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Sensing defeat in Bihar, Rahul Gandhi goes missing? Congress’s ‘part-time leader’ vanishes before polls as RJD sidelines his Yatra finale

श्रवण शुक्ल
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Sensing defeat in Bihar, Rahul Gandhi goes missing? Congress’s ‘part-time leader’ vanishes before polls as RJD sidelines his Yatra finale

The election fever has gripped Bihar. The first phase of voting is scheduled for November 6, and campaigning will continue until November 4. With just a week to go, the Mahagathbandhan camp appears to be in disarray. On one side, PM Modi, HM Amit Shah, and CM Nitish Kumar are holding rallies almost every day for the NDA. On the other hand, Rahul Gandhi seen as the face of the Opposition has pulled off a vanishing scene as the polls approach.

He hasn’t set foot in Bihar for two months. No rallies, no roadshows, not even virtual appearances. His last visit was on September 1, when he came to Patna to mark the end of his “Voter Adhikar Yatra.”

Meanwhile, PM Modi seems to have made Bihar his second home. Rally after rally, each with blistering attacks on the Opposition. During this same period, Rahul Gandhi has been missing in action. The same Rahul Gandhi who traveled across Bihar during the Voter Adhikar Yatra has now disappeared. With nominations for the first phase already over, his absence is no longer just a BJP talking point, even Congress workers are anxious and confused.

Rahul Gandhi’s long absence: Part-time politics or strategic silence?

Rahul Gandhi’s disappearance in the middle of a heated Bihar election feels like a mystery thriller. It’s been two months since September 1, yet he hasn’t returned to Bihar. No rallies, no press conferences, not even virtual support. Meanwhile, leaders like Modi, Amit Shah, and Tejashwi Yadav are campaigning tirelessly on the ground.

Unease is growing within the Congress. A senior Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC) official admitted, “Rahul ji revived the party’s spirit through the Voter Adhikar Yatra, but now his absence is costing us dearly. He was seen making ‘imarti’ in Delhi, but not in Bihar.” A Deccan Herald report also highlighted similar concerns that Rahul’s absence is hurting the Mahagathbandhan’s prospects. The debate is raging even on X (formerly Twitter).

AICC General Secretary K.C. Venugopal tried to calm nerves, saying, “Rahul will come after Chhath Puja. He’ll hold a joint rally with Tejashwi in Muzaffarpur on October 29, and Priyanka Gandhi will arrive on the 28th.” But this sounds like a last-minute patch-up effort. Whether this absence is “part-time politics” or a “smart strategy” will only be clear once the Bihar election results are out.

Why is there silence after the ‘Voter Adhikar Yatra’ buzz?

Let’s rewind to the “Voter Adhikar Yatra” that had created a storm in Bihar. The campaign crisscrossed villages, with Rahul raising questions about EVMs and claiming to expose a “hydrogen bomb of vote theft.” Yet, when the Yatra concluded on September 1 in Patna, it ended on an underwhelming note. No grand finale, no mass address.

And after that? Nothing. The Yatra ended, Rahul returned to Delhi, and Bihar was left to fend for itself. Congress workers feel abandoned. In fact, Rahul’s photos have quietly disappeared from the INDI bloc’s posters in several districts.

A BPCC leader, requesting anonymity, said, “The Yatra brought new energy to the party, but his absence has cooled that enthusiasm.” His vanishing act is hurting the alliance. Congress leaders are urging him to return and campaign. Even if his October 29 rally rekindles some energy, many believe it’s too little, too late. “The Yatra happened, but did he forget there’s an election to fight?” is the sarcastic refrain among voters.

After accepting Tejashwi as CM face, Congress lost steam

The alliance also delayed naming a CM candidate. Lalu Yadav kept pushing for Tejashwi’s name, while Congress kept stalling, even sending Ashok Gehlot to negotiate. Finally, on October 23, Tejashwi Yadav was announced as the chief ministerial face. But after that, Congress simply went cold.

Now, with a joint rally scheduled on October 29, the entire credit is expected to go to the RJD. Congress candidates are disheartened. One candidate, speaking off record, said, “We’re putting up posters and going door to door asking for votes, but people ask where is Rahul ji? They want to hear him speak. Without him, our rallies feel empty.” Many seats still lack proper ground-level preparation.

Political analysts say this is classic Rahul Gandhi style: launch massive events like the Bharat Jodo Yatra, show you are doing something, no matter how vague it is, for the masses, and then go into hibernation. But in elections, that costs dearly. In the 2020 Bihar polls, Congress contested 70 seats and won only 19. The same pattern seems to be repeating. If the Opposition alliance loses again, expect the usual “EVM tampering” blame game to follow.

Rahul’s old habit of “part-time politics” returns?

Congress’s energy in Bihar has clearly fizzled out, and instead of reviving it, Rahul Gandhi was seen making imarti(sweet fritters) in Delhi. The party is in disarray. Candidates are accusing state leaders of demanding money for tickets, and even Pappu Yadav has been accused of influencing ticket distribution. So, where exactly is Rahul Gandhi? What is he doing to unite his party? That’s the question haunting many in Bihar.

Notably, Rahul’s foreign trips have been steadily increasing. In the past nine months, he has made at least six international visits to Texas, Italy, Vietnam, Dubai, Qatar, Malaysia, and South America. These trips often spark controversies. His comments in Virginia about Sikhs and his remarks during his U.S. visit drew widespread criticism. Questions have also been raised about the cost and protocol of these frequent foreign visits.

Even though he hasn’t gone abroad recently, he still remains inactive in Bihar’s election campaign, a silence that even his staunch supporters find puzzling.

Congress spokespersons, however, continue to defend him. Pawan Khera said, “Rahul ji’s schedule is finalized. His rallies are planned in Bihar. We do issue-based politics, not crowd-based politics.”

The BJP has turned Rahul’s absence into a political weapon. BJP spokesperson Sanjay Mayukh said, “Rahul Gandhi doesn’t trust Bihar’s voters and that’s why he’s missing from the battlefield.” His disappearance has now become a major election talking point. Even Congress candidates and supporters are waiting anxiously wondering when Rahul will finally arrive in Bihar to sound the election bugle.

And deep down, many are asking: Has he already missed the bus this time?

London Mayor Sadiq Khan accused of covering up massive grooming gang problem: As Met Police reviews 9000 cases, Mayor Khan’s repeated denials now under scrutiny

Rukma Rathore
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London Mayor Sadiq Khan accused of covering up massive grooming gang problem: As Met Police reviews 9000 cases, Mayor Khan’s repeated denials now under scrutiny

The grooming gangs in the United Kingdom are once again in the spotlight following a new investigation that has uncovered how minor girls are falling victim to forced prostitution by these elements on the streets of London. Nevertheless, Mayor Sadiq Khan of Pakistani descent appears to be not only indifferent to this critical issue but has also reportedly attempted to conceal the harsh reality of the presence of such gangs in the capital of England, as reported by Tom Witherow in The Times.

Khan repeatedly demanded that his questioner, Susan Hall, the Conservative leader in the London Assembly explained what she meant by how many rape gangs there were in London. “The situation in London in relation to young people being groomed is different to other parts of the country. What we have in London is young people being groomed, to use your word, not mine, to be used in county lines,” he alleged.

“Every time I asked I got the same stupid answer back, ‘We don’t have (grooming gangs), it’s county lines and I thought, no, there is a difference. The truth is, it has existed for years. It’s a cover-up. Why can’t they come out with the truth,” Susan Hall lashed out at Khan’s inaction.

According to retired police officer Jon Wedger, the gangs are preparing minor girls for sex and prostitution. He was in Tottenham in northeast London to prove the existence of this menace. “I worked in the Met Police’s vice squad for years, and I’ve never seen so many in one area,” he voiced while highlighting that a 12-year-old Somalian girl and two English girls aged 15 and 16 years old were “working” together.

The former officer who departed the Met in 2017 after 25 years teamed up with an IBB Media documentary crew to expose the widespread practice of child prostitution on London’s streets. He is a member of a loose alliance of activists, nonprofits and ex-police officers who are trying to expose London’s sex trade.

Wedger asserted that he had proof, including the car registration numbers of the offenders. However, he was ordered to cease looking into the cases of 50 kids who had been sexually violated and groomed in London, in 2006. He advocates for victims now and complained that nothing has changed. “Sadiq Khan is making a mockery out of semantics, when the real issue should be vulnerable kids at risk, at mortal risk. Instead, he is having this puerile argument on semantics,” he charged.

Failure to accept the problem, U-turns and shocking cover-ups

Met (Metropolitan Police) commissioner Sir Mark Rowley refused to acknowledge the critical problem in response to enquiries from members of the London Assembly, in February. He then made a U-turn recently, professing that the police were handling a “steady flow” of “multiple offender cases” and mentioning “several live” inquiries. He added that there was a “very significant” number of historical cases.


The Met announced that it would examine 9,000 child sexual exploitation cases in response to recommendations made by Baroness Casey of Blackstock, who was called in to assist with the grooming gangs investigation when both of the chosen candidates to lead it stepped down.

The authorities claimed that multiple cases that needed to be examined did not meet the standard description of gang offending. These include instances of exploitation in institutional settings, peer-on-peer abuse and family situations.

On the contrary, the situation in London, according to campaigners who assisted in uncovering grooming gangs, is similar to the “cover-up” by officials they endured for years in northern English towns and cities. Maggie Oliver warned that London is the “last bastion” of this cover-up. She is the former Manchester police officer who turned whistleblower concerning Rochdale grooming gangs.

“I came to realize that everybody at the top 100% knew and wanted to cover it up. I think the Met is the last bastion of being able to cover up, because I have no doubt from the work we do (at the Maggie Oliver Foundation charity supporting survivors and) from what I’ve read (in the investigation’s findings) that there is a similar pattern of abuse in (London). I don’t know how they’ve managed to cover it up for so long, but it doesn’t surprise me,” she emphasised, according to Daily Express.

Negligence, victim blaming and no action against perpetrators

Professor Alexis Jay’s well-known findings on child abuse reveals several instances that bear an apparent similarity to the grooming model used in Bristol, Newcastle, Rotherham, Telford and other places.

A 15-year-old girl informed police that she had attended “*uck parties,” which are events where she was given drugs and drink in exchange for having sex but the cops did nothing, the Times stated.

Jay conveyed that the teenager had not been contacted by Met officers for five weeks preceding the case opening. She was informed following a “multi-agency meeting” that the gatherings she went to with older men, drinks and drugs were not “*uck parties.” As a result, she and her friends were not in danger. However, Jay observed that the proof suggested otherwise and the Met’s reaction was “weak.”

A 13-year-old “frequently missing” child from Tower Hamlets of east London was brought to hotel sex parties, in 2018. Jay outlined that after just one phone contact to social services, police “decided that this was not a child sexual exploitation case.” The youngster and his family were not contacted by officers.

Jay stated that the boy was placed on a child protection plan. The Met later admitted that its focus had been on drug and criminal exploitation, the “county lines” as mentioned by Sadiq Khan, rather than child sexual exploitation.

The public record contains a number of heinous cases. Officers were accused of “victim-blaming” by Jay in her report. One official remarked, “Her current lifestyle is placing her at risk of significant harm, her behaviour is not good,” in early 2018 notes.

The results of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services were much more serious. Khan provided formal responses to four reports from 2016 to 2025, each of which contained information about six possible victims. Maggie Oliver is positive that three of the offenders may be classified as grooming gangs.

Drugs, prostitution and paedophilia

“It’s not as bad as it is in Rotherham, it’s worse. We’ve got a problem in every area of London,” Chris Wild, an author and campaigner was quoted in the article by The Times. Wild reportedly oversaw six children’s care establishments in Enfield, Tottenham and Haringey in North London during the pandemic. “They were losing 50 to 75 per cent of their children every single week to prostitution,” he reported.

“One (home) had six kids, and lost five to prostitution every single week. They were coming back dishevelled, having had drugs, (been) sold off to sex rings and raped by paedophiles. The police won’t get back to you for five or six days,” Wild added.

He additionally mentioned that the police had various justifications. They claimed, “Oh, she won’t give a statement,” as well as “she’s the instigator, she’s promiscuous,” if they knew the victim.

“It’s happening all over London (and) so much so much more than anywhere else in the country. I’m on the front line and workers like me all have stories of girls like this. I’m constantly vocal about this in London. To hear reports from the Mayor’s office saying ‘but this is not a problem here’ show the guy’s deluded. You’ve got to ask yourself the question: who are they protecting? What are they protecting,” he asked and requested Khan to accept the grave issue.

London mayor Sadiq Khan under fire

“It is shameful that the Mayor of London is claiming to have no indication that grooming gangs are operating in London despite personally responding to reports containing evidence of victims abused by grooming gangs in the city. It is clear Sadiq Khan is facilitating a cover up,” charged Shadow Home Secretary Chris Philp MP.

“There is real, credible evidence that grooming gangs exist in London, and for the Mayor to have potentially turned a blind eye is utterly shameful,” Reform UK MP Lee Anderson expressed.

“Khan and the Met Commissioner’s continued denials of the trauma suffered by grooming gang survivors is gaslighting the survivors of some of the most unimaginably awful crimes by two of London’s most powerful men. They should be ashamed. It’s shocking that all of this evidence is on public record and that there is recognition that the issue of grooming gangs exist in London. For a mayor who positions himself as an ambassador for violence against women and girls justice, why would he so blatantly block the voices of these women survivors from speaking,” a victim questioned.

The mayor and the Metropolitan Police insisted that there have been “no reports” of Rotherham or Rochdale-style rape gangs in the city, with the former announcing there was “no indication” they exist. However, the development concerning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services exposed the truth.

Rowley even wrote Khan an open letter highlighting that the Met was looking into 654 child criminal exploitation cases that had been reported since 6th April and 716 child sexual exploitation cases involving “lone or multiple offenders.” According to Rowley, the force has documented over 14,500 sexual offences against adults and children during that time. He agreed that “too often, victims have been disbelieved and even judged at times” and that “historically and across the United Kingdom, the cases have not always been recognised and thoroughly probed.”

The reports based on reviews of the Met’s handling of sexual abuse cases from the beginning of Khan’s tenure until this year, described how police failed to act when they discovered that these predatory gangs were taking advantage of girls as young as 13. Meanwhile, Khan’s spokesperson declared that he should be commended for ordering the reports and acting upon “all recommendations” made.

The investigation found that five distinct youngsters in the east London borough were being abused by networks engaged in sexual exploitation. Witness accounts during the proceedings detailed how, in the late 2010s, “groups of older men” sexually exploited girls in hotel rooms.

Pakistan grooming gangs in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has been plagued by grooming gangs predominantly operated by Pakistani Muslim men for decades. Authorities, the government and even the media have been repeatedly accused of covering up the atrocious crimes by victims, their families and campaigners in the name of Islamophobia and racism. The situation escalated to such an extent that former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak formed a dedicated task force to address the issue.

Young girls, some as young as 11, were abducted, raped, abused, sold, and even killed by these gangs in the late 1990s. It was discovered that British Pakistani men had sexually assaulted 1,400 children in Rotherham alone over a 16-year period.

The National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse study disclosed that 64% of child sexual exploitation instances in Rotherham were committed by these men. Furthermore, the majority of the 42 people found guilty of child sexual exploitation charges under “Operation Stovewood” were Pakistani men.

According to the outcome of the Rape Gang Inquiry report, Pakistani Muslim rape gangs have been active in up to 85 locations around the United Kingdom, Great Yarmouth MP Rupert Lowe stated on 26th August. The persistent and unrestrained presence of these gangs has given rise to considerable political and social backlash.

Uttarakhand: Khatima Police book man for attempting to convert Dalit Hindus to Christianity with promises of a better life – Read FIR details

Anurag
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Uttarakhand: Khatima Police book man for attempting to convert Dalit Hindus to Christianity with promises of a better life – Read FIR details

On 24th October, a man identified as Sidari Prasad was booked by Khatima Police in Uttarakhand for attempting to convert members of the Dalit community to Christianity. Sidari reportedly offered inducements and gave false assurances to people that they would live a better life after converting to Christianity.

Sidari was regularly organising so-called prayer meetings in the Jhanakia Police Station area of Khatima under Udham Singh Nagar district of Uttarakhand. A complaint against him was filed by Jitendra Vishwakarma, Block Coordinator of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, Khatima, after which the police registered an FIR. OpIndia accessed a copy of the FIR in the matter.

Police investigation underway

According to media reports, members of Hindu organisations learned about the conversions happening under the guise of prayer meetings. When they reached the spot, they found religious books and prayer materials at Sidari’s residence. The material was later seized by the police.

The missionaries were targeting vulnerable communities where social discrimination and superstitions are prevalent. People were told that their ailments would be cured, addictions would end, and family issues would disappear if they adopted a new faith. Once converted, they were reportedly asked to gather every Sunday for prayer meetings and to abandon traditional Hindu customs in favour of Christianity. Apart from Khatima, areas including Melaghat, Sisaiya, Bari Anjaniya, Nousar, and Diyaan have been named in media reports where conversions have been happening in a similar manner.

What the FIR says

The FIR has been registered under Sections 3 and 5 of the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2018, along with Sections 351(3) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, against Sidari Prasad.

In his complaint, Jitendra said that on 24th October at around 10 am, he received information that an illegal church had been constructed at the residence of Sidari Prasad by some persons who had come from Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. They were praising Christianity and calling it the supreme religion. They were offering various inducements to members of the Dalit community to convert to Christianity.

Jitendra, along with Vishal Singh Kholiya, Akash Rathore, and Pradeep Singh, went to meet Sidari to ask him to stop such activities. To his surprise, Sidari tried to lure him to convert to Christianity by saying that if he converted, his family would lead a happy life. He also showed him a book related to Christianity and said that if he studied it, he would learn about the virtues of Christianity and his life would be blessed.

Source: Uttarakhand Police

When Jitendra opposed him, Sidari became furious and hurled abuses. He also tried to assault Jitendra. He said, “By offering different kinds of inducements, he is encouraging them so much that they do not feel any hesitation in adopting Christianity. When we questioned him as to why he was engaging in such acts, he abused us again and behaved indecently.”

Inspector-in-charge Devendra Gaurav said in a statement to the media that the investigation is underway. Notably, Sidari is absconding, and the police are trying to apprehend him.

As Congress targets Modi govt using Washington Post’s fiction on LIC investment in Adani, read how UPA govt used LIC as a ‘bailout buyer’ to cover deficits

Raju Das
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As Congress targets Modi govt using Washington Post’s fiction on LIC investment in Adani, read how UPA govt used LIC as a ‘bailout buyer’ to cover deficits

After Washington Post published another hitjob against the Modi government, accusing it of forcing Life Insurance Corporation to invest in Adani shares, the Congress party thinks it has got a Brahmastra to attack the govt. The party has been using the allegations to target the govt, and has posted several memes on X.

The party has posted several tweets from the official INC handle, such as one mockingly labelling the investment as “3,30,00,00,00,000 रुपए मात्र” (just 33,000 crore rupees) accompanied by a satirical image of Modi handing a giant LIC cheque to Gautam Adani, and quipping “Modi Hai To Mumkin Hai” (If Modi, then it’s possible) with a similar meme.

However, LIC has categorically denied these claims, stating that all investments, including a $570 million stake in Adani Ports & SEZ, rated ‘AAA’ by credit rating agencies, were made independently after “detailed due diligence” and with full integrity. Far from a loss-making favour as alleged by Washington Post and Congress, LIC’s Adani exposure actually yielded handsome returns. Notably, LIC’s stakes in other corporate conglomerates like Reliance (6.9%, Rs 1.3 lakh crore) and Tata (15.9%, Rs 82,800 crore) are much higher than its Adani holdings, but Congress party attacks only Adani group investments.

While Congress is busy making memes accusing Modi of handing over LIC money to Adani, it seems to have forgotten how its own government used LIC’s vast funds as its personal ATM. The UPA government, particularly during the second term, famously used LIC as a bailout buyer to meet the government’s ambitious disinvestment targets.

Facing twin deficits, failing disinvestment targets due to lackluster market interest in loss-making public sector undertaking (PSU) stocks and a ballooning fiscal shortfall, the Congress-led regime repeatedly forced LIC into buying such PSU stocks. Policyholders’ savings were funnelled into propping up government finances, often at lower returns, to window-dress books and meet arbitrary divestment targets.

While current LIC investments have been transparent and made good returns, UPA forcing the life insurer to participate in PSU disinvestments saddled it with losses. A 2013 Economic Times report states that LIC had lost over ₹3,000 crore in shares of several PSUs it had bought to bailout the government.

UPA’s disinvestment agenda was ambitious on paper but failed to get enough buyers from the private sector. With private investors shunning overpriced or underperforming PSU shares amid a sluggish economy, the government leaned heavily on LIC to absorb unsold stakes. As a result, disinvestment targets were met, but actually, it was a backdoor mechanism to claim “success” in privatization drives. This also allowed UPA govt to book revenues and improve the fiscal situation.

During the in UPA-II (2009-2014) government, LIC subscribed to 40-70% of several flagship Offer for Sale (OFS) and Follow-on Public Offer (FPO) issues, injecting over ₹30,000 crore to rescue flagging sales.

LIC was the leading investor in numerous cases. For instance, in 2010, LIC bailed out NTPC’s FPO by taking 49.48% of the offer, amounting to around ₹4,058 crore out of a total ₹8,200 crore issue, which was part of a combined Rs 10,000+ crore effort including NMDC. That same year, for NMDC’s FPO, LIC absorbed 63.72% or roughly ₹6,310 crore from the ₹9,900 crore mining stake sale, acting as the primary anchor amid weak bids. By 2012, in a follow-up OFS for NMDC, LIC picked up about 47% worth ₹278 crore from an estimated ₹597 crore offer, again compensating for minimal retail uptake.

The trend intensified in 2013 with a series of rescues. LIC took a whopping 96% or ₹12,179 crore of ONGC’s ₹12,700 crore OFS, marking the largest single buy in the oil and gas sector. For SAIL’s ₹1,500 crore OFS, LIC subscribed to 70.57% or about ₹1,058 crore, boosting its stake in the steel PSU to around 9%.

In NTPC’s February 2013 OFS, LIC accounted for roughly 49% with an investment of ₹1,765 crore of the approximately ₹3,570 crore offer. Additionally, for Hindustan Copper’s ₹1,225 crore OFS, LIC’s share was about 44% at ₹608 crore. Finally, in 2014, LIC fully absorbed BHEL’s ₹2,685 crore block deal, acquiring a 5.94% stake and pushing its holding in the engineering PSU to 14.99%.

These were not isolated investments, they formed a pattern where LIC’s subscriptions ensured UPA met ₹40,000 crore annual targets, even as global investors turned away. Unlike Adani’s high-growth companies, many of these PSUs underperformed, eroding LIC’s corpus value.

Not just disinvestments, UPA made even worse use of LIC, to hide high fiscal deficits, which reached 6.5% of GDP in 2011-12. With borrowing costs soaring and bond markets unwilling to take govt papers, the government treated the insurer as a “captive source of funds,” directing it to buy long-term bonds, recapitalize failing banks, and infuse capital into loss-making PSUs like Air India and BSNL.

In the later years of UPA-II govt, LIC bailed out several PSU banks suffering from high NPAs, by investing in equities and bonds. LIC was a major buyer of oil bonds worth thousands of crores issued by the UPA govt. These oil bonds were deferred liabilities that burdened future budgets.

This is not that LIC stopped buying PSU stocks during NDA government, but those are regular investments, not bailouts like earlier. The insurers investments into private equities and bonds, including those of Adani group, are also part of such regular investments, to generate return on its funds.

Moreover, LIC is known to invest on reputed stocks when they are down, and then selling them when the prices rise. This may seem counterintuitive for stock market investment, but for conservative investment policy of LIC, this strategy fits perfectly. That is why they invested in Adani stocks when they were down after Hindenburg allegations.

Gateway to Southeast Asia: India’s rising role in ASEAN diplomacy and connectivity under the Modi doctrine

Divyansh Tiwari
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Gateway to Southeast Asia: India’s rising role in ASEAN diplomacy and connectivity under the Modi doctrine

On Sunday (26th October), Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the 47th edition of the ASEAN summit and emphasised that the year 2026 will belong to India and the ASEAN countries.

“The 21st century is our century. It is India and ASEAN’s century. I am confident that the aim of ‘ASEAN Community Vision 2045’ and ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ will develop a bright future for the entire humanity,” PM Modi declared.

He further announced that 2026 will be observed as the ‘Year of ASEAN-India Maritime Cooperation.’

As PM Modi stregthenes relations with ASEAN nations through diplomacy, we examine its geopolitical evolution, India’s path from early engagement to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and how Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign-policy approach, including Act East 2.0, SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), has increased India’s influence in Southeast Asia since 2014.

To demonstrate how Southeast Asia is vital to India’s fundamental interests —securing sea lanes, diversifying supply chains, establishing digital and physical connectivity, and harmonising Indo-Pacific norms with ASEAN centrality —it synthesises key statements, official plans of action, trade and connectivity updates, and recent scholarly and think-tank work.

The research concludes with policy recommendations for the next five years, based on the ongoing modernisation of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) and the new ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2026–2030).[i]

Introduction

Southeast Asia has historically occupied a key position on the world’s geopolitical chessboard. The ASEAN bloc was created in the middle of the 20th century to promote regional collaboration, peace, and development amid Cold War divisions and colonial legacies.

India, which has a long history of trade, culture, and maritime ties with Southeast Asia, has progressively moved from the margins of Southeast Asian diplomacy to a key player. India’s growing economic power, strategic aspirations, and maritime interests in the twenty-first century have made a closer examination of the ASEAN-India relationship necessary.

This paper addresses the growth of ASEAN, its geopolitical trajectory, India’s expanding involvement, and the subtleties of India’s current diplomatic position toward ASEAN, including less obvious aspects that often go unnoticed by the public.

Preventing great-power rivalry from tearing the region apart while tying economies and societies together across a highly diverse maritime-continental space has always been the dual goal of ASEAN’s founding project, formalised in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and strengthened by the 2007 ASEAN Charter. ASEAN’s inclination for “centrality” in security and economic frameworks such as the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus, and RCEP can be explained by this dual objective.

Practically speaking, ASEAN’s “middle-power multilateralism” serves as the framework for maintaining order across the Indo-Pacific’s busiest maritime routes while power dynamics change.

From First Principles to Frameworks: Asean Indo-Pacific Outlook and India’s Response

ASEAN’s response to the Indo-Pacific debate, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP, 2019), reframed regional competitiveness as an inclusive agenda of maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN-charter-based principles, and sustainable development.

This conceptualisation was specifically adopted by India, which acknowledged near-complete complementarity between AOIP and India’s IPOI (INDO-PACIFIC OCEANS INITIATIVE) pillars in the 2021 ASEAN-India Joint Statement on AOIP collaboration.[ii]

According to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the ASEAN-India Joint Statement demonstrates the two countries’ dedication to close cooperation. It emphasises preserving regional peace, stability, and development through cooperation, communication, and mutual respect.

The declaration emphasises the similar objectives of sustainable development, a rules-based order, and closer regional collaborations to tackle shared issues. This helped to establish a diplomatic link between India’s growing Indo-Pacific activity and Southeast Asia’s consensus-first culture.

As the cornerstone of the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), the AOIP-IPOI synergy was reaffirmed in subsequent summit declarations in 2024.[iii]

How India entered ASEAN

India started its ASEAN journey by becoming a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, becoming a full Dialogue Partner in 1996, holding annual summits starting in 2002[iv], and most significantly, joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in October 2003[v], which firmly established New Delhi’s adherence to ASEAN’s principles of peaceful dispute resolution and non-coercion.

Beyond mere symbolism, TAC admission allowed India to participate in ASEAN’s concentric forums (EAS, ARF, and ADMM-Plus), where norms and procedures are established rather than only empty language.

Subsequent renovations, the Strategic Partnership in 2012, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022 were supported by this institutional binding.

The Modi Doctrine (2014 Onwards): Act East, Sagar and IPOI

India’s ASEAN strategy has been reformulated since 2014 as Act East 2.0, which moves away from declarative outreach and toward operational commitments on supply chains, at sea, and in digital public infrastructure.

Prime Minister Modi outlined the doctrinal foundation in his 2018 keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue: freedom of navigation, ASEAN centrality, an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific, and respect for sovereignty. That was put into practice by two programmatic tools.

Resources, commerce connections and marine transportation, disaster risk reduction, research and technology, maritime security and ecology are all covered under IPOI, a seven-pillar cooperation agenda. SAGAR focuses on maritime security and regional capacity-building.

The establishment of a specific Indo-Pacific Division under the Ministry of External Affairs formalised this shift in India’s own diplomatic framework.[vi]

Economics First: AITIGA Modernisation and the Trade Turn

A structural reset is taking place in the economic relationship between India and ASEAN.[vii] There are two distinct tendencies. First, two-way goods trade reached over $120 billion in 2023–2024[viii] following the pandemic’s volatility.

Both parties have officially committed to raising the ceiling through trade facilitation, tariff reduction, and new economic flows.

Second, a dedicated AITIGA-Sub-Committee on Review (AITIGA-SCR) has met multiple times through 2023–2025 to negotiate modernisation across rules of origin, customs cooperation, NTMs/standards, services linkages, and digital trade facilitation, the often unseen plumbing that determines whether SMEs can truly benefit from an FTA.

Signed in 2009, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods deal, also known as AITIGA, is a free trade agreement that became effective in 2010. To promote trade and economic cooperation, it seeks to lower or eliminate tariffs on the majority of goods traded between India and ASEAN nations.

To make the agreement more trade-friendly and in line with contemporary international standards, it is presently undergoing review. This means that the AITIGA Review is now transitioning from intent to text.

India and ASEAN Departments of Commerce are driving timetables tight until 2024–2025, according to readouts from the 4th and 5th AITIGA JC[ix] and later sessions, which indicate simplification and time-bound results.

The “minute details” that most people overlook are that the review is a collection of technical working groups rather than a single negotiation, and the outputs of these groups, certificate of origin digitising, accelerated clearance, and matched standards, are what turn communiqués into container traffic.

Connectivity: Highways, Sea Bridges, and the Bay of Bengal

Ambition and risk come together in physical connectedness. Supply chains from Thai and Vietnamese hubs to Indian ports will be shortened because to India’s India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway[x] and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which will connect the northeast and east coast of India to mainland Southeast Asia.

Although the Trilateral Highway has seen unequal progress, bridges have been rebuilt and portions completed, the final legs and riverine components of Kaladan have been postponed due to the security situation in Myanmar. The practical reading is that although connection is still essential to India’s Act East, schedules need to be balanced with marine options.

In this regard, port-led manufacturing that connects directly to ASEAN industrial networks around the Bay of Bengal is supported by the East Coast Economic Corridor (ECEC)[xi] and its initial phase, the Visakhapatnam–Chennai Industrial Corridor (VCIC), which was created in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank.

In addition to land links vulnerable to continental shocks, this serves as India’s “sea bridge” to ASEAN.

Digital Corridors: DPI, Payments, and Standards as Strategy

Digital railroads can still transport value even if roadways are slow. A Joint Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation was adopted by ASEAN and India in October 2024[xii], specifically highlighting collaboration on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) from identity rails to real-time payments and open-API ecosystems.

The most obvious proof of concept is the 2023 operationalisation of the UPI–PayNow connection between Singapore and India[xiii], which has subtly emerged as a paradigm for affordable, interoperable cross-border retail payments and MSME invoicing.

In the meantime, DPI’s growth implications are being studied by ASEAN’s own research environment, which makes it logical for India to export standards and architecture rather of merely software. For New Delhi, this is an industrial strategy in another way: integrate digital railroads in the Indian model into ASEAN markets now, and future service and trust trade will follow.  

Security and the Maritime Turn: Exercises, MDA and ADMM-Plus

The naval component is India’s most visible “Act East” move. In the first ASEAN–India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023)[xiv], which involved 1,400–1,800 troops, nine ships, and several aircraft, India transitioned from bilateral exercises to multilateral operations with seven ASEAN navies during the port phase in Singapore and the sea phase in the South China Sea.

Following that, India intensified its bilateral naval combat training with ASEAN nations, high-tempo coordinated patrols (CORPAT)[xv] with Indonesia and Thailand in the Andaman Sea approaches, SIMBEX[xvi] with Singapore in 2024 and 2025, and Samudra Shakti-25 with Indonesia.

Silently, maritime domain awareness (MDA) makes it possible. By connecting liaison officers and centres throughout the littorals, India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR)[xvii] in Gurugram improves incident response and cueing from the Malacca funnel westwards.

On top of this, India supports ASEAN-led standards on overflight, unhindered trade, and crisis communications through its involvement in ADMM-Plus[xviii] and EAS (EAST ASIA SUMMIT), two political-military frameworks.

How Southeast Asia serves India’s geopolitical interests

Southeast Asia serves as India’s eastern maritime gateway to development and security. Three factors provide an explanation.

Chokepoint leverage comes first. Nearly 30% of all international traffic passes through the Strait of Malacca[xix], and the western mouth of this funnel is home to India’s Andaman & Nicobar Command[xx], its sole tri-service theatre command.

Because of its location, India has an unparalleled advantage in protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that supply energy to East Asia as well as India’s export lifelines.

The capacity to view and communicate across the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok axes is known as domain awareness deterrence.

The second is supply-chain flexibility. With FDI reaching a record $230 billion in 2023[xxi] and Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand solidifying their positions in semiconductors and smartphones, ASEAN has emerged as a significant hub for electronics, automotive, and green production.

Components here, assembly there, and vice versa are co-location techniques that lower single-country risk for India, establish two-way parts commerce (e.g., Vietnam’s increasing electronics exports to India)[xxii], and strengthen political interdependence.

In a nutshell, Southeast Asia is more than just a market; it is India’s hedge and partner in rewiring global supply networks.

Third, the middle ground and conventions. India is able to pursue a rules-forward Indo-Pacific agenda without inciting bloc politics thanks to ASEAN’s practice of fostering agreement over charter based, non-coercive solutions, which are enshrined in TAC.

India can cooperate on disaster relief, maritime ecology, and scientific exchanges that stabilise the periphery even as major-power competition intensifies thanks to the AOIP-IPOI alignment, which is compatible with Indian values.[xxiii]

The RCEP Decision and the AITIGA Workaround

India’s controversial decision to withdraw from the RCEP in 2019[xxiv] has had a clarifying effect; instead of joining a mega-FTA where its concerns about import surges and rules-of-origin discipline were not adequately addressed, New Delhi has chosen to deepen its relationship with ASEAN through AITIGA modernisation.

Notably, India can still join the RCEP legally[xxv], and the AITIGA study is already filling in a lot of the efficiency gaps that Indian exporters encountered in ASEAN markets. Instead of agreeing to a universal tariff decrease, India is actually constructing functional regionalism, or sectoral integration where interests converge.

People, Startups, and Science: Soft Power Multiplier

India has tapped into ASEAN’s innovative energy in addition to ships and tariffs.

With hundreds of students from all ASEAN countries participating, the ASEAN–India Hackathon (2021)[xxvi] created a collaborative model in blue economy and education challenges; the ASEAN–India Start-up Festival (2024)[xxvii] in New Delhi featured more than 100 start-ups and incubators from both sides and ASEAN’s 2024 ScaleHub initiative in Bali put the ecosystem into overdrive.

These are small but effective conduits that transform goodwill into networks of founders, venture capital interest, and knowledge with standards often disregarded yet essential for a successful collaboration.

The Nuts and Bolts most deaders Miss

First of all, the new ASEAN–India Plan of Action (2026–2030)[xxviii] is not only another political document; it includes cross-pillar cooperation, an upgrade in monitoring, and alignment with the upcoming APASTI 2026–2035[xxix] in science, tech, and innovation as well as ASEAN’s own AEC Strategic Plan (2026–2030)[xxx].

That bureaucratic structure exactly the machinery that converts high-level declarations into program budgets determines which line ministries meet, what receives funding, and how progress is tracked.   

The ASEAN-India Plan of Action for Science, Technology, and Innovation is known as APASATI. Aiming for sustainable development and innovation-driven growth in ASEAN and India, it is a strategic plan to strengthen regional collaboration in the scientific and technological domains.

Second, the AIME-2023[xxxi] scenario is important because it demonstrates that ASEAN feels at ease holding maritime phases with India in the South China maritime while Singapore serves as co-host. This is a testament to ASEAN’s belief in India’s ability to maintain the status quo rather than undermine it.

The Singapore Navy[xxxii] and PIB readouts provide the participation data, which includes ships, planes, and personnel. It is significant not for bean-counting but rather for signalling interoperability procedures that are carried over into HADR operations and ADMM-Plus table tops.

Third, the emergence of fusion of maritime information is not a side event. Quicker reactions to illicit fishing, gray-zone harassment, and piracy are made possible by the IFC-IOR network[xxxiii], which provides ASEAN coast guards and warships with a common operational picture west of Malacca. Shared data is shared leverage in crisis signalling.

India-Singapore and India-Indonesia: Two lanes to the same sea

India has established a naval routine (SIMBEX’s more than 30 iterations)[xxxiv], a payments rail (UPI–PayNow), and a regulatory partnership based on fintech and maritime expertise with Singapore[xxxv]. This is a small representation of total cooperation: standards, security, and funding.

In a nation that is now at the centre of the nickel-battery business, India has doubled bilateral exercises (Samudra Shakti) and coordinated patrols (IND-INDO CORPAT)[xxxvi] with Indonesia while investigating critical-minerals discussions.

By connecting back into the ASEAN hub, these bilateral arcs subtly expand India’s “surface area” by connecting it to the sea lanes and supply chains of the region.

The China variable handled the ASEAN way

A China-centric perspective is frequently used to interpret India’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia. Although that cannot be avoided, ASEAN favours inclusion over exclusion in order to achieve balance. New Delhi[xxxvii] has pushed its maritime, connectivity, and standards agenda without pressuring ASEAN to make decisions by enclosing India’s advocacy within AOIP’s inclusive syntax and giving ASEAN-chaired meetings (EAS, ADMM-Plus) precedence. For this reason, since 2021, ASEAN leaders have been at ease promoting the relationship to CSP and including AOIP-IPOI alignment[xxxviii] into meetings. India has not asked ASEAN to take sides, instead, it has sought to increase capacity and lower friction. 

Risks and frictions: Mayanmar, NTMs, and politics of mega FTAs

The story is complicated by three headwinds. The Trilateral Highway and Kaladan are subject to increased costs and schedules due to the Myanmar conflict, necessitating backup plans using air freight and maritime gateways.[xxxix]

The technical portions of the AITIGA review are extremely important because non-tariff measures (NTMs)[xl], standards divergence, and rules-of-origin complexity continue to be the daily challenges faced by Indian MSMEs attempting to expand in ASEAN markets.

In order to avoid losing momentum to rivals who benefit from RCEP benefits[xli], New Delhi must work double time with like-minded ASEAN economies to create “coalitions of the willing” on modernising customs, e-invoicing, and service mobility. This is despite India’s deliberate decision to opt out of the RCEP. 

What changed after 2014?

India carries more weight in ASEAN now for a number of tangible and cumulative reasons. Initially, India’s vision aligned with ASEAN’s lexicon.

India demonstrated that it is a norm-shaper and a norm-taker rather than a norm-breaker by adopting AOIP and making ASEAN centrality the focal point of its Indo-Pacific narrative.

Second, through IFC-IOR, India provided MDA with capabilities that reduce regional vulnerability, particularly in the Andaman–Malacca seam, including AIME and SIMBEX.

Third, India provided choices for digital rails and payments, a legitimate public-goods road with immediate and noticeable benefits for migrants and MSMEs.

Fourth, India gave ASEAN a dependable partner on the Bay of Bengal side of the Indo-Pacific production map by moving from general economic discussions to the specific task of AITIGA modernization and port-led manufacturing on the east coast. In Southeast Asia, those four changes are the defining characteristics of the Modi doctrine.

Looking Forward: Five Actionable Lines

Complete the AITIGA task first, including securing rules-of-origin transparency, piloting mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in important sectors, and creating a digital trade annex that aligns with ASEAN capacity.

Second, use the 2024 digital statement as a framework to expand DPI trials outside of Singapore, including remittances and MSME e-commerce rails with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Third, train together for HADR, the security good with the lowest political impact, and institutionalise MDA sharing through IFC-IOR links with ASEAN marine centres.

Fourth, de-risk connectivity, continue to develop ECEC/VCIC as the maritime equivalent of land corridors that are susceptible to the conflict dynamics in Myanmar.

Fifth, establish clear benchmarks for AOIP-IPOI project pipelines under the new 2026–2030 POA[xlii] so that each summit may demonstrate measurable, incremental results. 

Conclusion

When considered collectively, the last ten years show that India’s ASEAN strategy has progressed from aspiration to implementation, and the Modi Doctrine, which is based on Act East 2.0, SAGAR, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), has offered a logical framework for doing so.

By aligning with ASEAN centrality, investing in digital and hard connectivity, and providing maritime public goods that lower risk for all users of the region’s sea lanes, India can add tangible capacity to Southeast Asia without requiring it to take sides, according to the doctrine’s main wager.

New Delhi now uses ASEAN’s own institutions to turn rhetoric into practice, exactly how lasting influence is established in this region of the world.

This is confirmed by India’s increased role in trade facilitation (the ongoing modernization of AITIGA), cross-border payments and identity rails (DPI cooperation), and multilateral naval routines (AIME, SIMBEX, and CORPATs).

The doctrine’s practicality is demonstrated by the economic pillar. Instead, India decided to take a functionalist approach and modernise the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement, which is where the frictions are: rules of origin, NTMs/standards, customs cooperation, and digital trade facilitation.

This will make it easier and more predictable for small businesses to trade. Although this “plumbing first” strategy isn’t as glamorous as tariff great agreements, supply networks and ASEAN bureaucrats both value it. Connectivity is animated by the same logic.

The East Coast Economic Corridor/VCIC offers a parallel, robust Bay of Bengal bridge to ASEAN industrial networks at sea, while the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan projects connect India’s Northeast to mainland Southeast Asian markets on land.

New Delhi has demonstrated a mature understanding of the region’s risk profile and ASEAN’s demand for multiple pathways to integration by purposefully creating redundancy between continental and maritime corridors an explicit buffer against delays caused by Myanmar.

Digital statecraft is perhaps the area where the doctrine has innovated the most. An ASEAN demand for affordable, interoperable rails for individuals, MSMEs, and public services is met by India’s export of digital public infrastructure, including identification, payments, and open APIs.

In addition to being a bilateral convenience, the UPI–PayNow link serves as a proof-of-concept for a larger ASEAN–India digital corridor that reduces remittance costs, speeds up settlement cycles, and enables cross-border micro-commerce.

In a region where standards are just as important as steel, India’s choice to compete on the basis of architecture and trust rather than just apps seems wise and well aligned with AOIP’s inclusive grammar.

The doctrine’s public-goods reasoning is especially evident in the area of security. The transition from intermittent bilateral exercises to multilateral operations with ASEAN navies (AIME-2023) and the subdued development of maritime domain awareness through the IFC-IOR have improved response speed and transparency along the Andaman–Malacca strait, which is arguably the most important chokepoint for the prosperity of both East Asia and India.

Southeast Asian governments have embraced these because they are stability services provided under ASEAN chairs (EAS, ADMM-Plus), not alliance gestures. In order to match the hub-and-spoke reality of ASEAN cooperation with bilateral horsepower where it counts (payments, ports, patrols, and now vital minerals), India has simultaneously deepened country-level lanes, particularly with Singapore and Indonesia.

Importantly, the doctrine has addressed the China variable in the ASEAN manner. India has positioned itself as a norm-taker and norm-shaper rather than a norm breaker by embracing AOIP’s terminology and eschewing bloc politics.

This has allowed ASEAN to write AOIP–IPOI complementarities into subsequent summit texts and elevate the partnership to the status of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

To put it another way, rather than increasing political pressure, New Delhi has gained weight by reducing friction and enhancing the regional operating system.

There are still issues to address. Land-corridor timetables will continue to be tested by Myanmar’s war; exporters will continue to be frustrated by non-tariff measures and standards divergence; and India will need to put in twice as much effort to provide the benefits that businesses anticipate from deep integration because it chose not to participate in the RCEP.

However, these obstacles are already anticipated by the doctrine. It disperses risk over land and sea, replaces latency in physical rails with digital ones, gives technical chapters precedence over catchphrases in trade negotiations, and intensifies HADR and MDA where security cooperation is most useful and least political.

To keep this machine going in between summits, the new ASEAN–India Plan of Action (2026–2030) includes cross-pillar tasking, institutional muscle monitoring, and alignment with ASEAN’s own strategic plans.

References

[i] ASEAN. (2025). Final Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 2026-2030. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

[ii] ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific for Peace, Stability and Prosperity in the Region. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf

[iii] Joint Statement on Strengthening ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Stability and Prosperity in the Region in the context of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38396%2FJoint_Statement_on_Strengthening_ASEANIndia_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership_for_Peace_Stability_and_Prosperity_in_the_Region_in_the_context_of_the

[iv] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2015, November). Overview ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2015/November/asean-india/Overview%20ASEAN-India%20Dialogue%20Relations%20-%20November%202015.pdf

[v] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (1976). Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. https://asean.org/legal-instrument/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia/

[vi] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2020, February 7). Indo-Pacific Division Briefs. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf

[vii] Fixing ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA): A litmus test for India-ASEAN relations. CSDS Online. https://csdronline.com/blind-spot/fixing-asean-india-trade-in-goods-agreement-aitiga-a-litmus-test-for-india-asean-relations/

[viii] Statista. (2024, March). Value of Indian trade with ASEAN countries in financial year 2023, by country (in million U.S. dollars). https://www.statista.com/statistics/650795/trade-value-asean-countries-with-india/#:~:text=The%20value%20of%20trade%20between

[ix] Diplomacy India. (2024, August 4). ASEAN-India trade talks in Jakarta pave way for closer ties. Diplomacy India. https://diplomacyindia.com/asean-india-trade-talks-in-jakarta-pave-way-for-closer-ties/

[x] Nair, S. P. (2025). Analysis of the connectivity parameters of the proposed Trilateral Highway (TH) between India, Myanmar and Thailand (IMT), the industrial corridor and its impact on the economic development of Southeast Asia. International Journal of Current Science Research and Review, 8(9), 4512-4517. https://doi.org/10.47191/ijcsrr/V8-i9-13

[xi] Banerjee, P. (2017). Development of East Coast Economic Corridor and Vizag–Chennai Industrial Corridor: Critical issues of connectivity and logistics (ADB South Asia Working Paper Series No. 50). Asian Development Bank. http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS178645-2

[xii] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), & Government of India. (2024, October 10). ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38397%2FASEANIndia_Joint_Statement_on_Advancing_Digital_Transformation

[xiii] Monetary Authority of Singapore. (2023). Launch of real-time payments between Singapore and India. [Website]. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2023/launch-of-real-time-payments-between-singapore-and-india

[xiv] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2023, May 8). Sea phase of ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise – 2023. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1922815

[xv] Consulate General of India, Medan. (n.d.).   https://www.cgimedan.gov.in/event_detail/?eventid=191

[xvi] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2024, October). Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070205

[xvii] Indian Navy. (n.d.). Indian Ocean Region Information Fusion Centre.  https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/

[xviii] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2023, November 15). Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh to attend 10th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, Indonesia on November 16, 2023. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1976783

[xix] Jacobson, R. (2024, February). These are the world’s most vital waterways for global trade. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/02/worlds-busiest-ocean-shipping-routes-trade/

[xx] Ways to strengthen the U.S.-Indian naval partnership. Proceedings Magazine. U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/ways-strengthen-us-indian-naval-partnership

[xxi] ASEAN. (2024). ASEAN integration report 2024 (Issue 3). ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AIR2024-3.pdf

[xxii] Vietnam News. (2025, October 21). Việt Nam and India trade reached $15 billion in 2024. Vietnam News. https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/1691657/viet-nam-and-india-trade-reached-15-billion-in-2024.html

[xxiii] ASEAN & Government of India. (2021). ASEAN-India joint statement on cooperation on the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf

[xxiv] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep

[xxv] Asian Development Bank. (2020). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Overview and economic impact (ADB Brief No. 164). Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/664096/adb-brief-164-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.pdf

[xxvi] Press Information Bureau. (2021, February 4). 1st ASEAN-India Hackathon 2021 concludes. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1695404

[xxvii] Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur. (2024). ASEAN-India Start-up Festival 2024 concludes. IIT Kanpur. https://www.iitk.ac.in/new/asean-india-start-up-festival-2024-concludes

[xxviii] ASEAN. (2025). Final plan of action to implement ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

[xxix] ASEAN Secretariat. (2025). ASEAN Plan of Action on Science, Technology and Innovation (APASTI) 2026-2035. ASEAN Secretariat. https://akstcc.org/cfind/source/files/asean_apasti_spreads_f04_.pdf

[xxx] ASEAN. (2025). ASEAN Economic Community strategic plan 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/AEC-Strategic-Plan-2026-2030.pdf

[xxxi] Press Information Bureau. (2023, May 1). ASEAN India Maritime Exercise (AIME-2023). Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1921224

[xxxii] The Diplomat. (2023, May). India, ASEAN hold first maritime exercises. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/india-asean-hold-first-maritime-exercises/

[xxxiii] Indian Navy. (n.d.). Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). Indian Navy. https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/

[xxxiv] Press Information Bureau. (2024, October 23). Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070205

[xxxv] Reserve Bank of India. (n.d.). FAQs on UPI-PayNow linkage for cross-border remittances between India and Singapore. https://www.rbi.org.in/commonperson/english/scripts/FAQs.aspx?Id=3415

[xxxvi] Consulate General of India, Medan. (n.d.). Event detail: [Event ID 191]. Consulate General of India, Medan. https://www.cgimedan.gov.in/event_detail/?eventid=191

[xxxvii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (n.d.). Joint statement on strengthening ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership for peace, stability and prosperity in the region in the context of the [URL truncated for clarity]. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F38396%2FJoint_Statement_on_Strengthening_ASEANIndia_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership_for_Peace_Stability_and_Prosperity_in_the_Region_in_the_context_of_the

[xxxviii] ASEAN & Government of India. (2021). ASEAN-India joint statement on cooperation on the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/71.-ASEAN-India-Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific-for-Peace-Stability-and-Prosperity-in-the-Region-Final.pdf

[xxxix] The proposed India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral expressway: Regional connectivity and economic implications. International Journal of Current Science Research and Reviews. https://ijcsrr.org/single-view/?id=23960&pid=23903

[xl] New Straits Times. (2025, October). Mutually beneficial ASEAN-India cooperation. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/business/2025/10/1289860/mutually-beneficial-asean-india-cooperation

[xli] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep

[xlii] ASEAN. (2025). Final plan of action to implement ASEAN-India comprehensive strategic partnership 2026–2030. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Final-POA-to-Implement-ASEAN-India-CSP-2026-2030.pdf

Turkish state broadcaster TRT singles out India’s Tata over Israel ties, fails to mention Turkiye among ports supplying Israel

Anurag
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Turkish state broadcaster TRT singles out India’s Tata over Israel ties, fails to mention Turkiye among ports supplying Israel

On 24th October (local time), Turkish state broadcaster TRT targeted India’s Tata Group, claiming that the conglomerate is “at the heart of the India-Israel military alliance”. In doing so, TRT quoted a UN report that, interestingly, categorically mentions Türkiye as one of the ports known to have facilitated the trans-shipment of F-35 parts, weapons, jet fuel, oil, and other materials to Israel. The contradiction is glaring, while TRT paints India as complicit, it conveniently ignores that its own country has been named in the same UN document that it used in its report against India, which is based on a report by a US-based South Asian political collective called South Asian Left Activist Movement (SALAM).

TRT singled Tata Group for having military ties with Israel

The report that TRT published was based on the findings of a US-based South Asian political collective called ‘SALAM’. In its report, TRT accused Tata Group of being “a key enabler of Israel’s system of control over Palestinians” while citing SALAM’s claims that Tata provided “the hardware of genocide and the machinery of daily oppression.” The report further claimed that Tata’s subsidiaries are deeply embedded in Israel’s military-industrial network, which includes manufacturing fuselages for Apache helicopters and providing digital infrastructure for Israel’s government and financial systems.

Source: TRT World

The Turkish state broadcaster positioned Tata’s collaboration with Israeli firms as part of a broader “occupation economy” and extended its role beyond defence to cloud computing and surveillance technologies. It even framed Tata’s sponsorship of the New York City Marathon as “sportswashing”, designed to distract from its alleged complicity.

What SALAM’s report claimed

SALAM has released a 50-page document titled “Architects of Occupation: The Tata Group, Indian Capital, and the India-Israel Alliance”, in which the group claimed that Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) produces parts for F-16 fighter jets and Apache helicopters, both of which are used by Israel’s Air Force. It also claimed that Tata has ties with Israel Aerospace Industries in the production of Barak-8 missile systems and that Tata Motors’ subsidiaries contribute to light armoured vehicles used by Israeli patrols in the West Bank.

On the digital front, SALAM linked Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) to Israel’s “Project Nimbus” cloud initiative and claimed that TCS helped sustain surveillance infrastructure. The report further attempted to link Tata’s economic ventures to ideological affinities and suggested that the India-Israel partnership is rooted in “shared leanings between Zionism and Hindutva.” The narrative of SALAM is clear that it views business cooperation through a political lens by framing India’s growing defence partnership with Israel as morally compromised.

UN report mentioned Türkiye as one of the ports supporting Israel

While attacking Tata Group, TRT quoted the UN Special Rapporteur’s advance unedited version as well, stating that India was among the 26 states that exported arms and ammunition to Israel between October 2023 and October 2025.

However, while quoting the UN report, TRT conveniently skipped the fact that it also explicitly mentioned Türkiye as one of the “ports known to have facilitated trans-shipment to Israel of F-35 parts, weapons, jet fuel, oil and/or other materials”. This statement placed Türkiye, TRT’s home state, within the logistical network that enables the movement of defence supplies to Israel, the very network it accused India of empowering.

Source: United Nations

Even if TRT’s moral outrage is considered genuine, it must extend to its own ports, which, according to the UN, are directly involved in the flow of military and energy supplies to Israel. The broadcaster’s silence on this fact raises questions about intent — whether the report was meant to expose the so-called global complicity, or whether it was written merely to target India for political optics.

The hypocrisy play

TRT selectively framed Tata, which appears less about journalistic investigation and more about preserving national optics. It projected India as the face of Israel’s so-called “occupation economy” and attempted to redirect global attention from Türkiye’s own complicity mentioned in the UN report. The broadcaster’s omission makes one thing clear: it is easy to moralise from a distance while ignoring facts that sit close to home.

The India-Israel relationship has always been pragmatic and transparent. New Delhi has maintained neutrality on the Palestine issue and continued humanitarian aid to Gaza through UNRWA. On the other hand, New Delhi has deepened strategic defence and technological ties with Jerusalem, primarily to enhance self-reliance and counter terrorism. Unlike Türkiye, India has never masked its position under contradictory posturing.

Conclusion

TRT’s report, which is based on SALAM’s highly ideological publication, weaponised selective outrage to vilify India. While doing so, it bypassed inconvenient UN findings that implicated Türkiye. If transparency and accountability were the goals that TRT aimed for, the Turkish state media failed miserably. Until it addresses its own country’s role in the arms and energy routes to Israel, TRT should refrain from lecturing others on “occupation economies”. And even if TRT someday does so, it has no right to lecture any country or business house, including India and Tata, on how to do business.

Fact check: Congress, SP and Bhim Army falsely claim ‘upper-caste’ men killed Dalit teen in Greater Noida – here is the truth

Anurag
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Fact check: Congress, SP and Bhim Army falsely claim ‘upper-caste’ men killed Dalit teen in Greater Noida – here is the truth

On 25th October, National Spokesperson of the Indian National Congress, Dr Shama Mohamed, claimed on social media platform X that “upper-caste goons” brutally beat up a 17-year-old Dalit boy, Aniket, in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, on his birthday. The victim succumbed to his injuries at the hospital while receiving treatment on 24th October. She wrote, “Every week or two, we see reports of Dalits being killed in BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh. Narendra Modi and his double-engine governments have completely failed to protect the lives of Dalits.”

Source: X

Congress was not the only one to push the “Dalit vs Upper Caste” narrative in the matter. While the Samajwadi Party’s media cell claimed the accused were from the “Thakur” community, Bhim Army chief used the term “dabang” to run a similar narrative.

In a post on X, the Samajwadi Party’s media cell wrote, “A few days ago, in Noida, a Dalit boy was brutally attacked and severely beaten by boys from the dominant Thakur caste in UP, and now that Dalit boy has died. His family is crying out in grief and despair.” Interestingly, the screenshots of news reports shared in the post did not mention “Thakur”.

Source: X

Bhim Army chief Chandra Shekhar Azad called them “Jatankwadi”.

Source: X

While Shama Mohamed and others claimed the “upper-caste goons” or “Thakurs” assaulted Aniket, in reality, the accused belong to the Meena community, which is categorised as a Scheduled Tribe, not “upper caste.”

What the FIR says

OpIndia accessed the FIR registered in the matter. The FIR was registered on 17th October, two days after the incident, based on the complaint of the victim’s uncle, Momchand, under Sections 191(2), 190, 115(2), 352, 109 and 309(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Sections 3(1)(d) and 3(1)(dh) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. As the victim has died, Section 103(2) of the BNS (murder) has been added.

The FIR is registered against seven named accused and 10–12 unidentified individuals. The names of the accused, according to the complaint, are Yuvraj, Jeetu, Rachit, Bharat, Anjit, Pawan and Sunit. All of the accused are residents of the same locality and belong to the Meena community, however, the FIR does not explicitly mention it. The accused’s caste details were revealed by the police in a statement.

According to the complainant, his younger brother Sumit had gone with his nephew Aniket and his friends Rajkaran and Shiva to celebrate Aniket’s birthday near Syed Pokar. They were standing on the 20-foot road when a boy named Asif came, saw them and left without saying anything.

Source: UP Police

A short while later, Yuvraj, the main accused, Jeetu, Rachit, Bharat, Ankit, Pawan, Sunit and 10–12 others arrived carrying sticks and iron rods. They began hurling abuses and casteist slurs at his brother and Aniket. They called them “Chamar” and “Dhed” and said, “We will show you your place”, before attacking them.

Sumit sustained injuries to his head and Aniket was brutally beaten. Both of them were thrown into nearby bushes. Aniket was unconscious at that time. Shiva and one other person present managed to escape from the attack and saved their lives. Later, they searched for Aniket for an hour and found him lying unconscious in the bushes.

Later, when Aniket and Sumit were rushed to the hospital, it was found that Aniket had deep head wounds at three to four places. Aniket was admitted to the hospital in critical condition.

During the assault, the accused reportedly snatched a gold chain from Sumit and took his iPhone. The complainant mentioned that the accused had beaten up Aniket a few days back as well and threatened to kill him.

Sumit was discharged from the hospital two days after the incident. However, Aniket continued to fight for his life. On 24th October, Aniket succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

Several individuals arrested by the police

On 19th October, police arrested Yuvraj Meena and Jitu Meera, two days after the FIR was registered. Four teams were formed to apprehend the remaining accused. Rachit and Ankit were arrested later on 24th October. Further search for the remaining accused is underway.

According to the police, 17-year-old Aniket Jatav was beaten up on 15th October and he died on 24th October. The accused belonged to the Meena community, the police confirmed.

“We had earlier arrested two accused on 19th October, Yuvraj Meena and Jitu Meena, who were residents of the same area, and sent them to jail. Four teams have been formed to quickly arrest the remaining accused,” the Noida Police said in a statement.

Speaking to the media, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Greater Noida 4, Sarthak Sengar, said that the victims and accused had previous altercations and the reason for the same is still unclear. He said, “They were young boys and it was not the first time that they had arguments.”

ACP Sengar added that following the altercation, the victim was admitted to the hospital with severe injuries and was recovering. However, on 23rd October, his health deteriorated and he succumbed to the injuries on the morning of 24th October.

Political response to the incident

Following the incident, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MLA from Jewar, Dhirendra Singh, visited the family. He also briefed Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath about the incident. When Dhirendra Singh went to meet the family, CM Yogi talked to them over the phone and assured justice.

Local BSP and Samajwadi Party leaders also met the family and promised their support.

The accused were not from the upper caste, as propagated by opposition parties

While political parties and activists rushed to frame the incident as another “Dalit versus upper caste” crime, police records and statements reveal a different reality. The accused in the case belong to the Meena community, which falls under the Scheduled Tribe category, not an upper-caste group as claimed by Congress, the Samajwadi Party and the Bhim Army. The narrative pushed online therefore appears to be politically motivated and factually incorrect, aimed at fuelling caste-based outrage rather than reflecting the facts of the case.

Jaisalmer bus fire: Rampant corruption in registrations, substandard fittings, safety rule violations found in inspections, action taken against over 1500 buses

Divya Bharti
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Jaisalmer bus fire: Rampant corruption in registrations, substandard fittings, safety rule violations found in inspections, action taken against over 1500 buses

The bus fire near Jaisalmer on October 14, which tragically killed 26 people, was caused by a short circuit in the air conditioning, an official forensic (FSL) report has confirmed. The bus was on its way from Jaisalmer to Jodhpur and had only travelled about 10 kilometres when the fire started. The investigation has completely ruled out any kind of bomb, explosion, or firecrackers. Instead, it points to a “gross negligence” by the people who owned and built the bus.

How the fire spread so fast

Jaisalmer’s SP (Superintendent of Police), Abhishek Shivhare, explained exactly what the report found. The fire started from a short circuit in the AC’s faulty wiring, which was on the roof and connected to the engine. This caused the air conditioning pipes to fill with thick, poisonous smoke and carbon monoxide gas, which then spread everywhere inside the bus.

Before the bus was completely engulfed in fire, passengers were having trouble breathing. They started to suffocate and couldn’t move quickly to get out. In a panic, passengers started breaking the glass windows to escape. But authorities explained that this actually worsened the situation.

The fresh oxygen from outside rushed in and “snowballed” the fire, turning the whole bus into an inferno that burned completely in just 5 to 7 minutes.

Rumours about explosives are false

The police were very clear that rumours about firecrackers or explosives are baseless. The FSL report conclusively proves there wasn’t even a trace of any explosive material. They did find some unburnt firecrackers near the main door and about 35 potash guns (the kind farmers use to scare animals) in the back storage area, but none of them had anything to do with the fire. The bus’s diesel tank and tyres were also completely safe, proving the fire started from a technical fault.

A preventable tragedy built on greed

This whole tragedy could have been prevented. The investigation found several irregularities that were likely done just to make unethical gains. The AC wiring was installed unsafely, and the materials used to build the bus body were not fire-resistant, meaning they burned very easily.

Worst of all, the bus was missing the most basic safety gear. There was no fire extinguisher and no emergency hammers to break the windows. Most shockingly, investigators found that a seat had been placed right at the emergency exit, making it completely useless. Officials said timely inspection and proper technical fitting would have stopped this from ever happening.

The government seizes 66 buses from the owner’s factory

The Rajasthan government took several actions after the fire. The Transport Department seized all 66 bus chassis from the owner’s (Manish Jain’s) factory, Jainam Coach Crafts Workshop, and is now preparing to cancel their fraudulent registrations. They also launched a 10-day state-wide campaign, inspecting 2,000 buses, which resulted in 398 buses being seized and 1,089 being fined for safety violations.

The investigation showed that the owner, who also runs Jain Travels, made several low-quality, dangerous changes to the bus that burned. The bus was illegally modified with an AC unit after being registered as a non-AC vehicle, which overloaded the wiring and caused the fire.

Furthermore, the owner violated safety standards by installing an emergency gate that was completely blocked by placing two seats in front of it. The bus’s size was also illegally extended just to add more seats and sleeper berths.

RTO officers and builders colluded in registration fraud

According to a report by Bhaskar, the investigation revealed a clear collusion between RTO (Regional Transport Office) officers and bus coach builders who were processing fraudulent registrations for these unsafe buses. RTO officials were approving buses that weren’t even finished. At the Jainam workshop, officers found that 26 buses had been registered before their bodies were even built. This fraud was widespread, with these paper registrations filed not only in Rajasthan but also in Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Nagaland, and Assam.

The report highlights how deep the collusion was, noting that in Rajasthan, “an RTO inspector verified three of the five buses before their bodies were built,” acting as if they were complete, and one of those buses was even fully registered in RTO regions like Jodhpur, Chittorgarh, Sikar, and Bikaner.

Three people arrested

Because of this gross failure to follow safety rules, police have now arrested three people. The Special Investigation Team (SIT) set up by the government has arrested the bus driver, the bus owner, and Manish Jain, the owner of the factory that built the bus body. The investigation is still proceeding as more details come in.

WaPo tries to pull off a Hindenburg, misleads about LIC’s publicly known investment in Adani Group through dubious ‘journalists’, ‘experts’ and non-existent ‘internal documents’

Dibakar Dutta
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WaPo tries to pull off a Hindenburg, misleads about LIC’s publicly known investment in Adani Group through dubious ‘journalists’, ‘experts’ and non-existent ‘internal documents’

On Friday (24th October), The Washington Post attempted to tarnish the reputation of the Adani Group and target the Modi government by making unsubstantiated claims of crony capitalism.

A hit-piece to this effect titled ‘India’s $3.9 billion plan to help Modi’s mogul ally after U.S. charges’ was published by the American leftist newspaper.

The Washington Post claimed to have accessed ‘internal documents’ exclusively, which somehow suggests that the Modi govt and its officials somehow ‘coerced’ the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) to invest ₹5000 crores in the Indian conglomerate.

It alleged, “Internal documents obtained exclusively by The Washington Post detail how Indian officials drafted and pushed through a proposal in May to steer roughly $3.9 billion in investments to Adani’s businesses from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, or LIC — a state-owned entity primarily responsible for providing life insurance to poor and rural families.“

Screengrab of the propaganda piece in the Washington Post

While the Washington Post tried to pass off the news as some exclusive information, the investment by LIC was acknowledged by none other than the Adani Group itself in a press release in May this year.

“Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), India’s largest integrated transport utility, has successfully raised INR 5,000 crore through a 15-year Non-Convertible Debenture (NCD). Backed by APSEZ’s strong financials and a ‘AAA/Stable’ domestic credit rating, the issue locked in a competitive coupon rate of 7.75% p.a. and was fully subscribed by LIC. The debentures will be listed on the BSE,” the Indian conglomerate had said.

For the unversed, NCD is a fixed-income instrument which companies use to raise funds without allowing the option of converting to equity shares. In the particular LIC-Adani deal, the insurance entity will receive regular interest payments at 7.75% pa. The principal amount of ₹5000 crores will also be returned to it on maturity, i.e. in the year 2040.

Given the nature of LIC, the investment in Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited will provide it with a predictable income stream with low risk (given the AAA/ Stable domestic credit rating).

At the same time, it is important to point out that the Indian public sector life insurance company has invested heavily in several private companies.

For instance, LIC’s top holdings include Reliance Industries (₹1.38 lakh crore), ITC Ltd (₹82,342 crore), HDFC Bank, TCS, IDBI Bank, ICICI Bank, Bharti Airtel, SBI, L&T, and Infosys.

As such, it is not unusual for LIC to invest in Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), either and that too an amount of ₹5000 crores.

But this did not stop ‘The Washington Post’ from alleging that the Modi government was somehow directing taxpayer money to bail out an Indian conglomerate ‘reeling under debt.’

The non-existent ‘internal documents’ referred to by The Washington Post apparently suggest that the Indian Department of Financial Services (DFS) warned LIC against investment in Adani Group.

The American newspaper alleged, “The DFS documents acknowledged that the proposed investment strategy came with risks. “Adani’s securities are sensitive to controversies…causing short-term price fluctuations,” one document said.“

It quoted an ‘independent expert’ named Hemindra Hazari in its report to cast aspersions on the motives of the Indian government and the integrity of LIC and the Adani Group.

Having said that, The Washington Post had to grudingly accept that the investments were made through transparent investment rationales, compliance with Indian regulators, exercising due diligence and ensuring economic benefits.

It also referred to the now-debunked Hindenburg report to further peddle unproven claims of ‘crony capitalism’ against the Indian conglomerate.

LIC rubbishes claims made by The Washington Post

In a statement released on Saturday (25th October), the Life Insurance Corporation of India pointed out, “The allegations leveled by the Washington Post that the investment decisions of LIC are influenced by external factors are false, baseless, and far from truth.”

The public sector insurance company also rubbished claims about the existence of any such internal document, which was the only foundation of the article by the American newspaper.

“No such document or plan as alleged in the article has ever been prepared by LIC, which creates a roadmap for infusing funds by LIC into Adani group of companies. The investment decisions are taken by LIC independently as per Board approved policies after detailed due diligence,” LIC emphasised.

It further pointed out that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) or any other entity does not have any role in its decision-making process.

“LIC has ensured highest standards of due diligence and all its investment decisions have been undertaken in compliance with extant policies, provisions in the Acts and regulatory guidelines, in the best interest of all its stakeholders,” it concluded.

Adani Group denies accusations of crony capitalism

The Adani Group has also categorically denied accusations of crony capitalism made by The Washington Post in its article.

“We categorically deny involvement in any alleged government plans to direct LIC funds…LIC invests across multiple corporate groups — and suggesting preferential treatment for Adani is misleading. Moreover, LIC has earned returns from its exposure to our portfolio. Assertions of undue political favour are unfounded…Our growth predates Mr Modi’s national leadership,” it added.

‘Journalists’ behind the dubious report targeting Adani and Modi govt

One of the ‘journalists’ behind the hit-piece happened to be Pranshu Verma.

OpIndia had reported in December 2023 how he was soliciting information about the Indian OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) handle ‘Disinfo Lab’ from American political commentator Jack Posobiec.

Pranshu Verma, who has been working with The Washington Post since February 2022, hoped to deter Jack Posobiec from sharing informative posts of ‘Disinfo Lab.’

In January 2023, he romanticised an Islamist named Raqib Hameed Naik in an article titled ‘Tracking rising religious hatred in India, from half a world away.’ A vicious fake news peddler, Raqib Hameed Naik is the founder of anti-Hindu disinformation outlet ‘Hindutva Watch.’

Screengrab of the article by Pranshu Verma

He is also infamous for denying the Hindu genocide, perpetrated by radical Islamists in the Kashmir Valley, in the early 1990s. Naik had also mocked the Hindu ‘Shivling’ found inside the Gyanvapi mosque in Kashi

In his article in January 2023, Pranshu Verma relied on a database provided by ‘DOTO’ to allege that ‘religious hatred’ is on the rise in India.

Coincidentally, ‘Disinfo Lab’ had previously exposed the fabrications of DOTO, following which the latter first revised and then deleted the database.

Another ‘journalist’ who co-authored the article happens to Ravi Nair, a columnist at the leftist propaganda portal ‘The Wire.’

In September this year, a Delhi court ordered him to remove unsubstantiated and defamatory content (based on the lies of Hindenburg Research), which he published to tarnish the reputation of businessman Gautam Adani.

Earlier in February 2025, Ravi Nair peddled lies about the Adani Group in the British newspaper ‘The Guardian.’

Out of desperation to target the Modi government, the ‘journalist’ made a fool out of himself by comparing the Indian rupee with the currency of Afghanistan.

OpIndia had earlier pointed out how an Australian NGO-backed portal, ‘Adani Watch’, retweets almost all misleading articles by Ravi Nair. The ‘journalist’ is known for deriding Hindu sentiments and using Hinduphobic tropes regularly.

He had earlier amplified lies about the Statue of Unity and called for its demolition.

Ravi Nair had been the front-runner in spreading lies about the Rafale Deal and thwarting India’s defence procurement, albeit unsuccessfullly.

How media twisted Allahabad HC’s words: A judgment on forced conversion and trafficking turned into a clickbait tale of ‘unsaid words can cause communal tensions’

Aditi
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How media twisted Allahabad HC’s words: A judgment on forced conversion and trafficking turned into a clickbait tale of ‘unsaid words can cause communal tensions’

In a clear display of bias against the Allahabad High Court, some media outlets published misleading headlines about a recent order of the High Court, which dismissed the petition of a person charged with disturbing communal harmony, seeking the quashing of an FIR against him.

Reporting about the High Court order, Live Law published a report with the headline “Unsaid Words Can Also ‘Promote Enmity’ Under BNS: Allahabad High Court On ‘Subtle’ Religious Undertones In WhatsApp Message”. A plain reading of the headline suggests that the High Court made out an offence where there was none.

Similarly, The Scroll also emphasised the words “Even ‘unsaid’ words can amount to promoting enmity” in the headline of its report on the Allahabad High Court order, insinuating that the High Court wrongly inferred an offence while no act was committed to constitute the offence.

Another media portal, Law Chakra, also used a similar language regarding the High Court order. Its headline read, “Even Unsaid Words Can Spark Communal Tension: Allahabad High Court”.

The abovementioned reports relate to a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 23rd October, passed by a division bench of Justices JJ Munir and Pramod Kumar Srivastava. The verdict was passed by the judges after the hearing of a petition filed by an individual booked under Sections 299 and 353(3) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner, Afaq Ahmad, sought the quashing of the FIR filed against him for circulating inflammatory WhatsApp messages after his brother was arrested in a religious conversion case.

“The petitioner, making this arrest of his brother in the case crime last mentioned, a foundation for disturbing communal peace and outraging religious feelings of a class of citizens of India, maliciously sent an inflammatory message to individuals on their mobile phones,” the High Court stated in its order. Explaining the intent of the inflammatory messages shared by the petitioner, the High Court said that in the message, the petitioner alleged that his brother was implicated in a false case because he belonged to a particular religious community.

“The words of the post quoted in the FIR may not speak per se about religion, but definitely convey an underlying and subtle message that his brother has been targeted in a false case, because of his belonging to a particular religious community. These unsaid words in the message prima facie would outrage religious feelings of a class of citizens hailing from a particular community, who would think that they are being targeted because of belonging to a particular religious community,” the court stated.

While the media outlets selectively picked the words used by the High Court, the entire statement of the court reads as, “Quite apart, and, even if one were to think that no religious feelings of a class of citizens or community have been outraged, per se by the WhatsApp message, it is certainly a message, which, by its unsaid words, is likely to create or promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between religious communities, where members of a particular community, in the first instance, could think that they are being targeted by members of another religious community by abusing the process of law”. It is clear from the statement of the High Court that the inflammatory message sent out by the petitioner attempted to promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between religious communities in an indirect manner, without using express words. Notably, the petitioner sent the message to multiple persons to expand its reach.

Maintaining that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner, the High Court rejected his request for quashing the FIR against him. “In the totality of circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is a matter which requires investigation and cannot be scuttled at an incipient stage, foreclosing probe that must be carried to its logical conclusion,” the High Court noted.

It is evident from reading the High Court’s order in its entirety that the media portals attempted to attribute a malicious intent to the High Court in its decision on the petition. While the High Court explained how the petitioner tried to disrupt religious harmony through his inflammatory message in an indirect manner, the media portals cleverly focused on a set of words to raise suspicion about the intent of the High Court.

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