under provisions relating to murder, attempt to murder and rioting, some media outlets were quick to peddle the case as one relating to cow vigilantism merely because the incident involved a truck carrying cattle.

Several media outlets referred to the convicts as Gau Rakhshaks (Cow vigilantes), while the term is nowhere mentioned in the judgment.

Some media reports wrongly mentioned the number of convicts granted life imprisonment by the court as 14, but 7 people were convicted and sentenced by the sessions court.

Before moving on to the court’s observations and the decision in the case, let’s take a look at the incident that led to the filing of the case.

As recorded in the judgment, the incident took place around midnight on August 3, 2022, on Nandarwada Road in Barakhad village, under the Seonimalwa Police Station area, of the Narmadapuram district in Madhya Pradesh. The complainant, Sheikh Lala (a truck driver), along with his companions, Nazeer Ahmed and Sheikh Mushtaq, was travelling in a truck carrying cattle. The truck left from Nandarwada and was travelling towards Amravati in Maharashtra.

As the truck was passing near Barakhad village around midnight on the day of the incident, its occupants were attacked by 10 to 12 villagers carrying sticks. The thrashed Sheikh Lala, Nazeer Ahmed and Sheikh Mushtaq. The police arrived at the spot and rushed the victims to the Community Health Centre (CHC) Seonimalwa. Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mushtaq sustained serious injuries, but Nazeer Ahmed passed away during treatment at the hospital.

A FIR was registered by the police at Seonimalwa Police Station against 10-12 persons under Sections 147, 148, 341, 307, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Seven of the accused were tried for the offences and convicted of some of the offences mentioned in the FIR.

The court framed seven issues for determining the commission of the offences alleged in the FIR. Out of the seven issues framed by the court, a key issue mentioned at number 3 stated whether the accused deliberately stopped the truck of the victims before launching an attack on them. This issue was crucial for establishing whether the accused had a motive behind their actions.

Screenshot of the judgment

“Whether, at the said date, time and place, the accused persons wrongfully restrained the complainant Sheikh Lala, Nazeer Ahmed and Sheikh Mushtaq, who were travelling in truck registration number MH-40-CD-8751, by stopping/obstructing their way?” read the issue framed by the court.

After examining the evidence adduced and the arguments advanced by both sides, the court concluded that the element of wrongful restraint could not be proved against the accused. In other words, the court held that the prosecution could not prove that the accused deliberately stopped the truck of the victims before attacking them. In the absence of a motive, the misleading claims of the media portals about the attack on the victims being motivated by cow vigilantism do not hold water.

Screenshot of the judgment

In para number 96 of the judgment, the court stated that the allegation against the accused that they wrongfully restrained the injured persons and the deceased by blocking their way was not proved. The court stated that the eyewitnesses, Sheikh Lala and Syed Mushtaq, made no statements before the court to the effect that anyone from the crowd had stopped their way by placing any vehicle in front of them. The court also pointed out that even their statements given to the police did not mention that the path of their truck had been blocked. No other evidence was submitted to the court to show that the accused blocked the truck’s path.

A plain reading of the judgment is sufficient to debunk the claims of the media portals to misrepresent the case as one of cow vigilantism. It is clear from the findings of the court that the incident did not relate to cow vigilantism and involved acts of murder, attempt to murder and rioting.

Should Punjab CM resign on orders of Akal Takht? The Bhagwant Mann controversy and the historical lesson of Tiwana: When the ‘Chief Minister’ bowed to Jinnah’s pressure

अर्पित त्रिपाठी
-
0
Should Punjab CM resign on orders of Akal Takht? The Bhagwant Mann controversy and the historical lesson of Tiwana: When the ‘Chief Minister’ bowed to Jinnah’s pressure

The Akal Takht has labelled Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann as a “Guru-dhokhi” (one who has betrayed the Guru) and declared him an adversary of the Khalsa Panth. There are increasing demands for his resignation and calls for his boycott, subjecting him to both political and religious pressure. Mann has dismissed these accusations and has shown no signs of intending to give up his chair.

As we discuss whether Mann should step down, it is first vital to understand the Punjab of the 1940s, as this period offers significant historical context for the matter at hand. The Punjab of that time was significantly different from today. During that period, both Lahore and Rawalpindi were part of the region.

Punjab before 1947

At that time, the Chief Minister or Premier of Punjab was Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana. He was a key figure in Punjab’s powerful Unionist Party and initially took on the role of Chief Minister in 1942. He returned to the office in 1946. His government received support from the region’s two principal political parties: the Akali Dal and the Congress.

This era was marked by massive upheaval in the country. The Muslim League was advocating for a separate Pakistan, while the Congress was resisting the partition of the nation, and the British were attempting to maintain their authority.

Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana

By the year 1945, the Second World War had concluded, and it became increasingly hard for the British to sustain their control over India. In February 1947, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that the country would be granted independence. Subsequently, the British acquiesced to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan and revealed a plan for the partition of India in June 1947.

Sir Cyril Radcliffe was dispatched to establish the borders between India and Pakistan. The demarcation process was greatly impacted by factors such as population, religion, language and the preferences of local leadership. The league argued that Muslims represented the largest demographic group in Punjab and hence the entire province should be incorporated into Pakistan.

It was not solely Hindu leaders who opposed this demand. The Muslim League faced its strongest opposition from Tiwana. He was an influential Muslim leader, yet he unequivocally rejected the partition of Punjab.

In fact, this resistance was not a recent development. A conflict between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League had been ongoing since 1935. An agreement was even set up between Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan and Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1937. This deal had no mention of Pakistan, but Jinnah sought the Unionist Party legislators to align with the League.

In 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution, which became known as the Pakistan Resolution. Afterwards, the Muslim League consistently applied pressure on the Unionist Party to endorse the creation of Pakistan. Most senior leaders of the Unionist Party were Muslims, and therefore, they faced pressure based on their religious affiliations.

By 1944, the Muslim League’s influence had expanded considerably. During a meeting, Jinnah urged Tiwana to support the Pakistan movement. Although Tiwana hesitated momentarily, the Governor of Punjab counselled him to maintain his stance, and he ultimately declined to comply with Jinnah’s requests.

Jinnah and his associates then initiated an extensive smear campaign against him. He was labelled a traitor to his community, a kafir (infidel) and a foe of Muslims. Jinnah himself referred to him as a kafir. This campaign escalated further following the announcement of the partition.

Tiwana consistently asserted that Punjab should not be divided. He believed that the individuals of different faiths residing in Punjab shared a common cultural heritage. Nevertheless, this viewpoint proved to be politically detrimental for him. Protests erupted on the streets against him, and his effigies were displayed in mock funeral processions. Maulanas delivered speeches denouncing him. Wherever he went, he was vilified as an infidel and a traitor to the community. His vehicles were surrounded, and he endured continuous social and religious pressure.

On 2nd March 1947, Tiwana ultimately resigned from his position as Chief Minister. RK Kaushik, a former IAS officer, has detailed the events surrounding his resignation in an article featured in “The Tribune.”

Kaushik recounted that on the day he resigned, Tiwana paid a visit to the residence of Punjab’s Education Minister, Ibrahim Khan Barq. During this visit, the minister’s 8-year-old son confronted him, asking, “Are you the same Khizar Tiwana uncle who is obstructing the Muslim nation of Pakistan? I will not shake your hand.” This comment profoundly disturbed Tiwana.

He confided in the Development Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, expressing, “I could have persisted in the struggle against the Muslim League, but if even our children are beginning to see us as adversaries, it is wiser for us to withdraw and allow events to unfold organically.”

He subsequently stepped down. The day after, Mohammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed that the primary hindrance to the creation of Pakistan had been overcome. Historians believe that the situation in Punjab deteriorated rapidly thereafter, marking the onset of widespread communal violence.

Should Bhagwant Mann resign

The present controversy involving Bhagwant Mann evokes memories of the region’s history. The Akal Takht has announced that it has received two objectionable videos featuring Bhagwant Mann, leading it to classify him as an opponent of the Khalsa Panth. In addition, various political parties, including the Akali Dal and the Congress, have called for his resignation based on these allegations.

Nevertheless, if the issue of Mann’s resignation is to be considered, the rationale must be rooted in democratic and administrative principles. If one contends that Punjab’s debt has increased during his tenure, crime control has been ineffective, criminals are making video calls from prisons, the drug problem remains unresolved, or election promises have not been met, these are issues that pertain to political accountability and the public interest. On such bases, the public is entitled to seek answers from a Chief Minister and may even call for their resignation.

The notion that an elected Chief Minister should resign merely due to an order from a religious institution raises major concerns from a democratic standpoint. If a leader has offended religious sentiments, the Akal Takht has the authority to impose religious penance, limit their religious privileges or initiate a social boycott. However, the ultimate decision regarding their continuation in a democratic role must be left to the electorate.

The people are the ultimate source of authority in a democratic system. If the public believes that a leader has failed to uphold their trust, they have the option to remove them from power in the subsequent election. The upcoming election in Punjab is approaching and this decision should rest with the populace, rather than a system that claims superiority over elected officials.

The story of Tiwana serves as a historical case pertinent to this issue. This account transcends the resignation of a single individual and delves into the crucial debate of whether democratic governance should be influenced by religious pressures. Historical evidence indicates that when political choices are swayed by religious or communal influences instead of the democratic framework, the entire society could face serious repercussions.

Read the original report in Hindi here.

1...484950...7,651Page 49 of 7,651