The Bombay High Court recently quashed the FIRs filed against actor Shekhar Suman and comedian Bharti Singh for a joke made during a popular comedy show, “Comedy Circus Ka Jadoo”, aired on Sony TV in November 2010. The decision passed on Wednesday (29th April) came during the hearing on the petitions filed by Suman and Singh, seeking the quashing of the FIR filed against them.
A Bench of Justice Amit Borkar held that no offence was made out against the petitioners under Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code, as alleged in the FIR.
Notably, the FIRs were lodged in November 2010, under Section 295-A, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, based on a complaint filed by one Mohd Imran Dadani Rasabi, owner of the Raza Academy, at the Pydhonie Police Station. The FIRs arose from Episode No.18 of the show, in which Bharti Singh performed a character styled as “Umrao Jaan”, inspired by the title character from the Hindi movie of the same name. Her co-performer enacted a character of a police officer inspired by a role from the Hindi film ‘Dabangg’.
During the performance, Singh uttered a joke containing the words “Ya Allah! Rasgulla! Dahi Bhalla!”. The use of the word ‘Allah’ irked the complainant, who submitted a complaint against Bharti Singh, along with Shekhar Suman, who was participating in the show as a judge.
Criminal law should not be invoked in a casual manner: HC
Bharti Singh and Shekhar Suman approached the Bombay High Court, challenging the validity of the FIRs. The High Court slashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioners on the dual grounds of merit of the case and the legality of the criminal procedure. Criticising the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners, the High Court cautioned that the criminal law should not be invoked in a “casual manner”.
“I am also mindful of the fact that criminal law should not be invoked in a casual manner against an artist or a programme judge merely because somebody feels insulted by a performance viewed out of context. There must be deliberate targeting of religious feeling. There must be a malicious object. There must be sufficient material to connect the petitioner with that object. On the present record, the connection is missing,” Justice Borkar remarked.
In arriving at the decision, the court examined the facts of the case to ascertain the nature of the television show, the intent of the artists in making the joke, and the presence of elements required for constituting the alleged offence. After hearing the submissions of the parties, the High Court concluded that the necessary elements of deliberate and malicious conduct required to constitute the offence were not present. The court also held that the manner in which the criminal proceedings were initiated against the petitioners also suffered a legal flaw.
The joke was not made with malicious intent: HC
In the order quashing criminal proceedings against the petitioners, the High Court noted that the joke, containing the expressions “Ya Allah! Rasgulla! DahiBhalla!”, was made during a light entertainment programme and was not made with malicious intent. The court said that the words were uttered to rhyme and give a comic effect, and there was no premeditation.
“In the present case, from the complaint and from the episode as described, I do not find any material showing such deliberate or malicious intention on the part of either Petitioner. The performance appears to have been made in a theatrical manner, with the object of entertainment. That does not by itself create criminality,” the judge stated.
The High Court took notice of the fact that the show was telecast as a family entertainment programme and had been running for a considerable time. Examining the format of the case, the High Court also noted that performers and judges in such programmes are supposed to create laughter while following the script of the episode.
“The Petitioners say that the performers and judges in such a programme are meant to create laughter. I find this to be a relevant surrounding circumstance. A judge in a comedy show does not stand in the position of a speaker making a declaration against a religious group. A performing artist on such a stage also performs according to the script of the episode,” the court asserted.
The show is meant for humour, and the artists follow the script: HC
Accepting the petitioners’ submissions, the court agreed that the programme was a light-hearted show involving comic exchanges by performers meant to create humour. “The learned counsel submits that no reasonable reading of the episode would show a deliberate design to insult any religion or religious belief. This submission has substance. The Court cannot ignore the context of the programme. A comedy show is not judged by the same standards as a doctrinal speech or a political statement. A performance of this nature is to be read as a whole, and not by selecting stray expressions from it,” the court said.
Criminal proceedings initiated without mandatory sanction: HC
The High Court reminded that for taking cognisance of an offence under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, a previous sanction of the state government is mandatory under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. “The provision is mandatory. It is intended to prevent abuse of prosecution in matters of sensitive public expression. Here, the record as placed before me does not show that such a sanction was obtained before the matter was proceeded with in the manner in which it was done. This omission goes to the legality of the prosecution,” the court pointed out.
“When the complaint itself does not disclose the ingredients and when the mandatory sanction is not shown, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to misuse of process,” the Court noted, quashing the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
Former Indian cricketer and Trinamool Congress MP, Yusuf Pathan, has reportedly filed an appeal challenging a Gujarat High Court single-judge Bench order declaring him an encroacher on government land. According to Ahmedabad Mirror, Pathan has also challenged a notice of the Gujarat government dated June 6, 2024, which rejected Vadodara Municipal Corporation’s (VMC) proposal to lease him a plot for 99 years without public auction.
The notice directed the VMC to remove the encroachment urgently. The High Court had rejected Pathan’s proposal to purchase the land he had been illegally occupying, holding that municipal land must be sold through auction. The court added that he can take part in the auction.
The Background of the Land-Grabbing Case against Pathan
In August 2025, Justice Mauna Bhatt dismissed a petition filed by Pathan challenging orders passed by the VMC and the state government asking him to vacate a piece of land illegally occupied by him. The matter relates to a piece of government-owned land in Vadodara, which, according to authorities, was encroached by Pathan.
On March 30, 2012, the VMC’s standing committee had agreed to allot the encroached plot to Pathan at a rate of ₹57,270 per square metre after a valuation exercise. The decision was also approved by the general body of the corporation in June 2012. Since the allotment was to be made without an auction, a recommendation was sent to the state government seeking its approval for the same. The state government, however, rejected the proposal in June 2014, but Pathan continued to illegally occupy the piece of land. Subsequently, in 2024, the VMC Commissioner ordered him to vacate the land, prompting him to approach the High Court against the order.
Pathan claimed adverse possession over the land
In his petition, Pathan had argued for the implementation of the VMC’s 2012 proposal to allot him the land without auction. He contended that the VMC is an independent body under the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, and has full authority to lease property without requiring the state government’s approval. He invoked the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which grants autonomy to local bodies, and claimed that the state’s interference was unconstitutional.
He clarified that he did not object to the VMC seeking the approval of the state government because everything appeared positive to him. Pathan claimed that the lack of approval by the state government did not affect the power of the municipal corporation to allot the land to him. Additionally, he claimed adverse possession over the land, arguing that the VMC’s silence regarding the possession of land by him for 12 years implied that his occupation should be considered valid.
Pathan cited his cricket career and position as an MP before the court
Pathan also tried to win the favour of the High Court by pointing out that he was an international cricketer and a Member of Parliament. He said that he was willing to purchase the land at market price. The land in question lies right next to Pathan’s bungalow, and he cited personal and family security concerns to lay his claim on it.
The VMC and the state government opposed Pathan’s claims
The Counsel appearing for the corporation and the state government submitted that Pathan had no right to occupy government or municipal land without proper approval. He emphasised that if the land was to be allotted to him without auction, the approval of the state government was mandatory, but it was not given.
He highlighted that despite the state government’s rejection of the VMC’s proposal, Pathan fenced the plot and kept occupying it. The counsel informed the court had not paid the corporation a single rupee in the last 12 years, and that his current offer to pay market rates could not undo the illegality.
Dismissing Pathan’s claims regarding security concerns, the counsel said that Pathan never sought security from the state nor provided evidence of any threat. He argued that Pathan, being a public figure and people’s representative, is expected to follow the law even more strictly than ordinary citizens.
The High Court dismissed Pathan’s petition, citing a lack of a legal right
The High Court dismissed his petition, emphasising that he had no legal right to the land and that his possession constituted encroachment. The court said that holding land unlawfully for a long time does not create ownership rights. The court turned down Pathan’s request to acquire the land at market price, saying that allowing the request would set a dangerous precedent of regularising illegal occupation. The court clarified that prolonged illegal possession of government land does not give rise to title.
The court asserted that celebrities have a greater accountability as they serve as role models to many and wield an influence on public behaviour and social values. It added that showing leniency towards such persons would send out a wrong message. The High Court called out the VMC for not remaining vigilant and failing to take timely action against Pathan. It did not impose any fine on Pathan as the corporation delayed in taking action against him, but it did not accept Pathan’s plea.
The article in GlobalAsia by Nirmal Ghosh is finely written, intensely felt, and practically pointless as a policy critique. He characterises the Great Nicobar project as a ‘Faustian bargain’ in which India sells its ecological soul in exchange for strategic benefits that he describes as ‘theoretically persuasive though tactically questionable.’ It’s a remarkable display that he dismisses environmental safeguards as insufficient in one breath and then questions whether the strategic rationale really makes sense in the next. He leaves the reader with an atmosphere rather than an argument, one of romantic environmental sadness that, no matter how deeply felt, cannot serve as the foundation for a country of 1.4 billion people making decisions about its sovereign development and territorial security.
Let’s take a careful and in-depth look at his real claims since they are worthy of more than a dismissal and because the facts as a whole provide a totally different story.
‘Rushed through safeguards’: A claim that cannot survive scrutiny
The project was ‘rushed through various safeguards,’ according to Ghosh’s worst claim. This is now the standard statement used by all project critics, and it is said so frequently that it is taken for granted. It isn’t.
On November 11, 2022, MoEF&CC granted the Environmental Clearance, which is a 30-page document with 42 specific conditions. These include conservation of leatherback sea turtles, protection of Nicobar Megapodes, coral translocation, management of saltwater crocodiles, mangrove restoration, tribal welfare for the Shompen, three independent monitoring committees, and a 30-year wildlife conservation program that is fully funded by the project proponent. Independent, long-term research tasks were given to the Wildlife Institute of India (WII), the Zoological Survey of India (ZSI), the Botanical Survey of India (BSI), and the Salim Ali Centre for Ornithology and Natural History (SACON) until 2052, the project’s completion year. These exercises don’t include checking boxes. They are institutionally endorsed, financially protected, and legally bound.
As part of the mitigation efforts, three new wildlife sanctuaries were created. A leatherback turtle sanctuary on Little Nicobar Island, a Megapode Sanctuary on Menchal Island, and a Coral Sanctuary on Meroe Island. Water withdrawals from the Galathea River were strictly prohibited. Eight wildlife corridors were established along the east coast. A Special Medical Unit with a budget of ₹100 crore was established to protect tribal communities from invasive diseases.
Then, in February 2026, a six-person National Green Tribunal court led by Justice Prakash Shrivastava considered petitions contesting these very clearances and rejected them, concluding that there was no good ground for intervention. The NGT is not a rubber-stamp organisation; rather, its purpose is to resist when governments take shortcuts. It found no cut corners here. It discovered both substantive and procedural compliance to Indian environmental law. Referring to something as ‘rushed’ is not environmentalist. That’s revisionism.
The coral argument
Corals are a key component of Ghosh’s and his intellectual camp’s most sentimental exhibit. The optics are striking, coral reefs inspire colour, fragility, and irreplaceability. Again, however, the science is more complicated than the rhetoric.
The ZSI conducted its own investigation and discovered no substantial coral reef formations inside the proposed port building zone. There are dispersed coral colonies within 15 metres of the project area, totalling roughly 16,150 colonies that are suggested for relocation. Importantly, ZSI referenced its own previous experience; effective reef systems were created through coral translocation in the Gulf of Kachchh, which had over 90% survival rates. The NGT accepted the evidence. The tribunal urged MoEF&CC to ensure coral regeneration using ‘proven scientific methods’ and ZSI, which is familiar with these waters, has a track record of successfully achieving precisely that.
Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and the strategic argument Ghosh cannot quite dismiss
This is when Ghosh’s analysis becomes most intellectually evasive. He describes the national defence justification as ‘theoretically persuasive though tactically questionable,’ but he does not present the tactical case. He dismisses the strategic case without addressing it.
So, let us confront it. Great Nicobar Island is around 40 nautical miles from the Strait of Malacca, across which nearly 80% of China’s oil imports pass. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), India’s Exclusive Economic Zone extends 200 nautical miles from its baseline. Without sufficient infrastructure in Great Nicobar, India cannot meaningfully exercise its sovereignty over this zone. A country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is more than just a legal concept; it is an economic and strategic reality that requires physical presence, monitoring capabilities, and maritime enforcement. Without a port or an airport, India’s EEZ in the southeastern Indian Ocean is essentially an unguarded frontier.
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has progressively expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean through what strategists refer to as the ‘String of Pearls.’ Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. These aren’t hypothetical threats. They are recorded infrastructural investments that allow the PLA Navy access to the Indian Ocean’s littorals. Against this backdrop, India’s development of its own island its own territory, within its own sovereign powers, does not constitute aggression. It is basic strategic prudence that is perfectly in tune with international law.
This is the headquarters of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), the only tri-service integrated command in India. By upgrading Great Nicobar, it becomes a real force multiplier rather than just a symbolic outpost. Ghosh may refer to this as ‘tactically questionable,’ but he should explain to the reader what exactly is dubious about protecting one’s own maritime frontier in a period when global power competition is fierce.
The 8000 people nobody talks about
The 8,000 people, out of which 7,000 are settlers from the mainland, who truly reside on Great Nicobar must finally be taken into consideration in any article regarding the island’s biodiversity. At the moment, they lack dependable road access to the rest of the island, are only reachable by air and water, have subpar medical services, and almost no economic opportunities. By 2052, the project’s Environmental Clearance anticipates 51,000 direct jobs and more than 1,28,000 potential jobs. The 160 MLD water system being constructed, township development, and water supply infrastructure are not abstract advantages, rather, they are the difference between an isolated population and one that is linked to the country’s mainstream.
Ghosh’s perspective leaves no room for these 8,000 people. Inhabited islands are sometimes viewed in the conservation literature as issues that need to be resolved rather than as communities with rightful development claims. That framing, however unintended, indicates whose interests the environmental critique eventually serves.
The monitoring architecture
A truly ‘rushed’ environmental clearance would not require a project monitoring committee led by the Chief Wildlife Warden, three independent monitoring committees that meet twice a year with site visits, biodiversity committee reviews before any road expansion, and six-monthly compliance reports submitted to the MoEF&CC Regional Office. It would not require the project proponent to pay and maintain WII research stations in Campbell Bay and Kamorta for a period of 30 years. It would not be necessary to install 150 satellite tags on leatherback turtles in the first five years of the initiative.
This oversight architecture is imperfect; no document is perfect, but it is not insignificant. It is hardly an honest environmental analysis to attack it as a ‘Faustian bargain’ without first acknowledging its existence.
Conclusion
Ghosh concludes with grief, which is an understandable reaction to large-scale change in ecologically valuable environments. However, grief alone cannot be used to shape policy. The government’s choice to develop Great Nicobar is not a concession to development lobbyists. It is the result of a collaborative process that included WII, ZSI, BSI, SACON, the EAC, the NGT, a public hearing in Campbell Bay, and the courts. Every institution under Indian environmental legislation was used. All agreed that the project, with its conditions, was acceptable.
A nation’s sovereignty over its own area, whether biological, economic, or strategic, is not negotiable. It’s a right. The challenging, unglamorous, institutionally controlled task of simultaneously pursuing security and the environment is what India has attempted at Great Nicobar, not a choice between the two. Critics who fail to acknowledge the problem do not safeguard nature. They’re simply making noise from a safe distance.
On 18th and 19th April, the Enforcement Directorate conducted raids at several locations linked to an organisation named The Timothy Initiative, TTI. According to the investigation agency, in just six months, TTI withdrew 95 crores using foreign bank debit cards across different states, including 6.5 crores in Naxal-affected Chhattisgarh’s Bastar and Dhamtari regions. While doing so, TTI bypassed FCRA regulations. Notably, this organisation is not registered under FCRA.
OpIndia is doing a series of reports on how TTI functions. During our research, we found that TTI has published 10 books that its members follow to convert Hindus and members of other communities. While nine books do not mention any religion directly, the tenth book of TTI presents a training text for “church planting leaders” on how to approach Hindus, enter villages that have a dominant Hindu population, and convince them to convert.
Chapter 3 of the book, titled World Religions and Cults, asks the church planters to examine religions against the “standard of Scriptures”. The book gives suggestions for apologetic responses and witnessing while coercing Hindus to convert to Christianity. It is essential to understand how TTI has spoken about Hinduism, posing it as the main target. The section on Hinduism in the book is not written as an academic survey or a neutral theological comparison. It is written as a practical guide for engaging Hindus and advancing missionary work among them.
How TTI targets Hindu villages as conversion ground
The book lays down the plan to target the core beliefs of Hindus, including the existence of many Gods. It pushes the idea that Jesus should be shown as an avatar to Hindus, which apparently makes it easier to lure Hindus to convert. Furthermore, it talks about the idea that sin is ignorance rather than moral rebellion, and that the doctrines of karma and reincarnation should be discussed in such a way that Hindus depart from their beliefs.
The book perfectly explains that the “ultimate goal of a Hindu” is release from the cycle of karma and rebirth, and it presents Hindu scriptures as a long and layered tradition centred around the Vedas, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Gita. However, this doctrinal summary is only the first part. Immediately after it, the book shifts into a section titled “Apologetic Responses and Witnessing Suggestions”, making it clear that the purpose is not just description but intervention.
Source: TTI
The structure of the text matters, as it does not just explain what Hindus believe, but also how missionaries should answer them. In simple terms, Hindu communities are treated as mission territory and Hindu belief as a field to be worked upon through argument, persuasion, and carefully designed outreach. It is not just theology but a conversion playbook.
‘Pray before entry’ – Demonisation of Hindu Gods and local beliefs
The most problematic aspect of the book is the way it demonises Hindu beliefs and Gods. The book reads, “Understand that most Hindu villages are possessed with evil spirits, or a Hindu god that watches over them.” It then adds, “Missiologists call this a territorial spirit. The spirit that has power for that particular village only.” The instruction that follows is direct, “When you enter into the village pray for protection and power from the Holy Spirit to remove any sort of disruptions that the evil spirits may attempt.”
This is not incidental word choice. Instead, it frames Hindu villages not merely as places where people hold different beliefs, but as spiritually hostile spaces under dark influence. Notably, “evil spirits” and “a Hindu God” are placed in the same frame, which clearly states that, for them, Hindu Gods are “demonic”. The village is thus portrayed as being under supernatural control that the missionary must confront before meaningful work can begin.
Notably, not only TTI, but many hardcore Christians and evangelists describe Hindu Gods as ‘demons’, especially when it comes to Maa Kali and Bhagwan Shiv. Same goes for self-proclaimed atheists, ex-Muslims and Islamists. Social media posts by Christians calling Maa Kali a demon are common and are often not removed by platforms despite the fact that they hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus.
A social media post from October 2025 targeting Maa Kali. Source: X
Step by step entry strategy to avoid suspicion in villages
The book clearly says that missionaries face hostility in Hindu-dominant villages and often get accused of forceful conversions. It notes that “many times the people you witness to are unable to read or write” and then warns that “in many places it may attract suspicion or cause problems to carry a Bible or show the Jesus film.” The book clearly shows that the people behind TTI know that open Christian proselytisation may not be welcomed and that visible missionary tools can generate doubt or opposition.
However, instead of reconsidering the outreach model because of the suspicion Hindus have against missionaries, the book offers an alternative entry strategy. It tells missionaries to “memorise Scriptures so that you are rich in the word of God” and to proceed orally rather than through overt material symbols. In other words, the concern is not whether entry is ethically appropriate in a resistant environment. The concern is how to continue the mission in a way that attracts less notice and invites fewer questions.
Soft tactics over direct preaching: Songs, bonding, gradual messaging
The book tells missionaries to “witness with the Word of God in your heart and mind, tell Bible stories, quote Scripture, sing songs, and pray with them.” It is a clear tactic of using softer methods of religious insertion. Instead of leading with a Bible in hand or a film screening, the missionary is told to rely on stories, songs, prayer, and remembered scripture. While the message remains the same and the aim revolves around converting Hindus, the process becomes more socially acceptable and less visibly confrontational.
Such instructions show how carefully the outreach is calibrated. Songs and stories are not suggested merely because they are culturally warm or pastorally gentle. They are suggested in a context where carrying explicit Christian material “may attract suspicion”. That makes these methods part of a tactical adjustment. The text is effectively training missionaries to rely on gradual messaging and interpersonal embedding when direct preaching is likely to be resisted.
Countering Hindu beliefs – Focus on karma, reincarnation, core philosophy
The manual is equally direct in how it wants missionaries to challenge Hindu belief itself. It describes karma as a system in which actions lead to consequences across rebirths, then adds the sharp line that “karma does not allow forgiveness”. This interpretation becomes the basis for the missionary response. The text then says Christians should explain that Christ frees people from “shame, guilt, and trying to work off debt from karma.”
Source: TTI
The same pattern appears in its treatment of sin and salvation. The book says Hindus see sin as “the result of ignorance, not moral rebellion”, but then instructs missionaries to argue the opposite. It tells them to say that sin is “personal”, that it is “not merely a matter of ignorance, but of disobedience”, and that the human problem is a “broken relationship with God”. The next step is to present confession and forgiveness in Christ as the sole answer. This is not casual comparative religion. It is a targeted attempt to dismantle core Hindu philosophical categories and replace them with Christian ones.
From religious teaching to organised conversion playbook
In short, the book, especially the sections on Hinduism, reveals a pattern that is difficult to dismiss as routine evangelism. The way the process has been orchestrated shows that TTI’s mission is not to get caught or come face to face with law enforcement agencies.
The implications of such ideas are serious. It is not about personal belief, but about the way TTI has a well-structured training module where it treats Hindu communities as conversion ground. They portray Hindus’ sacred landscape as spiritually polluted. The book teaches missionaries how to enter, adapt, persuade, and neutralise suspicion.
TTI was established in 2007. Its founder, David Nelms, first visited India around 1992. Since its establishment, David has visited India several times. Now, his son Jared Nelms serves as the president of the organisation and follows in his footsteps to plant churches in India and convert as many Hindus as possible to Christianity.
In coming chapters of this series, we will discuss how the organisation functions and how it establishes connections with other missionary programmes to convert Hindus across states.
On 29th April (Wednesday), 29-year-old Sharad Kalaskar was granted bail by the Bombay High Court in the murder case of atheist, rationalist and anti-superstition “activist” Dr Narendra Dabholkar. Notably, the move transpired after the court highlighted his extended incarceration and cited prima facie suspicions regarding his identity as one of the attackers. He is directed to provide a ₹50,000 bail bond.
The pronouncement had been made by a division bench consisting of Justices Ajay Gadkari and Ranjitsinha Bhonsale. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) wanted the decision to be stayed for 4 weeks, but was denied, and Justice Gadkari further countered, “Since we have already raised doubts over the identity of the applicant Kalaskar as the assailant, there is no question of staying this order.”
The court points out the flawed inquiry
The court outlined the testimony of a key prosecution witness, Kiran Kamble, who reported being alerted by sounds resembling firecrackers but expressed uncertainty regarding the interval between gunshots during his cross-examination. The trial court also documented that he was “not clear between the seconds and minutes.”
“An omission that, ‘he had stated to police that, on hearing noise like firecrackers his attention was drawn towards the noise. I had also stated that, out of the two boys one was heighted and another was somewhat of short height’ has been brought on record. That, the time gap between the bullets was one to two minutes or one to two seconds,” the division bench conveyed.
Kamble had recognised the palm-sized photographs. The images depicted two individuals, with two photographs of each. However, he acknowledged that he could not discern the identifying marks on the faces of those individuals. He asserted that they had moustaches, and the fleeing boys were approximately 60 feet away from the deceased. He observed them from a distance of about 15 feet.
The court conveyed, “The police had shown him sketches of persons in addition to the sketch drawn as per the description by him. This witness has admitted that he did not remember whether the sketch was shown to him on 2nd September 2013.” More importantly, Kamble was presented with another sketch, however, he remarked that this did not resemble the one that was created according to his description.
His statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class in Pune on 12th April 2019. Subsequently, he was summoned to the office of the Commissioner of Police in Pune to provide information regarding the occurrence. “At that time, he had told the police that, he had seen nothing of the said incident,” the court highlighted.
Glaring shortcomings command the bench’s attention
The second prime witness Vinay Kelkar was called to the CBI Office situated in Khadki, where he was shown a number of photographs. He selected 2 images from a group of 10 to 12, which he expressed were of the people he spotted at the time of the incident. He assured that the faces in the pictures matched to an extent of 80 to 85%.
During his cross-examination, he disclosed that the police had initially sketched the persons on the day of the instance with his aide. However, Kelkar was unable to recall if a second sketch had been produced on the basis of his information on 30th January 2015. He, along with a man named Meenanath, was invited to the CBI Office in Khadki about a year after the incident where they were shown some sketches.
Their signatures were collected on the reverse side of the papers and Kelkar stated that the resemblance was estimated to be between 70 to 80%. Nevertheless, he revealed that the sketch did not accurately reflect the details he offered. On 20th August 2013, a drawing was made following his account of the person who was behind the wheel.
The court mentioned, “This witness has given an admission that, it did not so happen that, during inquiry by CBI Officer he told that, the person in the sketch was driving the vehicle and he passed from his house.” The statement provided to the investigating agency on 4th September 2016 was read to him and he responded that it was incorrect.
Moreover, he has had spectacles since the year 2015-2016 for reading purposes and went to the crime scene nearly 20 to 25 minutes after the occurrence following a bath. He was even planning to visit his office, which is next to his residence.
“He did not wait to see whether anybody is helping the injured. He did not disclose the incident immediately to anybody in the house. This witness has admitted that it would be correct to say that, after taking bath he was about to leave for office and with that preparation he came out of the house,” the court observed. Kelkar was in the same position on the balcony as the assailants proceeded towards him and started the two-wheeler. The bench also termed his inability to react swiftly after the incident as inappropriate.
It reiterated that he saw the instance from his balcony, around 500 metres away. “I, Vinay Kelkar, hereby declare that assassination incident took place 5 years ago and the distance it took place is too far away from me. I declare that suspects resemble the faces of criminals, however, I cannot be identified entirely by me,” the court then quoted his statement delivered on 27th December 2018 after identifying Kalaskar’s picture.
The court reprimands the CBI and decides in favour of the applicant
The court mentioned that the prosecution had extensively relied on two eyewitnesses to establish his identity as an attacker, which was an essential concern in the application. They characterised them as chance witnesses whose actions following their purported observation of the shooting were at odds with usual human behaviour after carefully reviewing their testimony and cross-examinations.
“Though they (witnesses) had seen the ghastly assault on the deceased (Dabholkar), both the witnesses chose to give preference and complete their daily chores of life and thereafter leisurely approached the police to give information. According to us, the conduct of these two witnesses is not of the men of common prudence and raises doubt in the mind of the court about their witnessing the incident,” the bench declared.
It was pointed out that the murder transpired on 20th August 2013, while Kalaskar was arrested on 3rd September 2018. The court also criticised the CBI’s attempt to use photo identification instead of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) to fix identify and observed, “Though the investigating agency had every opportunity to conduct Test Identification Parade of Kalaskar, the investigating officer chose to establish identity by showing his photographs to the witnesses when he was already in custody,” the court emphasised, holding that such identification loses its sanctity.”
The bench invoked a previous judgement of the Supreme Court and mentioned that “an identification parade is not mandatory, nor can it be claimed by the suspect as a matter of right. That, purpose of pre-trial identification evidence is to assure the investigating agency that the investigation is going on in the right direction and to provide corroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness or victim later in court at the trial. That, if the suspect is a complete stranger to the witness or victim, then an identification parade is desirable unless the suspect has been seen by the witness or victim for some length of time.”
The court also noted that Kalaskar has been behind bars since 3rd September 2018 and has endured more than 7 and a half years of imprisonment at both the pretrial and post-conviction stages. It added that the probability of his petition being addressed for a final hearing soon is unlikely in light of the ongoing appeals.
“After taking into consideration the overall view of the application, we are of the opinion that, during the pendency of his appeal, the substantive sentence imposed upon him can be suspended and the applicant be released on bail,” the bench declared.
Background of the case
Dabholkar (67), who ran an organisation, “Maharashtra Andhashraddha Nirmoolan Samiti,” was shot and killed by two bike-borne men while he was on a morning walk in Pune. Sachin Andure and Kalaskar were declared perpetrators by the CBI which took up the case in 2014 after a Bombay High Court ruling. The matter was being looked into by the Pune Police initially.
A Pune sessions court sentenced them to life in prison and a fine of ₹5 lakh each on 10th May 2024. However, it cleared three other defendants, Dr Virendrasinh Tawade, Vikram Bhave and Sanjeev Punalekar, on the grounds of insufficient proof to connect them to the incident.
Afterwards, Kalaskar initiated a motion with the high court in 2024, contesting the judgment and requesting bail until the submission was eventually heard and concluded.
It is noteworthy that the complete case was overshadowed by a persistent media trial, including a sting operation led by Ashish Khetan, former leader of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), including a planchette session intended to communicate with Dabholkar’s spirit to uncover the identities of his killers.
“Sanatan Sanstha” became the primary focus of the media trial because it had opposed Dabholkar’s 2003 anti-superstition bill, which sought to criminalise acts of black magic, sacrifices and other actions classified as religious rituals.
Meanwhile, multiple procedural errors occurred during the inquiry, such as incorrect evidence management and the agency’s failure to perform the required identification parades in accordance with its manual. Likewise, critical questions remained unanswered as the investigators mismanaged or disregarded several leads and pieces of evidence.
The first two arrests made in the case were those of Vikas Khandelwal and Manish Nagori based on ballistic evidence that linked the two to the murder weapon which was allegedly discovered in their custody. However, the development was later deemed inconclusive and the witnesses present at the scene of the crime failed to identify the two leading to their release.
Similarly, the mysterious presence of foreign materials at the crime scene and the final disposal of the murder weapon were never determined conclusively. There were significant gaps in the probe which implied that either incompetence or intentional obstruction had occurred.
Since the Balen Shah government came to power in Nepal, another anti-India move has emerged. A controversy has erupted after Nepal’s national carrier, Nepal Airlines, shared a world map on social media that inaccurately depicted parts of India, triggering sharp reactions from Indian users online.
The issue began on 29th April, when Nepal Airlines posted a graphic on its official X account showing its global flight network. Nepal Airlines released a map showing all of Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan and the entire Northeast India as part of China. The post quickly went viral, drawing criticism from Indian social media users, many of whom called out the airline for what they described as a serious and unacceptable error.
The map specifically depicted all of Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan, which infuriated Indian netizens. Furthermore, the entire Northeast, including India’s northeastern states like Sikkim and Darjeeling, was also shown as part of China. This further angered Indian netizens. The Indian users are also demanding an apology for displaying such a misleading map.
Indian netizens expressed anger at Nepal Airlines
Hashtags related to Nepal Airlines and Jammu & Kashmir began trending, with users questioning how such a depiction could be shared by a national airline.
Several individuals expressed their concerns publicly. One user, Divya Gandotra Tandon, highlighted India’s long-standing ties with Nepal. Sharing a long post on X, she wrote, “India has kept Nepal’s economy breathing for decades… open borders, jobs for lakhs of Nepalis, trade access via Indian ports, fuel pipelines, power projects, disaster relief, infrastructure, scholarships, even military cooperation.”
India has kept Nepal’s economy breathing for decades… open borders, jobs for lakhs of Nepalis, trade access via Indian ports, fuel pipelines, power projects, disaster relief, infrastructure, scholarships, even military cooperation.
— Divya Gandotra Tandon (@divya_gandotra) April 29, 2026
Another reaction came from the official handle of the Assam Vocational Teachers Association, which termed the depiction “irresponsible” and called for accountability. The group stated that such errors, especially involving sensitive geopolitical boundaries, should be corrected immediately.
India has been Nepal’s biggest lifeline for decades, from open borders, lakhs of jobs, trade routes, fuel, power, disaster aid, infrastructure & more. Yet Nepal Airlines casually displays Jammu & Kashmir as part of Pakistan on its flight map.
— Vocational Teachers' Association of Assam NSQF (@VTAA_NSQF) April 29, 2026
Public figures also weighed in. Bhojpuri actor and RJD leader Khesari Lal Yadav also wrote, “Can anyone tell me what Nepal Airlines was thinking in such a way that it tampered with the map of India, and that too with Jammu and Kashmir? This is no ordinary thing; it seems to have been done deliberately. This is called teasing.”
कोई बता पाएगा की क्या सोच के नेपाल एयरलाइंस भारत के नक्शे में ऐसा छेड़ छाढ़ किया है और वो भी जम्मू कश्मीर को लेकर ?
ये मामूली बात नहीं है, जानबूझकर किया हुआ काम लगता हैं। इसको चिढ़ाना बोलते हैं। https://t.co/d1R5ZzzeSq
— Khesari Lal Yadav (खेसारी) (@khesariLY) April 29, 2026
Meanwhile, another social media handle, “The Darjeeling Chronicle,” also criticised the map and wrote, “The world is different from what Nepal Airlines sees. Looking at their map, it seems that the entire northwest of India, the entire northeast, Darjeeling, Sikkim, and even parts of Myanmar have been incorporated into China. What are people in Kathmandu blowing these days?”
DFQ – The world according to Nepal Airlines
Seems like for them most of North West and all of North East India, including Darjeeling, Sikkim and Mayanmar are part of China
— The Darjeeling Chronicle (@TheDarjChron) April 29, 2026
Nepal Airlines apologised
As the criticism intensified, Nepal Airlines responded with a public apology. In its statement, the airline acknowledged the error and said it “sincerely regrets” the inaccuracies in the map shared on its social media platform. The airline clarified that the depiction of international boundaries in the graphic was incorrect and did not reflect the official position of either Nepal Airlines or the Government of Nepal.
We sincerely apologize for error in the network map recently shared on our social media channels. The map contained significant cartographic inaccuracies regarding international boundaries that do not reflect the official stance of Nepal or Nepal Airlines. pic.twitter.com/E5MZSS8CjQ
The airline further assured that the issue was being taken seriously and that such mistakes would be avoided in the future. The apology, however, came only after the post had already sparked widespread backlash online.
Nepal’s anti-India stance and the turmoil in the Balen Shah government
It’s worth noting that Nepal’s anti-India stance has been on the rise since the new Balen Shah government took office last month. Recently, the Balen Shah government introduced a new customs policy, under which customs duties were imposed on goods imported from India worth more than 100 Nepalese rupees (approximately ₹63). This also led to protests against the Balen Shah government.
And it’s no secret that the Balen Shah government is facing a deadlock over its own decisions, with several of its top ministers facing corruption charges, forcing them to resign. Overall, the new Balen Shah government is proving incapable of running the country.
(This article is a translation of the original articlepublished on OpIndia Hindi.)
The Supreme Court on Wednesday (29th April) held that no cognizable offence was made out against BJP leaders Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Sahib Singh Verma, who were accused of making hate speeches in January 2020. The decision was made by a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta on a plea filed by CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat, challenging a Delhi High Court order passed on June 22, 2023, which refused to direct the filing of an FIR against the two leaders.
The Delhi High Court had dismissed the writ petition filed by Karat and upheld the decision of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (I), Rouse Avenue Court, dated August 26, 2020. The trial court had declined to issue a direction for registration of an FIR against the leaders under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 504, 505 and 506 of the IPC, citing a lack of prior sanction for prosecution.
Allegations made by Brinda Karat
In her plea, Karat alleged that in speeches made by the two politicians, they threatened to use force to remove protestors, who were holding protests at Shaheen Bagh against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). It also alleged that their speeches promoted hatred and enmity against Muslims by portraying them as invaders who will enter houses and rape and kill people.
Karat referred to the speech made by Anurag Thakur on January 27, 2020, where he allegedly raised the slogan “desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaron saalon ko” (Traitors should be shot dead). She also referred to a speech made by Parvesh Verma on January 27-28, 2020, while campaigning for the BJP and a subsequent interview given to the media.
Background of the case
A complaint was submitted on January 29, 2020, to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, seeking registration of an FIR against the two politicians. Subsequently, on February 2, 2020, a communication was made to the Station House Officer, Parliament Street Police Station, New Delhi, reiterating the request for immediate registration of an FIR. When no action was taken, the appellants filed a complaint under Section 156(3) of the CrPC before the trial court. In the status report submitted before the trial court, the investigating agency said that no cognizable offence was made out based on the material placed on record.
The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the appellants, holding that it was maintainable because there was no prior sanction from the competent authority to prosecute the accused. Thereafter, the appellants approached the Delhi High Court via a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, read with Sections 482 and 483 of the CrPC, and challenged the verdict of the trial court. The High Court also dismissed the writ petition, upholding the reasoning of the trial court, which stated that a direction for the registration of the FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC could not be exercised in the absence of prior sanction.
What the Supreme Court said
The Supreme Court examined the record and declined to interfere with the Delhi High Court’s order on the merits. However, the apex court disagreed with the legal reasoning given by the High Court in making the order. The court observed that even though it did not find any ground to interfere with or overturn the High Court’s decision, it found fault with the High Court’s observation that prior sanction is required before a Magistrate can order registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC.
Explaining the point of law, the Supreme Court said that the power exercised by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC falls at the pre-cognisance stage and does not require prior sanction. “The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognisance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature,” the Supreme Court said.
However, after examining the case on the merits, the Supreme Court categorically held that no cognizable offence was made out against the two politicians. “Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated 26th February, 2020, submitted before the Trial Court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out,” the Court stated, adding that their speeches were not directed against any specific community.
“The High Court has, on an independent assessment, held that the speeches in question do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, observing that the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder,” the top court observed.
“Accordingly, while we disapprove of the reasoning adopted by the High Court on the issue of prior sanction, we find no ground to interfere with the ultimate conclusion. The appeal against the impugned judgment dated 13th June, 2022, therefore, stands partly allowed to the aforesaid extent,” the Supreme Court held.
A 2003 internal speech by then-President Hu Jintao warned his leadership of what he called the ‘Malacca Dilemma‘, China’s existential reliance on a waterway it does not control and cannot easily avoid, somewhere in the Chinese Communist Party archives.
That problem has continued to grow worse over the past 20 years. As of 2025, more than 80% of China’s oil imports, which are valued at about $312 billion a year, come through the Strait of Malacca, which is only 2.8 km wide at its narrowest point. Approximately $3.5 trillion in global business, or two-thirds of all Chinese marine traffic, travels through these waterways annually. Every day, China uses more than 15 million barrels of oil. Just 3.7 million are transported by its overland pipelines. The maths is harsh. Beijing’s economic engine is based on a bottleneck that it fears and cannot fix.
Now think about India’s position. Geostrategically speaking, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a 700+ kilometre stretch that spans the entrance to the Malacca Strait, are a natural aircraft carrier that India was gifted by geography. Great Nicobar, the southernmost island in this series, is nearly equidistant from Singapore, Port Klang, and Colombo. One of the main routes used by ships to enter and exit the strait is the Six Degree Channel, which it overlooks. The waterways around these islands are used for 60% of China’s entire trade. Control of the route is a strategic trump card in any significant battle with China, rather than a negotiation chip. India is finally realising it and moving ahead to use its geographical blessing. And a segment of its own political class is attempting to prevent this.
What the great Nicobar project actually is
The Great Nicobar Island Development Project, devised by NITI Aayog and approved by the Union Cabinet in 2021, aims to make the island one of India’s most important commercial and strategic hubs. There are four main parts to the project, which are expected to cost around ₹81,000 crore (almost $10 billion).
Built on a naturally occurring deep harbour of 18 to 20 meters, the transhipment port in Galathea Bay aims to have a capacity of 4 million TEUs by 2028 and 16 million TEUs by 2058. This would challenge Singapore’s capacity close to the mouth of the strait, which China is most afraid of. An international greenfield airport that can accommodate wide-body aircraft and has a 3,300-meter runway. A 450 MW solar and gas-powered power plant. The Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command will be upgraded into a frontline strategic arm with these dual-use military and civil facilities.
Economic security is national security. Currently, ~75% of India’s transshipped cargo is handled by foreign ports like Colombo and Singapore. The Galathea Bay ICTP aims to internalize this trade, securing supply chains and reclaiming strategic economic leverage.
A crucial economic problem is addressed by the port alone. Around 40% of India’s transhipment business is handled by Colombo, and 25% of the country’s cargo is currently transshipped through foreign ports. Every container that travels through Colombo rather than an Indian port costs India money and geopolitical advantage. Galathea Bay would put an end to such reliance and secure India’s place at one of the busiest maritime crossroads in the world. This is India’s counter to China’s ‘String of Pearls’ not through confrontation, but by creating hubs of connectivity and commerce,” stated maritime historian Nick Collins.
The string of pearls and India’s answer
Defence strategists refer to the network of military and commercial port facilities that China has meticulously constructed over the past 20 years as the ‘String of Pearls,’ which stretches from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa. Although the phrase was originally used in a Booz Allen Hamilton report for the US Department of Defence in 2005, the strategy it refers to has only become more complex since then.
The pearls are well known. Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is located close to the Strait of Hormuz and serves as China’s western anchor for energy security; Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which was leased to China for 99 years after Colombo was unable to pay its debts, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, which has pipelines that go straight into Yunnan, and Coco Islands in Myanmar, which is strategically placed to monitor India’s Andaman naval installations. Additionally, China has established military structures in the Maldives and has a permanent military base in Djibouti. Containment is the ring’s obvious purpose. China wants to be able to keep an eye on Indian naval activities, project strength into the Indian Ocean, and, most importantly, safeguard its own supply lines that depend on Malacca by gaining influence around every chokepoint before India does.
India has responded with what observers now refer to as the ‘Necklace of Diamonds‘ strategy, which consists of a series of strategic port access agreements, naval collaborations, and infrastructure investments aimed at encircling China. In addition to strengthening naval cooperation through the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia), India has gained port access in Oman’s Duqm, Indonesia’s Sabang (a deep-sea port right on the entrance to Malacca), and the Seychelles. A ₹5,650 crore military infrastructure upgrade was given to the Andaman and Nicobar Command in 2019. The command now houses INS Utkrosh at Port Blair, INS Baaz in Great Nicobar, and INS Kohassa in North Andaman.
The centrepiece of this whole architectural design is Great Nicobar. A full-fledged military and commercial base at Galathea Bay, located at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, would enable India to monitor and, if necessary, intercept shipping through one of the world’s most important waterways. That is not adventurism. That is the reasonable application of geography.
The Iran lesson
If anyone requires a practical demonstration of what it means to sit beside a critical strait and have the power to threaten, facilitate and weaponise global trade, Iran has been providing it since February 2026.
When the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, Tehran used a weapon it had been keeping in reserve for decades, the Strait of Hormuz. Iran successfully blocked one of the busiest energy routes in the world by using threats, drone attacks, naval mines, and anti-ship missiles. During peacetime, the Strait of Hormuz transports nearly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil and LNG. That flow is now only a trickle.
The effects have been quick and widespread. The price of a barrel of oil has risen past $100. Shipping companies have stopped doing business. Insurance firms withdrew their coverage for war risks. Energy shocks have affected nations ranging from Germany to Japan, which receives 93% of its crude oil from Hormuz. Iran hasn’t had to literally sink every ship as part of the de facto blockade; all it has needed is enough genuine threat to force insurers, captains, and shipping firms to reevaluate the risk.
According to the Atlantic Council in March 2026, Iran has proved that ‘mass-produced drones, limited firepower, and credible threats may be enough for any country positioned along a critical maritime chokepoint to shut down major shipping lanes.’
Even more startling is the fact that Iran has used this location as a bargaining chip. Tehran has made the Strait of Hormuz the currency of a peace deal by offering to reopen it in exchange for the US lifting its naval blockade and ending the conflict. Iran has demonstrated its ability to impose costs on international energy markets through minimal interruption, and the CSIS noted that this ability will continue long after the current war is resolved. Once utilised, geography turns into a long term strategic asset.
Apply this lesson to the Malacca Strait now. 20% of the world’s oil is transported via a strait that Iran controls just one side of. If Great Nicobar is developed, India will be at the mouth of a strait that transports more than 80% of China’s oil imports and two-thirds of its overall trade. By all measures, India has significantly more leverage. And, unlike Iran, India’s posture is defensive, not a threat to close anything, but the ability to ensure freedom of travel or, in a conflict situation, to deny it to an adversary whose entire economic model is based on those waters. The Great Nicobar Project is more than just infrastructure because of this.
Opposition demand, strategic consequences
During his visit to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Rahul Gandhi called the Great Nicobar Project ‘one of the biggest scams and gravest crimes against this country’s natural and tribal heritage.’ He referred to it as ‘destruction dressed in development’s language.’ In a September 2025 editorial, Congress Parliamentary Chairperson Sonia Gandhi described it as an existential danger to the islands’ indigenous population, the Shompen tribe, and a threat to their distinctive ecosystem. The party has met with tribal elders who have complained about lack of transparency and displacement.
However, it is important to note what the project’s opponents do not address. Rahul Gandhi has not proposed a revised development plan that respects tribal concerns while maintaining vital infrastructure. He hasn’t offered a rehabilitation timeline. He hasn’t even touched on the military aspect. In its current form, the opposition calls for stopping rather than improving.
The National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management, the Environment Ministry’s High Powered Committee, and the National Green Tribunal have all approved the proposal. The government claims, with substantial evidence, that the port covers roughly 10% of the island’s total area, and that the strategic imperatives are inextricably linked to the economic imperatives, 25% of India’s cargo passing through foreign ports is both a national vulnerability and a logistics inefficiency.
It is hyperbolic and biased to say that the Nicobar project automatically puts the Shompen people in danger. The 2015 Shompen Policy, geofencing, surveillance towers, and a monitoring committee for tribal welfare are just a few of the safeguards the government has put in place to ensure that the project won’t disrupt Shompen communities. Additionally, it has been stated that the project’s clearances include protections, and the administration as a whole continues to help tribal communities with basic infrastructure, health care, education, and other social services.
Who else wants India to stand down
The most obvious form of opposition to the Great Nicobar Project is the political opposition in Parliament. Beneath it is a larger ecosystem of global advocacy, which merits examination because of what it regularly chooses to highlight, what it routinely ignores, and whose interests its findings just so happen to serve. Survival International, a London-based advocacy group that released its annual report mentioning how India plans to sacrifice one of the world’s most isolated tribes to create ‘the new Hong Kong’ in 2025, has been the most vocal global voice opposing the project.
The report, which has received widespread coverage in Western media, declares the initiative genocidal and asks for its immediate abandonment. Additionally, 39 worldwide ‘genocide experts’ wrote an open letter on behalf of Survival International, characterising the project as a death sentence for the Shompen. The language used is remarkable.
However, it is worthwhile to pose a straightforward query: where are the comparable Survival International campaigns opposing China’s infrastructure projects in Tibet, Xinjiang, or along its Belt and Road corridor? These projects have uprooted much larger indigenous populations with minimal tribal consultation and regulatory oversight. The response is that those campaigns are hardly non existent. The largest state directed displacement of indigenous populations in the twenty-first century is taking place next door, and a London based organization with the means to launch a persistent international pressure campaign against democratic India’s nationally approved, officially authorised infrastructure project seems to have found no comparable bandwidth.
This trend was first noted by India’s Intelligence Bureau in 2014, when an official report that was leaked revealed that a number of foreign-funded NGOs consistently opposed infrastructure, mining, and nuclear projects, slowing an estimated $2.8 trillion in GDP growth. The structural observation remains true regardless of the accuracy of every aspect of that report that a nation that is democratic, accessible, and whose courts and regulators react to civil society pressure is, by definition, more vulnerable to globally coordinated opposition campaigns than one that is not. China isn’t. India is.
By definition, people who have become accustomed to the status quo will find it inconvenient when a country asserts itself in the global world order. The Indo-Pacific power dynamics would be altered in ways that go far beyond any bilateral rivalry between China and India if India were to establish a significant naval and economic presence near the Strait of Malacca entry point. Beijing’s maritime calculations, established transshipment hubs that profit from India’s current reliance on foreign ports, and an international NGO ecosystem that has more experience managing developing world governments than taking into account their strategic interests are all disrupted by a more powerful India, and this observation is not paranoid.
Conclusion
China has spent hundreds of billions of dollars and twenty years trying to resolve the Malacca Dilemma. It has constructed ports across the Indian Ocean rim, pipelines through Myanmar, and corridors into Pakistan. It has invested in alternate routes precisely because the Strait of Malacca provides an acute, structural weakness, one that an India with strong Nicobar infrastructure could, in extreme cases, leverage. The single development that would most intensify China’s concerns about Malacca is a fully functional Great Nicobar, complete with a significant transhipment port, a military airport that can accommodate strike and surveillance equipment, and enhanced tri-service command capability. It would imply that India, located at the strait’s entrance, is no longer merely a passive geographical beneficiary. The presence would be strategically active.
The present opposition to this project, which calls for stopping it rather than reforming it or strengthening its tribal protections, coincidentally aligns with Beijing’s preferred conclusion. It might just be a coincidence. It might represent a true, principled, and wholly domestic environmental perspective. It is possible for both to be true. However, in a world where Iran’s geographic location near a strait is worth negotiating a ceasefire, and China’s most acute strategic fear is the waterway outside India’s front door, India’s political leaders owe the country a conversation that is proportionate to the risks.
The results of the Gujarat local body elections held on 26th April witnessed an electoral sweep by the BJP on all 15 Municipal corporations. The party made a clean sweep in Morbi and Porbandar Municipal Corporations, bagging all 52 seats in both the local bodies. The BJP also emerged victorious in the municipal corporations of Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Bhavnagar, Gandhidham, Surendranagar, Mehsana, Anand, Nadiad, Navsari and Vapi.
Out of 1,044 seats on which polls were held across the 15 municipal corporations, the BJP won 937 seats. The Congress Party secured 95 seats, and the remaining 12 seats went to other parties, including the AAP, which won 6 seats.
In Ahmedabad, the BJP won 160 seats out of the total 192, while Congress won 32. The All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), which bagged several seats in Ahmedabad in the 2021 elections, failed to get even one seat.
In Nadiad, the BJP won 51 out of 52 seats, while the Congress secured only one seat. In Navsari, the BJP won 50 out of 52 seats. In the Surat Municipal Corporation, out of 120 seats, the BJP won 115, and the Congress won one seat. As against 27 seats won in the last elections, the AAP managed to secure only four seats in the municipal corporation.
In the Rajkot Municipal Corporation elections, the BJP won 65 out of 72 seats, while the Congress won the remaining 7 seats. In Surendranagar as well, the Bharatiya Janata Party won 51 out of the total 52 seats. The BJP won 69 out of 76 seats in the Vadodara Municipal Corporation elections, while the Congress secured 6 seats. One of the seats was won by an independent candidate.
In the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, the BJP has won 44 seats out of 52 seats. The Congress party won the remaining 8 seats. Out of the 52 seats in the Vapi Municipal Corporation, the BJP won 37 seats, and the Congress won 11 seats. The remaining four seats were won by independent candidates.
In the Gandhidham Municipal Corporation, the BJP bagged 41 out of 52 seats, and the Congress won 11 seats. Out of the 52 seats in the Anand-Karmsad Municipal Corporation, the BJP secured 43 seats, and the Congress got 8 seats. Similarly, in the Mehsana Municipal Corporation, the BJP won 47 out of 52 seats, while the remaining five seats went to the Congress.
Criminals fielded by the AAP and the Congress won 2 seats in Jamnagar
Meanwhile, the poll results on two seats of Ward Number 12 of the Jamnagar Municipal Corporation turned out rather alarming, as two candidates with criminal antecedents, fielded by the Aam Aadmi Party and the Congress Party, won the seats. The candidates named Aslam Khilji (AAP) and Altaf Khafi (Congress) are accused under the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GUJCTOC) Act, 2015. Out of the 64 municipal seats in Jamnagar, the BJP won 60 seats, while the Congress and the AAP won 2 seats each.
Both Aslam Khilji and Altaf Khafi are currently lodged in jail and contested the elections from there only. Before the elections, the local administration took stringent action against Congress candidate Altaf Khafi and his gang. The authorities demolished encroachments by Altaf and his gang on around 12,000 square feet on government land in the Titodi Wadi and Bangla Wadi areas of Jamnagar. A lavish farmhouse illegally constructed by Khafi and his associates was also demolished by the authorities. However, the victory of the two candidates with criminal backgrounds is a disturbing development.
The clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 was not just another episode in India-China border tensions, but it was a strategic rupture. For decades, New Delhi had managed Beijing through a mix of restraint, dialogue and confidence-building measures. The Galwan attack broke the framework. It revealed a harsh reality that China was no longer working within mutually agreed-upon boundaries but rather systematically upsetting the status quo through deliberate, below-the-threshold aggression.
What followed was a planned shift toward overt conflict rather than an immediate one. India began to reconsider not only its response, but its entire strategy toward China. The emphasis shifted from reactive crisis management to a larger, long-term strategy, one capable of matching China’s methods while avoiding escalation.
Today, that shift is increasingly visible. India is no longer merely responding to Chinese pressure; it is quietly pushing back across multiple domains, including the military, economic, and diplomatic, while carefully avoiding open conflict. In effect, New Delhi has entered the grey zone, adopting a calibrated counter-pressure strategy that mirrors China’s playbook but on its own terms.
China’s Grey Zone playbook
China’s approach towards India is not driven by the logic of decisive, large-scale conflict but by a far more calibrated strategy of incremental advantage. Rather than attempting to shift the balance of power through direct war, Beijing has relied on what is often described as “salami slicing”. It is a method described for small, controlled moves that individually appear insignificant but cumulatively reshape realities on the ground. On the Line of Actual Control, this has taken the form of limited intrusions, changes in patrolling patterns and the gradual establishment of a more persistent presence in contested areas.
A key component of this strategy is infrastructure. The rapid construction of roads, airstrips, logistics hubs, and dual-use villages along the border is not merely developmental; it is a strategic move by China. These assets allow China the mobility, sustainment, and long-term deployments, and enhance its ability to project control without engaging in open conflict.
Such developments over time create a structural advantage that is hard to reverse. The use of controlled military pressure is no less important. Events like Galwan, where Face-offs and non-lethal forces allow China to express hostility without risking escalation into traditional war. This creates a situation in which constant pressure is exerted on the other country without crossing the line, which ultimately escalates into a full military response. The objective of these measures is not immediate confrontation but rather the progressive redefining of the status quo.
China’s aim is to build a “new normal” along the border by restricting access, seizing militarily advantageous sites, and normalising its presence. Economic and geopolitical levers, such as trade dependencies and supply chain influence, add to the pressure and expand it beyond the military domain. All of this together represents a coherent grey-zone playbook, one that prioritises sustained, multi-domain pressure over decisive engagement. It allows China to expand its influence, shape outcomes over time, and complicate its adversary’s response, all while remaining below the threshold of open war.
India’s post-Galwan Grey Zone response
This behavioural pattern is exactly what led to a reevaluation in New Delhi following Galwan. India realised that a policy intended to function consistently below the threshold of conflict would not be adequately countered by sporadic military or diplomatic actions. The challenge was a persistent form of pressure that called for an equally measured answer rather than a single provocation. Therefore, India’s post-Galwan approach has evolved into a multi-domain strategy that mirrors this logic, while remaining mindful of escalation risks. On the military front, India moved swiftly to match Chinese deployments along the Line of Actual Control, ensuring that any attempt to alter the balance would be met with immediate resistance. The occupation of key heights on the Kailash Range in 2020 demonstrated a willingness to seize tactical advantage when necessary, but also reflected restraint in not converting that advantage into broader escalation.
At the same time, India hastened the construction of border infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and forward logistics, which had long lagged behind China’s capabilities. This was a structural response intended to lessen imbalance over time rather than just a protective one. Building long-term capacity became more important than responding to specific occurrences.
India’s response went beyond the military to include the economy. The banning of numerous Chinese Apps, tighter scrutiny of foreign investments, and efforts to diversify supply chains signalled a deliberate attempt to reduce strategic vulnerability. Even though these steps are small, taken together, they are part of a larger initiative to raise prices and reduce China’s power. Diplomatically, India increased engagement with like-minded partners. India revitalised the Quad, improved coordination with the United States, and deepened ties with Japan. This forms a new cooperative balancing framework in the Indo-Pacific. These partnerships stop short of formal alliances, so India still maintains strategic autonomy while improving its ability to counter China.
In essence, India’s response is not about matching China move for move. Instead, India adopts a logic of sustained, calibrated pressure. It combines military readiness, economic resilience and diplomatic outreach. New Delhi now operates in the same grey zone, shaping outcomes gradually while avoiding open confrontation.
Taiwan: The silent Grey Zone front
In the last few years, India’s interaction with Taiwan has gone beyond general diplomatic efforts and reflects a more concrete, though deliberately understated, form of strategic involvement. While New Delhi officially follows the “One China” policy and maintains no formal diplomatic or military ties with Taipei, its role in Taiwan’s Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS) program highlights a different reality operating beneath the surface.
Image via Navalnews
The IDS program ‘s objective, which revolves around the Hai Kun-class submarine, is to develop domestic naval capacity through a “Non-Red Supply Chain”. It is a network of reliable partners that excludes China. It is a term used in political and economic discussions to describe supply chains designed to reduce reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for certain goods and technologies.
India’s contribution to this framework is technical rather than symbolic. It is believed that important mechanical assemblies and sub-components, including structural components and specialised internal systems necessary for submarine operation, were supplied by Indian defence companies. Although these are not the platform’s main weapon systems, they are essential inputs for the platform to function.
Beyond hardware, India’s role extends into technical expertise. It has been stated that retired Indian Navy engineers and staff have provided advice and support in areas including design integration, maintenance architecture, and operational planning, especially those with experience on Scorpene and Kilo-class submarines. This form of knowledge transfer is especially valuable for a country like Taiwan, which is transitioning toward indigenous submarine construction and requires high-level technical competence.
Moreover, India’s contribution places it within a larger, largely unreported network of nations that support Taiwan’s defence industry. India’s role as a mid-tier industrial and technical partner adds depth to this distributed supply chain architecture, while the United States provides combat systems and weapons integration, and nations like the United Kingdom and Japan provide specialised technology. More importantly, the logic of the grey-zone strategy underpins all of this. India’s participation is cautious and avoids any official recognition . Without crossing diplomatic red lines or inciting direct confrontation with China, New Delhi can support Taiwan’s defence readiness. India is effectively bolstering a significant regional player while beating China in its own game.
Military spending: The strategic foundation
India’s changing approach toward China must also be understood within the broader context of rising global military expenditure, reflecting an increasingly competitive, security-driven international environment. According to the SIPRI 2026 report, the global military spending reached $2.887 trillion in 2025. It was the highest level ever recorded and the 11th consecutive year of growth. This sustained increase signals a shift toward long-term strategic competition rather than isolated conflicts.
Asia has emerged as a central driver of this trend. In which China’s military expenditure rose to an estimated $336 billion. On the other hand, India has raised its defence budget by 8.9% to $92.1 billion, solidifying its place among the world’s top five military spenders. These patterns indicate a broader reevaluation of national security objectives, alongside regional concerns. Notably, the rise of military expenditure does not necessarily indicate an imminent shift towards open warfare, but it provides the foundation for grey-zone competition. It helps to enhance capabilities, whether in conventional forces, technology or logistics. It enables exerting pressure, building deterrence, and shaping outcomes without crossing the border or entering direct war.
For India, increased defence spending complements its post-Galwan strategy. In 2020, India’s military spending was $72.94 billion, which has now increased to $92.1 Billion, a 26% increase. It strengthens military readiness along the border, supports naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, and underpins its ability to engage in multi-domain competition. In this sense, military expenditure is not merely about preparing for war, but about sustaining a long-term strategic posture that allows India to operate effectively in the grey zone while maintaining escalation control.
Japan factor: Expanding India’s strategic alignment
Alongside its quiet engagement with Taiwan, India has adopted a more open stance in supporting Japan’s evolving defence posture. In recent years, Tokyo has shifted away from its traditionally pacifist stance, most notably by easing restrictions on exporting lethal weapons. This marks a significant shift in Japan’s post-World War II security policy and reflects rising regional concerns, particularly regarding China.
Unlike its approach with Taiwan, India’s engagement with Japan is open and publicly acknowledged. However, it still fits within a broader grey-zone logic. India is building flexible partnerships that enhance collective deterrence without formally escalating tensions rather than forming rigid alliances. This approach allows India to increase pressure on China indirectly by strengthening regional actors and creating a more complex strategic environment. However, China views this development with concern. Beijing has warned that closer India–Japan cooperation could contribute to a containment framework in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the calculation remains clear that partnerships with technologically advanced and strategically aligned countries like Japan are essential for maintaining balance in a rapidly shifting regional order.
India’s emerging Grey Zone doctrine
While India does not have a formally declared “grey-zone doctrine,” its actions since the Galwan clash point to the emergence of a clear and identifiable strategic approach. Rather than relying on singular responses or direct confrontation, India has adopted a sustained, calibrated pressure strategy across multiple domains.
A few essential principles serve as the foundation for this evolving doctrine. First, India prioritises escalation management, responding decisively to Chinese activities while avoiding steps that could spark a full-scale conflict. Second, it employs a multi-domain strategy that combines military readiness with economic measures, technical progress, and diplomatic collaboration. Third, it employs strategic ambiguity, especially in sensitive areas like its relationship with Taiwan, where actions are meaningful but not overtly acknowledged.
Another important element is gradualism. India’s response is not designed to produce immediate results, but to build long-term advantage. Whether through strengthening border infrastructure, reducing economic dependence, or expanding regional partnerships, the approach reflects a shift toward continuous competition rather than episodic reaction. In the end, India’s grey-zone doctrine is defensive in nature. Unlike China’s expansionist use of grey-zone tactics to alter the status quo, India’s objective is to preserve balance, deter aggression, and prevent unilateral changes along the border. It is a strategy that prioritises stability while still allowing India to impose costs and shape outcomes.
Conclusion: From reaction to strategic competition
The transformation in India’s approach after Galwan is not merely tactical, but it is fundamentally strategic. For years, India sought to manage tensions with China through restraint and compartmentalisation, separating border disputes from broader engagement. That framework has now eroded.
What has emerged in its place is a more integrated and assertive approach. India is no longer reacting to individual incidents but adapting to a continuous form of competition. Through military preparedness, economic measures, diplomatic partnerships, and quiet strategic engagement with actors such as Taiwan, New Delhi has begun to operate effectively in the grey zone. This does not signal a move toward open confrontation. Instead, it reflects a recognition that modern geopolitical competition is rarely fought through declared wars. It unfolds through sustained, incremental actions that shape the strategic environment over time.
In this evolving landscape, India is no longer on the defensive. It is learning to compete with China on its own terms, carefully and deliberately, without crossing the threshold into full-scale conflict. Therefore, the real shift after Galwan is not just on the battlefield, but in how India understands and conducts strategy.
