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UP under CM Yogi has kept electricity tariffs unchanged for the 7th year in a row: Read how that has been achieved

Dhruv Mishra
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UP under CM Yogi has kept electricity tariffs unchanged for the 7th year in a row: Read how that has been achieved


For years, the monthly electricity bill was one of the consistent sources of household anxiety in Uttar Pradesh. Between 2012 and 2017, domestic consumers watched their tariffs climb almost every year, with little warning and less relief. In the years since 2017, that pattern has broken, and for the state’s roughly 30 million domestic power consumers. This shift has become one of the most tangible, if under-discussed, changes in daily economic life. 

The old pattern: 2012–2017

The five years before 2017 were defined by frequent and steep tariffs revisions. Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission(UPERC) approved a hike of roughly 30% in June 2013, followed by another of around 12% in October 2014. Households budgeting for the coming year had no real way to plan because the goalposts altered with nearly every tariff cycle. A brief pause came in FY2015-16 and FY2016-17, when no hike was proposed for LMV-1 (domestic) consumers specifically, but by November 2017, tariffs rose again. This time by about 8.49% for urban domestic consumers. 

Taken together, the experience for an ordinary domestic consumer across this period was one of near-constant upward pressure on bills, compounding year after year, with no real sense of predictability.

The turning point: A freeze since 2019

UPERC has not approved a single tariff hike for domestic(LMV-1) consumers since September 2019. That’s six consecutive tariff cycles through FY2026-27 in which the per-unit rate has stayed exactly where it was. For a household, that means the number printed on the bill for each unit of electricity hasn’t moved in over half a decade, even as fuel costs, transmission costs and inflation elsewhere in the economy have not stood still. This didn’t happen by accident. The state’s power distribution utility, UPPCL, has repeatedly filed petitions before UPERC proposing increases as large as 25-45% to cover its widening revenue gap. 

Each time, the Commission has either rejected these proposals outright or deferred them, keeping the retail tariff for domestic consumers unchanged year after year.

How the gap has been absorbed: Subsidy, not consumers 

The freeze has been made possible by a steadily rising state subsidy, not by any actual fall in the cost of supplying power. For FY2026-27, the Uttar Pradesh government’s electricity subsidy has been raised to ₹20,400 crore, up from ₹17,100 crore the year. Before a jump of nearly 20% in a single year. Within that, support for the poorest domestic consumers has been specifically increased that the subsidy for lifeline consumers has gone up to ₹3.75 per unit from ₹3.50, and rural consumers using 0–100 units now receive ₹3.70 per unit in subsidy compared with ₹3.30 earlier.

In practice, this is the difference between the cost of supply rate and the rate a household actually pays. A rural lifeline consumer using up to 100 units a month effectively pays around ₹3.00 per unit after subsidy, even though the underlying cost of that power is much higher. The state government is absorbing the gap for now, not the consumers. This approach differs from the states that provide free electricity. Instead of making electricity completely free for large sections of consumers, Uttar Pradesh continues to charge consumers while using targeted subsidies to reduce their burden. As a result, consumers retain an incentive to use electricity judiciously, while the state limits the fiscal cost by subsidising only part of the bill rather than the entire consumption.

Beyond tariffs: Metering and service reforms

Alongside the tariff freeze, UPERC has pushed process reforms aimed squarely at the consumer experience. Under the Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS), prepaid smart meters are being rolled out across the state. The Commission has directed that no security deposit be collected from consumers with prepaid connections, and has required distribution companies to reconnect prepaid meters within two hours of recharge, backing that requirement with financial penalties on UPPCL for delays.

UPERC has also pushed for 100% consumer and distribution-transformer metering, aimed at reducing billing disputes and improving accountability across the five discoms (PuVVNL, MVVNL, DVVNL, PVVNL, and KESCO).

The other side of the ledger

A balanced assessment also requires acknowledging the concerns raised by critics. The tariff freeze has been supported by a steadily rising subsidy bill. For FY2026-27, the Uttar Pradesh government’s electricity subsidy has increased from ₹17,100 crore to ₹20,400 crore, reflecting the state’s decision to absorb a larger share of the cost rather than passing it on to consumers.

UPPCL has repeatedly argued before the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (UPERC) that the gap between its revenue and expenditure continues to widen. In successive tariff petitions, it sought increases ranging from 25% to 45%, citing higher power purchase costs and mounting financial pressure on distribution companies. However, UPERC did not approve these proposals for domestic consumers. Instead, the Commission continued the existing tariff structure, while the state government increased budgetary support and used regulatory mechanisms to bridge the financial gap.

According to the critics, it argues that this approach shifts part of the financial burden from electricity bills to the state budget and raises questions about the long-term sustainability of rising subsidy commitments. However, it contends that protecting households from repeated tariff increases, particularly during a period of inflation and rising living costs, has provided meaningful relief to millions of consumers while allowing the government time to pursue distribution-sector reforms.

Conclusion

Whatever the long-term fiscal debate, one fact remains clear: domestic electricity consumers in Uttar Pradesh have not faced a base tariff increase since September 2019. Between 2013 and 2017, households experienced repeated tariff revisions, whereas the years since 2019 have been marked by tariff stability despite repeated requests from UPPCL for significant hikes. The Yogi Adityanath government chose to shield consumers by expanding targeted subsidies instead of allowing higher domestic tariffs. Whether this model remains sustainable over the long term will depend on future fiscal conditions, but for now, it has ensured six consecutive years of stable base electricity tariffs while advancing reforms in metering, consumer services, and the distribution sector.

Thousands are being sent back since BJP won Bengal: Financial Times whines over India’s strict push-back policy for illegal immigrants now finally being enforced at border

Rukma Rathore
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Thousands are being sent back since BJP won Bengal: Financial Times whines over India’s strict push-back policy for illegal immigrants now finally being enforced at border

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s monumental success in the West Bengal assembly election, surpassing the 200-seat threshold to unseat Mamata Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress (AITC or TMC) signified an extraordinary political transformation and heralded a new era in governance. This included the crucial task of securing the porous India-Bangladesh border and implementing a strong policy against illegal immigration, which was previously handled with undue indulgence by the former government.

In fact, the TMC engaged in a relentless struggle with the central government to maintain the influx of Bangladeshi intruders in the state, with its leaders even boasting about facilitating the same, all to the detriment of national security and interests. However, this dangerous strategy for the aim of vote bank politics has been shut down by the Suvendu Adhikari government, which seems to have deeply frustrated the usual suspects.

The art of defending the intruders

On 1st July (Wednesday), Financial Times carried out a column, “India expels thousands of migrants in dead of night,” written by Andres Schipani to protests against the decisions of an elected state government of a sovereign nation that has taken crucial steps in the larger interest of its voters by making an effort to put a lid on the unlawful intrusions from the neighbouring country. The publication even opted for a sensational headline to provoke the readers, suggesting that a serious aggression is being inflicted upon legitimate citizens rather than on those who enter India in violation of its laws.

In a desperate bid to convey a dramatic narrative of supposed state brutality and injustice, the publication claimed, “Bangladeshi border guards use megaphones to tell their Indian counterparts not to push people across the border.” It referenced Bangladeshi officials who stated that the Indian side utilises darkness as a shield to advance its agenda which has only escalated after the saffron party stormed to power in West Bengal in May.

“They wait until it is dark to switch off the spotlights and for the right opportunity,” mentioned Lance Corporal Mahmud Masud. “They open the gates on the Indian fence and push people into the darkness. There are women, there are children and these poor people get stranded in the middle,” insisted Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui, director-general of the Border Guard Bangladesh.

The piece outlined that the state “has deported thousands of people, mostly Muslims of Bengali heritage, to Bangladesh, according to Indian and Bangladeshi officials.” It asserted that Bangladesh authorities complained about “dozens of people stuck in the zero line a narrow no man’s land between the Indian and Bangladeshi borders.”

It is apparent that instead of scrutinising Dhaka for denying the return of its own individuals, the media organisation cleverly tries to cast India as the antagonist for maintaining the laws of the land and added, “The deportation push has worsened fragile relations between the two countries, underscored fears about Hindu nationalism and heightened the sense of precarity for millions of Muslims in West Bengal and other border states.”

Of course, FT swiftly turned to “Hindu nationalism” otherwise it would have contradicted the fundamental principle for liberals to invoke Hindus, Hindutva or Hinduism to attack the Modi government merely for taking a stand for India, rather than succumbing to the victimhood propaganda peddled for even illegal residents because of their religion.

The effort to insert a religious element

Doubling down on his intentions, the author discussed the historical links between Dhaka and New Delhi along with the common language spoken in West Bengal and Bangladesh, to argue that the government should have allowed the rapidly increasing presence of illicit Bangladeshis in the country, essentially in “honour” of this background. India is effectively being called upon to accommodate them while Bangladesh just needs to remain passive as its people flood into its neighbourhood.

The unregulated and large-scale flow of Bangladeshis into states like Assam is depicted as a sentimental “history of migration” that lacks any foundation in either history or reality. Afterwards, the article reiterated its displeasure with the BJP for their actions against unlicensed Bangladeshi or Rohingya Muslims after achieving success in West Bengal.

It highlighted that the state has 30% Muslim population, implying that these actions could potentially affect them, echoing the conspiracy circulated during the anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) agitation, which declared that the law would be weaponised against the second largest majority. However, no such matter surfaced following its implementation.

Similarly, law abiding Indian citizens are immune to deportation irrespective of their religion, but the truth is conveniently masked by such rhetoric to diminish the government’s credibility and instigate doubt and division, ultimately leading to the incitement of violence.

FT stressed, “Critics say the deportation push reflects the BJP’s desire to turn India into a Hindu nation at the expense of its Muslim minority.” It then proceeded to quote Meenakshi Ganguly who is Human Rights Watch’s deputy Asia chief and “accused Indian authorities of cruelly dumping mostly Muslim families into Bangladesh or leaving them stranded at the border” as well as asked to “end this dismaying animosity towards Muslims.”

The government’s strategy to secure its borders and address elements that could endanger national security is labelled as a ploy to create a “Hindu nation” by the FT, indirectly insinuating that India should quietly observe while Bangladeshis and Rohingyas not only burden the nation’s economy but also infringe upon the rights of rightful citizens, including Muslims.

There is no such requirement imposed on Bangladesh, which not only refuses to accept its citizens but also has a disgraceful record of oppression against its minorities, especially Hindus. However, this faction’s warped ideology sees atrocities that do not exist and ignore them when the victims are Hindus.

The attack on BJP governments for executing laws, respecting judicial mandates

Schipani pointed to the “detect, delete and deport” approach of West Bengal government and mentioned Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari’s statement where he informed that around “10,000 illegal Bangladeshi immigrants have been expelled since he took office, while another 1,800 await deportation.”

Unsurprisingly, the platform also hit out at Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma for his unwavering approach towards the issue. It referred to his remarks that highlighted the policies of his government to tackle intruders who could instigate severe demographic changes in India and therefore, he intends to send them back to their homeland.

Notably, the precarious nature of demographic shift due to the significant figures of illegal immigration has been consistently emphasised by the Indian judiciary, ranging from high courts to the Supreme Court. Last year, the Gauhati High Court pronounced that Assam is experiencing a “silent and invidious demographic invasion” and conveyed that the central government possesses “absolute and unfettered discretion to expel foreigners from Indian territory,” while “the state has unfettered power to cause expulsion of a declared foreign national.”

Sarma has been pivotal in guaranteeing that intruders do not find refuge in Assam and has carried out a rigorous policy for their regular deportation. The matter was an integral part of his party’s manifesto that was launched ahead of the assembly polls in the state and vowed to take action against those recognised as foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal. He has also liberated acres of public properties, including forest and agricultural lands, from their occupation.

The unashamed duplicity

The government that complied with the court orders was bound to irritate FT because it was at odds with its agenda which was reinforced by highlighting the anger of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman over the developments in India as Bangladeshi officials expressed the failure to accept their citizens, given that they were already grappling with “1 million Rohingya refugees.”

Evidently, Bangladesh has the authority to reject its own citizens to mitigate a crisis, but India, the most populous country worldwide must overburden itself and permit the abuse of its resources by non-Indians.

The article outlined that Shama Obaed Islam, state minister for foreign affairs warned that the relationship would continue to be “strained” if New Delhi doesn’t alter its stance while his country has announced that it would not welcome even a single Rohingya, serving as a clear illustration of “have your cake and eat it too.”

On the other hand, India’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, maintained that illegal immigrants in India would be treated legally and New Delhi had sent more than 2,680 cases to Bangladeshi authorities for nationality verification. However, “this verification has been pending for more than five years” in multiple cases.

“Deportation is summary expulsion, but it requires co-operation from the country to which we are deporting. Unfortunately, that co-operation is never forthcoming in Bangladesh,” a senior Indian official disclosed to the FT and remarked that the country “was left with no choice but to push back the migrants.”

The article made yet another move to infuse sentimental value into their propaganda, ultimately concluding with the account of an intruder who had to surrender after living in the country for over a decade.

Conclusion

The article showed little concern for the truth and was dedicated to furthering a malicious agenda. Bangladesh has shown reluctance to cooperate with the Indian authorities. As a result, what alternatives do the latter have? The FT will predictably endorse inaction.

However, no rational government would or could keep its borders open for anyone to enter its country. Open borders are impractical for any nation, including India and Bangladesh. There is a reason why nations like Egypt and Jordan resolutely refuse to accept displaced Palestinians, despite their overwhelming support for them.

Even developed Western powers, including many in Europe and the United States, oppose such unrestricted immigration because they prioritise their interests. However, this sovereign right should not be exercised by India, according to Financial Times and risk everything from its stability to security.

Furthermore, India has been partitioned along religious lines, resulting in the Hindu community being persecuted for their faith in adjacent Islamic nations. Most importantly, the repercussions of major demographic modifications have been prominently visible from Kashmir to Murshidabad.

However, for organisations akin to FT, Hindus should be stripped of their rights to safeguard their culture and future similar to how India should not have the autonomy to set its own policies. These freedoms must only be bestowed upon those considered suitable by this Islamo-leftist lobby.

Diljit’s Satluj is a half-truth, now taken down by ZEE5 due to a legal loophole, not any govt ‘ban’: Explained

Divyansh Tiwari
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Diljit’s Satluj is a half-truth, now taken down by ZEE5 due to a legal loophole, not any govt ‘ban’: Explained


On the evening of 3 July 2026, after nearly four years of delays and three successive title changes from Ghallughara to Punjab ’95 and finally Satluj, Honey Trehan’s film about human rights activist Jaswant Singh Khalra appeared quietly on ZEE5, reaching audiences in India and across the world at the same moment. Within two days it had vanished from the Indian version of the platform while remaining fully available elsewhere, with ZEE5 citing only ‘current developments’ for the decision. 

Contrary to widespread assumptions, this was not the result of a government ban or any official prohibition. Instead, the removal stemmed from a single, obscure clause in India’s internet regulations, a provision that has largely remained suspended due to court orders and creates an uncertain environment in which platforms often choose caution when questions arise. ZEE5 has publicly affirmed its support for the film and stated that it is exploring all appropriate avenues to restore it, underscoring that the episode reflects the procedural complexities of digital content regulation rather than outright censorship. In essence, a story that had finally found its audience after years of waiting slipped from view again, not through an exercise of power but through the quiet mechanics of an unresolved legal framework.

Three years and 127 cuts

Certification troubles for the film began as soon as RSVP submitted it to the Central Board of Film Certification in late 2022. The initial six month process concluded with clearance granted only after 21 cuts and a mandated change in title, with the board expressing worries that the content displayed could provoke violence or influence Sikh youth. When RSVP challenged the decision in the Bombay High Court, the requirements reportedly intensified, climbing to as many as 127 cuts, as director Honey Trehan later recounted. The board is said to have sought the removal of ‘Punjab’ from the title despite the story being set in the state, objected to references to the Punjab Police, and requested that Indira Gandhi not be named, steps Trehan characterised as an attempt to erase elements of history. Amid these drawn out exchanges, the film was pulled from its scheduled world premiere at the 2023 Toronto International Film Festival, with reports pointing to political factors behind the move.

The real trivia: What rule 9 of Information Technology (Intermediary guidelines and and Digital Media Ethics code) 2021 says and why it is frozen still?

The story of Satluj’s release and removal has less to do with outright censorship and more to do with the actual plumbing of India’s content regulation. Films require certification from the Central Board of Film Certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, to play in theatres, yet streaming content has never fallen under this requirement. India’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting reaffirmed this position in a December 2025 Lok Sabha reply, confirming that the CBFC’s mandate is limited strictly to theatrical exhibition and does not extend to OTT platforms at all. 

What governs OTT content instead is Part III of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, specifically Rule 9. Rule 9(1) requires publishers of online curated content to observe a prescribed Code of Ethics, while Rule 9(3) creates the enforcement architecture through a three tier self-regulatory structure. 

Level I self-regulation by the publisher itself through an in house grievance officer who fields complaints, Level II through an industry wide self-regulating body, and Level III through an Inter Departmental oversight committee under the Ministry. This is the self-regulation framework that platforms are expected to follow when they certify or later pull content. 

The catch, however, is that Rule 9 has been under an interim court stay since almost the week it came into effect. On 14 August 2021, the Bombay High Court stayed Rules 9(1) and 9(3) in a challenge filed by journalist Nikhil Wagle and the digital outlet The Leaflet, holding that the Code of Ethics provisions were likely unconstitutional and beyond the government’s rule making power under the parent IT Act. The Madras High Court issued a similar stay weeks later and directed that the Bombay order should apply nationwide. The Supreme Court later transferred all pending challenges to the Delhi High Court in March 2024 for a consolidated hearing, but arguments on Part III of the rules only began there in November 2024. As of today, no final verdict has been delivered, which means the specific legal obligation for OTT platforms to self-regulate under the Code of Ethics has spent nearly its entire existence on hold, even as the government continues to cite it in Parliament as the governing framework for all streamed content in India. 

Speaking plainly, the very rule that supposedly requires platforms to self-certify content and the rule that supposedly allows them to pull content through their own grievance process are, on paper, the same paused and still litigated provision. Satluj was released on a regulatory shelf that courts have been debating for five years, and it was removed from the same shelf.

The removal is a platform call, not a government order

The makers chose to release the complete, uncut version of Satluj globally on ZEE5 from the first day rather than negotiate further cuts. Their statements make the intent clear. To place the full film, exactly as screened at festivals years earlier with nothing removed, in front of audiences worldwide before any additional domestic pressure could force changes. This mattered especially for a story that ends with Jaswant Singh Khalra’s killing by police, where any softening would have weakened its core purpose. Two days later ZEE5 removed the film from its Indian catalogue, offering only a vague explanation while promising to pursue every appropriate avenue through due process to bring it back. No government order has been made public. The platform acted instead under its own Level-I self regulatory authority, the same unsettled legal framework, still under court stay, that had allowed the uncut film to reach viewers in the first place.

What the record actually shows?

None of this touches the harder question the film dramatizes. Who was responsible for Punjab’s disappeared? The record on that question is genuinely two sided, and neither half cancels the other. Khalra, a bank manager in Amritsar, traced firewood purchase receipts at local crematoria and exposed what he described as mass illegal cremations of unidentified bodies. He was abducted by Punjab Police in September 1995 and murdered, six police officials were later convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The CBI’s December 1996 report confirmed 2,097 illegal mass cremations in Amritsar district alone, of which 582 were identified and 278 partially identified. 

The Supreme Court, hearing a petition from Khalra’s wife Paramjit Kaur, described this as a ‘flagrant violation of human rights on a mass scale’ and referred the matter to the NHRC, which eventually compensated 1,245 victims’ families by 2006. At the same time, Punjab’s counter insurgency followed roughly a decade of Khalistani militant violence that, by the movement’s own chronicler K.P.S. Gill’s count, claimed 21,469 lives before it was defeated, including close to 11,700 civilians killed by Sikh militant groups, among them thousands of Sikhs and roughly 4,500 Hindus. Human Rights Watch has documented both realities. Khalistani terrorists carried out civilian massacres and political assassinations, while government operations between 1984 and 1995 involved arbitrary detention, torture, and the disappearance of thousands. A film or an article that tells only one half of this record is not lying. It is simply presenting half the story.

Conclusion

The next time someone claims Satluj was banned, the sharper answer is not simply that a platform chose to pull it. The film reached audiences under Rule 9 of the Information Technology Rules, 2021, the very provision that requires OTT platforms to self-regulate, and was later removed under that same rule, a clause Indian courts have kept in legal limbo since 2021 without ever finally settling its validity. By launching the complete, uncut version globally on day one through ZEE5’s international service, producers Ronnie Screwvala’s RSVP Movies and MacGuffin Pictures ensured the film remained fully available to viewers worldwide even after its Indian availability ended within forty-eight hours. Five years on, with Rule 9’s legal footing still unresolved, platforms and creators continue to operate under it. 

This development has secured global access to one account of Punjab’s past at the moment when its reach inside India could be swiftly curtailed, allowing this half-told story to shape perceptions among audiences abroad without the counterbalance of the fuller record.

‘Atheist’ China frees underground church leader Ezra Jin Mingri after Donald Trump’s request: Who he is and what ‘underground churches’ are

Shriti Sagar
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‘Atheist’ China frees underground church leader Ezra Jin Mingri after Donald Trump’s request: Who he is and what ‘underground churches’ are

Atheist China released Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri, one of the country’s most prominent underground Christian leaders, after more than 250 days in detention. His release came less than two months after US President Donald Trump publicly said that he had personally raised Jin’s case with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a summit in Beijing, putting fresh international attention on China’s treatment of independent religious groups.

According to US-based religious freedom organisation ChinaAid, Jin has now arrived safely in Los Angeles on Sunday, 4th July, after being released from prison. His detention had become one of the most closely watched religious freedom cases in China, with governments, lawmakers and human rights organisations repeatedly calling for his release.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One after he met with Xi in May, Trump had said, “I think he’s giving very serious consideration to the pastor,” while also mentioning the case of Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai. Trump noted that Lai’s case appeared to be “a tough one.”

Jin’s family welcomed his release and directly credited the diplomatic intervention. In a statement, they thanked “President Trump and his administration for their tremendous leadership” and added, “We know that this could not have happened without the direct intervention from Chairman Xi Jinping.” The family also expressed hope that the development would mark “a positive turn for people of faith in China and relations between our two nations.”

Human rights advocates celebrated the release but stressed that the wider crackdown remains unchanged. Brian Tronic of Freedom House said, “While his release will bring much-needed comfort to his family, friends and many supporters, we cannot forget the leaders and members of Zion Church who remain detained.” ChinaAid founder Bob Fu similarly urged Washington to continue making “religious freedom and the release of all prisoners of faith a top priority in every engagement with Beijing.”

Who is Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri?

Ezra Jin Mingri, 57, is the founder and senior pastor of Beijing’s Zion Church, one of China’s largest independent Protestant congregations. He established the church in 2007 with only around 20 worshippers, but over the following decade it grew into a congregation serving thousands of believers and became one of the best-known house churches in China.

Unlike state-approved churches, Zion Church refused to register under China’s official religious system, insisting on remaining independent from government control. That position eventually brought it into direct conflict with Chinese authorities.

The Zion Church is among the largest underground or house churches in China that are unregistered with authorities. They defy a requirement that believers worship only in registered congregations.

In 2018, officials shut down the church’s physical headquarters in Beijing. Instead of ending its activities, Jin shifted the church online, livestreaming sermons and Bible teachings over the internet. According to his daughter, Grace Jin Drexel, those broadcasts attracted an estimated 10,000 viewers from across China.

Despite increasing surveillance and harassment, Jin continued his ministry. Although he had earlier moved his family to the United States for safety, he himself chose to return to China despite the growing risks. Before his arrest, authorities had already barred him from leaving the country to visit his wife, daughter and two sons in America.

China’s underground churches and why they operate outside the system

Jin’s case has also renewed attention on China’s vast network of underground or “house” churches.

China officially recognises Protestantism and several other religions, but all religious organisations are required to operate under state-approved institutions that remain subject to Communist Party supervision. Protestant churches are expected to register under the government-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement, where sermons and religious activities are closely monitored.

Many Christians reject this system, arguing that state oversight compromises religious independence. Instead, they choose to worship in private homes, rented apartments or office buildings through informal congregations commonly known as underground or house churches.

Researchers estimate that China has more than 68 million Christians, with roughly half worshipping outside the official state system. China could eventually become home to the world’s largest Christian population.

However, the government has steadily tightened restrictions on these independent congregations. In recent years, authorities have removed thousands of church crosses, demolished churches, restricted Bible distribution, banned religious apps and introduced regulations requiring religious groups to register with the state. Those who refuse registration risk arrests, property confiscation and criminal prosecution. Authorities have forcibly removed thousands of crosses from steeples, demolished megachurches using dynamite, and banned the online sale of Bibles outside of official bookstores.

The ruling Communist Party, which is officially atheist, views organised religion as a potential threat to its hold on power. Xi Jinping‘s government has also promoted the policy of “Sinicisation” of religion, arguing that religious practice should align with Chinese socialist values and Communist Party leadership. During a 2016 speech on religion, Xi declared, “We must resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”

Despite repeated crackdowns, many underground Christians continue to gather secretly. 

How Pastor Jin was arrested and why the crackdown intensified

The latest crackdown began on 10th and 11th October, 2025, when Chinese authorities arrested nearly 30 pastors, preachers and church members linked to Zion Church across seven cities, including Beijing, Shanghai and Zhejiang. Pastor Ezra Jin was detained in Beihai, Guangxi province, along with several other church leaders.

Human Rights Watch described the operation as one of the country’s largest coordinated actions against a single unofficial Protestant congregation in decades. Jin and several fellow pastors were taken to Beihai City No. 2 Detention Centre, while the whereabouts of several detainees initially remained unknown.

Authorities charged Jin with “illegal use of information networks,” accusing him of violating new online religious regulations introduced shortly before the arrests. The rules effectively prohibited the circulation of unauthorised religious content outside Communist Party control.

Human Rights Watch argued that the arrests reflected a broader campaign to tighten ideological control over religion. China researcher Yalkun Uluyol said, “The Chinese government’s arbitrary detention of dozens of people affiliated with Zion Church reflects an escalating crackdown on religious freedom.” He added that “President Xi Jinping’s government appears intent on reshaping religious practice to serve the Chinese Communist Party’s interests.”

The crackdown against Zion Church fits into a wider pattern. Since Xi launched his campaign to “Sinicise” religion, authorities have shut down influential house churches, imprisoned prominent pastors, demolished church buildings and prosecuted church leaders on charges ranging from illegal business operations to fraud.

Although Pastor Ezra Jin has now regained his freedom, many of Zion Church’s pastors and members remain in detention. 

Beyond the “Tap Water” narrative of Global Times: How India and Japan are reshaping Asia’s future, triggering unease in China

आशीष नौटियाल
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Beyond the “Tap Water” narrative of Global Times: How India and Japan are reshaping Asia’s future, triggering unease in China

The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on the steps of Hyderabad House was much more than a routine diplomatic photo opportunity. When Prime Minister Modi referred to Takaichi as his “younger sister,” the gesture symbolised the growing trust and warmth between the two nations. Today, the India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership has evolved beyond diplomatic declarations and is emerging as one of the strongest strategic partnerships shaping Asia’s changing political landscape. However, this meeting appears to have significantly heightened concerns in Beijing.

The visit generated the greatest unease in China. This was clearly reflected in the reporting of the Global Times, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By attempting to link the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to India with a trivial and unsubstantiated controversy over ‘tap water,’ the publication demonstrated that China’s state media increasingly resembles a social media troll rather than a serious journalistic institution.

The Global Times’ Propaganda: A Decline in Chinese Journalism

The Global Times claimed that members of the Japanese delegation neither drank tap water in India nor even used it for rinsing their mouths, and instead relied on bottled water. However, the report appears less like factual journalism and more like an attempt to construct a political narrative through propaganda. Such targeted media campaigns have been employed repeatedly by Chinese state media in the past.

In reality, it is not unusual for foreign delegations to carry their own drinking water or arrange for special meals during official visits. Such practices are generally part of established security, health, and diplomatic protocols. Interpreting them as an insult to the host country is both inaccurate and misleading.

History offers a comparable example. In 1902, when Maharaja Sawai Madho Singh II travelled to London, he carried approximately 4,000 litres of water from the Ganga River in two massive silver urns. His decision was motivated by religious faith rather than any intention to offend Britain. At the time, the world viewed this as an expression of cultural and religious devotion.

Against this backdrop, creating controversy over the Japanese delegation’s use of bottled water appears to be a weak and unconvincing argument. It raises no legitimate questions about India’s image; instead, it suggests that the Global Times sought to transform a routine diplomatic protocol into a political controversy.

The newspaper attempted to portray the Japanese Prime Minister’s decision not to drink tap water as an insult to India. However, this claim withstands neither journalistic scrutiny nor common sense.

Across the world, it is standard practice for foreign delegations to follow predetermined health and security protocols during official visits. Associating such measures with a nation’s dignity or prestige reflects an effort to advance a political narrative rather than present objective facts.

For this reason, the Global Times report appears more like propaganda than journalism. It also reflects a broader tendency within China’s political communication framework to portray personal preferences, institutional protocols, or security-related decisions as political statements. The primary objective of such reporting seems less about informing the public and more about shaping a particular perception.

What Is the Real Reason Behind China’s Unease?

China’s discomfort is not merely the result of a diplomatic meeting. The deeper reason is that the relationship between India and Japan has evolved far beyond traditional friendship. The two countries are now rapidly expanding cooperation in defence, technology, economic development, and the Indo-Pacific strategy. It is this growing strategic partnership that has become a source of concern for China.

1. Defence and Strategic Cooperation: A Growing Challenge for China

India and Japan are growing closer than ever in the field of maritime security. The two countries have agreed to jointly develop the UNICORN (Unified Complex Radio Antenna) naval radio antenna system for the Indian Navy. The project is expected to significantly strengthen the Navy’s operational capabilities, particularly in stealth operations.

At the same time, India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision are complementing each other. The objective of this partnership extends beyond strengthening relations with Southeast Asian nations and seeks to integrate India’s northeastern states with Asia’s economic and strategic networks.

To advance this objective, the two countries established the Act East Forum (AEF), through which Japan has been making substantial investments in roads, bridges, and connectivity projects in states such as Assam, Meghalaya, and Mizoram.

One of the most significant examples is the Dhubri–Phulbari Bridge across the Brahmaputra River. This infrastructure project is expected to transform the economic landscape of Northeast India by improving the movement of people and goods, facilitating trade, and creating new investment opportunities across the region.

Its significance, however, extends beyond economic development. Improved road and transport connectivity will enable India’s northeastern region to connect more directly with Southeast Asia. This will accelerate the implementation of India’s Act East Policy while simultaneously strengthening the country’s strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The shared objective of India and Japan is to reinforce a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Such cooperation naturally increases pressure on China’s expanding military activities in the region.

Although India and Japan face different security challenges, many of their concerns stem from the same source, which is China’s increasingly assertive behaviour.

For India, the principal challenge lies in China’s military activities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the growing pressure on the disputed border. For Japan, one of the most significant strategic concerns is the security of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, where China has consistently sought to expand its territorial claims and military presence.

Consequently, the security interests of India and Japan have become increasingly complementary. Both countries recognise that peace and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific can only be maintained through strong strategic cooperation among regional partners.

It is within this broader strategic framework that the roles of India and Japan in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) have steadily expanded. Together with the United States and Australia, the Quad supports a free, open, secure, and rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific.

China, however, views the grouping as a significant strategic challenge to its expanding maritime influence and regional ambitions. As a result, the Quad has evolved beyond a diplomatic forum into an important security framework aimed at maintaining the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

2. Semiconductors and Supply Chains: Reducing Dependence on China

India and Japan are also rapidly expanding their cooperation in the technology sector. Both countries are working together in strategically important areas such as semiconductors, electronics, and critical minerals to reduce global dependence on Chinese supply chains.

One notable example is Renesas Electronics’ semiconductor project in Sanand, Gujarat, valued at approximately ₹7,600 crore, along with growing Japanese investments in India’s northeastern region. These initiatives are widely regarded as components of a broader strategy to diversify global manufacturing and supply chains.

If these efforts prove successful, multinational companies may gain a strong alternative to China for advanced manufacturing and technology production.

3. Economic Cooperation: Toward a New Economic Powerhouse in Asia

India and Japan are also exploring mechanisms to expand bilateral trade using their respective national currencies, the Indian Rupee (INR) and the Japanese Yen (JPY). The objective is to simplify commercial transactions while strengthening economic cooperation.

The two countries are examining the possibility of establishing direct INR–JPY trade, thereby reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar for bilateral transactions. Such an arrangement would do more than facilitate trade. It carries significant strategic implications by helping both countries reduce exchange-rate risks, lower transaction costs, and strengthen their economic sovereignty.

For this reason, the prospect of direct Rupee–Yen trade is increasingly viewed as an indicator of India’s expanding role in the global economy and its strengthening position within the evolving international financial system.

From China’s perspective, this development is particularly significant. India represents one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing consumer markets, while Japan remains a global leader in advanced technology and high-end manufacturing. If the strengths of these two countries are effectively combined, they have the potential to reshape Asia’s economic and strategic landscape.

The Pillars of the India–Japan Partnership

The relationship between India and Japan is no longer confined to diplomacy alone. It is expanding rapidly across multiple sectors, including investment, technology, clean energy, and the future economy. This is why the partnership is increasingly regarded as one of the most significant strategic relationships for both countries.

1. Investment and Economic Cooperation

India and Japan have set ambitious goals to elevate their economic partnership over the coming years. While the earlier target was 5 trillion Japanese yen in investment, discussions are now underway to increase this figure to 10 trillion Japanese yen (approximately US$68 billion) over the next decade.

India is already home to 11 Japanese Industrial Townships (JITs), demonstrating that Japanese companies view India not merely as a consumer market but as a long-term destination for manufacturing and investment.

This growing economic engagement reflects a shared commitment to strengthening industrial cooperation and creating resilient supply chains.

2. Partnership in Clean Energy

The two countries are also deepening cooperation in the energy sector. Japan possesses advanced expertise in emerging technologies such as green hydrogen, while India is implementing its own National Green Hydrogen Mission to accelerate the transition toward clean energy.

If bilateral cooperation continues to expand, India and Japan could together establish a model for sustainable energy development that may serve as an example for the rest of the world.

3. Technology and the Digital Future

China’s long-standing technological dominance is gradually facing increasing competition. In this changing environment, India’s greatest strengths lie in its software ecosystem, engineering talent, and rapidly expanding digital infrastructure. Japan, on the other hand, remains a global leader in hardware, electronics, and high-precision manufacturing.

The combination of these complementary strengths creates the possibility of developing a Sovereign AI Network, an artificial intelligence ecosystem that is not dependent on any single foreign company or country, but instead is built upon the technological capabilities, data resources, and computing infrastructure of India and Japan.

Such collaboration could eventually lead to the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) that are not exclusively trained on Western datasets but are capable of understanding Asian languages, cultures, societies, and local contexts more effectively.

This would allow India and Japan to move beyond being mere consumers of advanced technologies and emerge as significant contributors to the global development of artificial intelligence.

Beyond AI, the partnership also holds considerable promise in fields such as quantum computing, sixth-generation (6G) telecommunications, and other advanced technologies. Recognising these opportunities, both countries continue to strengthen their digital partnership.

Challenges Facing the Partnership

Like every major strategic partnership, India–Japan relations also face practical challenges. Several issues remain unresolved, including achieving a more balanced bilateral trade relationship, differences in foreign policy approaches, particularly regarding Russia, and legal and regulatory complexities surrounding the transfer of advanced defence technologies.

Despite these differences, both governments continue to develop institutional mechanisms designed to encourage investment, facilitate technology sharing, and strengthen industrial collaboration. As a result, many analysts believe that the India–Japan partnership will continue to grow stronger in the coming years.

A Bitter Reality for China

China appears reluctant to recognise that the international system is no longer unipolar. Today’s world is increasingly multipolar, with several major powers shaping the global order.

India is no longer simply a large consumer market; it is emerging as a major global power. Against this backdrop, the Global Times’ emphasis on the so-called ‘tap water controversy’ is nothing but a reflection of China’s growing anxiety over its diminishing strategic influence.

At the same time, India and Japan are rapidly advancing the strategy of friend-shoring by relocating critical industries, supply chains, and investments to trusted partners that share political stability, transparency, and strategic confidence.

The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent geopolitical tensions demonstrated the risks of excessive dependence on a single country for essential goods and manufacturing. Learning from this experience, India and Japan are working together to establish supply chains that are more secure, diversified, and resilient during future crises.

Against the backdrop of Japan’s technological excellence, symbolised by its high-speed bullet trains, and India’s expanding economic influence, China’s growing concern appears understandable.

Together, India and Japan possess the potential not only to balance China’s expanding regional influence and unilateral strategic ambitions but also to shape the future global agenda. Their partnership represents more than an economic arrangement; it is increasingly emerging as a new strategic security framework for Asia.

China’s Concerns, Strategic Realities, and the Road Ahead

China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, appears unable or unwilling to recognise how rapidly Asia’s strategic landscape is changing. India is steadily progressing toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, and with this economic rise, its global strategic role continues to expand.

At a time when India and Japan are broadening cooperation in critical sectors such as defence, space exploration, and advanced technologies, it is only natural that their partnership will have implications for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

One notable example is the Lunar Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX), under which India and Japan are jointly working toward the exploration of the Moon’s polar regions. At the same time, collaboration in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and resilient supply chains continues to deepen.

These developments constitute precisely the kind of transformation that concerns China. If India and Japan succeed in building credible alternatives in strategic sectors such as defence, space technology, high-tech manufacturing, and semiconductors, they could challenge China’s long-standing dominance in several critical industries.

Against this backdrop, some analysts interpret the emphasis on issues such as the ‘tap water controversy’ as an indication that China is attempting to divert attention away from more substantive strategic and economic developments.

At the same time, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has faced increasing criticism in recent years over concerns related to debt burdens, project viability, and geopolitical influence in several participating countries. In contrast, the India–Japan partnership, with its emphasis on transparency, rules-based cooperation, and technology-driven development, is increasingly being viewed as an alternative model for regional growth in Asia.

Challenges: A Realistic Assessment

The India–Japan partnership is not without its practical limitations. China’s Belt and Road Initiative remains one of the world’s largest infrastructure and financing programs. In terms of capital investment and the number of projects, India and Japan have yet to match their scale.

Similarly, issues such as legal complexities surrounding defence technology transfers and bilateral trade imbalances continue to present challenges. However, the objective of India and Japan has never been to replicate the Belt and Road Initiative. Instead, their approach emphasises infrastructure that is transparent, financially sustainable, beneficial to local economies, and free from unsustainable debt obligations.

In recent years, several BRI projects have encountered difficulties arising from excessive debt, escalating costs, political resistance, and limited economic returns. Consequently, many developing countries are increasingly seeking not only financial investment but also reliable, transparent, and long-term strategic partners.

The geopolitical environment has changed considerably. China may eventually need to move beyond its traditional revisionist approach and acknowledge the emerging framework of regional cooperation.

Indeed, the foreign policies of India and Japan are not identical. Japan’s security architecture has long been anchored in its alliance with the United States, whereas India follows a policy of strategic autonomy, seeking to avoid formal alignment with any single geopolitical bloc. Their distinct responses to the Russia–Ukraine conflict are an illustration of these dissimilarities.

Nevertheless, the success of a strategic partnership should not be measured by whether two countries agree on every international issue. Rather, its true strength lies in their ability to cooperate consistently on areas of shared strategic interest.

In the case of India and Japan, this shared foundation is evident. Their interests converge on several critical issues, including responding to China’s growing assertiveness, preserving a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific, strengthening secure supply chains, advancing semiconductor manufacturing, promoting emerging technologies, and building reliable long-term economic partnerships.

For this reason, despite differences over issues such as Russia, bilateral cooperation has continued to expand in areas including defence collaboration, the Quad, semiconductor development, the Act East Forum, digital partnerships, and infrastructure development.

The strength of the India–Japan partnership therefore, does not rest upon any single international crisis. Instead, it is built upon multiple pillars of shared strategic interests, making it increasingly resilient and well-positioned for the future.

Who is Tenzing Lamsang, anti-Modi editor of The Bhutanese who spread the false claim that Bhutan rejected India’s E20 petrol offer

Anurag
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Who is Tenzing Lamsang, anti-Modi editor of The Bhutanese who spread the false claim that Bhutan rejected India’s E20 petrol offer

On 5th June, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas rejected reports claiming that Bhutan had turned down an offer of E20 petrol from India. In a post on X, the Ministry clarified that Indian Oil Marketing Companies had made no such offer and that there was no proposal to export E20 petrol to Bhutan.

The misleading claim originated in The Bhutanese, a newspaper founded and edited by Tenzing Lamsang. The report claimed that Indian OMCs, including IOCL, BPCL and HPCL, had offered E20 petrol to Bhutan, but the country had resisted the supply over infrastructure and fuel-quality concerns.

After Indian media outlets picked up the claim, the Petroleum Ministry issued its clarification and advised people to rely on official communications.

Lamsang’s own document did not prove his claim

Following the clarification, Lamsang defended his newspaper and shared a response received from Bhutan’s Department of Trade. He claimed that the document confirmed that Indian OMCs had offered E20 during technical meetings and that Bhutan had declined it.

However, the document said no such thing. It merely stated that Bhutan was not importing E20 and had requested Indian suppliers to continue providing conventional petrol for as long as it remained available. Bhutan also sought advance notice of any future transition so that dealers could upgrade old underground tanks and other infrastructure.

The response confirmed Bhutan’s concerns and preparations. It did not confirm that India had made an offer that Bhutan subsequently rejected. Lamsang therefore turned a precautionary request from Bhutan into a supposed diplomatic rejection of an Indian proposal.

His attempt to defend the report using a document that did not support its central claim raises questions about whether the story was designed to manufacture the appearance of friction between India and Bhutan.

Who is Tenzing Lamsang

Tenzing Lamsang is the founder and editor of the Bhutanese newspaper The Bhutanese. His social media history shows that criticism of the Narendra Modi government, Indian institutions and India’s regional conduct is not new for him.

On 2nd May 2019, following the Lok Sabha elections, Lamsang wrote, “The biggest loser of India’s 2019 polls is the Election Commission of India’s credibility and its hard won regional and international reputation.” He added that the Election Commission had been reduced to the status of the CBI, which supposedly followed “the whims of the party in power”.

Source: X

Lamsang wanted to portray India’s constitutional institutions as compromised merely because an election was not unfolding according to the expectations of Modi’s opponents. He repeated this line several years later without offering evidence of institutional capture.

On 6th May 2026, he claimed, “The signs were there earlier, but what has become crystal clear from the West Bengal polls is that India no longer has an autonomous Election Commission or an independent Supreme Court.” He declared that the “institutional capture of power is complete”.

Source: X

The sweeping accusation did not identify any judgment, order or legal provision establishing that either institution had surrendered its independence. Political disagreement with an election result or a court decision does not prove institutional capture.

Modi’s popularity reduced to an anti-Muslim conspiracy

On 31st May 2021, Lamsang reacted to a survey listing the abrogation of Article 370 and the Supreme Court verdict on the Ram Mandir among the Modi government’s major achievements.

He wrote, “So Modi is most popular for removing the special status for a largely Muslim state and the Supreme Court decision to allow a temple to be built on a destroyed Muslim mosque. Thinking hard here to spot the common thread in his popularity.”

Source: X

Through this framing, he attempted to reduce two complex constitutional and historical issues to supposed hostility towards Muslims. Article 370 concerned the constitutional status and complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir. The Ram Mandir was built after a Supreme Court judgment based on documentary, archaeological and legal evidence. Presenting both merely as attacks on Muslims erased their wider legal and historical context.

Comparing Modi-era India with the Emergency

On 19th December 2019, Lamsang wrote, “For all her flaws, Indira Gandhi had the decency to actually declare that an Emergency is in effect.”

Source: X

The post suggested that India under Modi was facing conditions comparable to the Emergency, when fundamental rights were suspended, opposition leaders were imprisoned and the press was censored. Criticism of the government, political protests and adverse media coverage were all continuing openly when Lamsang posted the remark, undermining his own attempt to suggest an undeclared Emergency.

A day earlier, on 18th December 2019, he had shared images of foreign newspapers covering protests in India and asked, “What was that about India now being more respected abroad than before?” He added that such headlines were usually reserved for “China, North Korea, Iran” and claimed that India’s “troll army” could only respond by abusing foreign journalists.

Source: X

He wanted adverse Western coverage of protests to be treated as proof that India had become an international pariah. Foreign newspaper headlines, however, are neither impartial measures of diplomatic standing nor evidence that India resembles authoritarian regimes.

Targeting India over Ram Mandir and historical disputes

On 21st May 2022, just days after a Shivling was discovered during the court-mandated survey of the disputed Gyanvapi structure, Lamsang wrote that if Buddhists asserted legal and historical claims, “a lot of temples and mosques in India will be in trouble”. He referred to temples allegedly built over Buddhist monasteries and mosques later constructed over those temples, adding, “Surveys will provide the evidence.”

Source: X

The timing and framing appeared aimed at diluting the Gyanvapi dispute and other cases involving temples destroyed or occupied during Islamic invasions by introducing broad, unverified counterclaims. Legal disputes over religious sites are determined through evidence concerning specific properties. They cannot be dismissed through sweeping equivalences.

Pushing an unverified motive in Surya Chauhan’s murder

On 3rd June 2026, Lamsang claimed that Surya Chauhan had harassed Asad’s sister and that Asad had repeatedly asked him to stop before murdering him. He attributed the claim to Surya’s neighbour, described as “a Hindu youth”, who had reportedly spoken to “a Hindu journalist”. He had quoted propagandist and anti-Hindu Karishma Aziz for this post.

Source: X

Surya Chauhan was a Class 11 student who was attacked in Khora on Bakrid. According to one of his friends, Asad had called Surya to the spot before surrounding him with his associates. Before the assault, Asad reportedly asked Surya whether he had ever seen a goat being slaughtered in the halal manner and said that he would show him. Surya was then allegedly stabbed multiple times. CCTV footage showing a group of youths attacking him also surfaced. He was taken to hospital but succumbed to his injuries on Friday afternoon.

Instead of restricting himself to the known circumstances of the attack, Lamsang circulated a motive that was not backed by any police finding cited in his post. He relied on a second-hand account while repeatedly highlighting the religious identities of the neighbour and the journalist, apparently to lend credibility to an otherwise unverified claim.

His old thread portrayed India as a regional bully

Lamsang’s hostility towards India’s regional position was particularly visible in a thread posted on 19th June 2019. He claimed that India’s idea of a friendly neighbourhood was “complete domination/monopoly” and said that South Asian countries had invited China to counterbalance India.

He described Indian concerns about neighbouring countries moving towards China as a reaction to Indian “loud mouths”. He compared Indian and Chinese economic and military capabilities, argued that India faced Pakistan and China on two fronts and claimed that even India’s partners did not support it during the Doklam confrontation.

He further claimed that India acted at Doklam not to defend Bhutan but because Chinese activity threatened India’s strategically important “chicken neck”. The thread repeatedly cast India as arrogant, weak and dependent on Bhutan while presenting Chinese expansion in South Asia as a defensive response to Indian conduct.

Seen alongside his latest E20 story, the pattern is difficult to miss. A routine Bhutanese request for continued conventional petrol supplies was converted into “Bhutan rejects India”. When the Indian government corrected the claim, Lamsang’s own evidence failed to substantiate it. His past posts show why such framing may have appealed to him, as it fits his longstanding attempt to depict the Modi government as authoritarian and India as an overbearing regional power.

No, Bhutan didn’t reject India’s E20 petrol offer: Read how anti-Modi editor of The Bhutanese spread fake news to give ammunition to opposition in India over Ethanol debate

Raju Das
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No, Bhutan didn’t reject India’s E20 petrol offer: Read how anti-Modi editor of The Bhutanese spread fake news to give ammunition to opposition in India over Ethanol debate

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas of the Government of India has denied reports by a section of Bhutanese media claiming that Bhutan has said no to E20 petrol exported from India. In a post on its official X account, the Ministry clarified that no such offer has been made by Indian Oil Marketing Companies, and there is no proposal whatsoever for the export of E20 petrol to Bhutan. The Ministry has advised the public to rely solely on official communications from itself and the OMCs rather than unverified reports.

The claim by The Bhutanese

This clarification directly addresses a report published by The Bhutanese, which claimed that Bhutan had turned down offers of E20 petrol from Indian OMCs including IOCL, BPCL and HPCL. The article said that the Department of Trade of the Royal Government of Bhutan had confirmed that Bhutan is not importing E20 and had resisted such supplies due to concerns over fuel quality, compatibility with older underground storage tanks, and risks of water seepage in Bhutan’s hilly terrain.

The report published last week claimed that Indian OMCs are offering E20, but Bhutan is resisting the offer. It stated, “It has been learnt that Indian Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) have been offering to supply E20 petrol to Bhutan, but Bhutan has resisted so far.” As per the report, the govt is concerned that the tanks used by petrol pumps in the country are not compatible with ethanol-blended petrol, and thinks that it may pose challenges in ensuring fuel quality and preventing contamination

It quoted the Department as having requested Indian PSUs and OMCs to continue supplying normal motor spirit as long as it remains available in the Indian market, while seeking advance notice in the event of any future transition to ethanol blends, in case pure petrol becomes unavailable in India, so that dealers could upgrade their infrastructure in time. The report presented this as Bhutan effectively saying no to an ethanol fuel offer from India.

The Bhutanese report, which was published last week, was picked up by several Indian news outlets yesterday and today, leading to widespread circulation of the claim that Bhutan has rejected to buy E20 petrol from India.

Editor defends claim, exposes himself

After India’s fact check clarifying that Indian OMCs have not offered E20 to Bhutan yet, Tenzing Lamsang, editor of The Bhutanese, posted a thread on X in which he stood by his newspaper’s story. He shared a copy of a written response from Bhutan’s Department of Trade, claiming it confirmed that an offer for E20 had been made by Indian OMCs during technical meetings, which was rejected by Bhutan. Lamsang added that his verbal interviews with officials had also verified this account, and he reiterated that The Bhutanese stood by the report based on both written and verbal inputs from official sources, while expressing appreciation for India’s consistent fuel supplies to Bhutan.

A careful examination of the very statement posted by Tenzing Lamsang himself, however, shows that it does not support the claim of an offer having been made or declined. The official response from the Department of Trade, issued in reply to specific questions from The Bhutanese, begins by stating plainly that Bhutan is not importing E20 petrol fuel. It then explains the technical concerns about ethanol-blended petrol absorbing water due to its hygroscopic properties, the condition of existing old underground tanks, and risks of contamination or performance issues in Bhutan’s terrain.

Crucially, it records that in view of these concerns, the Indian PSUs and OMCs were requested during technical meetings to continue supplying normal petrol for Bhutan as long as such fuel remains available in the Indian market. It further notes that Bhutan has asked for advance notice should India move to higher ethanol blending levels, to allow time for infrastructure upgrades.

The document makes it clear that it was a proactive request from the Bhutanese side for continued supply of conventional petrol and advance notice for preparatory planning for any future change in Indian supply. It contains no reference to any formal offer, proposal or push from the Indian OMCs to supply E20 that was then turned down by Bhutan.

This distinction is significant. The written statement confirms Bhutan’s preference for normal petrol and its infrastructure-related apprehensions, but it does not say that Indian OMCs extended an offer for E20 which Bhutan rejected.

India’s Petroleum Ministry’s position that no such offer was made and no export proposal exists is therefore consistent with the text of the official Bhutanese response. While Tenzing Lamsang has maintained that verbal communications indicated Indian OMCs were raising ethanol-related points in meetings, the documented evidence he himself shared does not corroborate the existence of such an offer.

Therefore, the original article’s claim that Bhutan said no to ethanol fuel offer from Indian OMCs is based on an interpretation that goes beyond what the official written record actually states. Bhutan’s request for assurances on continued normal petrol supply, and for advance notice of any change, reflects prudent planning on its part given its complete dependence on Indian fuel imports and the practical challenges of its storage infrastructure, but this does not mean rejecting an offer that was never extended.

It is interesting to note that while Bhutan is not ready for ethanol-blended petrol yet, Nepal has already prepared for it to cut the cost of imported oil. The Nepal government has allowed Nepal Oil Corporation to blend up to 10 percent ethanol in every litre of petrol, depending on availability. This is a global trend, with oil supply becoming uncertain over global conflicts, governments dependent on imported oil are looking towards using ethanol to partially replace petrol. Therefore, it is possible that Bhutan govt may also mandate the industry to upgrade its infrastructure to use ethanol.

Notably, Bhutan does not have an automobile industry, and most of the vehicles used in the country are imported from India. Which means most of the cars being used in the country are already compatible with E10 and E20 petrol. However, the government is concerned about the petrol pumps, as their tanks and equipment may require upgrades.

It is evident that a normal proactive request by Bhutan to India was wrongly turned into ‘Bhutan said no India’ by The Bhutanese, whose editor, Tenzing Lamsang, is known for his views against the Narendra Modi-led BJP government in India. He has been supporting anti-India forces in India, and speaking against most of the decisions taken by the Modi government. Therefore, the latest report, and then his ‘clarification’, can be seen as his and his newspaper’s attempt to create the impression of a rift between India and Bhutan.

While Indian companies have not offered E20 petrol to Bhutan yet, Tenzing Lamsang created a hypothetical situation of India offering such fuel to Bhutan based on the statement from the Bhutan government to make the claim that the Bhutan govt has rejected the blended fuel. In an attempt to create such a narrative, he asked questions to the Bhutan govt, and used the reply for his propaganda, even though the govt’s response didn’t support his claims.

‘Not a single Bengali Hindu is in detention camp’: As Himanta Biswa Sarma assures protection of Hindu refugees through CAA, read how he has reshaped the politics of Assam

Dibakar Dutta
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‘Not a single Bengali Hindu is in detention camp’: As Himanta Biswa Sarma assures protection of Hindu refugees through CAA, read how he has reshaped the politics of Assam

The Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, has been able to do the unthinkable: Erase fault lines and friction between the Assamese Hindu and the Bengali Hindu community living in the State.

For decades, Assam kept boiling over ethnic tensions between the Assamese and the Bengali population. Issues like mass migration, religious persecution, demographic change, and economic opportunities have prevented both cohesion and harmony to a large extent.

Himanta Biswa Sarma took an objective approach to draw a much-needed distinction between Bengali Hindu refugees (who migrated to the Indian State to flee persecution) and Bengali Muslim infiltrators (who came to Assam for economic opportunities).

How can someone who came to Assam to protect his religious identity be compared to someone who first created an Islamic nation and then migrated to the Indian State for opportunism? Although such a comparison is untenable, it remained the mainstay of politics in Assam.

But years of political propaganda, aimed at dividing and ruling over the masses, have been decimated under the leadership of Himanta Biswa Sarma.

Through targeted messaging, awareness about the big difference between the two groups and their contribution to demographic change was made crystal clear.

The Assamese Hindu community, which was once made to believe by vested political groups that their Bengali Hindu counterpart is somehow their enemy, is now convinced that there is only one enemy: It is not the refugee but the illegal immigrant who came to the Northeastern State after 24th March 1971 (the cut-off date of the Assam Accord) to reap economic benefits and change its culture.

No single Bengali Hindi in detention camp in Assam: Himanta Biswa Sarma

The matter became crystal clear from a statement of Himanta Biswa Sarma, which he made on Friday (3rd July) at the Indian Express Idea Exchange.

On being asked about D voters in Assam (individuals who are unable to prove Indian nationality with cases pending before the Foreigners Tribunal), he pointed out, “Now, Bengali Hindus’ number has come down below 1 lakh. It was at some point of time it was almost 4.5 lakhs. Tribunals are working, and I think it will be resolved because now the number has become very insignificant.“

The Assam CM pointed out, “There is not a single Bengali Hindu in our detention camp. That is one good news because everything has been resolved. There was no Aadhar card, everyone has got it. Now from 4.5 lakhs, it has come down to below 1 lakh. So the problem is almost resolved. I think this issue will be resolved in 1-2 years because every issue goes to the tribunal and there are disputes in the tribunal. So we are resolving the dispute through a legal process.“

“The number was at some point of time around 12-14 lakhs of both communities (Hindus and Muslims). Today this number has come down to 3.54 lakhs and out of that Bengali Hindus will be below 1 lakh. So this is significantly coming down,” Sarma added.

“But when NRC will be published, I doubt after publishing of NRC the number will jump initially again because many people names will not be there. So that point of time the Bengali Hindu people have to apply under CAA. So this issue is a little complex but we are resolving it,” he concluded.

A change in public perspective and role played by Himanta Biswa Sarma

When the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was enacted in 2019, there were large-scale protests in Assam. There was an uproar over the possibility of Bengali Hindu refugees, who were undocumented, being granted Indian citizenship. Many political groups in the State also claimed it would nullify the purpose of the Assam Accord, which made every illegal immigrant who came after 16th March 1971 eligible for deportation.

CAA provided a gateway to fast-track citizenship of people belonging to one of the 6 religious groups (Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains and Buddhists) who came to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before 31st December 2014 due to religious persecution. Fast forward 7 years, and the cut-off date has been increased to 31st December 2024.

Himanta Biswa Sarma has been able to propagate the message that the Hindu Bengali who was forced to migrate to Assam from East Pakistan/ Bangladesh is different from the Muslim Bengali who came to the Indian State from the other side of the border for economic benefit. Although both are undocumented, one is a refugee while the other is an infiltrator.

As a result, the Assam Accord no longer applies to the Hindu Bengalis refuees, and they are protected under the Citizenship Amendment Act. Himanta Biswa Sarma also made it clear that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be implemented in the State and only the ‘infiltrators’ will be put in detention camps until they are deported to Bangladesh. No Bengali Hindu refugee will either be deported or put in detention centres.

Just like Israel is the fatherland of all Jews, India was/ is and will remain the motherland of all Hindus. But to convince the masses, a different magnitude of political will, messaging and policy-making was required in Assam. Himanta Biswa Sarma has been vocal in differentiating between infiltrators and refugees. 

He made the paradigm shift in perspective possible, which was unimaginable 30 years ago. This explains why he received a grand welcome when he visited Silchar in August 2025. Lakhs of Bengalis flocked to catch a glimpse of Himanta Biswa Sarma. The overwhelming reception, warmth and adulation of the public that the Assamese-speaking Chief Minister received on that particular day remains unprecedented in the State’s history.

Ahead of the 2026 Vidhan Sabha election, he received a grand welcome in West Bengal. His speeches were attended by thousands of Bengali voters.

Himanta Biswa Sarma has been unabashed about his Hindu identity and has meticulously worked to unite the community across linguistic and ethnic lines in Assam. The historical differences between Assamese Hindus and Bengali Hindus have healed, and the State has moved in the direction of permanent reconciliation.

The vested groups, which thrived on exploiting fault lines, are watching the development from the sidelines. They have been left dismayed and powerless. All thanks to Himanta Biswa Sarma

35 years after Sikh man Baljit Singh disappeared from police custody, ex-Punjab cop Kashmir Singh gets five years’ rigorous imprisonment; Read what the judgment says

Anurag
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35 years after Sikh man Baljit Singh disappeared from police custody, ex-Punjab cop Kashmir Singh gets five years’ rigorous imprisonment; Read what the judgment says

Thirty-five years after Sikh man Baljit Singh disappeared from the custody of Chabal Police Station in Punjab, a special CBI court in Mohali sentenced former Punjab Police constable Kashmir Singh to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The other accused in the case, then SHO Suba Singh, Ravel Singh and Dalbir Singh, were convicted in 2023. Kashmir Singh was on the run for 15 years before being arrested in 2025. Special Judicial Magistrate Karanvir Singh Maju convicted Kashmir Singh of criminal conspiracy, abduction, wrongful confinement and causing hurt to extract information.

Kashmir Singh, who is now 56 years old, received five years under the relevant sections of the IPC. The court also imposed a fine of Rs 10,000 and rejected his request for probation.

What the case is about

The case stemmed from the custodial disappearance of Baljit Singh, a resident of Mallowal Santa village in Tarn Taran district, Punjab. According to the judgment accessed by OpIndia, on 7th August 1991, Baljit and his brother Paramjit Singh travelled by bus to Chabal to purchase manure. When they got down at Chabal bus stand at around 10 am, a team from Chabal Police Station arrived in an unnumbered blue Maruti Gypsy.

Paramjit informed the court that the vehicle was driven by police official Ravel Singh. Then SHO Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Kashmir Singh and two other police personnel were inside the Gypsy. He said Suba Singh caught Baljit by the neck and forced him into the Gypsy. Baljit was then taken to Chabal Police Station.

A witness identified as Anoop Singh, who later became the sarpanch of Kambo village, informed the court that he saw police personnel take Baljit into custody and later informed his family.

No formal arrest was recorded. During the investigation, the CBI found that Baljit was neither accused nor wanted in any case. The prosecution said the police detained Baljit over allegations of snatching a woman’s earrings at the bus stand and to extract the names of militants possessing firearms.

Baljit remained in illegal custody for ten days

According to the prosecution, Baljit was kept in the lock-up at Chabal Police Station from 7th August to 16th August 1991. He was never produced before a court, and his detention was not entered in official records.

Baljit’s father, Hari Singh, and brothers, Paramjit, Gurbhag and Dilbagh, repeatedly visited the police station. They brought him food, tea and clothes. Villagers accompanied them on several occasions, but they were never allowed inside the police station. Only Baljit’s father and close relatives were allowed to meet him.

At that time, Baljit’s brother Gurbhag Singh was serving as a Lance Naik in the Indian Army. He was stationed at Pathankot. After learning about the detention, he took leave and returned home. He met Baljit at the police station between 9th and 11th August. SHO Suba Singh told him that Baljit had been detained only for questioning and would be released soon.

On 15th August, Bassan Singh, the brother of Baljit’s wife, accompanied Paramjit to the police station and saw Baljit in the lock-up. Bassan said Baljit asked the family to get him released. It was the last time he saw him.

Relatives said he was tortured in custody

According to Baljit’s relatives, there were visible injuries on his body. Dilbagh Singh informed the court that there were injury marks on his brother’s body and that police personnel had severely beaten him. According to the prosecution, the police personnel tortured Baljit to force him to confess to the earrings-snatching incident and provide information about militants. Surjit Singh alias Fauji, another man reportedly detained illegally at the station, had also stated that Baljit was among the detainees and was beaten by police officials.

According to the CBI, the station had two lock-ups, and there were 20 to 25 people in each of them. Shingara Singh, who was legally arrested in a separate Arms Act and TADA case on 16th August 1991, also spoke about the large number of detainees.

Paramjit said Baljit feared that the policemen would take him out of the station and kill him. The family, however, continued to rely on assurances that he would be released after questioning.

Baljit disappeared on 17th August

When Paramjit went to the police station on 17th August, he did not find Baljit in the lock-up. When the family asked about him, SHO Suba Singh categorically denied detaining Baljit Singh. His reply raised alarm, as several relatives had met Baljit during the preceding ten days.

Surjit Singh said in a statement that Suba Singh and other officials took Baljit away one day and that he was not seen again. Despite repeated efforts by the family, Baljit’s whereabouts were never established.

The family also said police officials tried to stop them from pursuing the case. Paramjit was detained several times in 1991 and 1992. He said he was interrogated and tortured by Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh. He was released after Army authorities intervened.

Army officer wrote to the authorities

As Gurbhag Singh was serving with the 22 Punjab Regiment, he approached his Commanding Officer, Colonel Ravinder Singh, for help. The officer wrote several letters to military, police and civil authorities to trace Baljit.

The court record included communications dated 27th August, 11th September, 31st October and 14th November 1991. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar also wrote to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Tarn Taran, on 18th November. Another communication followed in January 1992.

None of the communications produced any information. Years later, the CBI published Baljit’s photograph in The Tribune on 12th February 2007 and Jalandhar Kesari on 14th February. No lead was received.

Baljit’s wife moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court

When Baljit’s family failed to trace him, his wife, Balbir Kaur, filed a Criminal Writ Petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1996. She sought a writ of habeas corpus for the production of her husband.

The petition named senior government and police officials, as well as Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh. It said the policemen took Baljit from Chabal bus stand, kept him at the police station for ten days and later denied having detained him.

On 6th April 2005, nine years after the petition was filed, the High Court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Amritsar to inquire whether Baljit had been taken away by Suba Singh and Dalbir Singh on 7th August 1991.

The CJM submitted the inquiry report on 14th December 2005. The High Court did not accept it. On 27th January 2006, it entrusted the investigation to the CBI.

What the CBI investigation found

Acting on the High Court’s directions, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered the case on 20th March 2006. It recorded statements from Baljit’s relatives, villagers, former detainees, Army officers and police officials. It also obtained the writ petition, the CJM inquiry report, police posting records and the letters sent by Army and civil authorities.

The agency concluded that Baljit had been picked up from the bus stand, illegally confined for ten days and tortured to extract a confession and information. His arrest was never recorded, and there was no case in which he was either an accused or a wanted person.

The CBI found that Suba Singh was the SHO and Dalbir Singh was serving as the additional SHO at Chabal Police Station. On 26th April 2007, it filed a charge sheet against them under Sections 120-B, 365, 344 and 330 of the IPC.

Kashmir Singh and Ravel Singh were not charge-sheeted initially. The investigating officer said Kashmir’s identity could not be firmly established because no Head Constable by that name appeared in the posting record. Paramjit had read the name on the policeman’s uniform but did not personally know him.

Evidence recorded during the trial, however, placed Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh at the scene. On 19th November 2009, the court summoned both as additional accused under Section 319 of the CrPC.

Three former policemen convicted in 2023

Ravel Singh appeared and faced trial with Suba Singh and Dalbir Singh. On 29th March 2023, the special CBI court convicted all three of criminal conspiracy, abduction, wrongful confinement and causing hurt to obtain information. They were sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The court found that Baljit was abducted from the bus stand, confined without authority and beaten to extract information. It held that the policemen acted in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy.

Balbir Kaur did not live to see the conviction. She died on 6th May 2022, nearly a year before the judgment.

Role of Kashmir Singh

The prosecution said Kashmir Singh was part of the police team that took Baljit away. Paramjit identified him in court as one of the policemen sitting in the Gypsy when Suba Singh caught Baljit and forced him into the vehicle.

Baljit’s brothers also placed Kashmir at Chabal Police Station during the illegal detention. Gurbhag said Kashmir and other policemen told the family that Baljit had been kept only for questioning and would soon be released. Dilbagh said he saw Kashmir at the station while visiting Baljit with food and clothes.

The prosecution also produced official posting records. Former police officer Manmohan Singh proved a list showing that Constable Kashmir Singh, belt number 3956/TT, was posted at Chabal Police Station in August 1991. The record said he was dismissed from service in October 2005.

The court noted that the CBI’s initial uncertainty arose partly because the allegations referred to a Head Constable, while the posting record showed a Constable named Kashmir Singh. It held that the witnesses’ identifications and the official record established his identity and involvement.

Kashmir Singh remained a proclaimed offender for over 15 years

After being summoned in November 2009, Kashmir Singh failed to appear. Non-bailable warrants could not be executed. His father told the serving constable that Kashmir was no longer living at the address given to the court.

He was declared a proclaimed offender on 21st July 2010. He neither challenged the summoning order nor the order declaring him a proclaimed offender, and he did not surrender.

The CBI arrested him on 12th November 2025 and produced him before the court the same day. He remained in judicial custody. Charges were framed against him on 2nd March 2026, and a separate trial followed.

Court rejects Kashmir Singh’s defence

The CBI examined 12 witnesses. Kashmir denied the charges and argued that the agency had not included him in the original charge sheet. His lawyer also questioned the witness identifications and the absence of a test identification parade.

The court rejected the objection over the test identification parade. It said Kashmir had not joined the investigation, had remained a proclaimed offender throughout the earlier trial and had appeared only after his arrest. He also failed to disprove the official posting record or show that his belt number was different from 3956/TT. The defence closed its evidence without examining a witness.

Court refuses leniency

During arguments on the sentence, Kashmir sought leniency. He said he was a first-time offender with no previous criminal record and asked to be released on probation.

The CBI opposed the request. It said Baljit’s disappearance left his dependent wife and four minor children without their breadwinner. It argued that Kashmir was a police official entrusted with protecting citizens but participated in the illegal detention and torture of a man who then disappeared.

The court described the acts as barbaric and held that a lenient sentence would adversely affect society. It sentenced Kashmir to five years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 365, three years under Section 344, three years under Section 330 and two years for conspiracy. All sentences will run concurrently. The period already spent in custody will be set off against the sentence.

Punjab was battling a brutal Khalistani insurgency when Baljit Singh disappeared

Baljit Singh’s custodial disappearance took place at a time when Punjab was passing through one of the bloodiest periods in its history. Khalistani terrorist organisations were carrying out assassinations, bombings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, police personnel, journalists, political leaders and those who publicly opposed separatism. Hindu passengers were frequently singled out on buses and trains, while Sikhs who resisted the terrorists or supported the Indian state were also murdered. The violence was aimed not only at spreading fear but also at creating a communal divide between Hindus and Sikhs.

One of the prominent early victims was veteran journalist and Hind Samachar Group founder Lala Jagat Narain, an outspoken critic of Khalistani separatism. He was shot dead near Ludhiana on 9th September 1981. Less than three years later, on 12th May 1984, terrorists murdered his son, Ramesh Chander, who had continued the newspaper group’s campaign against militancy. He was returning from an event when gunmen opened fire on him at a busy junction in Jalandhar. Several other editors, employees, newspaper hawkers and agents associated with the group were also targeted during the insurgency.

Public transport became a recurring target. In October 1983, terrorists stopped a bus near Dhilwan, separated six Hindu passengers from the others and shot them dead. In November 1986, gunmen forced Hindu passengers out of a bus in Punjab and killed 24 of them with automatic weapons. On 6th July 1987, armed terrorists intercepted a Haryana Roadways bus travelling from Chandigarh to Rishikesh near Lalru. They fired from both ends of the vehicle, killing 38 passengers, including women and children, and injuring over 30 others. The bus was carrying Hindu pilgrims, though available records describe their destination as Rishikesh, not Vaishno Devi.

On 25th June 1989, terrorists attacked an RSS shakha at Jawahar Lal Nehru Park in Moga. Twenty-one RSS workers were gunned down during the morning gathering. A couple and two police personnel were killed when a bomb planted at the park exploded afterwards, taking the toll to 25. The Punjab government’s official Moga district website records that another 31 people were injured. The attack was designed to provoke communal retaliation, but the RSS resumed its shakha at the same location the following day.

Months later, terrorists entered the hostel of Thapar Engineering College in Patiala during a youth festival. On the intervening night of 10th and 11th November 1989, they opened fire on students sleeping in two rooms. Nineteen students from educational institutions in Kurukshetra and Kanpur were killed, and five others were injured. The victims had travelled to Punjab only to participate in the festival.

The following year witnessed the Abohar Goli Kand. On the evening of 7th March 1990, armed terrorists entered the crowded Sadar Bazaar in the border town of Abohar and fired indiscriminately at shoppers and traders. Initial reports said 22 people were killed and more than 40 were injured. Later accounts placed the death toll at 32 after several of the injured died in hospital. The attack turned an ordinary market into a scene of mass killing within minutes.

The situation remained equally grim in 1991, the year Baljit Singh disappeared. On 15th June, terrorists stopped two passenger trains near Ludhiana and opened fire inside the compartments. An official Union Home Ministry compilation records 74 deaths in the two train attacks, while contemporary media reports gave higher figures. On 26th December that year, terrorists struck another passenger train travelling from Ludhiana towards Ferozepur. They fired at passengers believed to be Hindus, killing 49 people.

Political leaders, police personnel and public officials were also under constant threat. Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh, whose government had overseen the campaign that brought the insurgency under control, was assassinated in a suicide bombing outside the Punjab and Haryana Civil Secretariat in Chandigarh on 31st August 1995. Court records state that 17 people, including Beant Singh, were killed in the explosion.

This was the violent environment in which the police were operating when Baljit Singh was picked up in August 1991. The scale of terrorist violence explains the extraordinary pressure on Punjab Police and the security apparatus during the period. It does not, however, legalise an unrecorded arrest, custodial torture or the disappearance of a person who was neither wanted nor accused in any case.

Meet Shabir Ahmed, the Pakistani-origin ringleader of the Rochdale grooming gang, whose early release has created a storm in the United Kingdom

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Meet Shabir Ahmed, the Pakistani-origin ringleader of the Rochdale grooming gang, whose early release has created a storm in the United Kingdom

The release of Shabir Ahmed, one of the main convicts in Britain’s most notorious child sexual abuse case, has triggered widespread protests and renewed anger across the country. After spending 14 years in prison, Ahmed has walked free under an early release scheme, leaving victims fearful and many people demanding that he be deported to Pakistan.

However, the old British immigration law and Pakistan’s past refusal to accept similar offenders have made the issue more complicated. The issue has once again brought attention to one of the darkest criminal cases in modern British history.

Who is Shabir Ahmed, and what were the charges against him?

Shabir Ahmed was born in Pakistan and moved to Britain several decades ago, where he settled permanently. In 2012, a British court identified him as the leader of a nine-member gang involved in the sexual exploitation of vulnerable and underage girls in the town of Rochdale.

The court found him guilty of 30 counts of rape and other serious sexual offences involving minor girls. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison.

During the trial, it came out that Ahmed and the other gang members targeted girls from troubled and poor backgrounds. They gained the victims’ trust by offering free food, cigarettes and alcohol before trapping them in a cycle of repeated sexual and mental abuse.

The victims later told investigators that they were so frightened that they were forced to call Ahmed “Daddy.” The case exposed major failures in Britain’s policing and child protection systems and remains one of the country’s most shocking child abuse scandals.

The victims are scared after the early release of Ahmed from jail

Ahmed was released recently after serving 14 years in prison under Britain’s early release scheme. Although he is no longer behind bars, authorities have placed him under strict monitoring.

He now wears a GPS electronic tag that tracks his movements at all times. He has also been banned from entering Rochdale and nearby Oldham to reduce the risk of coming into contact with his victims.

Even with these restrictions, his release has deeply upset survivors of the abuse. One victim told the media that she fears not only for her own safety but also for the safety of her children. She said the news of Ahmed’s release has reopened old wounds and left many victims afraid to leave their homes.

The anger has also spread to local communities. Protesters have taken to the streets in Rochdale, while groups of local residents have started night patrols, saying they want to help protect victims. Many people believe someone convicted of such serious crimes should not be living freely in society.

The loophole in the 1971 immigration Act that shielded Ahmed

Following his conviction, the British government removed Ahmed’s British citizenship. As a result, he is now legally considered a Pakistani citizen.

Despite that, the government has not been able to deport him immediately because of a provision in the UK’s Immigration Act 1971.

Under the law, Commonwealth citizens who arrived in Britain before 1973 and had legally lived in the country for at least five years are protected from deportation in many cases.

Since Pakistan was a member of the Commonwealth at that time and Ahmed arrived in Britain in the late 1960s, he falls under this legal protection. This has made it difficult for British authorities to remove him from the country, despite the seriousness of his crimes.

The case has led to growing criticism of the old law, with many arguing that it was never meant to protect people convicted of grave offences.

Pressure on Britain as Pakistan refuses to take back convicts

The case has now put the British government under increasing political pressure. Several senior leaders have said that the decades-old immigration law should not be allowed to protect dangerous criminals.

Prime Minister has directed the Home Office to review Ahmed’s case and examine possible legal options. At the same time, lawmakers are discussing a new immigration bill in Parliament that could make it easier to deport people convicted of serious crimes by changing or updating the existing law.

Even if the legal hurdle is removed, another challenge remains. Britain still needs Pakistan’s cooperation to complete any deportation process.

British officials have already held discussions with the Pakistani government, but Pakistan has previously refused to accept similar offenders. Earlier, two other members of the Rochdale grooming gang also had their British citizenship removed, yet Pakistan declined to allow them to enter the country.

Some British politicians have now argued that if Pakistan refuses to accept Ahmed as well, the UK should consider reducing the foreign aid it provides to Pakistan.

For now, Ahmed remains in Britain under strict supervision, while the legal battle over his deportation continues. His release has once again raised difficult questions about public safety, justice for victims, immigration laws and international cooperation in dealing with convicted criminals.

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