On 27th June, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, issued a strong rebuttal to what it called an “illegal Court of Arbitration” seated in The Hague, Netherlands, which had released a “supplemental award” regarding the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The MEA labelled the tribunal as “purportedly constituted under the Indus Waters Treaty 1960, albeit in brazen violation of it.”
Pakistan had run to The Hague hoping to force India’s hand on the Treaty after India suspended its obligations post the Pahalgam terror attack. But with India refusing to even acknowledge the tribunal’s legitimacy, yet another Pakistani bluff stands thoroughly busted. India has made it clear that it has never recognised the legality of the tribunal.
India unequivocally stated that the very formation of the arbitral body represents a serious breach of the Indus Waters Treaty and renders all its proceedings and so-called awards “illegal and per se void”. The Government of India further asserted that after the Pahalgam terrorist attack, it had invoked its sovereign rights under international law to place the Treaty in abeyance until Pakistan credibly ceases its support for cross-border terrorism.
India further noted that there is no obligation under the Indus Waters Treaty that is currently binding on India. India pointed out that the illegitimate tribunal has no jurisdiction whatsoever to examine India’s sovereign decision. The MEA dismissed the “supplemental award” as just another facet of Pakistan’s desperate attempt to distract the global community from its role as a hub of international terrorism.
What the Court said in its supplemental award
On 27th June, the so-called Court of Arbitration issued a Supplemental Award on Competence favouring Pakistan. This was in response to India’s formal declaration made in April 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack, that the Indus Waters Treaty would be held in abeyance. The arbitral panel rejected India’s position in a unanimous decision and claimed that the treaty remains binding. The court further claimed that it has jurisdiction in the matter to tell India it cannot step back from the treaty.
The so-called court ruled that India’s unilateral decision to hold the treaty in abeyance does not affect the court’s competence, regardless of how that decision is characterised, whether as suspension under international law or otherwise. The court cited both the treaty text and customary international law and claimed that the Indus Waters Treaty cannot be held in abeyance or suspended unilaterally by either party. It further claimed that the jurisdiction of a court, once properly seized, cannot be defeated by post-hoc actions of a party.
Citing Article IX of the treaty, the court claimed that the dispute resolution process is a binding mechanism meant to function regardless of the political developments in either of the countries. The court also asserted that this reasoning applied similarly to any proceedings involving the Neutral Expert appointed in the parallel case by India. It said the ongoing work of both dispute resolution mechanisms must continue “in a timely, efficient, and fair manner”.
Interestingly, India did not submit any formal argument before the court in this phase, which led the court to base its assessment on the public statements and diplomatic communications originating from New Delhi. Not to forget, India has submitted only one reply throughout the case, which was initially submitted in 2016 by Pakistan. India has stood firm on its stance that the whole process was illegal and was against the provisions of the treaty.
In short, the Supplemental Award reaffirms the court’s stance that it retains full authority over the dispute concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects, despite India’s sovereign decision to no longer consider the treaty binding amid ongoing cross-border terror activities sponsored and supported by Pakistan.
Pakistan’s 11 June submission – Using PO 15 to prop up a tribunal India never recognised
The Supplemental Award issued by the so-called Court of Arbitration on 27th June did not emerge in a vacuum. It was directly precipitated by Procedural Order No 15, which was issued by the court to India and Pakistan on 16th May 2025 in response to India’s declaration that it would place the treaty “in abeyance with immediate effect” in light of the Pahalgam terrorist attack. The order asked both parties to make formal submissions by 6th June on whether these developments had any bearing on the ongoing arbitration proceedings or on the competence of the Court or the Neutral Expert.
As India does not recognise the Court of Arbitration, there was no formal response sent. India has maintained that the very constitution of this court, running parallel to the Neutral Expert process, is in violation of Article IX of the Indus Waters Treaty. Hence, India did not recognise its jurisdiction. India has categorically refused to give even a shred of legitimacy to what it calls “a fabricated arbitration mechanism at Pakistan’s behest”.
On the other hand, Pakistan responded to the court’s invitation with a comprehensive submission on 11th June 2025, seizing the opportunity to exploit the moment and revive its legal offensive. In its filing, Pakistan argued that India’s declaration of abeyance had no legal effect under the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty, nor under international law.
Pakistan cited paragraph 16 of Annexure G of the treaty, which gives the court sole authority to decide on matters of its competence, and claimed that no unilateral declaration by India can suspend, delay, or dissolve the proceedings once they had commenced.
Furthermore, Pakistan asserted that the treaty has no provision allowing either party to place it in abeyance or suspend its operation on national security grounds. The submissions conveniently ignored the context of the cross-border terrorism that prompted India’s decision. Instead, Pakistan portrayed it as a “tactic” to obstruct arbitration. It argued that permitting such a suspension would amount to handing a veto to either party, undermining what it called the Treaty’s “compulsory third-party dispute resolution mechanism”.
Pakistan also requested the court to take note of India’s absence from the submission process and urged it to proceed ex parte, that is, proceed with the case without India’s participation. It effectively demanded that the court continue hearing the matter and issue decisions regardless of India’s opposition, refusal to appear, or its sovereign decision to suspend its treaty obligations.
This was a calculated move as Pakistan used the Procedural Order, which was meant to take stock of a serious diplomatic and security escalation, to instead corner the tribunal into reaffirming its own authority. Pakistan cleverly responded within the framework of the tribunal’s own rules, which India does not recognise, and manufactured a legal context where the court could declare India’s decision illegal and continue its proceedings in “a timely, efficient, and fair manner”.
The outcome of Pakistan’s move to reply to the Procedural Order of the Court of Arbitration, which India does not recognise as a legal entity, reflected only one side’s version of legality, that of Pakistan’s. The 27th June Supplemental Award ignored the foundational issue of the court’s own illegitimacy, which India has raised from day one.
The entire episode illustrated how Pakistan continued to exploit international mechanisms. It does not seek honest resolution but wants to indulge in legal warfare aimed at constraining India’s sovereign rights while evading accountability for terror exported across the border.
India’s 2022 letter to the World Bank – A firm and reasoned rejection of the arbitration court’s legitimacy
In October 2022, India sent a comprehensive formal communication to the World Bank, which comprised a covering letter and a detailed explanatory note, making its position perfectly clear. India stated that the so-called Court of Arbitration, constituted at Pakistan’s behest, is illegal and that it violated the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. India further asserted that it was entirely created without any jurisdiction in the matter.
India’s objection was based on a procedural violation with far-reaching legal consequences. According to Article IX of the Indus Waters Treaty, disputes between India and Pakistan are to be resolved in a stepwise, escalating manner. It should begin with bilateral talks, followed by Neutral Expert proceedings for technical matters, and only reach arbitration if both parties agree, or if the Neutral Expert explicitly determines that the matter falls beyond his mandate. The Treaty makes it absolutely clear that the Neutral Expert process and arbitration are not to run in parallel.
India highlighted that Pakistan initiated both the Neutral Expert process and the Court of Arbitration on the same set of issues, that is, technical objections to the design features of the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir. The double approach adopted by Pakistan was not only a breach of the Treaty’s letter and spirit but also a cynical attempt at forum shopping to secure a favourable outcome.
Notably, India had consented in good faith to the Neutral Expert process, which is a mechanism that had worked in the past, especially during the previous Kishenganga dispute. However, India was taken aback when Pakistan simultaneously moved to activate arbitration proceedings. India bluntly stated that it never gave its consent to the establishment of a Court of Arbitration and that no condition precedent under the Treaty for arbitration was satisfied.
In short, the creation of the court while Neutral Expert proceedings were pending constituted a “legal nullity”. India warned the World Bank that facilitating this tribunal, especially when a Neutral Expert had already been appointed and had accepted the assignment, would place the Bank in material breach of its own role under the Treaty. Notably, India pointed out that the World Bank is strictly an impartial facilitator of the Treaty between India and Pakistan and not an adjudicator.
The Explanatory Note – Clause-by-clause dismantling of the arbitration move
India’s Explanatory Note, attached to the letter, served as a clause-by-clause rebuttal of the rationale behind the arbitration. India noted that Annexure G of the Treaty, which governs arbitration, applies only when the Neutral Expert process has either failed or has been exhausted. Furthermore, Annexure F, which governs the Neutral Expert process, was still active, with the Neutral Expert having been appointed and preparing to conduct a site visit.
India further stated that the existence of the Neutral Expert process made the parallel arbitration proceeding “jurisdictionally defective, procedurally premature, and fundamentally incompatible” with the Treaty. Furthermore, India’s participation in the Neutral Expert process could not, and should not, be misrepresented as tacit consent to arbitration.
India also noted that it had engaged in good faith dialogue and communication at every stage, including with the World Bank, to avoid an institutional split. However, Pakistan’s refusal to cooperate with the Neutral Expert process and its insistence on arbitration had manufactured a legal crisis, one that could jeopardise the very dispute resolution framework the Treaty was built upon.
A warning to the World Bank – Do not enable a Treaty violation
The 2022 letter served as a firm caution to the World Bank. India reminded the Bank of its limited role under the Treaty, that it has to act as a facilitator in the appointment of a Neutral Expert or arbitrators only when either party has failed to do so. India further pointed out that the World Bank had no mandate to determine the sequencing or permissibility of dispute resolution tracks. By entertaining Pakistan’s demand to constitute a court, that too when a Neutral Expert was active, the World Bank would essentially be enabling a breach of the Treaty’s fundamental architecture.
India emphasised that if the World Bank proceeded with actions recognising or enabling the arbitral tribunal, India would consider the Bank to have abdicated its neutrality, thereby compromising the credibility of the dispute resolution system under the Treaty.
Notably, India mentioned that while it asked for Neutral Expert proceedings, Pakistan asked for Court of Arbitration. Without considering the set rules in the treaty, the World Bank initiated both processes simultaneously which was against the rules. World Bank had paused both the proceedings in 2016 and the pause was lifted in 2022 after Neutral Expert was appointed and panel for the Court of Aribitration was formed.
The foundation of India’s continued rejection
The 2022 letter remains the foundational articulation of India’s position on the matter of the Court of Arbitration. India explained in the letter that while it continues to fully cooperate with the Neutral Expert proceedings, it has boycotted the so-called Court of Arbitration. All subsequent statements issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, including its categorical rejection of the June 2025 Supplemental Award, have reiterated the same legal stance that India made explicitly in its first and last communication on the matter with the World Bank.
Pakistan’s arbitration request – A deliberate bypass of the Treaty’s dispute resolution framework
Looking at the history of Pakistan’s efforts to initiate arbitration under the Indus Waters Treaty, it formally began with the request for arbitration made on 19th August 2016. In February 2023, Pakistan sent an amended request for the same. Pakistan sought to escalate its objections to India’s Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects to a Court of Arbitration. India has seen the move as not only premature but also a deliberate violation of the Treaty’s sequential dispute resolution framework.
According to Article IX and Annexures F and G of the Treaty, parties must first engage in bilateral negotiations. If unresolved, technical disputes may be referred to a Neutral Expert. Only under specific circumstances, either when both parties agree or when the Neutral Expert explicitly states that the dispute lies outside his mandate, may arbitration be invoked. In this case, none of these preconditions were fulfilled, making Pakistan’s arbitration request not just flawed but entirely inadmissible under the Treaty’s rules.
In its 2016 request for arbitration, Pakistan alleged that India’s hydroelectric projects violated the Treaty’s provisions by including drawdown flushing and other design features that allegedly impacted Pakistan’s rights as a lower riparian state. It asserted that the matter involved legal interpretations and was therefore unsuitable for the Neutral Expert mechanism, which traditionally addresses technical disputes.
However, this claim was misleading on multiple fronts. The dispute was already before a Neutral Expert at Pakistan’s own request in 2015, and that process had not reached any conclusion. Furthermore, the features objected to by Pakistan, particularly drawdown flushing, had previously been adjudicated in the 2007 Kishenganga arbitration, which had ruled largely in India’s favour, validating its design approach under specific operational constraints.
Instead of waiting for the Neutral Expert’s assessment or exhausting bilateral avenues, Pakistan abruptly requested arbitration, undermining the very architecture of the Treaty. This dual-track approach was not only unprecedented but tactically motivated. Pakistan sought to create parallel legal forums to pressure India diplomatically and to confuse procedural timelines. It was an abuse of process dressed up as legal recourse.
In 2023, when Pakistan submitted the amended request, it argued that India’s continued work on the Kishenganga and Ratle projects constituted a breach of the Treaty’s core obligations. It claimed that the Court of Arbitration should adjudicate the legality of India’s project designs and went further to question India’s compliance with the previous decision of the 2007 tribunal. Notably, India had adjusted its Kishenganga project to align with the 2007 ruling, a fact that Pakistan conveniently ignored.
Crucially, Pakistan again refused to acknowledge the Neutral Expert mechanism, even though India was fully engaged in that process. The amended request ignored the fact that both parties had already appointed experts and that Pakistan had unilaterally walked out of site visits, an act of procedural sabotage intended to portray the technical process as dysfunctional, thereby justifying arbitration.
Pakistan’s actions were not those of a treaty-abiding party seeking resolution. Rather, they were part of a calculated legal offensive to internationalise a bilateral issue, generate political pressure, and delegitimise India’s sovereign rights over development in its own Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
India’s objections and the court’s arguments against them
India has firmly maintained that the Court of Arbitration was illegally constituted. It further asserted that the court has no authority to determine its own competence. India argued that, according to the Treaty, arbitration must follow only after exhausting the Neutral Expert route, which was not done.
India further objected that no valid dispute under Article IX(2) had arisen and that Pakistan’s procedural steps were flawed and premature. India also pointed out that when Pakistan initiated arbitration in 2016, the matter was already being examined under the Neutral Expert mechanism, making any parallel arbitration impermissible. Moreover, India questioned the legitimacy of the tribunal’s formation and claimed there was no “necessity” for arbitration under the Treaty framework.
However, the court rejected the objections and held that under Annexure G of the Treaty, it had the authority to rule on its own competence. It claimed that India’s original acceptance of the Treaty implicitly meant it accepted this clause. The court claimed that a dispute had arisen once the Commission failed to resolve the matter, and that no formal Neutral Expert request had been made by India before Pakistan’s arbitration move.
It also claimed that Pakistan’s actions fulfilled procedural requirements and that the tribunal’s composition was valid, noting that India’s delayed arbitrator appointments were still honoured. Regarding the “necessity” objection, the court stated that no such condition exists in Annexure G and that India’s later activation of the Neutral Expert process did not block the arbitration. The court dismissed India’s argument that parallel proceedings violated the Treaty, claiming both mechanisms could continue simultaneously.
The Court, interestingly, ignored the very structure and sequencing prescribed by the Indus Waters Treaty. Article IX and Annexures F and G clearly mandate a step-wise process. It should start with bilateral negotiation, followed by Neutral Expert determination for technical disputes, and arbitration only as a last resort.
The Court’s assertion that a dispute had arisen simply because the Commission failed to resolve it is misleading, as Pakistan had itself referred the matter to a Neutral Expert in 2015, and India had engaged in that process in good faith. At the time Pakistan initiated arbitration in 2016, no Neutral Expert determination had been made, nor had the Neutral Expert declared the dispute outside his mandate, as required under Annexure F(8)(a) for arbitration to be triggered.
The Court’s claim that India’s original acceptance of the Treaty meant automatic consent to any arbitration defies the conditional framework of Article IX(6). The Treaty explicitly prohibits simultaneous proceedings, and Pakistan’s move to initiate arbitration while the Neutral Expert process was ongoing amounted to forum shopping and procedural sabotage.
The Court’s defence of its own competence by citing Annexure G(16) fails, as that clause applies only to a lawfully constituted tribunal, a status India never recognised due to the procedural violation. Thus, the Court’s arguments rest on a selective reading of the Treaty and disregard both its text and spirit.
Conclusion
In conclusion, India’s stand on the so-called Court of Arbitration is rooted in law, logic, and treaty integrity. Pakistan’s repeated attempts to bypass the agreed dispute resolution process reflect not a quest for justice but a tactic to internationalise a bilateral issue and obstruct India’s sovereign development rights. By refusing to legitimise a flawed and politically motivated process, India has upheld both the spirit and the structure of the Indus Waters Treaty.
