Actor-turned-politician Joseph Vijay Chandrasekhar’s party, Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), made heads turn after it defeated the incumbent DMK and won a staggering 108 seats in its debut election. While Vijay is yet to prove his majority on the floor and has sought time to show the support of the required 118 MLAs, the focus is now on the tall election promises made by the party ahead of the polls.
The road ahead seems challenging for the TVK, even as the party managed to break the political duopoly of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in the state. Part of the challenge arises from some of the electoral promises made by the party before the elections. The promises, which seem to have shifted a significant number of voters to the TVK, will require the spending of a huge amount of money.
TVK’s lucrative poll promises
The 95-page manifesto released by the TVK focused on welfare schemes, including handouts and loans. Here is a look at some of the most lucrative poll promises made by Vijay’s party:
TVK promised a ₹ 2,500 monthly allowance for women heads of households up to the age of 60 under the Madhippumigu Magalir Thittam scheme. Families of state and central government employees will be excluded from this. It also promised to set up separate departments to ensure the safety of women, children, and the elderly in the state, along with special women’s courts.
As per the manifesto, mothers of newborn children will get a gold ring for the newborn. Mothers of schoolgoing girls up to class 12 will receive ₹15,000 a year to reduce school dropouts. The party promised a single financial handout of up to ₹5 lakh for women’s self-help groups.
The party promised six free LPG cylinders per household every year under the Annapoorani Super Six Scheme. It also promised a ₹2,500 allowance for diploma holders, a ₹4000 monthly allowance for around 10 lakh unemployed graduates, and a ₹8,000 monthly allowance for ITI diploma holders.
The TVK also promised collateral-free loans of up to ₹20 lakh for students between Class 12 and the PhD level and a ‘transparent’ timeline for all recruits in the Tamil Nadu government. The most expensive promise made by TVK in its election manifesto is to give 8 grams (one sovereign) of gold and a quality silk saree to the families of brides from economically weaker sections under the Annan Seer Thittam scheme.
In addition to the handouts, the TVK manifesto promised a cooperative farm loan waiver and legally guaranteed MSP procurement of paddy and sugarcane. Salary hikes for certain employees and allowances have also been promised, including an increase in police salaries from ₹18,500 per month to ₹25,000, a ₹1,000 monthly hardship allowance and permanent jobs for temporary teachers, nurses and staff who have completed five years in service.
How TVK’s poll promises add to the state’s financial burden
To express these poll promises in numbers, the state government’s projected annual expenditure on welfare spending alone will go up to ₹1 lakh crore. According to the Indian Express, this will mark a sharp increase of 52% from the ₹65,000 crore spent by the previous DMK government on welfare schemes and subsidies in 2025-26. Pertinently, this financial burden on the state exchequer comes in addition to an existing debt of 26% of GSDP. If the poll promises are financed through higher expenditure without new revenues, this will increase the total fiscal deficit from the budgeted 3% of GSDP in 2025-26 to about 3.5-4.0%.
This estimate does not take into account the projected spending on the promised cooperative farm loan waiver and legally guaranteed MSP procurement of paddy and sugarcane. Besides, the salary hikes promised in the manifesto will also further push the government expenditure, and will cut down on government spending, which should have gone into investments needed for employment creation.
The TVK does not apparently have a roadmap laid out for implementing the poll promises and hopes to do that “by reducing the growing debt burden, increasing revenue without imposing any additional tax on the people, ensuring efficient and prudent expenditure, and creating new sources of income”.
Mamata Banerjee, who ruled West Bengal for 15 years, has slipped into denial mode after the Bhartiya Janata Party handed her the most spectacular electoral eviction notice. Aghast by the loss in Bhabanipur at the hands of BJP’s Suvendu Adhikari and TMC’s humiliating diminution to mere 80 seats, Mamata Banerjee is manufacturing a disgraceful and utterly needless constitutional crisis.
The outgoing Chief Minister has refused to resign. Short on numbers, Banerjee has accused the BJP of ‘rigging’ and claimed that the TMC has won the elections ‘morally’.
‘I will not go to Raj Bhavan’: Flabbergasted by electoral drubbing, Mamata Banerjee resorts to victimhood drama
Following the BJP’s 207-seat historic win, it was expected, as per the constitutional and democratic norms, that the outgoing Chief Minister would tender resignation to the Governor. However, out of what is evident as sheer frustration and disrespect for the public mandate, Mamata Banerjee resorted to victimhood theatrics and refused to resign.
Addressing the media on 5th May, Banerjee said, “If I had lost, I would have resigned. But if anyone thinks I will step down under pressure, that is not going to happen. We did not lose the election; it was a forceful attempt. Morally, we won the election.”
Banerjee went on to accuse Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah of “interfering” in Bengal elections. Furthermore, she called Chief Election Commissioner, Gyanesh Kumar, the “villain of this election”.
Kolkata, West Bengal: Outgoing West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee says, "…If I would have loose, I would have given my resignation. But if anyone thinks I will resign under pressure, that is not going to happen. We did not lose the election, it is there forceful attempt…" pic.twitter.com/5PUvp8j9bk
Self-declared moral victory does not extend the tenure of the defeated: What the Constitution says about post-election power transfer
Beyond Mamata Banerjee’s gimmick to appear strong in the face of a probable career-ending defeat, it is a norm that after the declaration of election results, the incumbent Chief Minister shall tender resignation to the Governor. The Governor’s role is very important here.
According to Article 164 of the Indian Constitution, it is the Governor who technically appoints and can dismiss the Chief Minister and the state cabinet.
“The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor,” Article 164 states.
Furthermore, Article 164 (1B) states, “A member of the Legislative Assembly of a State or either House of the Legislature of a State having Legislative Council belonging to any political party who is disqualified for being a member of that House under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified to be appointed as a Minister under clause (1) for the duration of the period commencing from the date of his disqualification till the date on which the term of his office as such member would expire or where he contests any election to the Legislative Assembly of a State or either House of the Legislature of a State having Legislative Council, as the case may be, before the expiry of such period, till the date on which he is declared elected, whichever is earlier.”
This essentially means that a state Chief Minister can be dismissed by the Governor, though there are constitutional safeguards to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power.
In cases wherein the Governor invites one candidate to form a government and asks the incumbent to resign while the Assembly’s tenure is not complete, a floor test is conducted. Whichever side proves the majority, it gets to form the government. In case no clear majority emerges, President’s Rule under Article 356 is imposed.
Coming to the crisis Mamata Banerjee is stoking, if she remains adamant about not voluntarily resigning as the Chief Minister, West Bengal Governor R.N. Ravi can direct her to resign. Her tenure as Bengal’s current CM is anyway expiring on the 7th of May 2026, as the TMC government’s tenure began on the 8th of May 2021.
In fact, even if TMC had won the elections, Banerjee would still have had to resign since the rules state that the sitting cabinet shall tender its resignation following the elections as a formality before being re-sworn in.
Regarding the duration of a state legislature, Article 172 of the Constitution states, “Every Legislative Assembly of every State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly.”
After Banerjee’s tenure officially expires, the Governor shall commence the process of constituting a new Assembly. This process involves the appointment and oath-taking of new elected MLAs and Chief Minister and the victorious side will form a government.
At best, Mamata Banerjee can request the Governor to allow her the opportunity to prove a majority on the floor of the House. Since the TMC has won just 80 seats, falling short of a clear majority by 68 seats, and the BJP has won a massive 207 seats, Banerjee will fail to prove a majority.
Also, since Mamata Banerjee is no longer an MLA after losing Bhawanipur to Suvendu Adhikari, after the dissolution of the current assembly, she can’t be in the assembly as an MLA.
However, it is not that a political veteran like Mamata Banerjee, who ruled West Bengal for three consecutive terms, does not know the futility of her gimmicks. She knows her party lacks a majority. Banerjee knows that she does not get to cling to the Chief Minister’s chair just because she has grown used to and fond of it.
When UP had two CMs in office: The Jagdambika Pal-Kalyan Singh drama
UP in February 1998 saw a major political drama when the then-governor Romesh Bhandari dismissed Kalyan Singh’s coalition government. Jagdambika Pal, the then leader of the UP Loktantrik Congress, that was a part of the coalition, was declared as CM by the governor, saying that he has the support of majority MLAs.
Sitting CM Kalyan Singh objected to the governor’s decision and moved to the Allahabad High Court. The HC declared the governor’s decision unconstitutional and ordered a stay on the governor’s order of dismissing Kalyan Singh’s government and ordered status quo, meaning reinstating Kalyan Singh as CM.
Finally, the Supreme Court ordered a composite floor test in the assembly, asking Kalyan Singh and Jagdambika Pal both to test their majority. Kalyan Singh comfortably won the floor test with majority support, and Jagdambika Pal’s CM post failed to last more than 3 days.
What happened in 1998 when UP briefly had two Chief Ministers?
Despite a crushing defeat, Mamata Banerjee is reluctant to step down.
If she doesn’t resign, could Bengal also end up with two Chief Ministers?
Mamata Banerjee goes the Congress way of declaring victories as genuine mandate, dismissing defeats as ‘BJP’s conspiracy‘
West Bengal’s Janadesh is clearly and decisively against her. What Mamata Banerjee appears to be trying to pull off is akin to the situation of the flame that flickers before it goes out. Banerjee wants to leave power not as a loser but as a ‘martyr’.
Her accusations of election rigging, the BJP-ECI conspiracy to manipulate the electoral roll in the BJP’s favour, and the supposed Modi-Shah ‘interference’ in Bengal elections are all but her attempts to project strength and keep her party united.
By refusing to gracefully accept the people’s mandate and resign, Banerjee wants the State to remove her in accordance with the constitutional procedure. The TMC supremo wants to mint martyrdom because nothing in this country is more effective than over-dramatised victimhood. Banerjee has taken a page from Congress’s playbook.
The Left-liberal ecosystem conveniently accepts people’s mandate in states where it wins, or the BJP loses, like Kerala and Tamil Nadu recently, but cries “Election Commission is compromised”, ‘vote chori’, ‘EVM hacking’, ‘VVPAT tampering’, ‘voter inflation’ and whatnot instead of accepting defeat and moving on. These parties know that they have been defeated by their political nemesis, and the public doesn’t buy their lies and yet they recycle the same bogey post every electoral defeat because accepting defeat is demoralising, while playing ‘Hum hare nahi humein haraya gaya hai’ card gets them unity, relevance, and most importantly, the headlines to stay relevant.
While Mamata Banerjee was dreaming about bolstering her claim to Prime Ministerial candidature after she won West Bengal, the TMC’s defeat has not only rendered her powerless in the state but also crushed her national ambitions. In this wake, it makes all the more sense for Mamata Banerjee to play all the ‘saam, daam, dand, bhed’ tactics to remain relevant and gain sympathy by coming across as a ‘martyr’.
For years, India’s political discourse has been dominated by one accusation hurled repeatedly at Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP by the Congress-Left ecosystem: fascism. Every electoral victory of the BJP was portrayed as a “threat to democracy”, every assertion of state authority was painted as authoritarianism, and every attempt to enforce political accountability was equated with the rise of dictatorship. Yet, when genuine displays of authoritarian behaviour emerge from leaders aligned with the anti-BJP camp, the same ecosystem suddenly discovers the virtues of silence, nuance, and selective outrage.
The conduct of outgoing West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee following the BJP’s landslide victory in the 2026 Bengal Assembly elections is perhaps the clearest demonstration yet of this hypocrisy.
Mamata Banerjee’s “stolen mandate” rhetoric mirrors Donald Trump’s post-2020 playbook
The BJP’s victory in Bengal was decisive and emphatic. With 207 seats in the 294-member assembly, the electorate delivered an unmistakable verdict against the Trinamool Congress and ended Mamata Banerjee’s 15-year reign over the state. In any functioning democracy, such a result would have compelled an outgoing chief minister to concede defeat gracefully, congratulate the winning side, and facilitate a smooth constitutional transition.
Instead, Mamata Banerjee chose confrontation over constitutional propriety.
At her press conference on May 5, Banerjee struck a defiant tone and declared that she would not resign because she did not “believe” that her party had lost the election. She further alleged that the Election Commission worked at the behest of the BJP and implied that the electoral process itself had been compromised. Predictably, no substantial evidence accompanied these allegations.
The parallels with Donald Trump and the aftermath of the 2020 US Presidential election are impossible to ignore.
Following his defeat to Joe Biden, Trump repeatedly claimed that the election had been “stolen” by Democrats through institutional manipulation and voter fraud. Despite courts rejecting those claims and officials finding no evidence of widespread fraud capable of overturning the result, Trump continued fuelling suspicion among his supporters. Critics and media observers argued that this relentless narrative helped convince a significant section of his voter base that he had been denied power through collusion between the Democratic Party and the American establishment.
Four years later, Trump returned politically stronger, powered by a support base that believed he had been wronged.
Mamata Banerjee appears to be attempting a similar political script in Bengal.
Her refusal to accept the verdict is not merely a political denial. It is an attempt to delegitimise democratic institutions when those institutions produce an outcome unfavourable to her party. The message being sent to TMC workers is dangerous and unmistakable: the BJP did not truly win, the Election Commission cannot be trusted, and therefore the transfer of power lacks moral legitimacy.
The Congress-Left ecosystem’s selective outrage over “fascism”
This is precisely how genuinely authoritarian political movements behave.
Ironically, these are the same behavioural patterns that the Left-liberal ecosystem has spent a decade attributing to Modi and the BJP without evidence. Yet when Mamata Banerjee openly questions the legitimacy of a democratic verdict and signals reluctance to vacate office, the outrage is either muted or absent.
That silence is not accidental.
Mamata Banerjee represents a political tendency that much of the Left ecosystem is unwilling to criticise because she occupies the same anti-BJP ideological camp. Her authoritarian tendencies, political violence, and institutional subversion have long been tolerated because she serves as a counterweight to Modi politically.
This is why Bengal’s record of post-poll violence rarely receives the scrutiny it deserves from the same commentators who routinely speak about democratic backsliding elsewhere.
Bengal’s long record of political violence is conveniently ignored
The aftermath of the 2021 Bengal Assembly elections should have permanently shattered the moral pretensions of the so-called secular-progressive ecosystem. Reports emerged of systematic attacks on BJP workers and their families. Several Hindu women and female relatives of BJP supporters allegedly faced abduction, sexual assault, and gang rape. Entire localities witnessed targeted violence. Families fled villages in fear.
Yet these stories never received sustained national outrage from the same media establishment that amplifies every allegation against BJP-ruled states. There were no prime-time morality lectures every evening. No coordinated celebrity activism. No sustained international concern about democratic collapse in Bengal.
The victims simply did not fit the preferred political narrative.
The same pattern was visible in Sandeshkhali, where women came forward with disturbing allegations against a TMC strongman and his network. The allegations involved land grabbing, intimidation, sexual exploitation, and terror carried out under political protection. Yet even such horrifying testimonies failed to trigger the kind of moral panic the Left ecosystem routinely manufactures over far smaller allegations elsewhere.
Then came the Murshidabad riots, where attempts were allegedly made in sections of the commentary space to invert victimhood itself, portraying aggressors as victims and victims as aggressors in service of ideological convenience.
None of this is surprising when viewed through the lens of Mamata Banerjee’s political conduct over the years.
Constitutional morality requires defeated leaders to step aside
A leader who repeatedly demonstrates contempt for institutional accountability eventually creates a political ecosystem in which party workers come to believe they are above constitutional limits. Political violence becomes normalised. Administrative neutrality collapses. State machinery begins functioning as an extension of partisan interests.
Her refusal to accept electoral defeat is therefore not an isolated emotional reaction. It is a culmination of a political culture that has steadily undermined democratic norms in Bengal.
The Indian Constitution, as envisioned by B. R. Ambedkar, was never merely a legal document. It depended fundamentally upon constitutional morality, the willingness of political actors to respect democratic verdicts, institutional processes, and peaceful transfers of power, even when outcomes are personally humiliating.
That moral framework requires defeated leaders to step aside.
Mamata Banerjee’s refusal to do so signals exactly the opposite. By suggesting that the mandate itself lacks legitimacy, she is effectively encouraging party cadres to treat constitutional transition as negotiable rather than binding.
The implications are serious.
In a state already scarred by decades of political violence, such rhetoric can embolden TMC workers and local strongmen to resist administrative transition, undermine law and order, and justify intimidation under the belief that they are protecting a “stolen” government. Once leaders communicate that a democratic defeat is illegitimate, political extremism among supporters becomes easier to rationalise.
Other defeated chief ministers accepted the public mandate with grace
What makes Mamata’s conduct even more indefensible is that Indian politics offers multiple examples of leaders accepting defeat with maturity and constitutional grace.
Down in Tamil Nadu, M. K. Stalin suffered an electoral setback at the hands of actor-turned-politician Vijay. Yet Stalin did not declare the election fraudulent or refuse to step down.
In Kerala, Pinarayi Vijayan and the Left government lost a crucial electoral contest to the Congress-led UDF. There was no melodrama about constitutional illegitimacy. Ironically, the Congress party and its ecosystem, which routinely cast aspersions on the integrity of the Election Commission, celebrated victory in Kerala with no complaints whatsoever.
Back in 2017, Akhilesh Yadav accepted defeat after the BJP swept Uttar Pradesh. He publicly acknowledged the verdict and stated that his party would introspect on the reasons behind the loss.
Similarly, after the 2025 Bihar elections, Tejashwi Yadav did not accuse institutions of conspiracy merely because the results were unfavourable to the RJD.
Naveen Patnaik showed the democratic civility Mamata Banerjee lacks
Perhaps the sharpest contrast comes from Odisha.
Naveen Patnaik had governed Odisha for over 24 years before the BJP defeated the BJD in the 2024 elections. Few regional leaders in India enjoyed the longevity, control, and political stature that Naveen Patnaik possessed. Yet after his defeat, he accepted the people’s mandate with composure.
More significantly, Naveen Patnaik personally attended the BJP swearing-in ceremony and congratulated Laxman Majhi, the relatively lesser-known BJP MLA who defeated him from Kantabanji. That is what democratic civility looks like. That is what constitutional maturity looks like.
The contrast with Mamata Banerjee could not be starker.
One accepted defeat with dignity after nearly a quarter-century in power. The other appears unwilling to acknowledge defeat after 15 years.
Mamata Banerjee today embodies the very authoritarianism the Left warns about
For all the rhetoric about “saving democracy” and “fighting fascism”, it is Mamata Banerjee today who most visibly embodies the authoritarian instincts that India’s Left-liberal establishment claims to fear. A leader unwilling to accept electoral defeat, eager to delegitimise institutions, dismissive of constitutional morality, and politically enabled by a partisan ecosystem that refuses accountability. That is not resistance to fascism; it is its textbook expression.
The tragedy is not merely Mamata Banerjee’s conduct. The greater tragedy is the intellectual dishonesty of those who spent years weaponising the language of democracy while remaining silent when actual anti-democratic behaviour emerged from within their own ideological camp.
Bengal’s verdict was not merely a defeat for the TMC. It was also a rejection of a political culture built on intimidation, selective outrage, institutional erosion, and ideological impunity.
Whether Mamata Banerjee accepts it or not, the people already have.
On 2nd May, a Nashik Court rejected the anticipatory bail plea of Nida Ejaz Khan in the TCS Conversion Scandal. The court held that the material collected during investigation prima facie showed that she was involved in a wider and organised effort to influence the victim, hurt her religious sentiments, and push her towards religious conversion. The court added that the plea was not a fit case for pre arrest protection and found that her custodial interrogation is necessary to get to the root of the matter.
The order was passed by Additional Sessions and Special Judge KG Joshi of the Nashik Road Court. Nida Khan was booked at Deolali Police Station under Sections 69, 75, 299 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and several provisions of the SC/ST Act. OpIndia’s detailed report on the FIR can be checked here.
What Nida Khan argued before the court
The defence argued that Nida and the victim worked in the same office and knew each other. However, the defence completely denied any wrongdoing on her part. It was claimed that she was falsely implicated and that the main accusations were against co accused Danish and Tausif, not her. The defence also argued that there was no material evidence against Nida to prove caste based humiliation within public view.
Nida Khan’s counsel further claimed that there is no specific law in Maharashtra dealing with religious conversion. He argued that Section 299 of the BNS concerns hurt to the religious sentiments of a community, not conversion. He also argued that casual talk about religion cannot be turned into an offence and that, at the highest, only a bailable provision could apply.
The defence further argued that Nida was pregnant and claimed that arrest would cause irreparable loss to the unborn child.
What the prosecution told the court
Nida’s anticipatory bail plea was strongly opposed by the prosecution, as the court was informed that from July 2023 to 2026, the accused persons, including Nida Khan, influenced the victim towards conversion. It was further argued that Nida Khan hurt the victim’s religious sentiments. Furthermore, the prosecution pointed out that the FIR itself specifically mentioned the name and role of Nida Khan and that the investigation has pointed towards a conspiracy involving communication among the accused.
The prosecution informed the court that Nida Khan was not a passive bystander. She used to talk to the victim in the office during breaks, brainwash her into converting to Islam, and played a role in compelling her to follow specific religious practices. Furthermore, the prosecution relied on the statements given by the victim, her mother, and brother.
The investigating officer informed the court that Nida Khan had provided the victim with a burqa and books related to Islam. An application was also found on the victim’s phone that was installed with the intent of converting her religion. The officer further added that Nida Khan sent her YouTube and Instagram links containing religious teachings. The officer added that further investigation was needed into the source of those materials and her wider links.
Notably, the prosecution informed the court that Nida Khan visited the victim’s home, trained her in namaz, instructed her on wearing hijab and burqa, and was involved in a plan to change her name to Haniya. The prosecution also said the victim was to be sent to Malaysia and that documents were to be prepared with the help of a “Malegaon party”, making custodial interrogation necessary to investigate whether a larger network, including possible foreign links, was involved.
What the victim’s side told the court
During the hearing, the victim’s counsel stated that the victim was brainwashed by the accused, including Nida Khan, into following their religion. Furthermore, Nida Khan’s and the other accused’s positions in the company were used to exert undue influence on the victim, force her to follow Islam, and even compel her to eat non veg food. It was also submitted that the accused made obscene remarks against Hindu deities and humiliated the victim regarding her caste in the office.
Furthermore, it was stated that Nida Khan attempted to convert the victim’s family using threats and intimidation.
Court says prima facie role of applicant is visible
After hearing both sides, the court drew a distinction between the role attributed to the co accused and that of Nida Khan. The Judge observed that the other two accused were prima facie involved in offences under Sections 69 and 75 of the BNS, while Nida Khan appeared to be involved in the offence under Section 299 of the BNS and the provisions of the SC/ST Act.
The judge specifically noted that the FIR itself mentioned the applicant by name and assigned her a role. The court said the material showed that the accused persons told “objectionable stories” about Hindu deities and hurt the victim’s religious feelings. The order also records that the applicant gave the victim a burqa, that the accused provided a book on the life of Prophet Muhammad titled “The Holy Life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)”, and that the applicant used to visit the victim’s house to impart religious training.
Court finds investigation points to organised attempt
The court observed that the interaction over faith between the victim and Nida Khan was not a casual one. The material on record showed a structured and organised effort directed at the victim. The court stated that the offence appeared to be “multi dimensional and multi layered”.
The court also took serious note of the material suggesting that the accused wanted to change the victim’s name and send her to Malaysia. The judge said the victim certainly has a constitutional right to profess any religion and choose any name, but added that this does not mean she can be brainwashed into doing so through an organised plan.
Court says custodial interrogation is necessary
The court observed that police custody was necessary for proper investigation. According to the judgment, the court found the case to be complicated and requiring a probe into the role of the “Malegaon party” and the names of the cities and countries that surfaced during the investigation. It was further necessary to probe possible links to persons outside India, including a person named Imran who is said to be based in Malaysia.
Pregnancy plea did not persuade the court
One of the main arguments of the defence was that Nida Khan was pregnant and that arresting her would have an irreversible effect on the unborn child. However, the prosecution argued that there is no separate rule in law for a pregnant accused where serious offences and a complicated investigation are involved. The court agreed with the argument and held that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and only in exceptional cases. In this case, the court found no such exceptional circumstance.
On this basis, the judge held that the application was devoid of merit and rejected anticipatory bail plea.
A Special TADA court in Jamnagar on Monday (4th May) convicted 12 persons in connection with the 1993 Gosabara cross-border arms smuggling case. The decision comes three decades after Pakistan-backed smuggling of arms into India via the Gujarat coast led to the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts and other communal discord across the country.
A Special Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act Judge Robin P Mogera convicted Osman alias Usman Umar Koreja, Mamad Alimamad alias Mamdu, Harun Adam Sanghar Vagher, Ahmed Ismail Oliya, Aarif Abdul Rehman alias Aarif Lambu Memon, Iftekhar Mohmmad Yunus Ansari, Mohammad Ayub Abdul Kayum Sati alias Ayub Taklo, Ahir Lakhman Hardas, Mohammad Salim alis Salim Kutta, Umarmiya alias Mamumiya Ismilemiya alias Panjumiya Saiyad Bukhari, Istiyaq Ahmad Mohammad Yunus Ansari, and Kadir Ahmad Amim Ahmed Shaikh. The court acquitted 17 accused, and declared 15 other accused, including Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon (Ibrahim Abdul Razak), Anees Ibrahim Kaskar, Chota Shakeel, Anwar Samba, whose last known location was Karachi (Pakistan), as proclaimed fugitives under Section 8(3)(A) of TADA.
Terror plot to avenge Babri Masjid demolition hatched at Dawood Ibrahim’s Dubai residence
The case relates to a terror conspiracy hatched by fugitive terrorist Dawood Ibrahim and his associates at his Dubai residence to avenge the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992. A large cache of weapons and explosives, including RDX, was smuggled into India via the Gosabara coast in Porbandar, Gujarat, using boats like Sada Al Bahar and Bismillah. The decision in the case comes nearly 33 years after an FIR was registered at the Jamnagar B-division police station in July 1993. The investigation in the case, which lasted several decades, was carried out by now-retired IPS officers P K Jha and Satish Verma, and current CBI Special Director Manoj Shashidha.
In its verdict, the special TADA judge held that a conspiracy was hatched by the conspirators against the Hindu community to avenge the demolition of the Babri Masjid. “…it clearly appears that the conspiracy was hatched to do away with the Hindu community for taking revenge for the Babri Mosque demolition, and as a part of it, launches of Mustafa Majnu were sent to Pakistan and prohibited arms and ammunition were obtained,” the special TADA judge noted.
“Thus, based on the above discussion, it clearly appears that the prosecution has successfully proved that a criminal conspiracy was hatched by the absconding accused Daud Ibrahim in connivance with deceased accused Mustafa Majnu and Osman @ Usman (A1), Mamad (A2) and Harun (A3), who went in Sada-Al-Bharar launch of Mustafa Majnu and procured arms and ammunition from Pakistan and were then landed at Gosabara in Sada-Bahar launch and thus, the prosecution successfully proved the charge of conspiracy against the above referred accused persons and hence,” the judge added.
Convictions and sentences of the accused
While sentencing the accused, the special TADA court considered the mitigating factors like the long period of trial, lack of subsequent criminal acts by the accused, their ages and health conditions. The court convicted – Osman @ Usman Umar Koreja (A1), Mamad Alimamad @ Mamdu Sap (A2), Harun Adam Sanghar Vagher (A3), Ahir Lakhman Hardas (A28) and Umarmiya @ Panjumiya Saiyad Bukhari (A34) under Section 3(3) TADA read with Section 120B IPC.
The court convicted Ahemad Ismail Oliya (A12) under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act, read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, together with Section 25(1A), 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. Accused Aarif Abdul Rehman @ Aarif Lambu Memon (A21) was convicted under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, while Iftekhar Mohammad Yunus Ansari (A23) was convicted under Section 25(1A), 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act.
Accused Mohammad Ayub @ Ayub Taklo (A24) was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act. Accused Mohammad Salim @ Salim Kutta (A30) was convicted for the commission of an offence under Section 25(1B)(a)(c)(f) of the Arms Act. Section 3(3) of TADA Act r/w Section 120B of Indian Penal Code together with Section 25(1A), 25(1AA), 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. Istiyak Ahmed Mohammad Yunus Ansari (A35) was convicted under Section 25(1A), 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. Accused Kadir Ahmad @ Kadir Haji Shekh (A37) was convicted by the court under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act.
The court directed that the time already spent by the accused in jail will be set off against the period of sentences given to them. Here are the details of the sentences granted to the accused by the court:
Osman @ Usman Umar Koreja (A1), Mamad Alimamad @ Mamdu Sap (A2), Harun Adam Sanghar Vagher (A3), Aarif Abdul Rehman @ Aarif Lambu Memon (A21), Mohammad Ayub @ Ayub Taklo (A24), Ahir Lakhman Hardas (A28), and Kadir Ahmad @ Kadir Haji Shekh (A37)were granted rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of ₹5000 each by the court for offences committed by them under the TADA Act and the Arms Act. In default of payment, they will have to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 months.
The court granted Ahemad Ismail Oliya (A12) rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of ₹5000 for his conviction under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act, read with Section 120B of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of ₹5000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act and rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of ₹1,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. All his sentences are to run concurrently, and in default of payment of fine, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment of one or two months as directed in the order.
Iftekhar Mohammad Yunus Ansari (A23) was granted 5 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, 1 year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act and 1 year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000 for the offence Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. In default of the payment of a fine of ₹5,000, he is directed to undergo two months’ simple imprisonment, and on failing to pay the ₹1,000 fine, he will undergo one month’s simple imprisonment. His sentences are also directed to run concurrently by the court.
Mohammad Salim @ Salim Kutta (A30) was sentenced to undergo 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of ₹5,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹3,000 (Rupees Three Thousand Only) for the offence punishable under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, and 1 year of rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹1,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. His sentence was also ordered to run concurrently, and in default of the payment of the fine, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment of one or two months, depending on the fine amount.
Umarmiya @ Panjumiya Saiyad Bukhari (A34) was given 5 years rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, and a fine of ₹5000 for the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of TADA Act read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 5 years rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of ₹5,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹3,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act, and 1 year rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹1,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. His imprisonment is to run concurrently. In default of payment, he will have to undergo imprisonment of one or two months for the fine amount.
Istiyak Ahmed Mohammad Yunus Ansari (A35) was granted 5 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, and 1 year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000 for the offence punishable under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act. The court directed his sentences to run concurrently. If he fails to pay the fine amount, he will have to undergo imprisonment of one or two months as directed in the court order.
The historic victory of the Bhartiya Janata Party in West Bengal has given heartburn not just to the Trinamool Congress and its supporters but to the entire Islamo-leftist cabal globally. Several foreign media publications covered the BJP’s thumping victory, though not without peddling propaganda about the victorious party’s ‘Hindu nationalist’ ideology, ‘Muslim minority under threat’ bogey and falsehoods about the pre-poll SIR exercise.
The New York Times frames the BJP’s Bengal ‘conquest’ as an expansion of Hindu nationalism
The New York Times, a US-based newspaper with a track record of pushing anti-India and anti-Hindu narratives through Indian brown sepoys, covered the BJP’s 206 out of 294-seat victory on 4th May. The Islamo-leftist newspaper, however, could not hold back its anguish over the “conquest” of West Bengal by “Modi’s Hindu Nationalists”.
In an article headlined, “Modi’s Hindu Nationalists Conquer a Bastion of India’s Opposition”, the NYT described the BJP’s victory in Bengal as a big boost to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s supposed expansionist “Hindu-first” politics.
Predictably, the newspaper amplified the opposition’s falsehoods around the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in West Bengal. It claimed that the SIR struck nine million voter names out of the electoral roll with “many of them Muslim”. The NYT not only framed the SIR as some sort of anti-Muslim electoral engineering in the BJP’s favour but also cast aspersions on the integrity of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar.
Without offering a shred of evidence but the opposition’s baseless rhetoric, the New York Times claimed that CEC Kumar has ‘close ties’ to PM Modi.
“Nine million names, many of them Muslim, were struck from the voter rolls in an audit by the Election Commission ahead of the election…. The Election Commission had rejected earlier versions of similar complaints. The commission, a formally independent body, is currently led by an official with close ties to Mr Modi,” the NYT piece reads.
It is essential to note that, contrary to the NYT’s framing that the ECI conducted SIR in Bengal right ahead of the elections, the ECI deleted 58.25 lakh voters who were found to be deceased, absent, shifted, or had duplicate entries in the draft rolls in December 2025. This slashed the total voter base down from 7.66 crore to 7.04 crore. Subsequently, an additional 5 lakh names were removed from the final rolls on 28th February, taking the overall number of deletions to just under 91 lakhs.
Of 60.06 lakh voters who were initially put under adjudication, nearly half were found ineligible. The highest number of deletions was recorded in Muslim-dominated Murshidabad, where more than 4.55 lakh voters were found ineligible out of 11 lakhs marked for adjudication. Murshidabad district shares a border with Bangladesh. Muslim mob violence and Bangladeshi Muslim infiltration are major issues here.
Contrary to the propaganda peddled by anti-BJP parties, their ideological allies in India and abroad, the official ECI breakdown demonstrated that the vast majority were standard clean-up categories like dead, absent, permanently shifted, untraceable at registered addresses, or bogus.
Pertinently, while the Indian and foreign Islamo-leftist media coterie has been framing the SIR exercise as a conspiracy by ECI and BJP to disenfranchise Muslims, it is Hindus who comprised 63% of the deletions in absolute terms.
Furthermore, the NYT attempted to contrast how PM Modi comes from the ideological background that defines India as a Hindu nation and loathes the presence of Islam, while the Bengali people uphold ‘secularism’ and intellectual superiority.
“Mr Modi’s B.J.P., by contrast, descends from a school of thinking that defines India as a Hindu nation and abhors the thousand-year presence of Islam,” the article claims.
The subtlety of this apocryphal framing is amusing. Quite conveniently, the New York Times painted Narendra Modi as ‘anti-secularist’ and what the Islamo-leftist cabal describes as ‘Islamophobe’. India is a Hindu nation. This is a civilisational reality, and Indians don’t need to subscribe to the BJP’s political ideology to acknowledge this fact. Moreover, the BJP or its ‘Hindu nationalist’ ideology does not abhor the ‘thousand-year presence of Islam’; it only abhors the glorification of Islamic barbarians and invaders, who brutalised, killed, converted Hindus and non-Muslims to Islam and destroyed Hindu temples.
It is interesting how the NYT and similar Islamo-leftist propaganda outlets frame ‘Hindu nationalists’ as bigots but never highlight the hatred for idolaters like Hindus mandated by Islamic texts.
Moving ahead, the NYT framed Mamata Banerjee as a champion of the poor and downtrodden who resisted “corporate interests while heralding welfare schemes and playing up her credentials as a secularist, which made her especially popular among Muslims and liberals.”
Contrary to the NYT’s framing, Mamata Banerjee is neither a secularist nor a leader who boosted Bengal’s economic growth through welfare schemes. In her 15-year rule, Banerjee pushed an industrial powerhouse of Bengal into the quagmire of a debt trap. Under the TMC regime, West Bengal’s share in national GDP dwindled, per capita income slumped below the national average, and thousands of companies have moved out of the state.
Indeed, Banerjee ran many populist welfare schemes; however, these resulted in Bengal’s entanglement in a cycle of borrowing to pay for day-to-day expenses rather than building assets that could generate future income, taking its debt to over ₹7.7 lakh crore. The TMC regime ruined Bengal’s industrial environment with its “syndicate raj” to such an extent that since 2011, more than 6,600 companies, including 110 listed firms, have moved their registered offices out of West Bengal.
OpIndia has documented numerous incidents wherein Mamata Banerjee demonstrated blatant neglect, rather, humiliating suppression of Hindus, while going out of the way to appease Muslims. It was reported in 2023 that a Durga Mandir was found blocked and barricaded in Kaliachak town in Malda district of West Bengal. The development came a day before the Islamic month of Muharram. Before this, CM Mamata Banerjee imposed restrictions on the immersion of Durga idols in 2016 and 2017 to make way for Muharram processions.
In fact, Banerjee took pride in not being a Kafir and fighting Kafirs (infidels as per Islam). But since Banerjee appeased Muslims and suppressed Hindus, she and her party remained ‘secular’ and ‘liberal’ in the eyes of liberals.
The Bengali Hindus, who trusted and voted for the TMC, have had enough of the party’s oppression and misrule and decided to give the BJP the long-awaited claim to power. This is how democracies function. But the New York Times cannot fathom that the so-called Hindu nationalist party has swayed Bengali voters with its issues-based grassroots-level poll campaign.
Reuters reduces the BJP’s poll successes in Bengal and Assam as a result of appealing to the Hindu majority
The foreign legacy media has this habit of describing the BJP as a ‘Hindu nationalist’ party, ‘Hindu hardliner’, ‘Hindutva outfit’ and whatnot, essentially to instil readers with the idea that it is a religious bigot, and fringe that has gained prominence and power by walking a linear path of aggressively appealing to India’s Hindu majority. In this vein, a Reuters report claimed that PM Modi’s supposed strategy of appealing to the country’s Hindu majority has become a sure-fire winner.”
“The gains also underline that Modi’s strategy of pushing economic development, giving generous handouts and appealing to the country’s Hindu majority has become a sure-fire winner, including in regions long seen as opposition strongholds,” the report reads.
Ironically, the BJP is abhorred by Islamo-leftists for supposedly being opposed to ‘secularism’, but when the same party wants to implement a secular Uniform Civil Code, somehow the same anti-Hindu cabal advocates communal narratives.
Interestingly, much like Reuters, almost all foreign legacy media outlets covering Bengal elections quoted Rahul Verma, a fellow at the anti-India propaganda factory, Centre for Policy Research, which is run by the daughter of Congress leader Mani Shankar Aiyar. It has been under scrutiny for non-compliance with the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) rules.
The Guardian fails to hide frustration over the ‘Hindu Nationalist’ BJP’s Bengal and Assam victories
From the 2020 Delhi Riots to the 2022 Leicester violence coverage, the UK-based newspaper, The Guardian, has been infamous for its blatant anti-Hindu and pro-Jihadist bias. In continuation of the same trait, The Guardian deployed Hannah Ellis-Petersen to recycle the same old ‘Hindu nationalism’, ‘minorities oppressed’ and ‘secularism in danger’ bogey as the BJP registered maiden victory in Bengal and retained Assam.
“Over the past 15 years, the state has been ruled by Trinamool Congress (TMC), a key opposition party, under the leadership of Mamata Banerjee, the state’s female chief minister. Banerjee had been one of the most outspoken critics of Modi and his religious nationalist agenda over his 12 years in power,” The Guardian article says.
The Guardian also amplified the already debunked lies regarding the SIR and its supposed targeted impact on Muslims.
“The result followed a highly controversial exercise by the BJP government to revise West Bengal’s electoral roll, under the guise of ‘purging’ it of illegal voters. As a result of the project, called a special intensive revision (SIR), more than 2.7 million voters were removed from the vote register. Analysis showed that Muslims and other minorities – who traditionally do not support the BJP – were disproportionately targeted,” the report reads.
Contrary to the narrative pushed by The Guardian, the 2.7 million or the 27,16,393 voters, to be precise, were not arbitrarily removed. These were flagged for discrepancies and reviewed by around 705 judicial officers under the Calcutta High Court monitoring, as well as Supreme Court oversight. Of the 60.06 lakh cases, 32.68 lakh were retained as eligible, while 27.16 lakh were ruled excludable.
The Guardian claimed that the SIR in Bengal “disproportionately targeted Muslims”; however, 3% of the deletions in absolute terms involved Hindus. Even some Hindu-dominated areas like Paschim Bardhaman and the Matua community pockets in North 24-Parganas witnessed significant deletions. It was the Supreme Court’s decision that people whose cases are still pending cannot be allowed to vote in the elections. Apparently, the foreign media would update its reportage as soon as the opposition updates its rhetoric from “ECI is compromised” to “ECI and the Supreme Court both are compromised”.
Al Jazeera credits the BJP’s victory to ‘religious polarisation’, fails to highlight the TMC’s Muslim appeasement
Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based Islamic Jihadist propaganda outlet, which has consistently been pushing anti-Hindu narratives, attributed the BJP’s Bengal victory to its strategy of ‘religious polarisation’.
Citing a Bengali Hindu voter’s statement, “Didi has lost the track and only appeases Muslims to stay in power”, Al Jazeera claimed: “That’s an accusation that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu majoritarian Bharatiya Janata Party has long levelled against the TMC, which emphasises religious pluralism and the protection of minority rights.”
“Yet it is the outcome in West Bengal that analysts say is by far the most consequential of the results that were declared on Monday, with the BJP walking the trails of religious polarisation and leveraging underlying anti-incumbency to win…” it added.
Much like The New York Times, Al Jazeera also whitewashed Mamata Banerjee’s anti-industrial growth policies as some sort of ‘push back’ against corporate interests.
Unsurprisingly, Al Jazeera also amplified the disinformation peddled by the opposition parties and Islamists online regarding the imaginary ‘anti-Muslim’ nature of the Special Intensive Revision.
Rejected by Indian voters, opposition finds takers in Pakistan: Pakistani media amplifies Rahul Gandhi-Mamta Banerjee’s ‘election rigging’ propaganda
From Pakistani ISPR bots pushing propaganda in favour of Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, former minister Fawad Chaudhary supporting Gandhi over his haranguing regarding Ayodhya Ram Mandir Pran Pratishtha, receiving media support for echoing Pakistan’s falsehoods during Operation Sindoor, the Gandhi scion enjoys more support from the hostile neighbour than his home country, India.
In a fresh demonstration of this limerence, Pakistani media has amplified Gandhi’s ‘election rigging’ and ‘ECI is compromised’ bogey. ARY Digital, a leading Pakistani Islamist propaganda outlet, published a report headlined, “Rahul Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee accuse BJP of rigging Indian state elections.”
This article, published on 5th May, amplified the claims by Rahul Gandhi and Mamata Banerjee that more than 100 seats were “stolen” by the BJP through the Election Commission.
On 4th May, Geo News, Dawn and other major Pakistani news outlets ran wire stories by the AFP about the recently-concluded multi-state elections. The wire report amplified the usual lies about the SIR and the imaginary targeted disenfranchisement of Muslims in Bengal.
The 2026 West Bengal Assembly election will be remembered not merely as a political upset but as a structural shift in the state’s political consciousness. To reduce the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory to campaign optics, charismatic speeches, or anti-incumbency would be analytically shallow. What unfolded in Bengal was something far deeper, a carefully engineered, long-duration socio-political transformation in which the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) played a decisive, if understated, role.
At the surface, the headlines celebrated leaders like PM Modi and Amit Shah. Strategists like Sunil Bansal were credited with electoral precision and booth-level execution. But beneath this visible layer lay an invisible architecture, the Sangh’s disciplined, decentralised network, which quietly did what conventional politics often fails to achieve: reshape the very instincts of an electorate.
For decades, West Bengal operated under a unique political grammar in which ideology trumped identity. The legacy of Left politics ensured that class consciousness overshadowed religious mobilisation, and even when identity politics gained prominence in other parts of India, Bengal remained relatively resistant to overt religious consolidation.
The RSS recognised this anomaly early. Bengal was not just another state; it was the land of Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the ideological fountainhead of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the BJP’s precursor. The inability of the BJP to dominate this terrain was therefore not merely an electoral gap but an ideological incompleteness.
What the RSS embarked upon was not an election campaign but a civilisational project. It sought to replace Bengal’s fragmented Hindu identity, divided by caste, class, and sub-regional loyalties, with a cohesive political consciousness. It did so not through spectacle but through persistence. Lakhs of micro-level engagements, ranging from voter awareness meetings to Lokmat Parishkar sessions, were conducted across constituencies. These were not rallies designed for television optics; they were conversations designed to recalibrate perception and embed a new framework of political thinking.
The most significant achievement of this effort lies in what Bengal had historically resisted: Hindu consolidation beyond caste lines. Unlike states where caste arithmetic dictates electoral outcomes, Bengal’s Hindu society had never voted as a unified bloc. The Sangh’s intervention gradually altered this equation.
Through sustained outreach that blended religious, cultural, and social messaging, it normalised the idea of collective identity without making it appear abrupt or externally imposed. Festivals like Ram Navami evolved into platforms for reinforcing shared identity, while grassroots outreach ensured that these signals penetrated rural, tribal, and semi-urban regions. The process was incremental, almost imperceptible, but cumulatively transformative.
What made this strategy particularly potent was its framing. It was not presented as political mobilisation in the conventional sense but as cultural awakening. That distinction is crucial because when identity is internalised rather than instructed, it becomes far more resilient. The RSS’s work operated at precisely this psychological level, embedding a sense of shared belonging that eventually translated into political alignment.
Modern elections are typically dominated by spectacle, mass rallies, aggressive media campaigns, and high-decibel rhetoric. The RSS inverted this paradigm in Bengal by relying on what can best be described as a “silent campaign.” Its strategy centred on hyper-local engagement, where volunteers and swayamsevaks held small meetings in homes, temples, tea stalls, and community spaces. The objective was simple yet effective: build trust through familiarity and maintain continuous contact with voters. This approach bypassed media scrutiny, avoided counter-narratives, and allowed for highly customised messaging tailored to local concerns.
Winning elections, however, requires more than shaping opinion; it demands converting that opinion into actual votes. Here again, the RSS played a pivotal role by ensuring high voter mobilisation. Campaigns emphasising participation were not merely symbolic slogans but operational frameworks. Volunteers tracked voter engagement, followed up through local networks and digital communication, and ensured that turnout among sympathetic demographics remained high. At the same time, efforts were made to minimise vote leakage by discouraging NOTA voting and strengthening booth-level coordination. This is where the synergy between the RSS and the BJP became particularly evident: the Sangh built social capital, and the BJP converted it into electoral outcomes.
The organisational backbone of this effort was the RSS’s expansive network of shakhas and affiliated bodies. Over the past decade, this network has grown significantly in Bengal, allowing it to penetrate regions that were once beyond the BJP’s reach. From tribal belts and border districts to tea garden communities and urban peripheries, the Sangh ecosystem created multiple points of engagement across social strata. This multi-layered presence enabled it to operate not as a single campaign entity but as a coordinated system of interventions, each tailored to specific demographics and local realities.
Equally important was the role of narrative construction. The RSS’s outreach consistently contextualised local electoral choices within broader civilisational concerns. Discussions around the condition of Hindus in neighbouring Bangladesh, particularly amid political instability, were used to frame the election as more than just a contest over governance. By linking voting behaviour to questions of identity and security, the stakes of participation were elevated. Voting was no longer perceived as a routine democratic act but as a decision with deeper cultural implications.
Beyond voter outreach, the RSS also played a crucial role in managing the BJP’s internal dynamics in Bengal. The party had long struggled with factionalism, particularly between established cadres and newer entrants. The Sangh, with its institutional authority and perceived neutrality, acted as a mediator. Coordination meetings helped align competing interests, resolve disputes, and maintain organisational cohesion during a high-stakes election. This internal stability proved essential, as even the most sophisticated electoral strategies can falter in the face of internal discord.
While the RSS built the socio-cultural foundation, leaders like Sunil Bansal provided the strategic architecture necessary to translate groundwork into votes. Bansal’s emphasis on data-driven micromanagement, booth-level strengthening, and candidate selection complemented the Sangh’s grassroots efforts. His coordination with the RSS ensured alignment between ideological mobilisation and electoral execution. This convergence of structure and strategy was instrumental in delivering the BJP’s breakthrough.
Bengal’s transformation is particularly significant because of the challenges it historically posed. The state’s strong regional identity, intellectual traditions, and legacy of Left politics made it resistant to the Sangh’s ideological framework. That this resistance was gradually overcome suggests that long-term, decentralised mobilisation can succeed even in environments that appear structurally hostile. It also signals a broader shift in Bengal’s political axis, from ideology-driven politics to identity-centric mobilisation.
To characterise the RSS’s role as merely supportive would therefore be misleading. In Bengal, it functioned as the foundational force that enabled the BJP’s electoral success. What became visible in the election results was the culmination of years of groundwork, an intricate web of relationships, narratives, and organisational structures that shaped voter behaviour long before polling day.
The implications of this model extend far beyond Bengal. It demonstrates that electoral success in complex political landscapes requires sustained social investment, culturally rooted narratives, and decentralised organisational strength. For the BJP, Bengal represents a replicable template. For its opponents, it represents a far more complex challenge because they are no longer confronting just a political party, but a transformed social consciousness.
Ultimately, the BJP’s victory in Bengal was not an isolated event but the culmination of a long-term process. At the centre of this process stood the RSS, whose quiet, methodical, and deeply embedded mobilisation redefined the contours of the state’s politics. By reshaping identity, strengthening organisation, and ensuring participation, the Sangh did what high-voltage campaigns alone cannot achieve: it altered how an electorate thinks, and therefore how it votes.
The 2026 West Bengal assembly elections have proven to be historic in many ways. This is the first time that the Bhartiya Janata Party has registered a victory in the state. Beyond the opposition’s ‘ECI is compromised’ noise, it is the BJP’s candidate selection and focus on real issues that propelled the party to 206 seats for its maiden triumph. BJP’s women candidates brought their own grassroots stories, carried pain and yearning to bring change that resonated with Bengali voters.
From house help to MLA: BJP candidate Kalita Majhi defeated TMC candidate by a margin of 12,535
The BJP fielded a former house help, Kalita Majhi, from the Ausgram seat. Majhi secured 107692 votes and defeated the Trinamool Congress candidate Shyama Prasanna Lohar by a margin of 12535 votes.
Before entering politics in 2021, Kalita Majhi worked as a domestic help earning around Rs 2,500 monthly from four households in the Guskara municipality. The BJP had fielded Majhi in the 2021 assembly elections, but she lost against the TMC candidate Abhedananda Thander back then.
The BJP, however, did not abandon or sideline Majhi; rather, the party renominated her this time, and she defeated her TMC rival by an impressive margin. Majhi lost the 2021 election; however, she enjoyed a connection with the local people, which the BJP knew would translate into an electoral victory with the right campaigning and political messaging.
Rekha Patra: From being the face of Sandeshkhali protests, losing the 2024 Lok Sabha election amidst TMC’s personal attacks, to winning Hingalganj in 2026
In electoral politics, a candidate’s winnability is the main factor in determining their nomination. However, some seats, some candidates and their stories are above the prospects of poll victories and defeats. BJP’s Rekha Patra has been one such candidate. Contesting from Hingalganj against TMC’s Ananda Sarkar, Rekha Patra won by a margin of 5421 votes, securing 100207 votes.
It must be recalled that Rekha Patra was the first woman in Sandeshkhali in North 24 Parganas, who had raised her voice and spearheaded the protests accusing TMC strongman Sheikh Shahjahan and his aides of land grabbing and sexual assault in 2024. In February 2024, hundreds of women in Sandeshkhali took to the streets to protest against land grabbing, non-payment of wages and sexual violence committed by Trinamool Congress goon Sheikh Shahjahan and his two aides, Shiba Prasad Hazra and Uttam Sardar.
When Rekha Patra, a victim herself, came forward and led the protests against TMC goons, she was targeted by the party’s supporters. Later, when the BJP fielded her from Basirhat for the Lok Sabha election, the TMC leaked her sensitive personal information.
Patra had lost the Lok Sabha election to her TMC rival, but she did not lose her party’s trust and commitment to support her fight against the TMC-linked perpetrators in the Sandeskhali land grabbing and sexual abuse matter.
Fast forward to 2026, the BJP nominated Rekha Patra from the Hingalganj seat, and she defeated her TMC opponent.
Ratna Debnath: The inspiring saga of the mother of the RG Kar College rape and murder victim, turning her pain into power
In the Panihati seat, the BJP fielded not a seasoned politician, not a celebrity, but a mother who sought justice for her daughter but received disappointment from the TMC regime. The party nominated Ratna Debnath, the mother of the RG Kar rape-murder victim, from the Panihati seat. Debnath won by a wide margin of 28836 votes against TMC’s Tirthankar Ghosh. She received 87977 votes in total.
In March this year, Ratna Debnath, the mother of the RG Kar rape-murder victim, spoke to the media and expressed her wish to contest the upcoming West Bengal Vidhan Sabha election on a BJP ticket.
#WATCH | North 24 Parganas, West Bengal: BJP's winning candidate from Panihati Assembly Constituency, Mother of RG Kar Medical College rape and murder victim and BJP leader Ratna Debnath says, "This victory is the victory of the people of Panihati, of the entire Bengal. I… pic.twitter.com/cnwDKmIbVB
Debnath’s chagrin stemmed from the TMC government’s failure to secure justice for her daughter, a junior doctor, who was brutally raped and murdered at the RG Kar Medical College and Hospital.
Addressing the media, Ratna Debnath had said that “women’s safety and security, and the well-being of people, are greatly compromised here in Bengal.”
Ratna Debnath had vowed to uproot Trinamool Congress from West Bengal. After over a month, Debnath witnessed the fulfilment of her vow as both she and her party registered a thumping victory by demolishing the TMC’s evil empire.
BJP did not politicise the women’s safety issue; it gave voice to the victims of TMC’s misrule and facilitated their quest to change the ‘system’ that failed them
In over a decade of the Trinamool Congress’s rule in West Bengal, the besmirching of the dignity of women, political murders and brutalities, riots, and overall collapse of law and order, became the new norm. From crimes against women after the 2021 elections, Sandeskhali horror to the RG Kar rape-murder case, not only the people of Bengal but the entire India saw the systemic failure under Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s leadership.
While TMC functionaries committed crimes with impunity, the party leadership gave them cover. It must be recalled how Mamata Banerjee attempted to downplay the harassment and sexual exploitation of women at the hands of Trinamool Congress goons.
During a public meeting at Birbhum in February 2024, she dubbed the unrest in Sandeshkhali as a ‘minor incident’ and blamed the BJP and the media for amplifying the issue in the public discourse.
At about 55:15 minutes into the programme, the West Bengal Chief Minister remarked, “An incident has happened or rather made to happen. First, they sent the ED (Enforcement Directorate), then its friend BJP, entered the scene.”
In May 2024, Banerjee went on to claim that BJP “scripted” the Sandeskhali incident. “The entire Sandeshkhali incident was preplanned. The BJP had scripted it. The truth has been exposed. I have been saying this for a long time,” Banerjee said back then.
In fact, Mamata Banerjee has a history of politicising, downplaying and victim-blaming in cases of sexual assault against women. In 2012, Banerjee dubbed the Park Street rape case involving an Anglo-Indian woman, Suzette Jordan, as ‘shajano ghotona‘ (concocted incident), which was allegedly ‘designed to malign the government.’ While TMC leaders kept casting aspersions on the victim’s character, a Kolkata Court upheld the rape charges and found the three accused guilty.
In 2013, Banerjee blamed rising population and modernisation for rapes in West Bengal. In April 2022, Mamata Banerjee courted controversy after she tried todownplay allegations of brutal rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl as a ‘love affair’ gone wrong.
In October 2025, a second-year MBBS student from Odisha was allegedly gang-raped by Apu Bauri, Firdos Sekh, Sekh Reajuddin and two others in a jungle area near Durgapur city. The failure of the TMC regime to safeguard women and even evoke trust that they will get justice can be understood from the fact that the rape survivor’s father had expressed fear that his daughter was not safe in West Bengal. “Trust has been lost. We don’t want her to stay in Bengal. She will pursue her education in Odisha,” he said.
The NCRB report released in October 2025 highlighted how West Bengal, under a woman chief minister, had become highly unsafe for women. The report revealed that West Bengal recorded 34,691 cases of crimes against women under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Special and Local Laws (SLL). While this marked a marginal decline from 34,738 cases in 2022, the number is one of the highest in the country. The statistics translate to a crime rate of 71.3 cases per lakh female population. In the category of kidnapping and abduction of women – others (Sec. 363A, 365, 367, 368, 369 IPC), West Bengal recorded the highest, 2054 incidents out of the 7964 cases nationwide.
Despite all this, the left liberal cabal hailed Mamata Banerjee as an icon of women’s empowerment, and covered her neglect of women’s issues with the “only woman Chief Minister” rhetorical shield.
With such an opprobrious record of victim-blaming, Mamata Banerjee hardly took women’s safety seriously. No wonder Banerjee did not even take the protests by RG Kar doctors in 2024 seriously. In fact, the TMC government persecuted junior doctors, who led protests against the gruesome rape and murder case at RG Kar Medical College and Hospital. The doctors who participated in protests faced legal, financial and professional troubles. They faced undue transfer, court cases and police FIRs for seeking justice and accountability. They were booked for ‘causing grievous hurt to police personnel’ and ‘unlawful assembly.’
After all this, when Ratna Debnath announced her BJP candidature and vow to uproot TMC from Bengal, she was called ‘India’s Erika Kirk’ by pro-TMC trolls online. However, Debnath’s victory showed that the people of Panihati understood her pain, her fight, and the BJP’s honest intentions beyond electoral winnability.
Undoubtedly, TMC has a symbolic female leadership, but the party failed women at the grassroots. For political gains, the TMC government allowed a culture of impunity in several pockets across the state. The victories of Kalita Majhi, Ratna Debnath and Rekha Patra demonstrate that the TMC had a clear disconnect with reality; their arrogance and past effectiveness of intimidation tactics blinded them to the widespread anger women had towards the party. BJP did not miss the bus and fielded the victims of TMC’s misrule as faces of resistance. The BJP challenged the notion that only the elite can represent women’s issues by fielding women from humble backgrounds and with first-hand experience of TMC’s misrule, paving their way to the legislature.
Call it poetic justice that while these women with no political background won big and BJP’s overall women candidates hit a strike rate of 65%, Mamata Banerjee lost her home turf of Bhabanipur to BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari by a margin of 15,000 votes. After the final round of counting, Adhikari secured 73,463 votes, while Banerjee trailed with 58,349.
There have been times in India’s judicial history when the Supreme Court has delivered a moral verdict on individuals who have abused its hallowed grounds rather than simply adjudicating a legal case. May 5, 2026, was one such day.
The India Young Lawyers Association (IYLA), the petitioner organisation whose initial 2018 writ petition sparked a ten-year storm over Lord Ayyappa’s sacred temple at Sabarimala, suffered a humiliation from which it will be difficult to recover with any professional dignity on the eleventh day of arguments before the nine-judge Constitution Bench hearing the Sabarimala reference.
The bench, which was led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and included Justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi, revealed what many legal observers had long suspected: that the IYLA’s involvement in these proceedings is a planned, driven, and legally futile exercise that has wasted the apex court’s valuable time.
The bench asked the IYLA’s counsel, who was representing a group whose president is Naushad Ali, a series of scathing questions that made it clear how seriously the court took the organisation’s standing, objectives, and conduct during these proceedings.
A PIL built on newspaper clippings
Perhaps the most startling moment of the day’s proceedings occurred when the IYLA’s counsel revealed to the court the intellectual foundations of the original public interest litigation that dared to challenge Lord Ayyappa’s centuries-old tradition of celibate worship. Those foundations were four newspaper stories published in June 2006. This is neither theological research nor constitutional research. Four newspaper stories, including ‘The Sex Slump Felt Sabarimala’ and ‘Touching Feet and Attracting Touches.’
Chief Justice Surya Kant’s answer was scathing, clinical, and precise. The CJI’s statement, ‘Okay, so it was based on press reports,’ sums up the intellectual gravity of the petition that disrupted millions of people’s devotional lives in just four words.
This is something worth contemplating. The Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a writ suit with the Supreme Court of India, aiming to overturn an old, unbroken, theologically founded religious tradition observed by tens of millions of Lord Ayyappa devotees, based on sensationalist tabloid journalism. The petition lacked a genuine comprehension of the rights of believers, the philosophical relevance of Naishtika Brahmacharya (celibate devotion), or the Ayyappa tradition. It was based on news stories intended to incite anger rather than reveal the truth. Every IYLA member who linked their name to this exercise should be deeply ashamed of this one disclosure.
An abuse of the process of law: The court’s own words
What followed was much more awful. ‘This is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, that too before a nine-judge Constitution Bench,’ declared Justice MM Sundresh from the bench in response to the IYLA’s counsel’s attempt to raise procedural arguments contesting the maintainability of the nine-judge bench reference, claiming that the original speaking order had referred the matter to a seven-judge bench rather than nine. Go through issues and get them done. We don’t want to humiliate you any further.
A sitting Supreme Court judge does not use these words lightly. An ‘abuse of the process of law’ is one of the most serious charges that a court can bring against a party before it. It signifies that the court has determined that the actions are being undertaken not for a valid legal purpose, but rather to harass, delay, or meddle. The Supreme Court of India’s nine-judge Constitution Bench has finally come to define the IYLA. This is not a small criticism; it is a court statement.
Nevertheless, the counsel continued. There were mentions of dubious procedural details. An attempt was made to use newspaper stories as proof. CJI Kant intervened directly after a comparison to the Khajuraho temple was made. If you do not know about a temple, please do not refer to all of them. Don’t waste our time, please. Simply continue and complete.
Throughout the morning’s proceedings, the same pattern emerged: a bench that was clearly irritated by the calibre of arguments being made, the irrelevant content being quoted, and the counsel’s seeming ignorance of the seriousness of the constitutional issues at hand.
Who is Naushad Ali, and why does it matter?
‘Who is your president?’ was the crucial question posed by Justice Aravind Kumar. Naushad Ali was IYLA’s counsel’s response.
Judge BV Nagarathna then brought out what is arguably the most significant and little-discussed issue about the entire Sabarimala PIL, ‘This is for an individual, how can a legal body such as yours have a belief? You lack morality.’ Then, sharply, ‘How is he a believer?’ Justify your explanation of the legal position.
The legitimacy of the PIL that sparked this debate is at issue when it comes to locus standi, or who has the moral and legal right to contest a religious practice. The president of a group that filed a writ petition to enter a Hindu temple worshipping a celibate deity, a temple whose customs have been upheld for generations by devout followers of that tradition, is Naushad Ali. Therefore, Justice Nagarathna’s inquiry was more than just procedural. What authority does this organisation and this person claim to advocate for, on behalf of, or against the devotional rights of Lord Ayyappa’s devotees? This was a fundamental challenge.
The answer appears to be none whatsoever. The organisation’s membership did not vote on a resolution approving the PIL’s file. Justice Aravind Kumar enquired directly, ‘Has your organisation passed a resolution to file a PIL? Has your President signed it?’ There was no such resolution; the counsel’s response was revelatory in its insufficiency. The PIL was submitted without the petitioner organisation’s own internal democratic approval.
A pattern of targeting the Hindu religion alone
Selective targeting is the underlying question raised by today’s proceedings and by millions of Hindu devotees since 2018. There is no arbitrary gender discrimination in the Sabarimala ritual. Because Lord Ayyappa is Naishtika Brahmachari, an immortal celibate, the tradition of celibacy linked with his form at Sabarimala is a sacred mandate. It is a differentiation based on the particular and distinctive nature of worship at that temple rather than the unworthiness of women. Devotees are aware of this. Practitioners are aware of this. The guardians of the tradition are aware of this.
During today’s proceedings, Justice BV Nagarathna made an observation that echoed this issue strongly. The court stated unequivocally: ‘Those who have faith in the deity will perform all that is required.’ However, this court cannot support anyone who claims to be willing to break all Niyam (rules). We are not superstitious. You are suggesting that people who do not have faith or belief in that deity are welcome to enter. You are not a true believer.
It is difficult to express the essential conflict more accurately. An organisation that had no believers among its petitioners attempted to overturn millions of believers’ deeply held convictions. Non-devotees marched into the Supreme Court, headed by a president who has no claim to be an Ayyappa devotee, to impose their will on a centuries-old religious tradition. They dressed it up in the rhetoric of constitutional rights, which they claimed out of ideology rather than actual faith.
Conclusion
Today was a quiet moment of vindication for the millions of devotees of Lord Ayyappa who walk barefoot through the Western Ghats forests, observe 41-day fasts, wear the Mala (rudraksha garland), and dedicate every part of their lives to their devotion during the pilgrimage season. The Supreme Court of India’s nine-judge panel stated unequivocally that the IYLA had squandered the court’s time, abused the legal process, and failed to present any genuine standing or argument for its case.
The Sabarimala case is far from over, and the nine-judge court will issue a decision with constitutional implications for religion, gender, and institutional autonomy. But what happened on Day 11 was a reckoning, a time when the court looked at the petitioners who sparked the debate and found them inadequate in every way, standing, sincerity, scholarship, and respect for the legal process. There are eighteen holy steps on the way to Sabarimala. The IYLA was a complete failure from the start.
On 4th May, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wrote history in West Bengal by defeating Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress (TMC) on its home turf. BJP won 208 out of 296 seats in the State Assembly Elections after a historic 91% voting during polls held in two phases. As the results started to come in on Monday, the opposition and left liberals started blaming the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) conducted by the Election Commission of India (ECI) in the state for TMC’s defeat.
However, the numbers tell a completely different story. In the 20 Assembly seats that recorded the highest number of voter deletions after adjudication, Mamata Banerjee’s party won 13, while the BJP won six of them and Congress managed to grab one.
These numbers are significant, as the narrative on social media projected the ECI as the villain behind TMC’s poor performance.
Opposition and the left liberals targeted the Election Commission after the results
Throughout the day, sections of the opposition and the usual left liberal ecosystem began attacking the Election Commission and the SIR process.
TMC chief and now-defeated caretaker CM of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, cried foul and claimed that BJP stole 100 seats in West Bengal.
Leader of Opposition and Congress leader Rahul Gandhi followed the suit and supported her claim of BJP “stealing” 100 seats from TMC in Bengal with the support of the Election Commission.
Assam and Bengal are clear cases of the election being stolen by the BJP with the support of the EC.
We agree with Mamata ji. More than 100 seats were stolen in Bengal.
We have seen this playbook before: Madhya Pradesh. Haryana. Maharashtra. Lok Sabha 2024 etc
Controversial RJ of Radio Mirchi, Sayema, posted on social media platform X, “Election Commission won”, hinting that it was the ECI that led to the BJP’s win.
Propagandist posing as journalist, Arfa Khanum Sherwani of The Wire, sarcastically congratulated the ECI for conducting “the most free and fair elections in the history of independent India”, again blaming the agency for TMC’s performance. However, she completely ignored the fact that the numbers are not in favour of the narrative.
Congratulations to the Election Commision of India for conducting the most free and fair elections in the history of independent India. https://t.co/m0xpBjjTP5
Rajdeep Sardesai, journalist and husband of former journalist turned TMC MP Sagarika Ghose, shared a video from India Today where Swaraj India’s co-founder Yogendra Yadav claimed that 27 lakh people were wrongfully denied voting rights and questioned how six lakh votes were added after publication of the final list.
AAP leader Sanjay Singh too attacked the ECI and claimed 27 lakh voters had been deprived of their franchise.
ED, CBI, चुनाव आयोग, ढाई लाख केंद्रीय सुरक्षा बल, चुनाव में हज़ारों करोड़ खर्च करना, DGP CS DM SP को हटाना, SIR के जरिये 27 लाख मतदाताओं को मताधिकार से वंचित रखना। फिर TMC को हराकर मोदी और गोदी मीडिया द्वारा ढोल पीटना। अगर ये लोकशाही है तो फिर तानाशाही क्या है? pic.twitter.com/hzstJIcDB7
However, the actual seat-wise numbers contradict the claims that deletions under SIR simply cost the TMC the election.
TMC won most seats with the highest deletions
According to the data cited in The Indian Express, the 20 seats with the highest deletions after adjudication included Samserganj, Lalgola, Bhagabangola, Raghunathganj, Metiaburz, Suti, Mothabari, Goalpokhar, Malatipur, Chopra, Sujapur, Rajarhat New Town and Basirhat Uttar. All these seats were won by the TMC.
Farakka, which recorded 38,222 deletions, was won by the Congress. The BJP won Jangipur, Ratua, Karandighi, Ketugram, Manickchak and Monteswar.
In simple terms, of the 20 constituencies where deletions were the highest, 13 were won by Mamata Banerjee’s party. That alone punctures the propaganda that SIR deletions uniformly damaged the TMC while benefiting the BJP.
What the broader numbers show
In broader terms, in 187 seats where more than 5,000 voters were deleted, the BJP won 119 while the TMC won 65. The Congress managed 2 seats and AJUP won 1.
Out of these 187 seats, the number of deleted voters was higher than the margin of victory or lead in 47 constituencies. Within the BJP’s 119 seats, 28 had deletions greater than the victory margin. Of these, 26 had been won by the TMC in 2021. At the same time, among the 65 seats won or led by the TMC, 18 too recorded deletions higher than the victory margin.
This shows that while deletions and margins overlapped in several closely fought seats, the opposition’s attempt to reduce the entire Bengal result to one slogan around SIR is plainly misleading.
How SIR was carried out in Bengal
The SIR exercise was different from routine electoral roll revision. Registered electors were required to fill fresh enumeration forms and submit documents to establish eligibility, including citizenship. The Election Commission began the exercise in June last year, starting with Bihar and later extending it to nine other states, including West Bengal, and three Union Territories.
In Bengal, 60.06 lakh electors, or 8.5 per cent of those in the final roll published in February, were placed under adjudication. After cases were examined by around 700 judicial officers, 27.16 lakh electors were deleted. Appeals filed by those deleted are now pending before 10 Appellate Tribunals.
The propaganda versus the data
The post result reaction from opposition politicians, armchair journalists and television commentators tried to create the impression that voter deletion under SIR was behind TMC’s poor performance and proof of wrongdoing by the ECI. However, the seat-wise data, especially from the 20 constituencies with the highest deletions, neutralised the claims.
If SIR deletions alone were the magic explanation being projected by the usual ecosystem, the TMC would not have won 13 of the 20 seats where deletions were the highest. It is evident that there is an attempt to weaponise SIR as a one-line excuse for the Bengal result and they will continue to use it for months to come.
