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Gateway to Southeast Asia: India’s rising role in ASEAN diplomacy and connectivity under the Modi doctrine

Divyansh Tiwari
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Gateway to Southeast Asia: India’s rising role in ASEAN diplomacy and connectivity under the Modi doctrine

On Sunday (26th October), Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the 47th edition of the ASEAN summit and emphasised that the year 2026 will belong to India and the ASEAN countries.

“The 21st century is our century. It is India and ASEAN’s century. I am confident that the aim of ‘ASEAN Community Vision 2045’ and ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ will develop a bright future for the entire humanity,” PM Modi declared.

He further announced that 2026 will be observed as the ‘Year of ASEAN-India Maritime Cooperation.’

As PM Modi stregthenes relations with ASEAN nations through diplomacy, we examine its geopolitical evolution, India’s path from early engagement to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and how Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign-policy approach, including Act East 2.0, SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), has increased India’s influence in Southeast Asia since 2014.

To demonstrate how Southeast Asia is vital to India’s fundamental interests —securing sea lanes, diversifying supply chains, establishing digital and physical connectivity, and harmonising Indo-Pacific norms with ASEAN centrality —it synthesises key statements, official plans of action, trade and connectivity updates, and recent scholarly and think-tank work.

The research concludes with policy recommendations for the next five years, based on the ongoing modernisation of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) and the new ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2026–2030).[i]

Introduction

Southeast Asia has historically occupied a key position on the world’s geopolitical chessboard. The ASEAN bloc was created in the middle of the 20th century to promote regional collaboration, peace, and development amid Cold War divisions and colonial legacies.

India, which has a long history of trade, culture, and maritime ties with Southeast Asia, has progressively moved from the margins of Southeast Asian diplomacy to a key player. India’s growing economic power, strategic aspirations, and maritime interests in the twenty-first century have made a closer examination of the ASEAN-India relationship necessary.

This paper addresses the growth of ASEAN, its geopolitical trajectory, India’s expanding involvement, and the subtleties of India’s current diplomatic position toward ASEAN, including less obvious aspects that often go unnoticed by the public.

Preventing great-power rivalry from tearing the region apart while tying economies and societies together across a highly diverse maritime-continental space has always been the dual goal of ASEAN’s founding project, formalised in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and strengthened by the 2007 ASEAN Charter. ASEAN’s inclination for “centrality” in security and economic frameworks such as the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus, and RCEP can be explained by this dual objective.

Practically speaking, ASEAN’s “middle-power multilateralism” serves as the framework for maintaining order across the Indo-Pacific’s busiest maritime routes while power dynamics change.

From First Principles to Frameworks: Asean Indo-Pacific Outlook and India’s Response

ASEAN’s response to the Indo-Pacific debate, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP, 2019), reframed regional competitiveness as an inclusive agenda of maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN-charter-based principles, and sustainable development.

This conceptualisation was specifically adopted by India, which acknowledged near-complete complementarity between AOIP and India’s IPOI (INDO-PACIFIC OCEANS INITIATIVE) pillars in the 2021 ASEAN-India Joint Statement on AOIP collaboration.[ii]

According to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the ASEAN-India Joint Statement demonstrates the two countries’ dedication to close cooperation. It emphasises preserving regional peace, stability, and development through cooperation, communication, and mutual respect.

The declaration emphasises the similar objectives of sustainable development, a rules-based order, and closer regional collaborations to tackle shared issues. This helped to establish a diplomatic link between India’s growing Indo-Pacific activity and Southeast Asia’s consensus-first culture.

As the cornerstone of the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), the AOIP-IPOI synergy was reaffirmed in subsequent summit declarations in 2024.[iii]

How India entered ASEAN

India started its ASEAN journey by becoming a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, becoming a full Dialogue Partner in 1996, holding annual summits starting in 2002[iv], and most significantly, joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in October 2003[v], which firmly established New Delhi’s adherence to ASEAN’s principles of peaceful dispute resolution and non-coercion.

Beyond mere symbolism, TAC admission allowed India to participate in ASEAN’s concentric forums (EAS, ARF, and ADMM-Plus), where norms and procedures are established rather than only empty language.

Subsequent renovations, the Strategic Partnership in 2012, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022 were supported by this institutional binding.

The Modi Doctrine (2014 Onwards): Act East, Sagar and IPOI

India’s ASEAN strategy has been reformulated since 2014 as Act East 2.0, which moves away from declarative outreach and toward operational commitments on supply chains, at sea, and in digital public infrastructure.

Prime Minister Modi outlined the doctrinal foundation in his 2018 keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue: freedom of navigation, ASEAN centrality, an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific, and respect for sovereignty. That was put into practice by two programmatic tools.

Resources, commerce connections and marine transportation, disaster risk reduction, research and technology, maritime security and ecology are all covered under IPOI, a seven-pillar cooperation agenda. SAGAR focuses on maritime security and regional capacity-building.

The establishment of a specific Indo-Pacific Division under the Ministry of External Affairs formalised this shift in India’s own diplomatic framework.[vi]

Economics First: AITIGA Modernisation and the Trade Turn

A structural reset is taking place in the economic relationship between India and ASEAN.[vii] There are two distinct tendencies. First, two-way goods trade reached over $120 billion in 2023–2024[viii] following the pandemic’s volatility.

Both parties have officially committed to raising the ceiling through trade facilitation, tariff reduction, and new economic flows.

Second, a dedicated AITIGA-Sub-Committee on Review (AITIGA-SCR) has met multiple times through 2023–2025 to negotiate modernisation across rules of origin, customs cooperation, NTMs/standards, services linkages, and digital trade facilitation, the often unseen plumbing that determines whether SMEs can truly benefit from an FTA.

Signed in 2009, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods deal, also known as AITIGA, is a free trade agreement that became effective in 2010. To promote trade and economic cooperation, it seeks to lower or eliminate tariffs on the majority of goods traded between India and ASEAN nations.

To make the agreement more trade-friendly and in line with contemporary international standards, it is presently undergoing review. This means that the AITIGA Review is now transitioning from intent to text.

India and ASEAN Departments of Commerce are driving timetables tight until 2024–2025, according to readouts from the 4th and 5th AITIGA JC[ix] and later sessions, which indicate simplification and time-bound results.

The “minute details” that most people overlook are that the review is a collection of technical working groups rather than a single negotiation, and the outputs of these groups, certificate of origin digitising, accelerated clearance, and matched standards, are what turn communiqués into container traffic.

Connectivity: Highways, Sea Bridges, and the Bay of Bengal

Ambition and risk come together in physical connectedness. Supply chains from Thai and Vietnamese hubs to Indian ports will be shortened because to India’s India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway[x] and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which will connect the northeast and east coast of India to mainland Southeast Asia.

Although the Trilateral Highway has seen unequal progress, bridges have been rebuilt and portions completed, the final legs and riverine components of Kaladan have been postponed due to the security situation in Myanmar. The practical reading is that although connection is still essential to India’s Act East, schedules need to be balanced with marine options.

In this regard, port-led manufacturing that connects directly to ASEAN industrial networks around the Bay of Bengal is supported by the East Coast Economic Corridor (ECEC)[xi] and its initial phase, the Visakhapatnam–Chennai Industrial Corridor (VCIC), which was created in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank.

In addition to land links vulnerable to continental shocks, this serves as India’s “sea bridge” to ASEAN.

Digital Corridors: DPI, Payments, and Standards as Strategy

Digital railroads can still transport value even if roadways are slow. A Joint Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation was adopted by ASEAN and India in October 2024[xii], specifically highlighting collaboration on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) from identity rails to real-time payments and open-API ecosystems.

The most obvious proof of concept is the 2023 operationalisation of the UPI–PayNow connection between Singapore and India[xiii], which has subtly emerged as a paradigm for affordable, interoperable cross-border retail payments and MSME invoicing.

In the meantime, DPI’s growth implications are being studied by ASEAN’s own research environment, which makes it logical for India to export standards and architecture rather of merely software. For New Delhi, this is an industrial strategy in another way: integrate digital railroads in the Indian model into ASEAN markets now, and future service and trust trade will follow.  

Security and the Maritime Turn: Exercises, MDA and ADMM-Plus

The naval component is India’s most visible “Act East” move. In the first ASEAN–India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023)[xiv], which involved 1,400–1,800 troops, nine ships, and several aircraft, India transitioned from bilateral exercises to multilateral operations with seven ASEAN navies during the port phase in Singapore and the sea phase in the South China Sea.

Following that, India intensified its bilateral naval combat training with ASEAN nations, high-tempo coordinated patrols (CORPAT)[xv] with Indonesia and Thailand in the Andaman Sea approaches, SIMBEX[xvi] with Singapore in 2024 and 2025, and Samudra Shakti-25 with Indonesia.

Silently, maritime domain awareness (MDA) makes it possible. By connecting liaison officers and centres throughout the littorals, India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR)[xvii] in Gurugram improves incident response and cueing from the Malacca funnel westwards.

On top of this, India supports ASEAN-led standards on overflight, unhindered trade, and crisis communications through its involvement in ADMM-Plus[xviii] and EAS (EAST ASIA SUMMIT), two political-military frameworks.

How Southeast Asia serves India’s geopolitical interests

Southeast Asia serves as India’s eastern maritime gateway to development and security. Three factors provide an explanation.

Chokepoint leverage comes first. Nearly 30% of all international traffic passes through the Strait of Malacca[xix], and the western mouth of this funnel is home to India’s Andaman & Nicobar Command[xx], its sole tri-service theatre command.

Because of its location, India has an unparalleled advantage in protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that supply energy to East Asia as well as India’s export lifelines.

The capacity to view and communicate across the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok axes is known as domain awareness deterrence.

The second is supply-chain flexibility. With FDI reaching a record $230 billion in 2023[xxi] and Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand solidifying their positions in semiconductors and smartphones, ASEAN has emerged as a significant hub for electronics, automotive, and green production.

Components here, assembly there, and vice versa are co-location techniques that lower single-country risk for India, establish two-way parts commerce (e.g., Vietnam’s increasing electronics exports to India)[xxii], and strengthen political interdependence.

In a nutshell, Southeast Asia is more than just a market; it is India’s hedge and partner in rewiring global supply networks.

Third, the middle ground and conventions. India is able to pursue a rules-forward Indo-Pacific agenda without inciting bloc politics thanks to ASEAN’s practice of fostering agreement over charter based, non-coercive solutions, which are enshrined in TAC.

India can cooperate on disaster relief, maritime ecology, and scientific exchanges that stabilise the periphery even as major-power competition intensifies thanks to the AOIP-IPOI alignment, which is compatible with Indian values.[xxiii]

The RCEP Decision and the AITIGA Workaround

India’s controversial decision to withdraw from the RCEP in 2019[xxiv] has had a clarifying effect; instead of joining a mega-FTA where its concerns about import surges and rules-of-origin discipline were not adequately addressed, New Delhi has chosen to deepen its relationship with ASEAN through AITIGA modernisation.

Notably, India can still join the RCEP legally[xxv], and the AITIGA study is already filling in a lot of the efficiency gaps that Indian exporters encountered in ASEAN markets. Instead of agreeing to a universal tariff decrease, India is actually constructing functional regionalism, or sectoral integration where interests converge.

People, Startups, and Science: Soft Power Multiplier

India has tapped into ASEAN’s innovative energy in addition to ships and tariffs.

With hundreds of students from all ASEAN countries participating, the ASEAN–India Hackathon (2021)[xxvi] created a collaborative model in blue economy and education challenges; the ASEAN–India Start-up Festival (2024)[xxvii] in New Delhi featured more than 100 start-ups and incubators from both sides and ASEAN’s 2024 ScaleHub initiative in Bali put the ecosystem into overdrive.

These are small but effective conduits that transform goodwill into networks of founders, venture capital interest, and knowledge with standards often disregarded yet essential for a successful collaboration.

The Nuts and Bolts most deaders Miss

First of all, the new ASEAN–India Plan of Action (2026–2030)[xxviii] is not only another political document; it includes cross-pillar cooperation, an upgrade in monitoring, and alignment with the upcoming APASTI 2026–2035[xxix] in science, tech, and innovation as well as ASEAN’s own AEC Strategic Plan (2026–2030)[xxx].

That bureaucratic structure exactly the machinery that converts high-level declarations into program budgets determines which line ministries meet, what receives funding, and how progress is tracked.   

The ASEAN-India Plan of Action for Science, Technology, and Innovation is known as APASATI. Aiming for sustainable development and innovation-driven growth in ASEAN and India, it is a strategic plan to strengthen regional collaboration in the scientific and technological domains.

Second, the AIME-2023[xxxi] scenario is important because it demonstrates that ASEAN feels at ease holding maritime phases with India in the South China maritime while Singapore serves as co-host. This is a testament to ASEAN’s belief in India’s ability to maintain the status quo rather than undermine it.

The Singapore Navy[xxxii] and PIB readouts provide the participation data, which includes ships, planes, and personnel. It is significant not for bean-counting but rather for signalling interoperability procedures that are carried over into HADR operations and ADMM-Plus table tops.

Third, the emergence of fusion of maritime information is not a side event. Quicker reactions to illicit fishing, gray-zone harassment, and piracy are made possible by the IFC-IOR network[xxxiii], which provides ASEAN coast guards and warships with a common operational picture west of Malacca. Shared data is shared leverage in crisis signalling.

India-Singapore and India-Indonesia: Two lanes to the same sea

India has established a naval routine (SIMBEX’s more than 30 iterations)[xxxiv], a payments rail (UPI–PayNow), and a regulatory partnership based on fintech and maritime expertise with Singapore[xxxv]. This is a small representation of total cooperation: standards, security, and funding.

In a nation that is now at the centre of the nickel-battery business, India has doubled bilateral exercises (Samudra Shakti) and coordinated patrols (IND-INDO CORPAT)[xxxvi] with Indonesia while investigating critical-minerals discussions.

By connecting back into the ASEAN hub, these bilateral arcs subtly expand India’s “surface area” by connecting it to the sea lanes and supply chains of the region.

The China variable handled the ASEAN way

A China-centric perspective is frequently used to interpret India’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia. Although that cannot be avoided, ASEAN favours inclusion over exclusion in order to achieve balance. New Delhi[xxxvii] has pushed its maritime, connectivity, and standards agenda without pressuring ASEAN to make decisions by enclosing India’s advocacy within AOIP’s inclusive syntax and giving ASEAN-chaired meetings (EAS, ADMM-Plus) precedence. For this reason, since 2021, ASEAN leaders have been at ease promoting the relationship to CSP and including AOIP-IPOI alignment[xxxviii] into meetings. India has not asked ASEAN to take sides, instead, it has sought to increase capacity and lower friction. 

Risks and frictions: Mayanmar, NTMs, and politics of mega FTAs

The story is complicated by three headwinds. The Trilateral Highway and Kaladan are subject to increased costs and schedules due to the Myanmar conflict, necessitating backup plans using air freight and maritime gateways.[xxxix]

The technical portions of the AITIGA review are extremely important because non-tariff measures (NTMs)[xl], standards divergence, and rules-of-origin complexity continue to be the daily challenges faced by Indian MSMEs attempting to expand in ASEAN markets.

In order to avoid losing momentum to rivals who benefit from RCEP benefits[xli], New Delhi must work double time with like-minded ASEAN economies to create “coalitions of the willing” on modernising customs, e-invoicing, and service mobility. This is despite India’s deliberate decision to opt out of the RCEP. 

What changed after 2014?

India carries more weight in ASEAN now for a number of tangible and cumulative reasons. Initially, India’s vision aligned with ASEAN’s lexicon.

India demonstrated that it is a norm-shaper and a norm-taker rather than a norm-breaker by adopting AOIP and making ASEAN centrality the focal point of its Indo-Pacific narrative.

Second, through IFC-IOR, India provided MDA with capabilities that reduce regional vulnerability, particularly in the Andaman–Malacca seam, including AIME and SIMBEX.

Third, India provided choices for digital rails and payments, a legitimate public-goods road with immediate and noticeable benefits for migrants and MSMEs.

Fourth, India gave ASEAN a dependable partner on the Bay of Bengal side of the Indo-Pacific production map by moving from general economic discussions to the specific task of AITIGA modernization and port-led manufacturing on the east coast. In Southeast Asia, those four changes are the defining characteristics of the Modi doctrine.

Looking Forward: Five Actionable Lines

Complete the AITIGA task first, including securing rules-of-origin transparency, piloting mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in important sectors, and creating a digital trade annex that aligns with ASEAN capacity.

Second, use the 2024 digital statement as a framework to expand DPI trials outside of Singapore, including remittances and MSME e-commerce rails with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Third, train together for HADR, the security good with the lowest political impact, and institutionalise MDA sharing through IFC-IOR links with ASEAN marine centres.

Fourth, de-risk connectivity, continue to develop ECEC/VCIC as the maritime equivalent of land corridors that are susceptible to the conflict dynamics in Myanmar.

Fifth, establish clear benchmarks for AOIP-IPOI project pipelines under the new 2026–2030 POA[xlii] so that each summit may demonstrate measurable, incremental results. 

Conclusion

When considered collectively, the last ten years show that India’s ASEAN strategy has progressed from aspiration to implementation, and the Modi Doctrine, which is based on Act East 2.0, SAGAR, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), has offered a logical framework for doing so.

By aligning with ASEAN centrality, investing in digital and hard connectivity, and providing maritime public goods that lower risk for all users of the region’s sea lanes, India can add tangible capacity to Southeast Asia without requiring it to take sides, according to the doctrine’s main wager.

New Delhi now uses ASEAN’s own institutions to turn rhetoric into practice, exactly how lasting influence is established in this region of the world.

This is confirmed by India’s increased role in trade facilitation (the ongoing modernization of AITIGA), cross-border payments and identity rails (DPI cooperation), and multilateral naval routines (AIME, SIMBEX, and CORPATs).

The doctrine’s practicality is demonstrated by the economic pillar. Instead, India decided to take a functionalist approach and modernise the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement, which is where the frictions are: rules of origin, NTMs/standards, customs cooperation, and digital trade facilitation.

This will make it easier and more predictable for small businesses to trade. Although this “plumbing first” strategy isn’t as glamorous as tariff great agreements, supply networks and ASEAN bureaucrats both value it. Connectivity is animated by the same logic.

The East Coast Economic Corridor/VCIC offers a parallel, robust Bay of Bengal bridge to ASEAN industrial networks at sea, while the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan projects connect India’s Northeast to mainland Southeast Asian markets on land.

New Delhi has demonstrated a mature understanding of the region’s risk profile and ASEAN’s demand for multiple pathways to integration by purposefully creating redundancy between continental and maritime corridors an explicit buffer against delays caused by Myanmar.

Digital statecraft is perhaps the area where the doctrine has innovated the most. An ASEAN demand for affordable, interoperable rails for individuals, MSMEs, and public services is met by India’s export of digital public infrastructure, including identification, payments, and open APIs.

In addition to being a bilateral convenience, the UPI–PayNow link serves as a proof-of-concept for a larger ASEAN–India digital corridor that reduces remittance costs, speeds up settlement cycles, and enables cross-border micro-commerce.

In a region where standards are just as important as steel, India’s choice to compete on the basis of architecture and trust rather than just apps seems wise and well aligned with AOIP’s inclusive grammar.

The doctrine’s public-goods reasoning is especially evident in the area of security. The transition from intermittent bilateral exercises to multilateral operations with ASEAN navies (AIME-2023) and the subdued development of maritime domain awareness through the IFC-IOR have improved response speed and transparency along the Andaman–Malacca strait, which is arguably the most important chokepoint for the prosperity of both East Asia and India.

Southeast Asian governments have embraced these because they are stability services provided under ASEAN chairs (EAS, ADMM-Plus), not alliance gestures. In order to match the hub-and-spoke reality of ASEAN cooperation with bilateral horsepower where it counts (payments, ports, patrols, and now vital minerals), India has simultaneously deepened country-level lanes, particularly with Singapore and Indonesia.

Importantly, the doctrine has addressed the China variable in the ASEAN manner. India has positioned itself as a norm-taker and norm-shaper rather than a norm breaker by embracing AOIP’s terminology and eschewing bloc politics.

This has allowed ASEAN to write AOIP–IPOI complementarities into subsequent summit texts and elevate the partnership to the status of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

To put it another way, rather than increasing political pressure, New Delhi has gained weight by reducing friction and enhancing the regional operating system.

There are still issues to address. Land-corridor timetables will continue to be tested by Myanmar’s war; exporters will continue to be frustrated by non-tariff measures and standards divergence; and India will need to put in twice as much effort to provide the benefits that businesses anticipate from deep integration because it chose not to participate in the RCEP.

However, these obstacles are already anticipated by the doctrine. It disperses risk over land and sea, replaces latency in physical rails with digital ones, gives technical chapters precedence over catchphrases in trade negotiations, and intensifies HADR and MDA where security cooperation is most useful and least political.

To keep this machine going in between summits, the new ASEAN–India Plan of Action (2026–2030) includes cross-pillar tasking, institutional muscle monitoring, and alignment with ASEAN’s own strategic plans.

References

[i] ASEAN. (2025). Final Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 2026-2030. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

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[v] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (1976). Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. https://asean.org/legal-instrument/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia/

[vi] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2020, February 7). Indo-Pacific Division Briefs. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf

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[viii] Statista. (2024, March). Value of Indian trade with ASEAN countries in financial year 2023, by country (in million U.S. dollars). https://www.statista.com/statistics/650795/trade-value-asean-countries-with-india/#:~:text=The%20value%20of%20trade%20between

[ix] Diplomacy India. (2024, August 4). ASEAN-India trade talks in Jakarta pave way for closer ties. Diplomacy India. https://diplomacyindia.com/asean-india-trade-talks-in-jakarta-pave-way-for-closer-ties/

[x] Nair, S. P. (2025). Analysis of the connectivity parameters of the proposed Trilateral Highway (TH) between India, Myanmar and Thailand (IMT), the industrial corridor and its impact on the economic development of Southeast Asia. International Journal of Current Science Research and Review, 8(9), 4512-4517. https://doi.org/10.47191/ijcsrr/V8-i9-13

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[xii] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), & Government of India. (2024, October 10). ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38397%2FASEANIndia_Joint_Statement_on_Advancing_Digital_Transformation

[xiii] Monetary Authority of Singapore. (2023). Launch of real-time payments between Singapore and India. [Website]. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2023/launch-of-real-time-payments-between-singapore-and-india

[xiv] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2023, May 8). Sea phase of ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise – 2023. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1922815

[xv] Consulate General of India, Medan. (n.d.).   https://www.cgimedan.gov.in/event_detail/?eventid=191

[xvi] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2024, October). Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070205

[xvii] Indian Navy. (n.d.). Indian Ocean Region Information Fusion Centre.  https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/

[xviii] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2023, November 15). Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh to attend 10th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, Indonesia on November 16, 2023. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1976783

[xix] Jacobson, R. (2024, February). These are the world’s most vital waterways for global trade. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/02/worlds-busiest-ocean-shipping-routes-trade/

[xx] Ways to strengthen the U.S.-Indian naval partnership. Proceedings Magazine. U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/ways-strengthen-us-indian-naval-partnership

[xxi] ASEAN. (2024). ASEAN integration report 2024 (Issue 3). ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AIR2024-3.pdf

[xxii] Vietnam News. (2025, October 21). Việt Nam and India trade reached $15 billion in 2024. Vietnam News. https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/1691657/viet-nam-and-india-trade-reached-15-billion-in-2024.html

[xxiii] ASEAN & Government of India. (2021). ASEAN-India joint statement on cooperation on the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf

[xxiv] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep

[xxv] Asian Development Bank. (2020). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Overview and economic impact (ADB Brief No. 164). Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/664096/adb-brief-164-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.pdf

[xxvi] Press Information Bureau. (2021, February 4). 1st ASEAN-India Hackathon 2021 concludes. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1695404

[xxvii] Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur. (2024). ASEAN-India Start-up Festival 2024 concludes. IIT Kanpur. https://www.iitk.ac.in/new/asean-india-start-up-festival-2024-concludes

[xxviii] ASEAN. (2025). Final plan of action to implement ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

[xxix] ASEAN Secretariat. (2025). ASEAN Plan of Action on Science, Technology and Innovation (APASTI) 2026-2035. ASEAN Secretariat. https://akstcc.org/cfind/source/files/asean_apasti_spreads_f04_.pdf

[xxx] ASEAN. (2025). ASEAN Economic Community strategic plan 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/AEC-Strategic-Plan-2026-2030.pdf

[xxxi] Press Information Bureau. (2023, May 1). ASEAN India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023). Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1921224

[xxxii] The Diplomat. (2023, May). India, ASEAN hold first maritime exercises. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/india-asean-hold-first-maritime-exercises/

[xxxiii] Indian Navy. (n.d.). Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). Indian Navy. https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/

[xxxiv] Press Information Bureau. (2024, October 23). Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070205

[xxxv] Reserve Bank of India. (n.d.). FAQs on UPI-PayNow linkage for cross-border remittances between India and Singapore. https://www.rbi.org.in/commonperson/english/scripts/FAQs.aspx?Id=3415

[xxxvi] Consulate General of India, Medan. (n.d.). Event detail: [Event ID 191]. Consulate General of India, Medan. https://www.cgimedan.gov.in/event_detail/?eventid=191

[xxxvii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (n.d.). Joint statement on strengthening ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership for peace, stability and prosperity in the region in the context of the [URL truncated for clarity]. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38396%2FJoint_Statement_on_Strengthening_ASEANIndia_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership_for_Peace_Stability_and_Prosperity_in_the_Region_in_the_context_of_the

[xxxviii] ASEAN & Government of India. (2021). ASEAN-India joint statement on cooperation on the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf

[xxxix] The proposed India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral expressway: Regional connectivity and economic implications. International Journal of Current Science Research and Reviews. https://ijcsrr.org/single-view/?id=23960&pid=23903

[xl] New Straits Times. (2025, October). Mutually beneficial ASEAN-India cooperation. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/business/2025/10/1289860/mutually-beneficial-asean-india-cooperation

[xli] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep

[xlii] ASEAN. (2025). Final plan of action to implement ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

Turkish state broadcaster TRT singles out India’s Tata over Israel ties, fails to mention Turkiye among ports supplying Israel

Anurag
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Turkish state broadcaster TRT singles out India’s Tata over Israel ties, fails to mention Turkiye among ports supplying Israel

On 24th October (local time), Turkish state broadcaster TRT targeted India’s Tata Group, claiming that the conglomerate is “at the heart of the India-Israel military alliance”. In doing so, TRT quoted a UN report that, interestingly, categorically mentions Türkiye as one of the ports known to have facilitated the trans-shipment of F-35 parts, weapons, jet fuel, oil, and other materials to Israel. The contradiction is glaring, while TRT paints India as complicit, it conveniently ignores that its own country has been named in the same UN document that it used in its report against India, which is based on a report by a US-based South Asian political collective called South Asian Left Activist Movement (SALAM).

TRT singled Tata Group for having military ties with Israel

The report that TRT published was based on the findings of a US-based South Asian political collective called ‘SALAM’. In its report, TRT accused Tata Group of being “a key enabler of Israel’s system of control over Palestinians” while citing SALAM’s claims that Tata provided “the hardware of genocide and the machinery of daily oppression.” The report further claimed that Tata’s subsidiaries are deeply embedded in Israel’s military-industrial network, which includes manufacturing fuselages for Apache helicopters and providing digital infrastructure for Israel’s government and financial systems.

Source: TRT World

The Turkish state broadcaster positioned Tata’s collaboration with Israeli firms as part of a broader “occupation economy” and extended its role beyond defence to cloud computing and surveillance technologies. It even framed Tata’s sponsorship of the New York City Marathon as “sportswashing”, designed to distract from its alleged complicity.

What SALAM’s report claimed

SALAM has released a 50-page document titled “Architects of Occupation: The Tata Group, Indian Capital, and the India-Israel Alliance”, in which the group claimed that Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) produces parts for F-16 fighter jets and Apache helicopters, both of which are used by Israel’s Air Force. It also claimed that Tata has ties with Israel Aerospace Industries in the production of Barak-8 missile systems and that Tata Motors’ subsidiaries contribute to light armoured vehicles used by Israeli patrols in the West Bank.

On the digital front, SALAM linked Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) to Israel’s “Project Nimbus” cloud initiative and claimed that TCS helped sustain surveillance infrastructure. The report further attempted to link Tata’s economic ventures to ideological affinities and suggested that the India-Israel partnership is rooted in “shared leanings between Zionism and Hindutva.” The narrative of SALAM is clear that it views business cooperation through a political lens by framing India’s growing defence partnership with Israel as morally compromised.

UN report mentioned Türkiye as one of the ports supporting Israel

While attacking Tata Group, TRT quoted the UN Special Rapporteur’s advance unedited version as well, stating that India was among the 26 states that exported arms and ammunition to Israel between October 2023 and October 2025.

However, while quoting the UN report, TRT conveniently skipped the fact that it also explicitly mentioned Türkiye as one of the “ports known to have facilitated trans-shipment to Israel of F-35 parts, weapons, jet fuel, oil and/or other materials”. This statement placed Türkiye, TRT’s home state, within the logistical network that enables the movement of defence supplies to Israel, the very network it accused India of empowering.

Source: United Nations

Even if TRT’s moral outrage is considered genuine, it must extend to its own ports, which, according to the UN, are directly involved in the flow of military and energy supplies to Israel. The broadcaster’s silence on this fact raises questions about intent — whether the report was meant to expose the so-called global complicity, or whether it was written merely to target India for political optics.

The hypocrisy play

TRT selectively framed Tata, which appears less about journalistic investigation and more about preserving national optics. It projected India as the face of Israel’s so-called “occupation economy” and attempted to redirect global attention from Türkiye’s own complicity mentioned in the UN report. The broadcaster’s omission makes one thing clear: it is easy to moralise from a distance while ignoring facts that sit close to home.

The India-Israel relationship has always been pragmatic and transparent. New Delhi has maintained neutrality on the Palestine issue and continued humanitarian aid to Gaza through UNRWA. On the other hand, New Delhi has deepened strategic defence and technological ties with Jerusalem, primarily to enhance self-reliance and counter terrorism. Unlike Türkiye, India has never masked its position under contradictory posturing.

Conclusion

TRT’s report, which is based on SALAM’s highly ideological publication, weaponised selective outrage to vilify India. While doing so, it bypassed inconvenient UN findings that implicated Türkiye. If transparency and accountability were the goals that TRT aimed for, the Turkish state media failed miserably. Until it addresses its own country’s role in the arms and energy routes to Israel, TRT should refrain from lecturing others on “occupation economies”. And even if TRT someday does so, it has no right to lecture any country or business house, including India and Tata, on how to do business.

Fact check: Congress, SP and Bhim Army falsely claim ‘upper-caste’ men killed Dalit teen in Greater Noida – here is the truth

Anurag
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Fact check: Congress, SP and Bhim Army falsely claim ‘upper-caste’ men killed Dalit teen in Greater Noida – here is the truth

On 25th October, National Spokesperson of the Indian National Congress, Dr Shama Mohamed, claimed on social media platform X that “upper-caste goons” brutally beat up a 17-year-old Dalit boy, Aniket, in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, on his birthday. The victim succumbed to his injuries at the hospital while receiving treatment on 24th October. She wrote, “Every week or two, we see reports of Dalits being killed in BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh. Narendra Modi and his double-engine governments have completely failed to protect the lives of Dalits.”

Source: X

Congress was not the only one to push the “Dalit vs Upper Caste” narrative in the matter. While the Samajwadi Party’s media cell claimed the accused were from the “Thakur” community, Bhim Army chief used the term “dabang” to run a similar narrative.

In a post on X, the Samajwadi Party’s media cell wrote, “A few days ago, in Noida, a Dalit boy was brutally attacked and severely beaten by boys from the dominant Thakur caste in UP, and now that Dalit boy has died. His family is crying out in grief and despair.” Interestingly, the screenshots of news reports shared in the post did not mention “Thakur”.

Source: X

Bhim Army chief Chandra Shekhar Azad called them “Jatankwadi”.

Source: X

While Shama Mohamed and others claimed the “upper-caste goons” or “Thakurs” assaulted Aniket, in reality, the accused belong to the Meena community, which is categorised as a Scheduled Tribe, not “upper caste.”

What the FIR says

OpIndia accessed the FIR registered in the matter. The FIR was registered on 17th October, two days after the incident, based on the complaint of the victim’s uncle, Momchand, under Sections 191(2), 190, 115(2), 352, 109 and 309(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Sections 3(1)(d) and 3(1)(dh) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. As the victim has died, Section 103(2) of the BNS (murder) has been added.

The FIR is registered against seven named accused and 10–12 unidentified individuals. The names of the accused, according to the complaint, are Yuvraj, Jeetu, Rachit, Bharat, Anjit, Pawan and Sunit. All of the accused are residents of the same locality and belong to the Meena community, however, the FIR does not explicitly mention it. The accused’s caste details were revealed by the police in a statement.

According to the complainant, his younger brother Sumit had gone with his nephew Aniket and his friends Rajkaran and Shiva to celebrate Aniket’s birthday near Syed Pokar. They were standing on the 20-foot road when a boy named Asif came, saw them and left without saying anything.

Source: UP Police

A short while later, Yuvraj, the main accused, Jeetu, Rachit, Bharat, Ankit, Pawan, Sunit and 10–12 others arrived carrying sticks and iron rods. They began hurling abuses and casteist slurs at his brother and Aniket. They called them “Chamar” and “Dhed” and said, “We will show you your place”, before attacking them.

Sumit sustained injuries to his head and Aniket was brutally beaten. Both of them were thrown into nearby bushes. Aniket was unconscious at that time. Shiva and one other person present managed to escape from the attack and saved their lives. Later, they searched for Aniket for an hour and found him lying unconscious in the bushes.

Later, when Aniket and Sumit were rushed to the hospital, it was found that Aniket had deep head wounds at three to four places. Aniket was admitted to the hospital in critical condition.

During the assault, the accused reportedly snatched a gold chain from Sumit and took his iPhone. The complainant mentioned that the accused had beaten up Aniket a few days back as well and threatened to kill him.

Sumit was discharged from the hospital two days after the incident. However, Aniket continued to fight for his life. On 24th October, Aniket succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

Several individuals arrested by the police

On 19th October, police arrested Yuvraj Meena and Jitu Meera, two days after the FIR was registered. Four teams were formed to apprehend the remaining accused. Rachit and Ankit were arrested later on 24th October. Further search for the remaining accused is underway.

According to the police, 17-year-old Aniket Jatav was beaten up on 15th October and he died on 24th October. The accused belonged to the Meena community, the police confirmed.

“We had earlier arrested two accused on 19th October, Yuvraj Meena and Jitu Meena, who were residents of the same area, and sent them to jail. Four teams have been formed to quickly arrest the remaining accused,” the Noida Police said in a statement.

Speaking to the media, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Greater Noida 4, Sarthak Sengar, said that the victims and accused had previous altercations and the reason for the same is still unclear. He said, “They were young boys and it was not the first time that they had arguments.”

ACP Sengar added that following the altercation, the victim was admitted to the hospital with severe injuries and was recovering. However, on 23rd October, his health deteriorated and he succumbed to the injuries on the morning of 24th October.

Political response to the incident

Following the incident, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MLA from Jewar, Dhirendra Singh, visited the family. He also briefed Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath about the incident. When Dhirendra Singh went to meet the family, CM Yogi talked to them over the phone and assured justice.

Local BSP and Samajwadi Party leaders also met the family and promised their support.

The accused were not from the upper caste, as propagated by opposition parties

While political parties and activists rushed to frame the incident as another “Dalit versus upper caste” crime, police records and statements reveal a different reality. The accused in the case belong to the Meena community, which falls under the Scheduled Tribe category, not an upper-caste group as claimed by Congress, the Samajwadi Party and the Bhim Army. The narrative pushed online therefore appears to be politically motivated and factually incorrect, aimed at fuelling caste-based outrage rather than reflecting the facts of the case.

Jaisalmer bus fire: Rampant corruption in registrations, substandard fittings, safety rule violations found in inspections, action taken against over 1500 buses

Divya Bharti
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Jaisalmer bus fire: Rampant corruption in registrations, substandard fittings, safety rule violations found in inspections, action taken against over 1500 buses

The bus fire near Jaisalmer on October 14, which tragically killed 26 people, was caused by a short circuit in the air conditioning, an official forensic (FSL) report has confirmed. The bus was on its way from Jaisalmer to Jodhpur and had only travelled about 10 kilometres when the fire started. The investigation has completely ruled out any kind of bomb, explosion, or firecrackers. Instead, it points to a “gross negligence” by the people who owned and built the bus.

How the fire spread so fast

Jaisalmer’s SP (Superintendent of Police), Abhishek Shivhare, explained exactly what the report found. The fire started from a short circuit in the AC’s faulty wiring, which was on the roof and connected to the engine. This caused the air conditioning pipes to fill with thick, poisonous smoke and carbon monoxide gas, which then spread everywhere inside the bus.

Before the bus was completely engulfed in fire, passengers were having trouble breathing. They started to suffocate and couldn’t move quickly to get out. In a panic, passengers started breaking the glass windows to escape. But authorities explained that this actually worsened the situation.

The fresh oxygen from outside rushed in and “snowballed” the fire, turning the whole bus into an inferno that burned completely in just 5 to 7 minutes.

Rumours about explosives are false

The police were very clear that rumours about firecrackers or explosives are baseless. The FSL report conclusively proves there wasn’t even a trace of any explosive material. They did find some unburnt firecrackers near the main door and about 35 potash guns (the kind farmers use to scare animals) in the back storage area, but none of them had anything to do with the fire. The bus’s diesel tank and tyres were also completely safe, proving the fire started from a technical fault.

A preventable tragedy built on greed

This whole tragedy could have been prevented. The investigation found several irregularities that were likely done just to make unethical gains. The AC wiring was installed unsafely, and the materials used to build the bus body were not fire-resistant, meaning they burned very easily.

Worst of all, the bus was missing the most basic safety gear. There was no fire extinguisher and no emergency hammers to break the windows. Most shockingly, investigators found that a seat had been placed right at the emergency exit, making it completely useless. Officials said timely inspection and proper technical fitting would have stopped this from ever happening.

The government seizes 66 buses from the owner’s factory

The Rajasthan government took several actions after the fire. The Transport Department seized all 66 bus chassis from the owner’s (Manish Jain’s) factory, Jainam Coach Crafts Workshop, and is now preparing to cancel their fraudulent registrations. They also launched a 10-day state-wide campaign, inspecting 2,000 buses, which resulted in 398 buses being seized and 1,089 being fined for safety violations.

The investigation showed that the owner, who also runs Jain Travels, made several low-quality, dangerous changes to the bus that burned. The bus was illegally modified with an AC unit after being registered as a non-AC vehicle, which overloaded the wiring and caused the fire.

Furthermore, the owner violated safety standards by installing an emergency gate that was completely blocked by placing two seats in front of it. The bus’s size was also illegally extended just to add more seats and sleeper berths.

RTO officers and builders colluded in registration fraud

According to a report by Bhaskar, the investigation revealed a clear collusion between RTO (Regional Transport Office) officers and bus coach builders who were processing fraudulent registrations for these unsafe buses. RTO officials were approving buses that weren’t even finished. At the Jainam workshop, officers found that 26 buses had been registered before their bodies were even built. This fraud was widespread, with these paper registrations filed not only in Rajasthan but also in Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Nagaland, and Assam.

The report highlights how deep the collusion was, noting that in Rajasthan, “an RTO inspector verified three of the five buses before their bodies were built,” acting as if they were complete, and one of those buses was even fully registered in RTO regions like Jodhpur, Chittorgarh, Sikar, and Bikaner.

Three people arrested

Because of this gross failure to follow safety rules, police have now arrested three people. The Special Investigation Team (SIT) set up by the government has arrested the bus driver, the bus owner, and Manish Jain, the owner of the factory that built the bus body. The investigation is still proceeding as more details come in.

WaPo tries to pull off a Hindenburg, misleads about LIC’s publicly known investment in Adani Group through dubious ‘journalists’, ‘experts’ and non-existent ‘internal documents’

Dibakar Dutta
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WaPo tries to pull off a Hindenburg, misleads about LIC’s publicly known investment in Adani Group through dubious ‘journalists’, ‘experts’ and non-existent ‘internal documents’

On Friday (24th October), The Washington Post attempted to tarnish the reputation of the Adani Group and target the Modi government by making unsubstantiated claims of crony capitalism.

A hit-piece to this effect titled ‘India’s $3.9 billion plan to help Modi’s mogul ally after U.S. charges’ was published by the American leftist newspaper.

The Washington Post claimed to have accessed ‘internal documents’ exclusively, which somehow suggests that the Modi govt and its officials somehow ‘coerced’ the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) to invest ₹5000 crores in the Indian conglomerate.

It alleged, “Internal documents obtained exclusively by The Washington Post detail how Indian officials drafted and pushed through a proposal in May to steer roughly $3.9 billion in investments to Adani’s businesses from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, or LIC — a state-owned entity primarily responsible for providing life insurance to poor and rural families.“

Screengrab of the propaganda piece in the Washington Post

While the Washington Post tried to pass off the news as some exclusive information, the investment by LIC was acknowledged by none other than the Adani Group itself in a press release in May this year.

“Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), India’s largest integrated transport utility, has successfully raised INR 5,000 crore through a 15-year Non-Convertible Debenture (NCD). Backed by APSEZ’s strong financials and a ‘AAA/Stable’ domestic credit rating, the issue locked in a competitive coupon rate of 7.75% p.a. and was fully subscribed by LIC. The debentures will be listed on the BSE,” the Indian conglomerate had said.

For the unversed, NCD is a fixed-income instrument which companies use to raise funds without allowing the option of converting to equity shares. In the particular LIC-Adani deal, the insurance entity will receive regular interest payments at 7.75% pa. The principal amount of ₹5000 crores will also be returned to it on maturity, i.e. in the year 2040.

Given the nature of LIC, the investment in Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited will provide it with a predictable income stream with low risk (given the AAA/ Stable domestic credit rating).

At the same time, it is important to point out that the Indian public sector life insurance company has invested heavily in several private companies.

For instance, LIC’s top holdings include Reliance Industries (₹1.38 lakh crore), ITC Ltd (₹82,342 crore), HDFC Bank, TCS, IDBI Bank, ICICI Bank, Bharti Airtel, SBI, L&T, and Infosys.

As such, it is not unusual for LIC to invest in Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), either and that too an amount of ₹5000 crores.

But this did not stop ‘The Washington Post’ from alleging that the Modi government was somehow directing taxpayer money to bail out an Indian conglomerate ‘reeling under debt.’

The non-existent ‘internal documents’ referred to by The Washington Post apparently suggest that the Indian Department of Financial Services (DFS) warned LIC against investment in Adani Group.

The American newspaper alleged, “The DFS documents acknowledged that the proposed investment strategy came with risks. “Adani’s securities are sensitive to controversies…causing short-term price fluctuations,” one document said.“

It quoted an ‘independent expert’ named Hemindra Hazari in its report to cast aspersions on the motives of the Indian government and the integrity of LIC and the Adani Group.

Having said that, The Washington Post had to grudingly accept that the investments were made through transparent investment rationales, compliance with Indian regulators, exercising due diligence and ensuring economic benefits.

It also referred to the now-debunked Hindenburg report to further peddle unproven claims of ‘crony capitalism’ against the Indian conglomerate.

LIC rubbishes claims made by The Washington Post

In a statement released on Saturday (25th October), the Life Insurance Corporation of India pointed out, “The allegations leveled by the Washington Post that the investment decisions of LIC are influenced by external factors are false, baseless, and far from truth.”

The public sector insurance company also rubbished claims about the existence of any such internal document, which was the only foundation of the article by the American newspaper.

“No such document or plan as alleged in the article has ever been prepared by LIC, which creates a roadmap for infusing funds by LIC into Adani group of companies. The investment decisions are taken by LIC independently as per Board approved policies after detailed due diligence,” LIC emphasised.

It further pointed out that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) or any other entity does not have any role in its decision-making process.

“LIC has ensured highest standards of due diligence and all its investment decisions have been undertaken in compliance with extant policies, provisions in the Acts and regulatory guidelines, in the best interest of all its stakeholders,” it concluded.

Adani Group denies accusations of crony capitalism

The Adani Group has also categorically denied accusations of crony capitalism made by The Washington Post in its article.

“We categorically deny involvement in any alleged government plans to direct LIC funds…LIC invests across multiple corporate groups — and suggesting preferential treatment for Adani is misleading. Moreover, LIC has earned returns from its exposure to our portfolio. Assertions of undue political favour are unfounded…Our growth predates Mr Modi’s national leadership,” it added.

‘Journalists’ behind the dubious report targeting Adani and Modi govt

One of the ‘journalists’ behind the hit-piece happened to be Pranshu Verma.

OpIndia had reported in December 2023 how he was soliciting information about the Indian OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) handle ‘Disinfo Lab’ from American political commentator Jack Posobiec.

Pranshu Verma, who has been working with The Washington Post since February 2022, hoped to deter Jack Posobiec from sharing informative posts of ‘Disinfo Lab.’

In January 2023, he romanticised an Islamist named Raqib Hameed Naik in an article titled ‘Tracking rising religious hatred in India, from half a world away.’ A vicious fake news peddler, Raqib Hameed Naik is the founder of anti-Hindu disinformation outlet ‘Hindutva Watch.’

Screengrab of the article by Pranshu Verma

He is also infamous for denying the Hindu genocide, perpetrated by radical Islamists in the Kashmir Valley, in the early 1990s. Naik had also mocked the Hindu ‘Shivling’ found inside the Gyanvapi mosque in Kashi

In his article in January 2023, Pranshu Verma relied on a database provided by ‘DOTO’ to allege that ‘religious hatred’ is on the rise in India.

Coincidentally, ‘Disinfo Lab’ had previously exposed the fabrications of DOTO, following which the latter first revised and then deleted the database.

Another ‘journalist’ who co-authored the article happens to Ravi Nair, a columnist at the leftist propaganda portal ‘The Wire.’

In September this year, a Delhi court ordered him to remove unsubstantiated and defamatory content (based on the lies of Hindenburg Research), which he published to tarnish the reputation of businessman Gautam Adani.

Earlier in February 2025, Ravi Nair peddled lies about the Adani Group in the British newspaper ‘The Guardian.’

Out of desperation to target the Modi government, the ‘journalist’ made a fool out of himself by comparing the Indian rupee with the currency of Afghanistan.

OpIndia had earlier pointed out how an Australian NGO-backed portal, ‘Adani Watch’, retweets almost all misleading articles by Ravi Nair. The ‘journalist’ is known for deriding Hindu sentiments and using Hinduphobic tropes regularly.

He had earlier amplified lies about the Statue of Unity and called for its demolition.

Ravi Nair had been the front-runner in spreading lies about the Rafale Deal and thwarting India’s defence procurement, albeit unsuccessfullly.

How media twisted Allahabad HC’s words: A judgment on forced conversion and trafficking turned into a clickbait tale of ‘unsaid words can cause communal tensions’

Aditi
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How media twisted Allahabad HC’s words: A judgment on forced conversion and trafficking turned into a clickbait tale of ‘unsaid words can cause communal tensions’

In a clear display of bias against the Allahabad High Court, some media outlets published misleading headlines about a recent order of the High Court, which dismissed the petition of a person charged with disturbing communal harmony, seeking the quashing of an FIR against him.

Reporting about the High Court order, Live Law published a report with the headline “Unsaid Words Can Also ‘Promote Enmity’ Under BNS: Allahabad High Court On ‘Subtle’ Religious Undertones In WhatsApp Message”. A plain reading of the headline suggests that the High Court made out an offence where there was none.

Similarly, The Scroll also emphasised the words “Even ‘unsaid’ words can amount to promoting enmity” in the headline of its report on the Allahabad High Court order, insinuating that the High Court wrongly inferred an offence while no act was committed to constitute the offence.

Another media portal, Law Chakra, also used a similar language regarding the High Court order. Its headline read, “Even Unsaid Words Can Spark Communal Tension: Allahabad High Court”.

The abovementioned reports relate to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 23rd October, passed by a division bench of Justices JJ Munir and Pramod Kumar Srivastava. The verdict was passed by the judges after the hearing of a petition filed by an individual booked under Sections 299 and 353(3) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner, Afaq Ahmad, sought the quashing of the FIR filed against him for circulating inflammatory WhatsApp messages after his brother was arrested in a religious conversion case.

“The petitioner, making this arrest of his brother in the case crime last mentioned, a foundation for disturbing communal peace and outraging religious feelings of a class of citizens of India, maliciously sent an inflammatory message to individuals on their mobile phones,” the High Court stated in its order. Explaining the intent of the inflammatory messages shared by the petitioner, the High Court said that in the message, the petitioner alleged that his brother was implicated in a false case because he belonged to a particular religious community.

“The words of the post quoted in the FIR may not speak per se about religion, but definitely convey an underlying and subtle message that his brother has been targeted in a false case, because of his belonging to a particular religious community. These unsaid words in the message prima facie would outrage religious feelings of a class of citizens hailing from a particular community, who would think that they are being targeted because of belonging to a particular religious community,” the court stated.

While the media outlets selectively picked the words used by the High Court, the entire statement of the court reads as, “Quite apart, and, even if one were to think that no religious feelings of a class of citizens or community have been outraged, per se by the WhatsApp message, it is certainly a message, which, by its unsaid words, is likely to create or promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between religious communities, where members of a particular community, in the first instance, could think that they are being targeted by members of another religious community by abusing the process of law”. It is clear from the statement of the High Court that the inflammatory message sent out by the petitioner attempted to promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between religious communities in an indirect manner, without using express words. Notably, the petitioner sent the message to multiple persons to expand its reach.

Maintaining that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner, the High Court rejected his request for quashing the FIR against him. “In the totality of circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is a matter which requires investigation and cannot be scuttled at an incipient stage, foreclosing probe that must be carried to its logical conclusion,” the High Court noted.

It is evident from reading the High Court’s order in its entirety that the media portals attempted to attribute a malicious intent to the High Court in its decision on the petition. While the High Court explained how the petitioner tried to disrupt religious harmony through his inflammatory message in an indirect manner, the media portals cleverly focused on a set of words to raise suspicion about the intent of the High Court.

Assam govt to table Tiwari Commission report on 1983 Nellie Massacre in assembly: Read what it was and why the successive govts never made it public for over 4 decades

Shraddha Pandey
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Assam govt to table Tiwari Commission report on 1983 Nellie Massacre in assembly: Read what it was and why the successive govts never made it public for over 4 decades

On 23rd October 2025, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma announced that his government will table the 1985 Tiwari Commission report on the 1983 Nellie Massacre in state assembly during the upcoming winter session. This would be the first time that real truth of Nellie Massacre will come out after around four decades.

In a press conference on Thursday, CM Sarma said, “In 1983, a massacre occurred in Nellie. At that time, the state government formed a commission called the Tiwari Commission. However, until today, the commission’s report has not been presented in the legislative assembly. In the upcoming November 25th session of the legislative assembly, we have officially decided to present the Tiwari Commission report, which was formed in the context of the 1983 Nellie massacre.”

“Since this is a part of Assam’s history later studied and presented by scientists, historians and social scientists in different ways, making the report available will at least allow people to access accurate information about what happened at that time…” he added.

Nellie Massacre of 1983 and why it took over 40 years to bring out the truth

The Nellie massacre took place on 18th February 1983 in and around Nellie area in central Assam during the height of the Assam Movement or the Anti-Foreigners Agitation. Between 2,000 to 3,000 lives were lost when the villages occupied by Bengali Muslims were attacked by hundreds of indigenous people from nearby areas. Armed with machets, spears and sticks, the mob comprising people belonging to local communities burnt houses and blocked roads killing anyone who tried to escape. Most of the casualties were women and children.

While the official figures put the death toll at 1,819 including 1,327 women and 253 children, human rights groups and scholars estimate that the actual figures were way higher. The local police are alleged to have failed to protect the victims and the situation came under control only after the CRPF arrived.

Notably, twelve out of the fourteen Lok Sabha seats in Assam were vacant since 1980, the year after the anti-foreigner agitation in Assam began. The assembly was likewise dissolved in 1982. Elections had to be held, and on 6th January 1983, it was announced that there voting would take place for the assembly and Lok Sabha seats in four phases.

The election, however, was boycotted by the Assam movement supporters with many political parties not partaking in the elections. Despite this, the elections took place amidst violence and chaos. Eventually, Congress (I) won and formed a government under the leadership of Hiteswar Saikia.

The violence in Nellie erupted during the height of state assembly elections in Assam, which took place amid the Assam agitation, a movement led by the All-Assam Students Union (AASU) demanding detection and deportation of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and deletion of their names from voter lists. They feared that an unchecked influx of Bangladeshis would alter the demographic composition of the state.

On 18th February 1983, the attacks began in Nellie which now comes under Nagaon district, when tensions peaked amidst the Assam Agitation. Within hours on that day, mobs comprising people from the indigenous Tiwa community, local Bodos and others stormed 14 villages housing Bengali-speaking Muslims around Nellie. During this massacre, the state was under President’s rule.

It is also alleged that Assam police perssonnel misled CRPF troops away from the massacre site, allowing the killing to go on. However, this claim remains unverified, which could be one of the major findings in the report.

The violence erupted on the day of voting Assam’s state assembly elections. These elections were pushed forward by the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi-led Congress government in Centre. The Congress-led central government decided to proceed with the state elections without addressing the demands of AASU and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) for a revised electoral roll which could have weeded out illegal voters including undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants. It is said that the elections were conducted in a haste even as demands for revision of electoral roll were raging.

Post the massacre, in another agitation-filled election, Congress government came to power in 1984, where mostly the Bengali-majority areas voted.

After the Nellie massacre left thousands of people dead, the Congress government in the state headed by Hiteswar Saikia established the Tiwari Commission headed by IAS officer Tribhubhan Prasad Tiwari to investigate the causes that led to the violence, identify culprits, and recommend actions. The commisson submitted a 600-page report in 1984 to then Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia. However, the report was never tabled in the assembly or made public. Reports say that only three classified copies were retained in government archives.

Tribhubhan Prasad Tiwari

As a precondition to the signing of the Assam Accord, the Congress (I) government was dissolved prematurely. Riding on the sympathy wave after Indira Gnadhi’s assassination, her son Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister. He signed the Assam Accord in 1985 where 1 January 1966 became the base year for detecting foreigners and 24th March 1971 was decided as the cut-off date for detecting illegal foreigners and removing them from the electoral rolls.

Ram Pradhan, the Union Home Secretary who negotiated the Assam Accord with AASU said that Rajiv Gandhi did not pursue the Assam Accord because “it would have impacted Congress’ (Muslim) votebank”.

About the survey to identify illegals, Ram Pradhan said,“This was a part of the accord, but they realised that the survey would seriously impair the votebank of the Congress”.

Following the Assam Accord which was signed a year after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 194, state assembly elections were held and the leaders of Anti-Foreigners Movement won a majority and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) formed government with Prafulla Kumar Mahanta becoming the youngest Chief Minister of the state.

Interestingly, the BJP government recognised the 885 AASU members who died during the Assam Anti-Foreigners Movement as “martyrs”. The Congress government, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government and the BJP government under Sarbananda Sonowal also gave them financial compensations.

Coming back to the Nellie Massacre and the Tiwari Commission report, although the commission reportedly submitted its report in 1984, the Hiteswar Saikia led Congress government in the state decided to not make it public. Since then, it has never been made public until now, as subsequent governments also followed the same policy of keeping it confidential.

It remained unclear why the report was not made public in the last four decades with many accusing Congress of a deliberate cover up, AGP and the BJP of nonchalance in bringing out the truth.

However, now, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has revealed the main reason why the report was never made public. According to him, the report was not made public because its veracity could not be confirmed. The CM stated that the copies of the 600-page Tiwari Commission report which were available with the Assam government did not have the signature of the retired IAS officer Tribhuvan Prasad Tiwari who headed the commission, due to which there has been second guessing of questions that would be raised on whether the report was authentic or not.

Tribhuvan Prasad Tiwari, who later become the governor of Puduchery, died in 2015 at the age of 93 years, making it even more difficult to confirm the authenticity of the report. However, Himanta Biswa Sarma government talked to other officers who worked under the commission, and they have confirmed that the copy of the report available with the govrernment is genuine.

“We have interviewed different clerks from that time and did forensic tests and found that it is genuine. The previous government was fearing taking a courageous step on this. Some government or the other should present it, it is a chapter of our history,” CM Sarma said.

More than 600 FIRs were filed, chargesheets were filed following probe in around 300 cases, however, most of the cases were eventually dismissed. In the early 2000s, a few cases were filed in the Guwahati High Court to seek better compensation for families of the victim of Nellie massacre, however, these cases too were dismissed.

The Assam Accord of 1985 ended the Anti-Foreigners agitation, however, neither the complete truth of the Nellie Massacre came out nor the menace of illegal immigration of Bangladeshis and Rohingyas in Assam has ended. However, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma is ensuring that neither the truth of past injustices go untold nor the issue of deliberate attempts at altering Assam’s demography go unaddressed.

‘Bihar was ruled by impotent governments’ says Badri Narayan Pandey, who formed the Gram Raksha Dal to fight against dacoits and made West Champaran crime-free: Ground Report

श्रवण शुक्ल
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‘Bihar was ruled by impotent governments’ says Badri Narayan Pandey, who formed the Gram Raksha Dal to fight against dacoits and made West Champaran crime-free: Ground Report

If you walk down the streets in Bihar’s West Champaran district in the evening, you feel the serenity of a village. But about three decades ago, this area was known as “Mini Chambal”. Dacoits ruled the region, and for locals, leaving home after 5 pm amounted to inviting death. Kidnapping, robbery, murder, and massacre were a daily occurrence. The situation worsened during Lalu Yadav’s Jungle Raj.

Seeing the shattered law and order situation in the area and the locals being left to fend for themselves, Badri Narayan Pandey, displayed immense courage and formed a self-defence group comprising locals called the ‘Village Defence Force’. The self-defence group not only liberated Champaran from dacoits but also became an example of self-defence across the country. From the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh to the Village Defence Force in Jammu and Kashmir, Pandey’s story continues to inspire many.

In conversation with OpIndia, Badri Narayan Pandey narrated how it all began. Let’s first start by understanding the dark period when Bihar was a victim of Jungle Raj. From 1990 to 2005, under the governments of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi, the crime rate skyrocketed. The statistics were shocking. According to a report, there were more than 32,000 kidnappings, 18,000 murders, and 59 major massacres during the dreaded period. In 1997, the Patna High Court had termed the period as “Jungle Raj”.

The era of Jungle Raj in Bihar and of Mini Chambal

The 1990s were a dark period for Bihar. Lalu Prasad Yadav was in power at the time, and the term “Jungle Raj” had become commonplace in Bihar. The Bagaha region of West Champaran, known as “Mini Chambal,” had become a hotbed of dacoit terror. People were afraid to leave their homes after 5 p.m. Kidnapping, robbery, murder, and rape had become routine. Schools and colleges were closed, traders avoided going to markets, and farmers feared visiting their fields. The threat of dacoits in this region was so prevalent that people were not safe even in their own homes.

One of the most harrowing examples of peak criminal activities during the Jungle Raj was the Narkatia massacre of December 14, 1994. In the horrifying incident, dacoits brutally killed 15 villagers in Narkatia Bhuarwa village, in Ramnagar block. More than a dozen villages were brutally murdered by the dacoits in a single night. The victims were Gauri Shankar Mahato, Jai Ram Mahato, Ramvilas Mahato, Vishram Mahato, Dharamraj Mahato, Bhikhari Mahato, Chhedi Mahato, Roshan Mahato, Rogahi Mahato, Narsingh Mahato, Bhubaneshwar Mahato, Rudal Mahato, Baliram Mahato, Sadakat Miyan, and Pandu Munda.

The massacre spread terror throughout the region. Gangs of notorious dacoits like Radha Yadav, Ramchandra Mallah, Alauddin Miyan, Chumman Yadav, Rajendra Chaudhary, Kishori Nunian, Patthar Chauhan, and Nema Yadav had become synonymous with terror in the area.

Jungle Raj meant a free pass to criminals under Lalu Yadav’s rule

During the rule of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi, the nexus between crime and politics was at its peak in Bihar. In West Champaran, dacoits held such sway that they held their own courts, where politicians came to pay obeisance to ensure their electoral victory. Dacoit leaders like Bhagad Yadav, Lachhan Yadav, Bansi Yadav, Harihar Yadav, Lalu Yadav, and Suresh God not only blatantly committed crimes but also interfered in local politics. The police and administration had no power or control. Due to the government’s failure to maintain law and order, ordinary people were left helpless. Children were unable to attend school, and parents constantly prayed for their children’s safety.

Even the judges were not safe, and some of them were shot dead by dacoits. The District Judge of the West Champaran district referred to the area as ‘Mini Chambal’. In 1986, the police launched ‘Operation Black Panther’ to wipe out dacoits but failed to curb the menace. Seeing the government and the police fail, the locals mustered courage and decided to fight the terror on their own.

Badri Narayan Pandey started the village defence team

In the terror-ridden environment of West Champaran, an ordinary man, Badri Narayan Pandey, was determined to free society from the dacoits. A retired clerk from the Army Medical Corps, Pandey had witnessed the terror of dacoits in his village, Siswa-Basantpur. People wouldn’t open their doors before 8 a.m. in the morning and would not step out of their homes as soon as the sun set. Pandey resolved to change this situation.

On July 27, 1990, he founded the Gram Raksha Dal (village defence team), which included people of all ages and castes in the village. Pandey initially gathered a few villagers to form a “Shaheedi Jattha” (martyr squad) and collected all their licensed weapons. They swore an oath to sacrifice their lives to protect the village. This group began patrolling the village. Checkpoints were set up in every village, where no one was allowed to enter without identification and verification. During the day, people received weapons training and remained awake at night to perform duties. Women and children also participated in the search missions.

Abhayanand and G. Krishnaiah received support

In this campaign, Pandey was supported by the then Superintendent of Police, Abhayanand, and District Magistrate, G. Krishnaiah. Abhayanand recognised Pandey’s efforts and provided moral and logistical support. G. Krishnaiah, too, prioritised the safety of the villagers, without caring for his own job. Both officers participated in Gram Raksha Dal meetings and encouraged them. However, in 1994, G. Krishnaiah, then serving as District Magistrate in Gopalganj, Lalu Yadav’s home district, was assassinated. His murder sent shockwaves throughout Bihar, but it failed to dampen the spirits of the Gram Raksha Dal.

The Gram Raksha Dal operated like a disciplined army

The Gram Raksha Dal operated in a military style to fight the dacoits. They identified the dacoits’ informants and associates. They tried to reform some, and those who refused were expelled from the village or punished. Pandey infiltrated the dacoits’ gangs and won over their associates, luring them into the mainstream and assuring their families’ safety. They also spied on the dacoits and gathered complete knowledge of their weapons and ammunition stock. Gram Raksha Dal waited for the dacoits to run out of ammunition before launching their retaliatory attack and killing or capturing the dacoits.

This armed struggle lasted from 1990 to 2002. During this period, the Gram Raksha Dal seized weapons such as machine guns and handed them over to the government. At one point, they possessed 16,000 weapons, including 9,500 licensed ones. The organisation established units in over 375 villages, covering over 60% of West Champaran. The dacoits were driven into the forests of the Someshwar Hills. The courage of the villagers forced them to surrender or flee.

Narkatia massacre and the Village Defence Party’s response

Following the Narkatia massacre, when dacoits demanded rice, goats, and women from villagers and killed 15 when they refused, the Gram Raksha Dal took a unique action. They formed a kilometre-long human chain, including women and children. The solidarity demonstrated by villagers shattered the morale of the dacoits. In another case where dacoits kidnapped 16 children, the Gram Raksha Dal acted swiftly and rescued them.

There was also political opposition, the RJD was wary of the Gram Raksha Dal

The ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) was alarmed by the growing strength of the Gram Raksha Dal. They feared that Badri Narayan Pandey would challenge their power by forming his own political party. Voices were raised against the Gram Raksha Dal in the Assembly and Lok Sabha, but the then Assembly Speaker criticised the government, stating that the local people were compelled to defend themselves after the elected government failed to protect them. This support further emboldened the Gram Raksha Dal.

By 2002, dacoits had been completely eliminated from West Champaran. Dacoits surrendered, and peace returned to areas like Bagaha. The success of the Gram Raksha Dal inspired movements like the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh. Even today, organisations like the Gram Raksha Dal are deployed by the government to fight terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

SN Subbarao became the inspiration for Badri Pandey

Badri Pandey’s source of inspiration came from his participation in the Youth Project in Bengaluru, where, under the leadership of S.N. Subbarao, young people were encouraged to engage in social work. Pandey applied this inspiration to his village, uniting the community to fight against dacoits. Under his leadership, the Gram Raksha Dal not only defeated the dacoits but also created a new atmosphere of discipline and unity in the community.

Today’s West Champaran is moving towards freedom from crime.

After Nitish Kumar’s government came to power in 2005, crime in Bihar was significantly curbed. Once a stronghold of dacoits, the Gobarahiya police station area of ​​West Champaran is now crime-free. In the past five years, there have been almost no cases of murder, robbery, snatching, or harassment of women. In villages, individuals referred to as ‘Gumasta’ help in the resolution of disputes at the local level, thus reducing the burden on the police system.

Listen to Badri Narayan Pandey narrate how Champaran slipped into the darkness of robbery and plunder, and how he freed Champaran from the terror of dacoits by establishing ‘Gram Raksha Dal Shaheed Jatha’ in 1990.

The story of Badri Narayan Pandey and his Gram Raksha Dal is a story of a community’s triumph in the face of Bihar’s Jungle Raj. Emerging from the horrific events like the Narkatiya massacre, West Champaran set an example of peace and security. Pandey’s courage, the support of officials like Abhayanand and G. Krishnaiah, and the solidarity of the villagers transformed “Mini Chambal” into a crime-free zone. This story is an inspiration not only for Bihar but for the entire country: if a community unites, no challenge is impossible.

Over 40 deaths in two bus fire incidents in a month: Read why luxury sleeper buses become death traps in case of an emergency

Raju Das
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Over 40 deaths in two bus fire incidents in a month: Read why luxury sleeper buses become death traps in case of an emergency

In the early hours of October 23, 2025, a horrifying accident took place on National Highway 44 near Kurnool in Andhra Pradesh. A private sleeper bus traveling from Hyderabad to Bengaluru collided with a motorcycle, sparking a massive fire that claimed at least 25 lives. Charred bodies were pulled from the wreckage, and survivors described a frantic scramble for escape as flames engulfed the vehicle in minutes.

Just nine days earlier, on October 14, another similar tragedy struck near Jaisalmer in Rajasthan. A bus travelling from Jaisalmer to Jodhpur burst into flames, killing 22 passengers, many of whom were trapped inside due to a jammed emergency door. Both these incidents took place in just one month, and several such accidents of large number of causalities in bus fires have taken place in recent times.

While buses, like any other vehicles, do meet with accidents, it has been observed that casualty numbers are unusually high in case of night service luxury and sleeper buses, compared to day service buses. Common wisdom says that when fire starts in a bus, it will be immediately spotted, the vehicle will be stopped and the passengers will come out quickly. In fact, that is what happens with buses that run in the day, even though daytime buses carry more passengers as they often take standing passengers, but things get complicated with night service buses.

One of the obvious reason is the time, during the day, most people in a bus are awake, and therefore they are able to spot fire as soon as it starts, enabling fast evacuation. In contrast, as most passengers remain asleep in night service buses, it is often too late when the fire is spotted, resulting in higher number of deaths and injuries. However, that is not the only reason. There are some very important differences between luxury sleeper buses and the basis buses that run for shorter distances during the day, and these factors contribute to such higher casualties.

Fewer Escape Routes, Tight Spaces

The interiors of basic day-service buses often feel open and more spacious, while the sleeper and luxury buses feel like cramped in the inside, even though they are actually often taller and longer. In a standard day bus, there are two main doors for passengers, one at the front and one at the rear, apart from emergency exit doors. Standard non-luxury buses also have sliding windows, which can be easily opened, and can be used to evacuate in case of fire or other accidents. These buses are built for short daytime trips, therefore they have basic seats, making it simpler to stand and move.

But on the other hand, sleeper and luxury buses are designed for comfort, as they are made for longer overnight journeys. One big compromise in these buses is the lack of the back passenger door. These buses have just one passenger door at the front. They includea or two emergency exits in the back, but they are not easily accessible. In the Jaisalmer fire, that single emergency door was jammed, trapping dozens inside.

These buses also have fixed, sealed windows, meant to keep out dust and noise, and offer better climate control. However, in case of accidents, they become walls of glass. The glass needs to be broken in case of an emergency, but without something hard to hit them with, it is nearly impossible to break them with bare hands.

The openable windows in basic also play a vital role in letting the fume and smoke go out, allowing people to survive long enough to escape. In contrast, the closed nature of luxury buses traps smoke and fume, and people pass out quickly due to lack of oxygen, and then are engulfed in flames.

Another design difference is width of aisles. Luxury buses have wider recliner seats and bed bunks, leaving a narrow walkway. That space is wider in basic buses, as they feature standard seats. In case of a fire, this narrow aisle, and the lack of a backdoor, means there is a long queue to reach the front quickly. In a closed cabin filled with fume and smoke, people can’t survive long enough to cover that distance. The problem gets even more complicated for sleeper buses, as people in upper bunks need to come down evacuate, and they often can’t do it in time.

Luxury and sleeper buses are also darker inside compared to general buses, due to curtains and tinted windows, presence of sleeper bunks, and bigger seats. This makes evacuation a bigger challenge for the passengers.

Inaccessible emergency exits

Luxury buses comprise one or two emergency exits, and such exits on the right side become vital if the main door on the left side gets blocked or jammed. But these emergency exit doors are often located behind seats, and are hard to reach even in normal circumstances. Moreover, such emergency doors are often hidden behind curtains, and are not properly marked, making them difficult to locate.

As the emergency exits are not regularly opened, they often get jammed, and become difficult or impossible to open when it is needed. Unlike airlines, bus operators don’t have protocols requiring regular test to confirm that everything is working perfectly. Therefore, they find about a jammed emergency exit only in case of an emergency.

For most buses, the rear windshield is meant to be broken in case of an emergency. But the buses don’t carry hammer or such tools to break the glass. In most cases, it is the outsiders who are able to break the glass using rocks or bricks, as passengers often don’t have such hard objects.

Flammable Interiors: Curtains, Fabrics, and Fast-Spreading Fires

Luxury doesn’t always mean safer; it often means more fuel for the flames. Luxury and Sleeper buses are decked out with thick curtains to block light for sleeping, plush upholstery on seats, and thick foam mattresses on bunks for a “hotel-on-wheels” feel. These materials are often highly flammable and release toxic smoke when they burn, filling the cabin in seconds.

A spark in a sleeper bus can turn those cozy touches into a roaring blaze. Worse, the smoke isn’t just thick, it’s poisonous too. Burning plastics and foams produce cyanide-like gases that cause disorientation and unconsciousness. In day buses, open windows might vent some of it out, but sealed sleeper cabins trap it all inside.

In contrast, basic day buses stick to simpler vinyl seats and metal frames with fewer flammable soft furnishings, which means less fuel for a bad fire.

Customized Builds: Hidden Risks from Aftermarket Tweaks

There is another big difference, most basic buses today are fully built by the company in factories. They can be operated just after driving out of the dealerships, just like cars. They follow strict designs with tested wiring, fuel lines, and fire safety features baked in from the start.

On the other hand, most luxury and sleeper buses that operate in India are not factory built. They are actually custom-made coaches built on chassis bought from automobile dealerships. Bus operators purchase the basic chassis and then take it to a ‘body building workshops’ where the coach is built, including everything from the body to seats and bunks, and all other amenities.

This means drilling holes for AC units, adding bunk frames, and rerouting wires without proper checks. Faulty electrical work is a top fire starter, like short circuits from overloaded inverters, loose connections under seats, or sparks from modified exhausts. These modification to the chassis can weaken the structure too. A custom door might not seal right, or added weight could make the bus unstable, tilting it during a collision and blocking exits. Buses fully built in factories avoid this by sticking to proven blueprints.

Even though now automobile companies like Tata Motors, Ashok Leyland, Volvo, Bharat Benz etc offer fully built luxury buses, many operators still prefer the custom-built route.

Notably, till a couple of decades ago, all buses in India were such coaches made by local garages on chassis bought from companies. At that time, companies like Tata and Ashok Leyland didn’t offer fully built buses or trucks, they only sold chassis. In fact, for many decades they didn’t even make dedicated bus chassis, all of them were same truck chassis. Bus operators needed to purchase such truck chassis and get a bus coach or a truck bed built on them. This is the reason why bus journeys were not comfortable in the past, their suspension was not made for carrying people.

After opening up of the automobile sector and entry of foreign companies, automobile companies started to offer factory-built buses and trucks. Now companies like Tata Motors, Ashok Leyland, Volvo, Bharat Benz etc offer fully built luxury buses too, apart from bare chassis for buses and trucks. But despite this availability, many operators still prefer the custom-built route.

Such bus building work is done in workshops located in almost every part of the country. As this is an unorganised sector with no strict quality control, safety and quality of such custom-built buses remains a question, even though they look more luxurious and swankier. They feature additional lights and other electrical systems, putting more load on the electrical lines.

Such customised buses are also relatively taller, to fit double-decker bunks and more luggage space. If a bus tilts suddenly, reaching emergency exits or windows becomes difficult for passengers.

Countries like China banned double-decker sleepers years ago for these risks, but India still allows them with minimal checks.

These issues related to luxury sleeper buses point to one thing, there is requirement for drastic changes to their design and regulation. Instead of checking just the documents, the authorities need to check whether the buses comply with safety norms.

Regular safety audits for such buses, ensuring use of fire-proof materials by law, and heavy penalty on unauthorised modifications are required, bans on overcrowding. Rules must mandate easily breakable windows and better emergency exits, wider aisles, and mandatory installation of fire detection and fighting systems.

The Korean peninsula on a knife’s edge: What is really moving as ROK’s Gyeongju prepares to host both Trump and Xi Jinping at APEC

Divyansh Tiwari
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The Korean peninsula on a knife’s edge: What is really moving as ROK’s Gyeongju prepares to host both Trump and Xi Jinping at APEC

The Korean Peninsula is once again the most closely watched flashpoint in the world as the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meet in the ancient city of Gyeongju, South Korea, from October 31 to November 1. Trade, supply networks, and technology appear to be on the agenda. But just underneath it is a complex network of signalling, counter-signaling, and low-key risk-reduction, much of which is intended to allow for high-level optics and, maybe, little steps back from the edge. 

After a pause of several months, North Korea resumed short-range missile testing. South Korea, meanwhile, is subtly changing its border arrangements. The situation is delicate because China’s leader Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump are both scheduled to visit Gyeongju soon. China’s persistent presence, South Korea’s composed response, and North Korea’s military pressure have left the regional balance precarious.

A SUMMIT WITH HEAVY WEATHER

Let’s start with the fundamentals. In order to safeguard Gyeongju and surrounding venues for the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, South Korea has intensified a vast security operation that includes anti-drone jammers, helicopters, armored vehicles, and over 18,000 troops. The goal is to fortify the perimeter while maintaining the appearance of a well-run host economy that can bring adversaries together without any problems. The dates and venue are sealed. The guest list, significantly, includes both Trump and Xi. Because it is the first opportunity in years for the leaders of the two biggest economies in the world to exchange messages in Korea’s neighborhood.

Pyongyang’s reaction has been predictable and exact. The first of the missile launches in months occurred on October 22, when a series of short-range ballistic missiles headed east. Days prior to the leaders’ arrival, North Korea announced its veto over quiet, reminding all sides that any negotiations must go on Kim Jong Un’s terms. This timing is a typical example of pre-summit pressure. Analysts have warned of more attempts to shape headlines and extract leverage, and independent outlets and wire services have agreed on this assessment. The goal is to occupy APEC’s peripheries rather than to undermine it. 

SEOUL’S SILENT EDITS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE STAGE

It’s easy to overlook, but equally significant, what South Korea has done. The new government shut down the banks of loudspeakers that were broadcasting K-pop and propaganda throughout the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in late June. Despite Pyongyang’s animosity, the action was intended as a “goodwill” de-escalation and reversed the previous year’s approach. That choice was in line with a larger initiative to lessen “trip-wires,” which frequently lead to tit-for-tat escalations.

A recurrent issue that Pyongyang views as a security danger and a degrading affront to human dignity, Seoul has also increased enforcement against activist organizations who use balloons to carry USB sticks and pamphlets into the North. To prevent launches, police have been called in, “risk zones” have been marked along the border, and other authorized routes have been mentioned. Once more, removing the hair-trigger events that may escalate in minutes, exactly the kind of tensions a host country wants to eliminate weeks before a global summit is the goal, not caving in to the North’s demands.

The most significant change occurred in the Joint Security Area (JSA) within the DMZ, the congested collection of sky-blue structures in Panmunjom where Trump and Kim had a brief encounter on the border in 2019. During the APEC timeframe, from late October to early November, Seoul’s Unification Ministry has canceled field excursions to Panmunjom. For the same time frame, the United Nations Command, which is in charge of the southern portion of the JSA, has put a halt to its own visitation program. This is considered standard security cooperation. If choreography at the border is needed quickly, it unofficially clears the schedule. The stage has been swept whether or not a handshake occurs.

THE SHATTERED DÉTENTE AND ITS RELEVANCE TODAY  

The significance of these changes may be understood by keeping in mind that the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, which was the finest attempt in years to reduce hazards along the border, has long ago fallen apart. Following a bleak 2024, South Korea terminated portions of the agreement and resumed the activities that the treaty had restricted. Pyongyang subsequently said that it was no longer obligated by the agreement and promised to resume the military actions that had been paused. A re-militarized border was the end outcome. Seoul has hinted at the possibility of reestablishing the deal in some capacity in 2025, but the North has not provided the reciprocal measures that would be necessary. This creates a void that can only be partially filled by tactical solutions like restricting leaflets or suppressing speakers.

HUMANITARIAN THREADS: FAMILY REUNIONS AND POLITICAL SIGNALING

President Lee Jae Myung has highlighted a humanitarian road amid the missile theater and high security. He openly asked Pyongyang to think about resuming reunions for families who have been separated since the 1950–53 conflict at the beginning of October. This is one of the few morally significant problems that does not directly relate to nuclear negotiating. When they do happen, these reunions are short, painfully formal, and quite popular in the South. Most importantly, they provide North Korea with a gesture that it can accept without compromising its deterrence. Seoul’s message is clear: this is low-hanging fruit if Pyongyang seeks a minor victory that enhances the mood at the summit and softens South Korean public sentiment.

UNDER THE RADAR

When you combine these elements, a pattern becomes apparent. The speaker switch-off, the balloon crackdown, and the tour freeze at the JSA are all minor script changes. During leaders’ week, each lessens the likelihood of an incident that would cause everyone to cancel the picture opportunities or, worse, set off an escalating cycle. If the principals desire it, Seoul is essentially opening the way for political drama to take place. Although Washington officials have floated the possibility of a Trump-Kim meeting, reliable reports indicate that no official agreements are in place, and previous attempts at outreach were met with a lack of interest. The network of signals supports a realistic assessment: a DMZ ‘HELLO’ is still feasible under extreme circumstances, but it is unlikely. The more likely scenario is that Pyongyang pushes provocations to the limit without overthrowing the set, South Korea demonstrates competence and hospitality, and Trump meets Xi. 

Map of the DMZ between North and South Korea, image via Visit Korea

BEIJING’S SHADOW AND THE RUSSIA VARIABLE   

China’s involvement is crucial as the North Korea’s political backer and economic lifeline, not as a mediator who can bring about disarmament. Kim and Xi have officially promised “deeper ties” in recent weeks, and their foreign ministries met to denounce “hegemonism,” a diplomatic jargon that often refers to Washington. Mainstream think tank analysts point out that stability and leverage, not mediation for its own sake, are China’s top priorities. In that regard, Xi’s presence in Korea focuses attention, Beijing has the option to lower the temperature if it so chooses, or it may let the pressure cook, say, in order to maintain influence over Seoul and Washington. Since there is no indication that Beijing will request that Pyongyang divorce its increasing military ties with Moscow, the default assumption from serious analysis is that China will exert mild pressure on Kim at most.

The largest structural shift since Trump’s initial DMZ tour is this closeness to Russia. This isn’t conjecture. According to many intelligence-supported reports and assessments of war debris, Russia had deployed North Korean short-range ballistic missiles in Ukraine by early 2025, and Pyongyang’s assistance had grown from shells to rockets to personnel. Open-source catalogs have identified the components, friendly nations have sanctioned facilitators, and Kyiv and Washington have made proof public. While Seoul’s defense minister recently issued a warning about probable Russian technological inputs into North Korea’s submarine programs, South Korean briefings and Reuters’ in-depth research indicate a growing pipeline of military collaboration. In summary, Kim is less motivated to make hasty concessions from the United States or South Korea, especially on his nuclear deterrence, because he has more outside backing and a wider range of allies than he had during the 2018–2019 talks.

MARKETS ARE READING THE TEA LEAVES

The rumor cycle has already been noted by Korean equities markets, which have a tendency to lead geopolitical narratives. In response to speculation about potential Trump-Kim optics, the “inter-Korean” basket, consumer, construction, transport, and logistics names that often pop on peace signals, has witnessed rash, rumor driven actions. This is a sentiment barometer, not a prediction machine. In effect, traders are pricing in a higher likelihood of headline level de-escalation, which may lower volatility but would not change fundamentals, and a smaller likelihood of a DMZ cameo.

HOW TO READ THE SIGNALING

The best approach to interpret the upcoming two weeks is to view restraint and pressure as complimentary strategies. The goal of North Korea’s testing is to strengthen its negotiating position and maintain the nuclear status quo. Silencing speakers, restricting pamphlets, and halting JSA visits are all examples of South Korea’s calm restraint, which lowers friction and maintains a path for optics that may, if only momentarily, temper the mood. China, on the other hand, is in an ideal position, close enough to Pyongyang to influence the atmosphere, but far enough away to avoid responsibility for the outcome. Furthermore, Kim may play for time, extract military and economic value, and wait for better conditions before considering anything that appears to be a restraint thanks to Russia’s growing support for North Korea.

THE BOTTOM LINE: CALIBERATED THEATER

The most likely scenario for APEC’s opening is a well-balanced theater that avoids a crisis and highlights South Korea’s capacity as both the host and a middle power. There will be strict upfront security. The main concerns of supply chains, tariffs, and chips will probably remain parked at “frameworks” and “working groups” when Trump and Xi meet and exchange jabs shrouded in diplomatic jargon. Pyongyang will keep showcasing its capabilities without resorting to a red-line reaction. Every rumor of a border cameo will cause the markets to fluctuate. Seoul will also record little victories, such as a clean summit, a few technical deliverables, and, with luck, a humanitarian foundation that it can grow into something more. 

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