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Smriti Irani’s big comeback in BJP 3.0: Why the party has brought its ‘giant killer’ back ahead of UP polls

On Monday, August 17, the Bharatiya Janata Party unveiled its new national team under party president Nitin Nabin. Among the most significant appointments was that of Irani, who has been brought back into the BJP’s national organisation as one of its eight national general secretaries. The new team also includes several experienced political operators, signalling a significant organisational reset as the BJP prepares for a fresh electoral cycle.

Irani’s return is particularly significant because she is not merely another former minister being accommodated in the party organisation. She is one of the BJP’s most recognisable political campaigners, a former Union Cabinet minister and, above all, the politician who once delivered one of the most politically humiliating defeats to the Gandhi family.

And there is a reason her return is attracting attention in Uttar Pradesh.

The Amethi factor

Smriti Irani’s political association with Uttar Pradesh began with a defeat.

In 2014, she took on Rahul Gandhi in Amethi, then one of the Congress party’s most formidable strongholds. She lost, but instead of treating the constituency as a one-election contest, Irani continued to cultivate her presence there.

She returned repeatedly, interacted with local workers and maintained a political presence in the constituency. That persistence eventually produced one of the defining upsets of the 2019 Lok Sabha election.

Rahul Gandhi had represented Amethi since 2004. The constituency had long been associated with the Gandhi family and was widely regarded as one of Congress’ safest political territories.

Then came Smriti Irani.

In 2019, Irani polled 4,68,514 votes, defeating Rahul Gandhi, who secured 4,13,394 votes, by 55,120 votes.

The significance of that victory went far beyond the 55,120-vote margin. Irani had defeated the sitting Congress president in a constituency that had been synonymous with the Gandhi family for decades.

The victory transformed her political stature almost overnight.

She was no longer merely the BJP’s high-profile television personality-turned-politician. She had become the BJP’s quintessential “giant killer”, a leader capable of taking on the Congress’ most prominent political family on its home turf.

From Amethi to the Union Cabinet

Irani’s rise after 2014 was equally remarkable.

She served in several important Union portfolios, including Human Resource Development, Textiles and Women and Child Development. By the second Modi government, she had become one of the most prominent women in the Union Cabinet.

Her political trajectory was unusual even by Indian political standards: from television’s hugely popular Tulsi Virani to a BJP organisational leader, Lok Sabha MP and Union Cabinet minister.

But the 2024 Lok Sabha election changed the equation.

Irani lost Amethi to Congress candidate Kishori Lal Sharma, a long-time Gandhi family loyalist. Sharma secured 5,39,228 votes, while Irani polled 3,72,032, defeating her by 1,67,196 votes.

The defeat was a major reversal.

The politician who had once wrested Amethi from Rahul Gandhi had now lost the same constituency to a Congress candidate closely associated with the Gandhi family.

After the defeat, Irani receded from the national political spotlight. She was no longer in the Union Cabinet and was not part of the BJP’s central organisational structure.

But that did not mean she had abandoned politics.

The politician who did not really leave Uttar Pradesh

This is perhaps the most important part of the BJP’s latest decision.

While Irani was less visible nationally after 2024, her political connection with Amethi and Uttar Pradesh did not simply disappear.

Even after losing the Lok Sabha election, she continued to remain associated with developments in Amethi. On Monday itself, just as her return to the BJP’s national team was announced, Irani shared an update concerning the redevelopment of Gauriganj railway station in Amethi, presenting it as part of the Modi government’s development agenda.

That matters because the BJP’s organisational politics is not built exclusively around elected office.

A leader can lose an election and still retain political value if he or she has a strong network of workers, familiarity with local political structures and the ability to communicate the party’s message to voters.

Irani possesses all three.

Her political career in Uttar Pradesh was built on precisely this model: contest, lose, remain present, build, return and eventually win.

That history makes her particularly relevant as the BJP prepares for another battle in Uttar Pradesh.

Why Uttar Pradesh matters so much

The timing of Irani’s elevation is difficult to separate from the political importance of Uttar Pradesh.

The state sends 80 MPs to the Lok Sabha and remains one of the central pillars of national electoral politics. The 2024 Lok Sabha election, however, exposed vulnerabilities in the BJP’s Uttar Pradesh organisation.

The BJP won 33 seats in the state, while the broader NDA tally stood at 36. The opposition INDI bloc won 43 seats.

The next major test will be the Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, expected in 2027.

For the BJP, rebuilding its organisation in the state is therefore not simply about winning another election. It is about restoring the political momentum that helped the party dominate Uttar Pradesh in the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections and the 2017 and 2022 Assembly elections.

This is where Irani’s political profile becomes useful.

She knows the state’s political landscape. She has personally fought one of its most high-profile electoral battles. She has spent years interacting with party workers and voters in Amethi. And unlike purely organisational functionaries, she can also campaign aggressively on the public stage.

Why bring Smriti Irani back now?

There are several possible reasons behind the BJP’s decision.

First, she brings electoral credibility.

Irani has already demonstrated that she can turn a seemingly impossible contest into a victory. The 2019 Amethi election remains one of the clearest examples of a BJP challenger successfully dismantling a Congress bastion. That experience can be valuable in a state where the BJP will have to fight intensely for every constituency.

Second, she brings grassroots experience.

Irani’s political story in Amethi was not built around parachuting into the constituency during election season. Her 2019 victory followed years of political engagement after her 2014 defeat.

That ability to remain connected to a constituency even after losing an election is particularly important for a party seeking to strengthen its booth-level organisation.

Third, she remains an exceptionally effective communicator.

The BJP’s organisational apparatus needs people who can work behind the scenes, but it also needs leaders who can take the party’s message directly to voters.

Irani belongs to the latter category.

She is a combative speaker, an experienced campaigner and a politician who has spent years operating at the intersection of television, electoral politics and government.

The women voter equation

There is another reason Irani’s elevation makes political sense.

Women voters have become increasingly important to the BJP’s electoral strategy. Welfare programmes such as Ujjwala, Swachh Bharat and Jal Jeevan Mission, along with various direct-benefit schemes, have helped the party establish a significant connect with women beneficiaries.

Irani’s profile fits naturally into that political narrative.

She is a former president of the BJP Mahila Morcha, a former Union minister for Women and Child Development and one of the party’s most recognisable female leaders.

Her return therefore gives the BJP another high-profile woman leader who can communicate directly with female voters while also operating as a broader political campaigner.

The BJP’s new national team itself places considerable emphasis on representation, with 10 women finding positions in the restructured national organisation.

A different kind of organisational general secretary

Irani’s appointment is also interesting because of what she is not.

She is not primarily known as a backroom organisational strategist in the mould of leaders who spend their careers building party structures away from the spotlight.

Her strength is different.

She is a mass-facing political leader.

The BJP has simultaneously brought several experienced organisational hands into prominent positions. Leaders such as Sunil Bansal, Vinod Tawde and Satish Poonia bring extensive experience of managing party structures and electoral campaigns.

Irani adds something different to that combination: visibility, political aggression and name recognition.

That combination could become particularly useful in Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP will have to contend with the Congress’ attempts to rebuild its organisation and the broader opposition alliance.

The Rahul Gandhi factor

There is also an unmistakable political symbolism in bringing Irani back.

Rahul Gandhi remains one of the Congress’ principal national faces. And Smriti Irani is the BJP leader who famously defeated him in Amethi in 2019.

The Congress subsequently reclaimed Amethi in 2024, but the memory of the 2019 contest remains politically potent.

The BJP can therefore deploy Irani not merely as another campaigner but as a living reminder of the party’s ability to challenge the Congress leadership on its own ground.

That symbolism could become particularly useful if the BJP’s political contest with Congress intensifies in Uttar Pradesh.

Her television comeback made her visible again, but politics remained the bigger story

Interestingly, Irani’s public profile began rising again before Monday’s organisational appointment.

In 2025, she returned to television as Tulsi Virani in the reboot of Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi, reprising the role that had made her a household name.

But Irani herself made it clear at the time that the television comeback did not represent a retirement from politics. In an interview discussing her return to television, she said that politics would always remain part of her life.

A year later, the BJP has now demonstrated exactly what that meant.

The television comeback may have brought Tulsi Virani back into Indian living rooms.

The BJP’s latest decision brings Smriti Irani back into the political war room.

BJP 3.0’s message from Uttar Pradesh

The larger message from the reshuffle is that the BJP appears to be preparing well in advance for the battles ahead.

The party has not simply brought back one former minister. It has assembled a national team combining experienced political leaders, organisational strategists, regional faces and high-visibility campaigners. The official announcement includes 13 national vice-presidents, eight national general secretaries and 16 national secretaries.

Within that architecture, Smriti Irani has a very specific political utility.

She knows what it means to fight Congress in Uttar Pradesh.

She knows what it means to lose there.

She knows what it means to keep working after losing.

And, most importantly, she knows what it means to defeat a Gandhi in Amethi.

Her 2024 defeat may have temporarily pushed her out of the BJP’s central spotlight. But it did not erase the political capital she accumulated over the previous decade.

Now, with the BJP preparing for the next Uttar Pradesh battle, that political capital is being put back to work.

Smriti Irani’s return is therefore not simply a comeback.

It is a message.

The BJP has decided that the woman who once broke the Gandhi family’s hold over Amethi still has a role to play in rebuilding the party’s political machine in Uttar Pradesh.

Whether that translates into electoral gains in 2027 will depend on the BJP’s broader organisation, alliances, candidate selection and voter sentiment.

But one thing is already clear: Smriti Irani is back where the BJP believes she can make the most difference, in the political fight.

The former Union minister’s elevation as BJP national general secretary is more than an organisational reshuffle. With Uttar Pradesh heading towards a crucial Assembly election, the party appears keen to bring back a leader whose political identity is deeply intertwined with the state, and whose biggest electoral achievement came from defeating Rahul Gandhi in his family’s traditional bastion of Amethi.

For Smriti Irani, the political comeback has now come full circle.

Is ‘Dimagi Naxal Party’ another front of AAP-linked Cockroach Janta Party? Here is what we found

It has now become a trend to create a party out of random remarks. The left-liberal ecosystem appears to have taken Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s latest remark so personally that, within a day, another satirical political outfit appeared online. A page named “Dimagi Naxal Party” (@dimaginaxalpartyy) has emerged after PM Modi used the term “dimaagi Naxals” in his Independence Day speech. The page presents itself as a satirical political party. 

The immediate trigger was PM Modi’s Independence Day address from the Red Fort on Saturday, 15th August. While speaking about Left-Wing Extremism, Modi said that armed Naxalism had been weakened but that its ideological influence still remained a concern. He warned against what he called “dimagi Naxals” and said such people needed to be identified and isolated. “LWE extremism destroyed the future of lakhs of youths. Naxal violence and ideology snatched the children of so many mothers,” Modi said, adding that Naxal violence had controlled large parts of the country for decades and had “ruled by the gun.”

Soon after the speech, the phrase became a subject of political debate and online reactions. Within this atmosphere, the Dimagi Naxal Party appeared on Instagram. Like many internet-born political pages, the outfit seems to have turned a political phrase into a brand, using the same words that were used by the Prime Minister and presenting them as the identity of a satirical movement. The page has not publicly established itself as a registered political party, and its founders have so far remained away from the public spotlight.

From “Cockroach” remark to Cockroach Janta Party

The method is not entirely new. The AAP-linked Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) was created in almost the same manner. The CJP emerged after a controversy over remarks made by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant during a courtroom hearing. His comments about unemployed people entering professions such as law, journalism and activism triggered a major social-media debate. The CJI later clarified that he was referring to people who posed as professionals despite having bogus degrees, rather than legitimate lawyers, journalists or activists.

The controversy was picked up by Abhijeet Dipke, who posted on social media asking, “What if all the cockroaches come together?” The post quickly gained traction, following which Dipke created a website and launched the satirical Cockroach Janta Party on May 16, 2026. The CJP described itself as a “political party for the people the system forgot to count” and the “voice of the lazy and unemployed”. Its tongue-in-cheek eligibility criteria included being “unemployed”, “lazy”, “chronically online” and having the “ability to rant professionally”.

What began as an online joke soon moved beyond memes. Dipke returned to India and the organisation became associated with protests in Delhi over alleged examination irregularities and demands concerning the education system. The group also appointed public-facing spokespersons, including investigative journalist Saurav Das, political researcher and filmmaker Vijeta Dahiya, and Ashutosh Ranka.

Is Dimagi Naxal Party another CJP front?

The Dimagi Naxal Party, however, has not revealed the faces of its founder or co-founder. Yet, its social-media activity provides some clues about the political and ideological ecosystem with which it appears to be engaging.

The Instagram account is currently following 38 pages and individuals. Among them are the Cockroach Janta Party, its founder Abhijeet Dipke, CJP chief spokesperson Saurav Das, spokesperson Ashutosh Ranka, former spokesperson Vijeta Dahiya, and Arpit Sharma, who has been identified in social-media discussions as the son of an AAP leader. The presence of several CJP-linked individuals in the following list is notable because it creates a visible overlap between the two internet-born political outfits.

Furthermore, the party follows various individuals who were openly making objectionable remarks during the CJP-backed Jantar Mantar protests or actively extending support to the movement. The account follows YouTuber Dhruv Rathee, who openly backed the CJP demonstration. 

It follows Bollywood actress Sonakshi Sinha, who rarely commented on political issues in the past year, but posted a video looking noticeably thrilled right after Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation. Stand-up comedian Kunal Kamra is also present on the following list; Kamra was seen making controversial jokes about Lord Ram and Goddess Sita during the CJP gathering at Jantar Mantar. 

South Indian actor and propagandist Prakash Raj is another notable account followed by the DNP. He is the same actor who faced backlash for mocking the Chandrayaan-3 mission, and whose name also surfaced during the controversies involving Dharmasthala. Additionally, left-liberal student activist and president of the communist student outfit AISA, Neha Bora, is followed by the party.

Taken together, the following list gives the impression that the Dimagi Naxal Party is drawing from a similar political-social media ecosystem as the CJP. Whether that makes it an actual “front” of CJP is not established, but the overlap is certainly significant enough to raise questions about the relationship between the two outfits.

Bhagat Singh post and Vijeta Dahiya connection

The page has also attempted to establish an ideological identity. On Instagram and X, it shared a post featuring freedom fighter Bhagat Singh with the words, “Bhagat Singh Inspiration of party.” The accompanying caption said: “We are Followers of Bhagat Singh… If THEY try to suspend our accounts or label us Anti-Nationals.. Just know- They are disrespecting Bhagat Singh.”

Interestingly, the post was published in collaboration with former CJP spokesperson Vijeta Dahiya. Dahiya is a political researcher, author, poet, filmmaker and content creator. He studied at Delhi Technological University and has directed Haryanvi films including Dararein and Opri Parai. He has also authored Power of Universe and To Hell With That Job. His public profile is particularly associated with his work as a researcher and scriptwriter for YouTuber Dhruv Rathee. Multiple profiles and interviews identify Dahiya as part of Rathee’s research and writing team.

Dahiya’s association with the CJP itself was short-lived. He was appointed one of its spokespersons in June, alongside Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka. However, on 21st July, CJP removed him after a video circulated showing him eating a burger during the period of the organisation’s protest. Dahiya later said he had been “made a scapegoat” in the controversy.

The fact that the anonymous Dimagi Naxal Party collaborated with Dahiya while also following almost the entire visible CJP leadership has added another layer to speculation surrounding the page.

Following the CJP playbook

The broader pattern is difficult to miss. CJP began with a viral remark, converted the controversy into a political identity and then attracted a network of activists, influencers, political commentators and protesters. The Dimagi Naxal Party appears to be following a similar route: take a political phrase, turn it into a satirical party name, build an online identity and connect it with personalities already active in anti-government or protest politics.

The CJP itself became closely associated with the protests in Delhi over alleged examination irregularities and the demand for political accountability. The group’s Jantar Mantar mobilisation brought together social-media personalities and activists, while its digital campaign expanded rapidly. The Indian Express reported that Dahiya was brought into the CJP team through his connection with Dhruv Rathee, while Dipke already knew other members of the core group.

The AAP connection behind CJP

A closer look underlines the direct connection between AAP and CJP. The party was launched by Abhijeet Dipke, an active political operator who served directly within the Aam Aadmi Party‘s social media core. In a past social media post, Dipke claimed, “The cockroaches have awakened!” portraying the movement as a spontaneous youth uprising. However, this raises serious concerns, as opposition networks have repeatedly tried to ignite Gen-Z-led street protests in India targeting the central government, mimicking political upheavals seen in neighboring nations. CJP’s website claims to represent “a political party for the people the system forgot to count” and calls itself the “voice of the lazy and unemployed,” declaring, “They tried to step on us. We came back.”

At first glance, the Cockroach Janta Party might look like just another meme page born out of social media outrage. But examining its founder’s political affiliations and manifesto reveals that the satire serves as a calculated vehicle for anti-BJP and anti-institutional narratives. The party capitalised on the CJI’s court remarks where he mentioned “jobless” youth entering professions like law or activism as “parasites.” The CJP platform welcomed anyone who was “lazy,” “chronically online,” and ready to “rant professionally.”

However, its actual manifesto lays bare its political agenda: demanding that no retired CJI be given a Rajya Sabha seat, calling for the arrest of the Chief Election Commissioner under UAPA if any legitimate vote is deleted, and attacking the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise. 

The manifesto also demands 50% reservation for women in Parliament without expanding seat counts, a direct challenge to the planned delimitation exercise, and calls for cancelling the broadcast licenses of major media houses while investigating “Godi media” anchors. Beneath the comedic surface, the entire setup systematically advances opposition talking points targeting the judiciary, Election Commission, media, and corporate sector.

Abhijeet Dipke is far from an independent or neutral web user who stumbled into politics. Reports from the 2020 Delhi Assembly elections explicitly identified the Pune native as a key strategist behind AAP’s social media overhaul, working directly under AAP IT media head Ankit Lal. 

He specialised in simplifying political propaganda for first-time voters using memes, pop-culture clips, and parody videos to promote “Brand Kejriwal” while attacking opponents. Reports from AAP’s election war room confirmed that Dipke was in charge of national social media coordination, managing trending hashtags like #DelhiWithKejriwal and monitoring rival handles.

Despite Dipke claiming on news channels that his association with AAP was limited strictly to 2020-2023, digital evidence proves otherwise. Resurfaced posts from 2018 show key AAP social media member Aarti Chadha tagging Dipke’s old handle (@aaptimist_) and praising him as a dedicated youth worker representing “an Arvind Kejriwal in all supporters.” 

Furthermore, as far back as June 2017, AAP member Hasan Safin publicly promoted Dipke as the “AAP Maharashtra SM in-charge.” These clear records completely debunk his claims of being an independent youth icon, proving that both CJP and the newly created Dimagi Naxal Party function as coordinated extensions of AAP’s political network.

The overlap between the two online outfits is striking. The anonymous Dimagi Naxal Party follows CJP’s founder, its leadership, its former spokesperson and several personalities associated with its protest ecosystem. Until the founders of the new page reveal themselves, the strongest available clue about its political orientation remains its own digital footprint, and that footprint points unmistakably towards the same ecosystem that helped turn the Cockroach Janta Party from a viral joke into a political pressure group.

Malvika Sharma asked about beef in Kerala: How the state’s Islamised media ecosystem normalises provocations against Hindus and mocks their faith

There is something deeply revealing about the question asked to actor Malvika Sharma during her first interaction with the Kerala media. She had travelled to the state to promote Khalifa, her Malayalam debut. Yet, barely minutes into the interaction, a reporter asked her: “Did you like beef?”

Malvika, visibly taken aback, replied that she was a vegetarian and therefore had not tried it. The exchange subsequently went viral. And the obvious question is: why was beef the question that a reporter thought was worth asking an actress who had come to Kerala to promote a film?

The question matters because it fits into a wider cultural pattern in Kerala: beef is not merely treated as food by sections of the political-media ecosystem; it is presented as a badge of secularism, progressivism and opposition to Hindu nationalism. The Malvika episode therefore looks less like an innocent food question and more like an attempt to normalise beef consumption as a cultural marker while putting a Hindu celebrity on the spot.

That is the real problem. The issue is not what another person chooses to eat. The issue is the deliberate cultural signalling involved in making beef the first question posed to a Maharashtra-born actress during a promotional interaction in Kerala, and then hoping her response could garner eyeballs and normalise the consumption of beef among Hindus.

When beef becomes an ideological performance

Modern digital media has discovered a simple formula: identify a cultural fault line, push a celebrity towards it, record the reaction and allow social media to do the rest. In Kerala, beef has long been weaponised in precisely this manner. It is portrayed not merely as cuisine but as a statement: eat beef, therefore you are progressive; object to it, therefore you are a “Sanghi”.

Perhaps the reporter wanted engagement. Perhaps the question was deliberately provocative. Either way, the outcome is the same: Hindu religious sentiment is converted into entertainment while beef consumption is presented as something that a Hindu celebrity ought to be asked to publicly account for.

Now reverse the question. Suppose a journalist had asked a celebrity in a public interaction whether he had eaten pork. Would the same people who are now silent have treated it as a harmless food question? Or would the familiar ecosystem of Left commentators, activists and social-media outrage merchants have descended upon the journalist, accusing him of communalism, bigotry and dehumanising Muslims?

The fact that there has been no comparable outrage over the Malvika episode tells us much about the selective standards of India’s self-styled secular ecosystem. When a Muslim’s religious sensitivities are perceived to have been touched, the outrage machinery can be immediate and ferocious. When the target is a Hindu, the same ecosystem often discovers the virtues of humour, free speech and “local culture”.

That is not principled secularism. It is a hierarchy of sensitivities in which Hindus are expected to keep their religious beliefs sacrosanct only in private, while public expressions of those beliefs are treated as obstacles to progressive politics.

Kerala’s media space is increasingly an ideological battlefield

There is a broader cultural phenomenon here that deserves discussion. Kerala’s media space is not ideologically neutral. Like the state’s politics, its media ecosystem contains strong ideological currents, including organisations and commentators influenced by Islamist politics. It would be intellectually dishonest to pretend that these currents have no influence on the way religion, identity and Hindu customs are discussed.

Beef has increasingly acquired a meaning far beyond food. It has become a political symbol used to mock Hindu reverence for the cow and to signal opposition to the BJP, the RSS and Hindutva. Beef-parotta is routinely presented in sections of the discourse as a badge of Kerala’s secular credentials, while Hindus who object to cow slaughter are caricatured as communal or backward.

This is precisely how cultural normalisation works. Repetition turns provocation into ordinary conversation. A Hindu’s discomfort is first mocked, then dismissed, then portrayed as proof of his alleged intolerance. Eventually, the very act of objecting to the mockery becomes the offence.

And the Malvika Sharma episode fits neatly into that pattern.

Kerala’s deeper problem with religious extremism

This discussion cannot be divorced from Kerala’s history of religious extremism. It is the same state where a Congress leader had slaughtered a cow to protest against the government’s notification to restrict the sale of cattle in the markets for slaughter purposes.

The most haunting example is Professor T.J. Joseph.

In 2010, Joseph, then a professor at Newman College in Thodupuzha, became the target of a brutal attack after a question he prepared for a college examination was interpreted by radical elements as insulting the Prophet Muhammad. On July 4, 2010, a group attacked him and chopped off his right hand. The subsequent investigation and prosecution established the involvement of members of the now-banned Popular Front of India (PFI).

The case was not merely an assault on one individual. It represented an attempt to enforce a religious verdict through violence.

In 2023, a Special NIA Court convicted six people in the second phase of the trial. Three—Sajil, M.K. Nasar and K.A. Najeeb—were sentenced to life imprisonment, while three others received three-year prison terms. The court described the violence as a terrorist act and said it amounted to an attempt to establish a parallel religious judicial system.

That is an important distinction.

Religious extremism is not merely about someone holding conservative beliefs. It becomes a grave threat when individuals believe their religious interpretation gives them the authority to punish another citizen outside the constitutional and legal system.

Joseph’s story is especially powerful because the physical attack was only one part of his suffering.

His English-language memoir, A Thousand Cuts: An Innocent Question and Deadly Answers, documents the consequences of the controversy and the isolation he experienced afterwards. Penguin describes the book as an account of a man who survived the attack but was subsequently deprived of his livelihood and isolated by his own community.

His wife Salomi eventually died by suicide in 2014, after years of financial, emotional and social turmoil surrounding the controversy.

Joseph’s own conclusion is perhaps more important than any political interpretation imposed upon his story: religious fundamentalism itself is the problem.

That lesson should not be selectively applied.

The T.J. Joseph case shows where unchecked religious extremism can lead

If Kerala’s media is genuinely committed to pluralism, it must confront religious extremism wherever it originates. The T.J. Joseph case remains one of the most disturbing reminders of what unchecked religious fanaticism can produce.

The Kerala media slanders a Hindu activist defending himself against political killings as extremist while contextualising violence perpetrated by Islamists belonging to banned PFI and other such organisations.

The ideological label should follow the conduct, not the religion of the perpetrator.

This is where the media’s vocabulary becomes important.

There is a growing tendency in ideological discourse to describe violence against Hindu nationalist activists primarily through the vocabulary of “political rivalry”, “clashes”, “local disputes” or “hooliganism”. Yet when the ideological motivation is Islamic extremism, sanitising the description serves nobody.

A media ecosystem that selectively applies these standards is not protecting society from extremism. It is protecting an ideological narrative from scrutiny.

Malvika Sharma was asked a question. The silence that followed is the bigger story

The most revealing part of the Malvika Sharma episode is not merely that the question was asked. It is the silence afterwards.

If a journalist had asked a celebrity whether he had consumed pork, the Left ecosystem would almost certainly have discovered its outrage vocabulary. The journalist would be branded communal, hateful, Islamophobic and worse. Social-media campaigns would follow. Think-piece after think-piece would explain why such a question was “dehumanising”.

But ask a Hindu-origin actress about beef within minutes of meeting her for a film promotion, and there is silence.

That silence exposes the double standard.

The same ecosystem that lectures Hindus about tolerance rarely asks why Hindus alone are expected to tolerate repeated provocations to their faith. A Hindu is expected to laugh when his religious symbols are mocked, remain silent when his festivals are stripped of their religious character, and demonstrate his liberal credentials by showing indifference to practices that offend his beliefs.

Meanwhile, religious boundaries asserted by other communities are often treated as matters requiring accommodation.

Consider the recent Nilavilakku controversy. IUML MLA Fathima Thahiliya was criticised after lighting a traditional lamp at a restaurant inauguration, while Samastha’s Central Mushawara said Muslims should refrain from participating in practices associated with other faiths and described such participation as religiously problematic.

That episode is revealing for another reason. Religious communities are entitled to preserve their doctrinal boundaries. But if one community’s religious boundaries are treated as legitimate while the majority’s religious sentiments are routinely subjected to ridicule, the result is not harmony. It is asymmetry.

This is why the Malvika Sharma episode cannot be dismissed as merely a silly question. It is symptomatic of a culture in which provoking Hindu sentiment has become a form of ideological performance.

The objective is not necessarily to make every Malayali eat beef. It is to make beef consumption culturally unremarkable, politically fashionable and, eventually, a weapon with which to taunt Hindus who refuse to treat the cow as merely another animal.

That is the larger ideological project.

And the Left’s silence is part of the story.

India’s secularism cannot survive if it demands that only Hindus constantly prove their liberal credentials by surrendering their religious sensitivities. A civilisation in which one community is repeatedly told to accommodate while its own beliefs are mocked is not becoming more tolerant. It is merely teaching one side that its sentiments do not matter.

The Malvika Sharma episode should therefore be remembered not because a reporter asked an awkward question, but because it exposes the cultural climate in which such a question could be considered normal, amusing or newsworthy in the first place.

Kerala’s media has every right to question politicians, actors and public figures. It has every right to challenge religious beliefs. But if it wants to claim the moral high ground of journalism, it must abandon the habit of treating Hindu sentiment as uniquely disposable.

Professor T.J. Joseph’s story reminds us of the end of religious intolerance: when accusations of blasphemy become a justification for physical violence. The Malvika episode is obviously nowhere near that level. But between violent extremism and a harmless joke lies a vast cultural territory where religious contempt can be normalised, one provocation at a time.

That is precisely why such incidents deserve scrutiny.

When a Hindu’s faith is repeatedly made into a punchline, the problem is not that Hindus have suddenly become too sensitive. The problem is that a section of India’s ideological establishment has become far too comfortable with attacking the very idea that Hindus are entitled to take their own faith seriously.

And instead of calling out dangerous Islamist extremism for what it is, the state’s media ecosystem has repeatedly cosseted and legitimised Islamists. This indulgence has only emboldened them to continue their increasingly depraved provocations, gradually creating a culture in which mocking and denigrating Hindus and their religious beliefs is treated as acceptable.

That is not pluralism. It is selective contempt dressed up as progressivism.

Linking rivers of India: Why it matters

Every year during the monsoon season, two contrasting realities emerge across India. While states like Assam, Bihar, and Eastern Uttar Pradesh face devastating floods that submerge farmland and cause structural losses worth thousands of crores, regions like Bundelkhand, Marathwada, and Western Rajasthan suffer from acute drought and severe water shortages. This recurring paradox reveals a fundamental truth about India’s geography: the nation does not suffer from an absolute shortage of water; the real crisis lies in water management.

In the first part of this series, author Shravan Shukla breaks down why the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) project is essential for India’s long-term water management goals. Overseen by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA), this massive infrastructure vision encompasses 30 inter-basin river links, divided into 14 Himalayan and 16 Peninsular components designed to balance the country’s water distribution.

The core philosophy of this mega-project is simple yet revolutionary. During the 100 to 120 days of the monsoon, billions of litres of surplus freshwater flow unchecked into the sea or unleash destructive floods. By constructing a national water grid of canals, reservoirs, and dams, this excess water can be captured and diverted to thirsty, drought-prone regions that crave every single drop for drinking and farming.

The report highlights that river interlinking is far more than an agricultural proposal; it is the bedrock of India’s future food, energy, and economic security. With India’s population expected to reach nearly 1.7 billion by 2050, securing water resources is a national imperative. Global models like China’s South-North Water Transfer Project and the California State Water Project in the United States have already proven that large-scale inter-basin water transfers can eliminate national-level water crises.

Beyond controlling annual floods and mitigating droughts, a fully realised national water grid offers multi-dimensional benefits. It promises to bring millions of hectares under reliable irrigation, generate thousands of megawatts of clean hydroelectricity, boost inland navigation, and help resolve decades-old interstate water disputes. Part 1 establishes why connecting India’s major river systems is the most crucial infrastructure goal of the 21st century.

The full article is available on Chapter One Mag.

UPI still climbing, The Wire still faking: Notorious fake news peddler claims decline in UPI use, data shows healthy growth

Habitual fake news peddler The Wire is back with another piece of fake news. This time, they have claimed that Indians have started to switch to cash from UPI after the parliament passed a bill allowing the centre to impose a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on some Unified Payments Interface (UPI) transactions. The Wire claimed, “data shows that these transactions have been slowing in the last five years, with cash flow increasing in the same period.”

The Wire report further claims, “UPI transactions have declined, according to data from the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI).” However, contrary to the claim, UPI transactions have not declined in the country. While the data shows that the rate of annual growth of UPI has been coming down, Wire changed that to a fall in UPI transactions.

Screenshot of the Wire report

The article by The Wire, published on 16 August 2026 and based on a The Hindu analysis from the previous day, asserts that UPI transactions have slowed while cash usage is increasing, linking this to the recent passage of the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, which enables the government to permit a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on certain UPI and RuPay transactions. The article implies a behavioural shift away from UPI “since” the announcement.

The reality of the fee

The entire claim made by left-wing propaganda portal The Wire is baseless, because no MDR on UPI has been imposed yet. The Bill is only an enabling provision that amends Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007. It removes the earlier statutory bar and allows the government, through future notification, to specify modes that may attract charges. The actual decision on whether to introduce MDR, on which transactions, at what rate and from when rests with the UPI and Services Steering Committee headed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). Nothing has changed on the ground for users or the vast majority of merchants.

Essentially, the bill itself does not levy any tax on digital payments; it merely removes a legal prohibition on levying such tax. This means that if the government decides to tax certain digital transactions in future, it can do so through a notification.

Moreover, the government has clarified repeatedly that even if the MDR is implemented, consumers will not face any charges. All person-to-person (P2P) transactions will remain free. Any MDR, if and when introduced, will apply only to a limited set of merchant transactions above a certain threshold, at a nominal rate far lower than existing MDRs for debit or credit cards. Only the merchants will have to pay the MDR when it is implemented, not the consumers.

Moreover, the government has clarified that the vast majority of merchant transactions will continue to remain free of charge. Industry estimates circulating around a possible ₹2,000 threshold for larger merchants indicate that only around 4-5% of person-to-merchant volume would be affected, meaning well over 95% of transactions by volume would stay untouched. Everyday payments for groceries, local transport, small purchases and transfers would be unaffected. The claim that people have already stopped using UPI because of a fee that has not been levied is therefore meaningless.

Payment Council of India (PCI), a trade body representing non-banking payment players, has also clarified that consumers will not be charged for making UPI payments. The council also clarified that small merchants and kirana stores will continue to accept UPI payments without paying any Merchant Discount Rate (MDR). It said protecting small businesses remains central to UPI’s inclusive growth model.

PCI further added that even if merchant service charges become applicable for certain large merchants in the future, such arrangements would be commercial agreements between merchants and payment service providers. They would not result in consumers being charged for making UPI payments. Merchant service charges are common across digital payment ecosystems worldwide and typically remain separate from consumer payment charges.

As per the latest data, 63% of UPI transaction volume is person‑to‑merchant (P2M) transactions, reflecting UPI’s extensive use for high‑frequency, low‑value retail payments. In contrast, person‑to‑person (P2P) transactions dominate transaction value, contributing 71%, indicating their use for higher‑ticket transfers between individuals. This contrast underscores UPI’s dual role as a mass retail payments platform and a trusted channel for larger‑value fund transfers.

86% of person‑to‑merchant transactions are valued below ₹500, highlighting UPI’s deep integration into routine retail and day-to-day commerce. People routinely use UPI to pay for a cup of tea or a pack of chips. Therefore, majority of merchant payments will not have any MDR if and when it is implemented, and P2P transactions will be completely exempt, regardless of the value.

Bill passed on 6 August, UPI data up to 9 August

An interesting fact is that The Hindu report uses UPI transaction data upto 9th August. On the other hand, the amendment to the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 was passed on 6th August. Therefore, if The Wire is to be believed, in just 3 days, Indians switched to cash from UPI after the bill was passed in Parliament.

What the data shows

The Wire claimed that the UPI transactions have declined, but the underlying data actually shows continued expansion of UPI, not a reduction in usage. The Hindu report, the basis of the Wire report, itself notes that the value of UPI transactions grew 133% in 2019-20, 95% in 2020-21 and 105% in 2021-22 before moderating to 20.3% in 2025-26 and further to 18.7% in 2026-27 so far (April-August). It further states that the growth rate of cash usage has also gone up in recent periods—from around 4% in 2023-24 to 6.5% in 2024-25, 12% in 2025-26 and nearly 13% as of 31 July 2026 (reaching ₹41.8 lakh crore).

However, UPI’s growth rate remains higher than that of cash, while absolute volumes and values keep rising. In July 2026 alone, UPI processed a record 23.66 billion transactions worth about ₹29.88 lakh crore, up roughly 22% in volume and 19% in value year-on-year. April-July 2026 volume growth stood at 23.5%. Full-year FY 2025-26 saw 24,162 crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore, with volume growth of 30% and value growth of about 20.6%.

Calling a still-healthy 18-20% growth “decline in UPI usage” is completely misleading. Of course, the growth rate is coming down every year, and that is expected. In the initial years, the UPI usage was low, and that’s why the growth rate was enormous, but such high rates can’t be sustained in the long term. Ten years ago, the UPI transaction value in 2026-17 was ₹6,952 crore, and in the last FY it was ₹314 lakh crore.

When the annual use is already enormous, percentage growth naturally moderates even as absolute numbers climb sharply. Early triple-digit rates reflected a low base after the launch of UPI in 2016. Sustaining three-digit or even high two-digit growth forever is mathematically impossible once the system processes tens of billions of transactions every month and accounts for the bulk of India’s digital payments. Growth is stabilising at a robust level consistent with a mature, high-penetration platform in a growing economy.

Along with UPI, the value of cash transactions is also increasing, and that is expected. Cash is not going away, govt is not planning it, at least not yet. The fact that usage of both cash and UPI is increasing at a healthy rate indicates a growing economy, where people are transacting more.

Both cash holdings and UPI volumes can rise simultaneously when nominal economic activity expands, prices adjust, and people hold more liquidity for precautionary or everyday reasons while also making more digital payments. This is not evidence of substitution away from UPI to cash; it is evidence of a larger overall payments pie.

It is also notable that The Hindu’s 18.7% figure for August 2026 is also potentially misleading. The month is not yet over, and full-month data cannot yet exist. Therefore, any comparison based on partial August figures (Upto 9th August) cannot be treated as definitive for the entire period. Year-to-date trends through July already showed solid double-digit growth.

The UPI Growth Story

Since its launch in 2016-17, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has transformed India’s digital economy into one of the most inclusive and dynamic payment ecosystems in the world. What began as a bold experiment in real-time, interoperable payments has now become a global benchmark, processing billions of transactions every month and reaching deep into the fabric of everyday life. Today, UPI has grown into the world’s largest real-time payment system.

UPI’s trajectory from its introduction underscores why high early growth rates were never going to persist indefinitely. NPCI launched the system on 11 April 2016 with 21 member banks as a real-time, interoperable platform for inter-bank transfers using a simple mobile interface. Adoption was modest at first. Demonetisation later that year provided an early push, followed by the rollout of BHIM and progressive integration by major apps and banks. From just a few crore transactions and negligible value in the initial years, volumes exploded. Annual transactions rose from around 2 crore in FY 2016-17 to over 24,162 crore in FY 2025-26, an almost 12,000-fold increase, while value climbed more than 4,000-fold to ₹314 lakh crore.

By 2025-26, the platform was handling average daily volumes of around 66 crore transactions. Banks live on UPI now exceed 700. This explosive phase was powered by network effects, zero-MDR policy from 2020, QR code proliferation and deep smartphone and internet penetration. Once a system reaches this scale and becomes the default for everyday retail payments, growth rates settle into the tens or low twenties while absolute usage keeps expanding with the economy. That is precisely the phase India is in now.

The Wire’s headline and narrative invert this reality. A modest deceleration in the rate of growth is presented as people using UPI less, a fee that has not been imposed is treated as the cause, and the simultaneous rise in cash, itself slower than UPI’s growth, is cast as a switch. The data from NPCI and RBI show UPI still expanding robustly, cash rising alongside a growing economy, and no behavioural retreat from digital payments triggered by an enabling Bill. The report therefore peddles an inaccurate and alarmist interpretation rather than a careful reading of the numbers.

It is notable that the fake news by Wire on UPI comes when the Indian payments system is going global. The system is already operational in several countries, including the UAE, Singapore, France, Qatar and others. The next decade of UPI is poised to drive even greater transformation in India’s digital payments landscape. Therefore, it is typical of anti-India portal The Wire to create negativity around the UPI system.

UPI is a national achievement built by Indians, for Indians. The Government has repeatedly said that it will continue to promote and fund the system in future.

The Wire and fake news

The Wire has a well-documented record of publishing sensational claims that later collapse under scrutiny, forcing it to delete stories and issue apologies. Two of the most prominent examples illustrate this pattern clearly. In January 2022, the portal ran a multi-part “investigation” claiming the existence of a sophisticated, secretive app called Tek Fog, allegedly used by operatives linked to the BJP to manipulate social media trends, amplify propaganda, hijack WhatsApp accounts and systematically harass journalists and critics. The reports presented technical screenshots, supposed whistleblower accounts and complex diagrams as proof. Independent examination, including detailed fact-checks by OpIndia, showed the claims were based on fabricated or unverifiable material, no such app existed, and the technical evidence did not hold up.

The Meta-Instagram episode that followed later the same year proved even more damaging. In October 2022, The Wire published reports asserting that Meta had granted BJP IT cell head Amit Malviya special privileges under its XCheck programme, allowing him to get Instagram and Facebook posts removed “with no questions asked.” The stories relied on purported internal emails, screenshots and technical claims. Meta and several people quoted by The Wire publicly stated that the documents and emails published by the portal were fabricated. After an “internal review” following the exposure on social media, The Wire formally retracted the articles, claimed it had been “subjected to deception” by a member of its own investigation team, deleted the reports, and issued a public apology to readers for failing basic editorial standards on technical verification.

When the portal’s later Meta coverage unravelled, The Wire also quietly removed the Tek Fog series from public view, citing an internal review because one of the key authors was also involved in the Meta stories.

These were not minor errors or differences of interpretation. In both cases the core claims were false, the supporting material did not withstand independent scrutiny, and the portal was compelled to erase the stories and apologise. The pattern of publishing high-impact, politically charged narratives on the basis of shaky or fabricated technical evidence, only to retract when exposed, continues to undermine The Wire’s credibility whenever it makes similar sweeping claims.

Dalit Rapido driver suspended for 100 years after he created a ruckus over ‘caste slurs’ by passengers: How he made up a story to get famous, falsely accusing Dalit passengers

On the 15th of August, a video surfaced in which a Rapido taxi driver was seen screaming at and abusing his passengers, claiming that they had hurled casteist abuse in their conversation about their own senior. The passengers were railway employees who were allegedly talking about their superior. The video from Lucknow was first posted by Piyush Rai, who claims to be a journalist. He wrote, “A Dalit cab driver, Ankit Kumar (30), confronted four Indian Railways employees in Lucknow after they allegedly repeatedly used casteist slurs while referring to a senior officer from his community. He later asked all four employees to deboard the cab midway”.

On the same day, Piyush Rai posted another video where the cab driver was seen narrating the incident. He starts his video with ‘Jai Bhim’. In the video, the Rapido driver claims that he has no religious, cultural or caste-based sentiments against the passengers he threw out of his cab. He claimed he was not even aware of the passengers’ caste. However, he claims that the passengers were specifically targeting one caste in their conversation. Ankit Kumar says that, because he hails from the same caste, he asked the passengers several times to refrain from targeting that community; however, they did not heed his request. In his video, he further claims that Rapido suspended him for 100 years without asking him for his version.

The incident drew widespread reactions, with the usual Ambedkarite trope being spewed on the internet. The selective framing of the incident was used by many to abuse Hindus and Hinduism, and also by many Muslims to demand a “Muslim Atrocity Bill”, claiming that Dalits could file SC/ST cases when they face abuse; however, Muslims do not have similar laws to “protect them”.

Congress functionaries also commented on the issue, outraged.

The truth, however, was very different from what Piyush Rai was projecting. After these two videos, Rai did not publish any other information which revealed the truth about the case, making it a classic case of spreading motivated misinformation.

What the truth of the case was: Dalit passengers open up, reveal how Rapido driver Ankit Kumar lied

Hours after Piyush Rai posted Ankit Kumar’s video, journalist Brajbhushan Markandey posted a long interview with the passengers, in which they revealed that they were themselves Dalit and that the Rapido driver had lied blatantly.

He wrote, “Wanted to implement the SC/ST Act! The claim turned out to be the opposite! The victims’ side is shocking! They were four railway employees who booked a Rapido! The Dalit Rapido driver stopped the vehicle and shouted loudly in an aggressive tone! These four people are repeatedly seen shouting while calling them Manuvadi, and it is being observed that they have used caste-related words! The crowd gathers, and then what happens… The special thing is that three of these four people were from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and one person was from Backwards Classes! These railway employees, with their great sense of judgment, stopped a big commotion while a major accident could have happened! If such reactions and the misuse of SC/ST will continue without any reason, where will society go? The four experienced individuals who were present in the discussion themselves had requested to come on our channel so that the truth could be told to society!”

The passengers said that they themselves belonged to the Dalit community and denied having used casteist slurs in their conversation. They also said that Ankit Kumar randomly stopped the cab and started picking a fight with them. He started the video with the casteist slur, and it was at that moment they understood that he aimed to ensure that the passengers were trapped in an SC/ST Atrocities case by making the video viral.

Interestingly, in the original video posted by Piyush Rai, one passenger is also heard saying that he himself is a Dalit; however, Rai did not highlight that aspect of the video.

One passenger in the interview also revealed that Ankit Kumar was calling others on the phone to reach the spot, potentially to incite unrest. “We would have been in serious danger if people were of that mentality and had been influenced by Ankit Kumar”, the passenger said.

3 out of 4 passengers were Dalits

Journalist Brajbhushan Markandey, in his opening remarks, made an interesting observation. That the way the video by Ankit Kumar was framed, and how it was presented on the internet, gave the impression that the passengers probably belonged to general castes and were using casteist slurs against Dalits. Ankit, however, was unaware that 3 of the 4 passengers he threw out of his taxi were Dalit themselves.

How the incident unfolded – what the passengers said

The incident is from the 10th of August. According to one of the passengers, who is a Dalit, the 4 of them were discussing the merits of taking an Ola/Uber ride rather than owning a car. The conversation was about how taxis for hire are far more convenient, since one does not have to pay road tax, tolls, or car servicing costs. Even if one has to travel a bit far, taxis are far more convenient.

The passenger says that they then started discussing how the Railways has now started giving leave to its employees, which was not the case earlier. During that conversation, the group discussed how leave becomes difficult when they receive an insensitive “Triple-C”.

It is this statement that was misunderstood, deliberately or otherwise, by Ankit Kumar, the Rapido driver. He believed that “Triple-C” was a casteist reference, when in reality, Triple-C is a post in the Railways equivalent to an HR manager.

The passenger alleges that after this conversation, Ankit stopped the car and started becoming aggressive. He switched on his camera and started recording the incident.

He also revealed that Ankit started calling people, threatening to commit violence.

Another passenger confirmed the incident and said that right after stopping the car, Ankit Kumar first called someone on the phone, asking them to come to the location.

In another shocking revelation, the second passenger said that when Ankit switched his camera on, he first pointed it towards him. When he did so and started accusing them of using caste slurs, the passenger told him that he was from the SC community as well. At that point, he turned the camera towards a different passenger.

This reveals that the driver actually knew that the group he was accusing had members who were Dalits, and yet proceeded to accuse them of using anti-Dalit slurs.

“The moment he started recording, he started by using the slur (that we had not used). That very moment I knew that he was trying to stir trouble”, the passenger said. “While I understood, those sitting at the back did not understand his motives. They had also done night duty, so were taken aback by the aggression. He kept abusing”, he added.

A third passenger said during the interview that he aimed to get famous, since he has his own YouTube channel.

The fourth passenger said that when Ankit started accusing them, he told him that they also believe in Dr Ambedkar since they were Dalits; however, Ankit did not heed and kept accusing them.

“He created a lynching type of situation”

The passenger says that even when Ankit Kumar was screaming and becoming aggressive with them, they had told him that they too belonged to the SC and ST communities; however, the Rapido driver did not bother listening.

Further, the passenger claims that the crowd that had gathered there was also trying to stop Ankit, saying that he had no right to create a ruckus based on some private conversation among passengers.

“We were very scared. We were lucky that the crowd over there had good people; otherwise, Ankit had created a lynching sort of situation”, the passenger said.

“Differences are disappearing, but such incidents will increase the caste divide”, says passenger

One of the passengers, who is himself a Dalit, said that society was becoming far more egalitarian. Discriminatory practices are disappearing; however, such incidents would only deepen the caste divide.

“We were Dalits. But if we belonged to General Caste, I can’t even imagine what the driver would have done to us”, the passenger said. “Even though we belong to the SC/ST community, we got scared by his aggression. He just imagined the insult and forced it on us”, he added.

Another passenger insinuated that Ankit was trained in creating such a scene to go viral. “He first said that he was a lone Dalit fighting against 4 Manuvaadis. Then he started saying that he was tolerating our supposed caste abuse quietly for a long time. Then changed his statement to claim that he kept requesting us not to use the caste slur, but we did not listen. Then he started telling us about the SC/ST Act. Such people need to understand and stop trying to play the victim. We work in a profession where all castes work as equals. Such elements should not try to create strife”, he said.

Worrying trend of Ambedkarite activism

This incident underlines a worrying trend in modern politics – the rise of dangerous Ambedkarite activism which has crossed over from assertion of identity pride to aggressive posturing and the active persecution of non-Dalits, in some frenzied vengeance over real, as well as imaginary and exaggerated historical grievances.

There have been several cases where those chanting ‘Jai Bhim’ have falsely accused non-Dalits of indulging in casteist behaviour, inciting hate and, on several occasions, violence.

In April 2026, an Instagram influencer was assaulted by Ambedkarite goons simply because he questioned the degrees of Dr Ambedkar. In April, a video from Amravati, Maharashtra, went viral on social media, where a group of Ambedkarite activists (Bhim Tola) were seen beating up an influencer identified as Dev. His mistake was that he had questioned the claims of 32 degrees earned by Dr BR Ambedkar in one of his videos, which has now been deleted. The assault video had a background song, making it hard to understand what the activists were saying and what Dev said in reply. However, he was seen folding his hands and apologising. By the end of the video, police were seen standing while Ambedkarites continued to intimidate Dev. Later, Dev was forced to publish a video apologising to the followers of Dr Ambedkar if he had hurt their feelings. In truth, according to a PIB press release from 2024, Dr BR Ambedkar had five degrees and two honorary degrees, making the total seven. There is no official source that can support the claim of 32 degrees.

In April 2025, in the Shirur area of Maharashtra’s Pune district, a youth was attacked over a social media post on Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar. The incident unfolded near Nakshatra Building in the evening when a 24-year-old Vaibhav Santosh Bhosale, a resident of Pawar Mala, was attacked by the accused Roshan Devre and three others. A case has been registered against the four accused at the Shirur Police Station on the victim Vaibhav Bhosale’s complaint. The police said the accused created a fake social media account in the complainant’s name and posted objectionable content against Dr Ambedkar on the Bhimsena Maharashtra Group. Under the pretext of resolving the dispute they created, the accused called Vaibhav to meet them; however, the accused assaulted the complainant.

Another troubling incident from February 2026 was when journalist Ruchi Tiwari was assaulted in the DU Campus.

In the North Campus of Delhi University, a pro-UGC protest took a disturbing turn on 13th February 2026. A journalist, Ruchi Tiwari, associated with the YouTube channel ‘Breaking Opinion’, was mercilessly assaulted by caste activists, including Leftist elements. The incident took place at the Arts Faculty when the Brahmin woman had gone to cover the protests by SC-ST-OBC activists.

The protest was organised by left-wing student groups like the Students’ Federation of India (SFI), All India Students’ Association (AISA), and the newly formed All India Forum for Equity. The protestors demanded the implementation of the University Grants Commission (2026) “Promotion of Equity in Higher Educational Institutions” regulations, stayed by the Supreme Court. The caste discrimination-related guidelines have caused significant outrage over the 2026 regulation, which ruled out the general castes as victims of caste-based violence by restricting the category of victims to SCs, STs, and OBCs.

Amidst the tensions among student groups in Delhi University, YouTuber Ruchi Tiwari had arrived on campus to cover the pro-UGC protests. However, she was soon surrounded and cornered by a pro-UGC mob comprising 50-100 men and women. It has been alleged that upon learning her surname “Tiwari”, a common Brahmin identifier, several among the mob shouted phrases like “Yeh Brahmin hai, isko pakdo” (She is a Brahmin, catch her). A man can be heard saying in a video, “mar isko pata chalega” (beat her, she will learn a lesson). Another voice was saying repeatedly ‘Koi bol na dena yahan pe, kaat ke phenk denge” (Don’t say a word here, or else we’ll cut and throw you). Someone said the protests were peaceful when she appeared.

These three cases are merely indicative of the malaise that has overtaken Ambedkarite activism, where the assault, vilification, and persecution of non-Dalits, merely for a difference of opinion and, more often than not, merely for their non-Dalit identity, has become a feature rather than a bug. The incident of Ankit Kumar falsely accusing the passengers of hurling caste abuse and the media blindly following that narrative is the natural result of such dangerous activism.

Left-liberals who believed that the National Population Register was ‘dead’ have bad news: The Census 2027 is bringing it back

The Registrar General of India (RGI) on Friday, 14th August, notified the 40-question questionnaire that will be used during the population enumeration phase of Census 2027. The questionnaire marks a major change from the 2011 Census, most notably because it will ask every respondent to provide their “caste”. This will be the first time since Independence that caste, beyond the existing enumeration of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), will be recorded across the population. The notification was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Census Act and authorises census officials to collect information through the Household Schedule.

The new Census will also collect several categories of information that were not part of the 2011 questionnaire. While the 2011 Census had 29 questions, the new schedule has 40. Among the new or expanded fields are spouse’s name, nationality, father’s and mother’s particulars, digital literacy, permanent residential address, place of Covid-19 vaccination, number of bank accounts, and the availability of mobile number, Aadhaar, voter ID, passport and driving licence details.

What are the 40 questions in Census 2027?

The notification, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) under the Census Act, authorises census officers to collect information through the household schedule from every person residing in their assigned areas. According to the notification, officials will gather 40 categories of information from residents. These include basic demographic details such as name, age, sex, marital status, spouse’s name, nationality, religion, caste, and parental information.

The questionnaire will seek information on education and skills, including literacy and digital literacy status, attendance in educational institutions, and the highest level of education attained. Language-related information, including mother tongue and other known languages, will also be recorded.

Respondents will be asked whether they worked during the previous year, their occupation, industry or service sector, class of worker, and whether they are seeking employment. Information on travel to the workplace will also be collected.

The notification further provides for the collection of migration-related data, including place of birth, previous place of residence, reasons for migration, and duration of stay at the current location since migration. Permanent residential address details will also be recorded.

For women who are currently married, widowed, divorced, or separated, census officials will collect information on the number of children surviving, children ever born alive, and, in some cases, births during the previous year.

The final section moves into areas that were largely absent from the 2011 Census. Respondents will be asked about the place where they received their Covid-19 vaccination and the total number of bank accounts they hold. The questionnaire will also seek their mobile number, Aadhaar number, voter ID number and passport number, where applicable, as well as whether they have a driving licence. The identification details are conditional: for example, the form asks for a passport number if the respondent is an Indian passport holder and asks for mobile and Aadhaar numbers “if available.”

The 40 questions included in this year’s census questionnaire are:

  1. Name of the person
  2. Relationship to head
  3. Sex
  4. Date of Birth and Age (in completed years)
  5. Current Marital Status
  6. Age at Marriage (in completed years)
  7. Spouse Name
  8. Nationality as declared
  9. Religion
  10. Scheduled Caste (SC)/ Scheduled Tribe (ST)/ Caste
  11. Father’s Particulars
  12. Mother’s Particulars
  13. Disability
  14. Mother Tongue and other languages known
  15. Literacy and digital literacy status
  16. Status of attendance in educational institution
  17. Highest educational level attained and Stream/Discipline
  18. Worked at any time during the last year
  19. Category of economic activity
  20. Occupation
  21. Nature of industry, trade or service
  22. Class of worker
  23. Non-economic activity (for marginal, semi-marginal and non-worker)
  24. Seeking or available for work (for marginal, semi-marginal and non-worker)
  25. Travel to place of work
  26. Birth place
  27. Place of last residence
  28. Reason for migration
  29. Duration of stay in this village/town since last migration
  30. Permanent Residential Address
  31. Number of children surviving at present (for currently married, widowed, divorced and separated women only)
  32. Number of children ever born alive (for currently married, widowed, divorced and separated women only)
  33. Number of children born alive during last one year (for currently married women only)
  34. Place of Covid-19 Vaccination
  35. Total number of Bank Accounts
  36. Mobile Number (if available)
  37. Aadhaar Number (if available)
  38. Voter ID Number (if available)
  39. Passport Number (if Indian Passport holder)
  40. Availability of Driving License

The Overlap with the National Population Register (NPR)

Several of these questions were also featured in the rehearsal form of the National Population Register (NPR) in 2019. The NPR, which was initially proposed to be conducted alongside the first phase of the Census, was temporarily halted due to Covid-19. Left-liberal groups and Muslim organisations across the country had assumed that it was ‘dead’. They claimed that the data gathered through the NPR exercise could subsequently be used by the central government to prepare a countrywide National Register of Citizens (NRC).

This overlap of questions in Census 2027 comes as bad news for those who celebrated the stalling of the NPR after organising protests in multiple parts of the country, including the anti-Hindu Delhi riots.

The Modi government has brought back the same questions in Census 2027 that were previously criticised by left-liberals and opposition parties, aiming to appease their vote bank. 

During the anti-CAA agitation, West Bengal witnessed extensive violence across Murshidabad, Howrah, Malda, and North 24 Parganas, where rioters set fire to 17 buses, five empty trains, police vehicles, and fire engines, while also vandalising rail stations and blocking major highways.

Similar unrest escalated in the national capital starting in mid-December 2019, leading up to the anti-Hindu Delhi riots in February 2020. Protesters at Shaheen Bagh instituted prolonged blockades, demanding that the NPR exercise be cancelled in Delhi. Violence subsequently broke out in Jafrabad, Seelampur, Gokulpuri, Bhajanpura, and Chand Bagh, resulting in 37 deaths, including an Intelligence Bureau constable and a police head constable, alongside widespread property damage. Despite these agitations, the crucial data parameters have now been incorporated into the main census process.

Tracing lineage and the connection to Citizenship

Specific details such as relationship to the head of household, father’s particulars, mother’s particulars, duration of stay, and permanent residential address closely mirror the draft requirements of NPR 2020. 

These questions carry political sensitivity because of their direct link to establishing parental lineage and long-term residency. If a Bangladeshi Muslim illegally enters India, they can potentially acquire local identity documentation like an Aadhaar card, PAN card, birth certificate, or passport over time. 

However, such individuals cannot retrospectively insert their name or their father’s name into the 1971 Indian voter list. This core verification requirement is precisely why the NPR faced opposition, to establish genuine lineage, an individual must demonstrate their parent’s presence in historical electoral rolls or official registers.

Why does the issue have a citizenship angle?

The controversy over the NPR largely comes from its connection with the legal framework for preparing a National Register of Indian Citizens. Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 provides that the Central Government may compulsorily register citizens and maintain a National Register of Indian Citizens. It also states that the Registrar General can function as the National Registration Authority.

This legal connection is the reason critics have historically worried that information collected through the NPR could eventually become relevant to an NRC exercise. At the same time, it is important to distinguish the legal possibility from an actual government decision. The presence of similar questions in a Census questionnaire does not by itself establish that an NRC is being conducted or that Census data will automatically be converted into an NRC.

The concerns became especially strong after the Citizenship Amendment Act was passed in December 2019 and then Union Home Minister Amit Shah spoke in Parliament about a nationwide NRC. The experience of Assam further intensified the debate, as the Assam NRC exercise required applicants to establish their eligibility for inclusion and resulted in a large number of people being left out, while questions remained over the treatment and status of those excluded.

The political significance of the questionnaire is therefore likely to extend beyond the simple counting of India’s population. The inclusion of caste could provide the country with its first broad official caste data since Independence, while the addition of information on education, employment, migration, digital literacy, banking and identity documents will create a much wider picture of Indian society.

With the inclusion of parent particulars and identity parameters in Census 2027, the structural framework for resident verification remains active within the central administrative apparatus.

When will Census 2027 take place?

Census 2027 is being conducted in two phases. The first is the Housing and House Listing Operations (HLO), followed by Population Enumeration. The HLO phase is being conducted during 2026, while the main population enumeration is scheduled for February 2027. For Ladakh and the snow-bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, the population enumeration will take place earlier, in September 2026.

For these snow-bound areas, the government has notified September 1-30 for enumeration, followed by a revisional round from October 1-5. Self-enumeration will be available before the house-to-house exercise. The reference date for these areas is midnight of October 1, 2026, while for the rest of the country it is midnight of March 1, 2027.

The Census is also significant because it is India’s first fully digital Census, with self-enumeration being offered as an additional facility. The last Census was conducted in 2011.

From opposing Indian nuclear weapons to peddling ‘saffron terrorism’ narrative: How P Chidambaram’s confession of being a ‘Dimagi Naxal’ doesn’t surprise anyone

Prime Minister Modi’s reference to “Dimagi Naxals” in his Independence Day address has triggered many Naxal sympathisers, including senior Congress leader P Chidambaram. In response to the PM’s remarks, the former Union Home Minister posted a message on X on Sunday (16th August) identifying as a proud “Dimagi Naxal”. “I am proud to be a dimagi naxal !” Chidambaram wrote.

In his address, PM Modi distinguished a “Dimagi Naxal” from armed Naxals, who operated and spread violence and terror in multiple districts across different states, including Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra. The Prime Minister used the term to refer to the people sitting in power corridors and still pushing the Naxal ideology that aims to overthrow the Indian state and the democratically elected government. PM Modi cautioned the country against such “Dimagi Naxals” who want to influence the young minds and use them to impose their delusion of a utopian ‘proletariat rule’ on people while making them bear its cost.

While the fact that a former Union Home Minister identifies and openly associates himself with the Naxal ideology is disturbing, it is not at all surprising. Chidambaram’s admission comes as no surprise because back in 2010, when he was the Union Home Minister, he offered to hold talks with armed Naxals without requiring them to lay down arms. An old video shows Chidambaram speaking at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, expressing the government’s willingness to engage in dialogue with the Naxals, without having them compromise their ideology.

In the video, he clearly stated that the government would not even ask the Naxals to lay down arms, as it was aware that they believed in armed struggle. “We’re ready for talks; we’re not asking you to lay down arms. We know you won’t do that because you believe in armed struggle,” Chidambaram said in the video. His remarks were welcomed with huge applause by the audience present at the varsity, which has been a stronghold of leftist and other extremist ideologies. Coincidentally, the comments came a month after the Dantewada Maoist attack, where 76 CRPF policemen were killed.

Chidambaram headed the Union Home Ministry at a time when Naxalism was at its peak in the country. But he and his government not only failed to counter the threat, but they also failed to see the problem for what it was and come up with a lasting solution for it. The Congress government was notoriously soft on Naxals and terrorists. During the Congress rule, while on one hand armed Naxals attacked and wounded the Indian state, on the other hand the ‘Dimagi Naxals’ existing within the system, who protected and patronised them, made sure that the government engaged with the Naxals on their terms.

Chidambaram’s act of acting soft and pleading with the Naxals to engage in a dialogue with the government aligns with his admission of being a “Dimagi Naxal”. A close examination of his stance on issues like national security and terrorism, and his aversion to policies aimed at development, reveals a similarity with the anti-state and anti-development ideology of Naxalism.

The peddling of a false narrative of Hindu terror

Chidambaram took offence on behalf of all Dimagi Naxals and expressed solidarity with them by identifying as one of them. His statement clearly arose from his massive empathy for the Naxals, irrespective of the fact that they engaged in armed rebellion against the democratic state of India for decades and killed thousands of Indian security personnel and civilians. The empathy is not just misplaced but dangerous in light of the fact that it is coming from a person who headed the Union Home Ministry, which is responsible for overseeing national security.

Interestingly, the merciful Chidambaram, whose heart bleeds for the Naxals, did not hesitate to target the entire Hindu community with the false and made-up narrative of Hindu terror. This was a striking contrast to Congress’s stance that terrorism has no religion. Chidambaram was among the Congress leaders who coined the term ‘saffron terror’ and peddled a white lie, defaming the majority community, to monkey-balance and appease their vote bank.

In 2010, while he was the Union Home Minister, he cautioned the law enforcement authorities regarding the “recently uncovered phenomenon of saffron terror”. His successor and fellow Congress leader, Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde, along with Congress leader Digvijaya Singh, also peddled the lie of Hindu terrorism.

The entire Congress ecosystem exerted all its might to establish the lie of Hindu terror as a fact by falsely implicating Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, Lt. Colonel Shrikant Prasad Purohit (who was serving at the time) and other Hindus in the 2008 Malegaon blast case. The case was a desperate attempt by the Congress government to weave the narrative of “Hindu terror” and “saffron terror”. However, the case, after 17 years of legal scrutiny, fell flat in the court of law for the simple reason that there was no truth in it.

Chidambaram opposed digitalisation of payments

Despite being a seasoned politician and a successful lawyer, Chidambaram ridiculed and opposed the Modi government’s push for a cashless economy and digitalisation of payments, knowing well that this would reduce corruption and bring transparency. He also slammed the Modi government for demonetisation, calling it a “scam”. What is to noted is that his opposition to these policies was not a result of his short-sightedness but a consequence of his Naxal-influenced anti-progress and anti-development mentality.

Research has shown how demonetisation hit at the backbone of terrorism, including left-wing terrorism, as it directly impacted the funding that fueled the menace. Terror funding generally happens in cash form, which is physically moved across borders or funnelled through unregulated underground banking systems. It remains one of the primary methods for financing both organisational activities and terrorist operations. The funds are mostly stored in the form of large denomination currency notes like ₹500 and ₹1000 banknotes, which make it easier to store large amounts of money in smaller stacks of notes. Demonetisation discontinued the use of ₹500 and ₹1000 banknotes, which rendered the terror funding moving in cash form as good as nothing.

Similarly, digitalisation of payments also proved to be a successful policy decision in combination with government programs like Digital India and Jan Dhan Yojana, along with rising smartphone penetration, cheaper data plans and near-universal household electrification.

Chidambaram was against India acquiring nuclear capability

The former Union Home Minister vehemently opposed the development of nuclear capabilities by India. Speaking in Parliament, Chidambaram argued that by developing nuclear weapons contrasts with “moral authority” that India has acquired globallly. In his speech delivered on 27 May 1998 in Parliament, he objected to the then Vajpayee government’s plan to use the nuclear capabilities aquired by India after the successful Pokhran II test for developing nuclear weapons.

Neglecting India’s need to acquire military might to become capable safeguarding itself against any possible military aggression, Chidambaram was more focused in maintaining some delusional moral supriority. A politician like Chidambaram arguing against enhancing the military might of a country with hostile neighbours is clearly symptomatic of a Dimagi Naxal.

‘Anti-Muslim hate machinery’: TRT World publishes propaganda documentary vilifying India, Hindus and peddling ‘Islamophobia’ propaganda

Ever since the BJP came into power at the Centre in 2014, Indian and foreign Islamo-leftist media have consistently been churning out propaganda articles and documentaries to further their one-sided ‘Indian Muslims are being persecuted by Hindutva fascists’, ‘Islamophobia on a rise in India’ bogey. The latest piece of propaganda against India has been rolled out by Turkish state-owned media outlet TRT World. TRT World published a 21-minute 6-second-long documentary on 10th August 2026, with the title, “Inside the machinery of anti-Muslim hate in Narendra Modi’s India”.

TRT World peddles the Muslim victimhood bogey based on half-truths and propaganda, and makes no mention of Muslim crimes against Hindus

The TRT documentary shows cherry-picked personal stories of alleged mob violence, demolitions of illegal encroachments, and alleged police actions, and relies on villainisation of Gau Rakshaks, as ‘proof’ of a continuous ‘anti-Muslim hate machinery’ under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The Turkish state media, however, made not even a passing mention of how Muslim neighbours of a Hindu man named Tarun Kumar in Delhi’s Uttam Nagar brutally killed him over a mere Holi colour-filled balloon falling over one of the Muslim ladies.

Be it Hindu festivals of Ram Navami, Hanuman Jayanti, Holi, Diwali, Durga Visarjan or celebration of a major cricket match victory, recent years have witnessed how Muslims look for triggers, store stones and petrol bombs to attack Hindu processions, and as seen in the 2025 Sambhal violence case, pelt stones at police officials in a pre-planned fashion.

However, the Turkish state-owned propaganda outlet has no interest in cases wherein innocent Hindus have been killed by Muslims over real or imaginary excuses.

The TRT World documentary attacking India shows ‘cow-vigilantes’ as violent groups with the backing of BJP governments, out on the streets only to harass and kill Muslims, even as Gau Rakshaks catch and report cow smugglers or slaughterers regardless of their religious identity.

Unsurprisingly, TRT raises no questions over significant involvement of Muslims in cow smuggling and slaughter despite there being prohibitions on cow slaughter by law in some states, and broader Hindu religious sentiments.

The propaganda documentary further insinuates that Muslim men are being targeted by ‘Hindu extremists’ and the ‘Hindutva regime’ helmed by PM Modi, in alleged cases of love jihad.

Here again, the TRT World documentary presents one-sided victimhood propaganda. The film does not even properly address what grooming or rape jihad is, which is colloquially called ‘love jihad’. It wrongly articulates the Hindu community’s criticism of love jihad as criticism and intolerance of all interfaith marriages.

There is a well-documented pattern of Muslim men deliberately faking their identity as Hindu, approaching Hindu girls, from school-going minors to women working in top corporate offices, feigning love, gaining trust, establishing sexual relations, only to later blackmail, brainwash, and coerce them into converting to Islam.

OpIndia, and to now a noticeable extent even mainstream media, has covered thousands of incidents involving Love Jihad, and yet somehow the Islamo-leftist cabal is still peddling the denialist propaganda that love jihad is ‘BJP’s conspiracy theory’.

From Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan’s Beawar, Bhilwara and Ajmer, to the United Kingdom’s Rotherham and Telford, the disgusting Muslim pattern of weaponising rape to humiliate Kafirs, insult their faith, and secure conversion to Islam is not unique to India. Yet, TRT World turns a blind eye to the naked truth, because the Islamist-inflicted misery of be it Hindu Kafirs of India or Christian Kafirs of the UK is unimportant, immaterial or perhaps a source of glee.

The Islamo-leftist media cabal’s selective amplification of real or fake Muslim victimhood and their deliberate downplaying and trivialisation of Muslim victimisation of Hindus is not surprising.

Remember how the global Islamo-leftist media coterie outraged and extensively covered the Bulli Bai case, even as there was no real selling or exploitation of Muslim women? This Islamo-leftist cabal continues to highlight this case to vilify Hindus, while they conveniently dismiss real cases of love jihad and online sexual objectification of Hindu women as sex slaves of Muslim men as non-issues.

The documentary further amplifies the Indian Islamo-leftist peddled lies that somehow the BJP governments are deliberately demolishing houses and shops belonging to Muslims, conveniently withholding the facts that in most cases Muslims encroached government lands, land belonging to Hindus, and built illegal mazars, Jhuggis, etc.

The TRT World documentary makes no mention of how Waqf Boards over the years arbitrarily laid claims over entire villages, government offices, houses, and land patches belonging to Hindus, and other non-Muslim communities.

Turkish state broadcaster’s Muslim victimhood documentary relies on Islamo-leftists Sanjay Hegde and Asif Mujtaba over the 2020 anti-Hindu Delhi Riots

The propaganda documentary published by the Turkish state-owned media features advocate Sanjay Hegde, who claims that in all the episodes of ‘organised violence’ against Muslims, the BJP governments, be it in states or the Centre, as well as the police administration, essentially protect ‘Hindu perpetrators’.

Hegde’s remarks suggested that in all cases involving communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims, it is essentially Hindus only who are at fault, or trigger violence. This insinuation apparently stems from the Islamo-leftist cabal’s demonstrated pattern of blaming Hindus for Muslim mob violence against them.

If Hindus celebrate a cricket match victory on the road and happen to pass by a mosque in a ‘Muslim area’, they deserve to be attacked with rods, stones and sharp objects by Muslims, for having somehow ‘offended’ them.

If Hindus take out their religious procession and the loud music of devotional songs falls on the ears of Muslims, or Hindus put up religious flags, it is justified for Muslims to hurl stones at Hindus.

If a movie (Chhava) shows how an Islamic fanatic Mughal tyrant tortured Hindu warrior king Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj, and yet failed to coerce him into converting to Islam, it is ‘natural’ for Muslims to do violence against Hindus, destroy their and public property, while leftists and Muslim-appeasing politicians would blame the film’s makers and actors for making the film.

OpIndia has consistently documented senior Supreme Court advocate Sanjay Hegde’s anti-Hindu moorings over the years. Hegde is a notorious Islamist sympathiser, who wants India to welcome more and more Rohingya and Bangladeshi Muslim infiltrators despite reports of their involvement in various criminal activities against Indian citizens. Hegde’s Hinduphobia is also widely known and criticised.

The TRT World documentary also features Islamist Aasif Mujtaba, describing him as a ‘social activist’. Mujtaba claimed that “justice s utopian” for Muslims in India.

He claimed that be it the 2020 Delhi Riots, the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, or the 2002 Gujarat pogrom, and several other riots, were all ‘anti-Muslim riots’ and that Muslims have yet not received justice.

Neither Aasif Mujtaba informed (expectedly), nor TRT World cared to highlight the complete truth of the 2002 Gujarat Riots, and both conveniently painted it as an anti-Muslim pogrom even as it was Muslims who began the communal violence.

Riots broke out in Gujarat in 2002 after a Muslim mob set fire to 2 coaches of Sabarmati Express near the Godhra railway station, burning 59 Hindu pilgrims alive. A total of 31 Islamists were found guilty of committing the heinous crime.

11 of them were handed the death penalty by a special fast-track court on March 1, 2011. Their names include Abdul Razzak Kurkur, Ismail Suleja, Jabbir Binyamin Behra, Ramzani Binyamin Behra, Mehboob Hassan, Siraj Bala, Irfan Kalandar, Irfan Patadia, Hassan Lalu, Mehboob Chanda, & Salim Zarda. Their death penalty was later commuted to a life sentence in October 2017.

TRT World platformed Aasif Mujtaba to peddle his one-sided version portraying the 2020 anti-Hindu Delhi Riots as a pre-planned anti-Muslim violence, even as it was Muslims, including the recently convicted and sentenced to jail, former Aam Aadmi Party councillor Tahir Hussain, who orchestrated Muslim mob violence and brutally killed a Hindu Intelligence Bureau (IB) officer, Ankit Sharma and dumped the dead body in a drain.

Mujtaba made no mention of how a mob comprising his co-religionists brutally lynched Head Constable Ratan Lal of Delhi Police while he was trying to perform his duty on the main Wazirabad Road, Chand Bagh, during the violent riot.

A mob attacked police officers stationed in Maujpur, Delhi’s North-East area, on February 24, 2020. Ratan Lal died from a bullet wound, according to the autopsy report.

A voiceover in the film amplifies the Islamo-leftist narrative on the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), describing the legislation brought to fast-track citizenship of Hindu, Sikh, Christian, and other non-Muslim minorities from neighbouring Islamic or Islamic majority countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, as “discriminatory”.

While TRT World describes the CAA as the ‘trigger’ for the Delhi Riots, it did not care to understand or inform its viewers why Muslims from the neighbouring countries were not included in the CAA.

Pakistan’s persecuted Shias and Ahmadiyas identify as Muslims; thus, their persecution is the Islamic Republic’s law and order issue. Meanwhile, Rohingyas persecuted in Myanmar come to India via Bangladesh; they enter India for material benefits and no longer remain a persecuted group; thus, they are excluded from the CAA, not due to any anti-Muslim agenda or hatred.

Notably, Aasif Mujtaba is the founder of Miles2Smiles Foundation, the organisation that had set up a learning centre at a Rohingya camp at Nuh in Haryana. The organisation had raised funds for the construction work for the Rohingya Refugees at Nuh in Haryana and had also built housing units, he claimed on Twitter in January this year. It is worth noting that Nuh belongs to Mewat in Haryana, the region that is notoriously known as “Mini Pakistan“, where tales of abduction, rapes and forced conversions of Hindus have been routinely reported. 

An IIT Delhi graduate, Mujtaba has been propagating hate against Hindus and spreading fake news to project the usual “muslims in danger in India” narrative. In December 2022, the so-called activist and social worker, Aasif Mujtaba, said that Jamia University was not created to become a centre of excellence but for “Muslims to learn to resist.”

In their pursuit of portraying a Hindu majority India under a supposedly ‘pro-Hindu’ government as a dystopia for Muslims, TRT World did not even mention the fact that Aasif Mujtaba was named by Delhi Riots accused jihadi Sharjeel Imam as a co-conspirator.

The TRT World documentary also features unsuspecting Hindu rights activists from Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and a few Gau Rakshaks. Their utility in the film, however, is not to present a balanced view of the situation, but to portray their grievances and their pushback against Islamist intransigence as blatantly ‘Islamophobic’.

However, expecting balanced reporting from the Turkish state broadcaster is like expecting an Islamic terrorist to believe in secularism. TRT World itself has repeatedly peddled anti-India and anti-Hindu propaganda over the years.

It is quite audacious for the Turkish state broadcaster to attempt to tarnish India’s image as a bigoted and Islamophobic ‘majoritarian state’, given it conveniently overlooks Turkey’s own persecution of Kurds, secularists, and Gülenists.

The TRT World documentary on ‘anti-Muslim hate in India’ is yet another Islamist media propaganda that relies on selective framing, half-truths, lies and blatant neglect of the Islamist crimes against Hindus.

What is disturbing but not surprising is that the majority of the comments under the film on YouTube are by Indian Muslims, with a common statement being, “as an Indian Muslim, it is true”. Apparently, despite enjoying freedoms of all sorts, equal treatment and opportunities, even reservations in some states, a significant section still prefers not only to be used by ‘secular’ parties as their votebank even if they ridicule their intellect, but also to have an international image of ‘perennial victims’.

Reliance joins forces with Rolls-Royce to build indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft engine: What does it mean for India

Reliance Industries and British aerospace major Rolls-Royce have announced plans to work together on developing a sovereign combat aircraft engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme. The partnership is aimed at giving India greater control over one of the most critical technologies needed for its planned fifth-generation fighter jet. The two companies said on Friday, 14th August, that they intend to explore the design, development, manufacturing and delivery of an indigenous combat engine for the AMCA. As part of the proposed collaboration, Reliance and Rolls-Royce will also explore setting up a dedicated Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex in India.

The proposed facility is expected to become a centre for advanced power and propulsion technology. It would aim to develop capabilities across the complete engine lifecycle, including design, development, manufacturing, testing, production and long-term maintenance and support.

However, the announcement is currently a strategic intent to explore the partnership, and not a final joint venture agreement or commercial engine contract. The companies have not yet disclosed details such as the investment, ownership structure or timeline for establishing the proposed complex.

What will the Reliance-Rolls-Royce partnership do?

The proposed partnership brings together two different strengths. Rolls-Royce will contribute its long-standing expertise in aircraft engines and advanced propulsion technology, while Reliance will bring its manufacturing capabilities, technology, scale and project execution experience.

The central objective is to develop the AMCA’s combat engine in India rather than depending entirely on foreign suppliers for the fighter’s propulsion system.

According to the companies, the proposed Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex would create an end-to-end capability within the country. This means that India could potentially develop expertise not just in assembling an engine but across its entire lifecycle, from design and development to manufacturing, testing, production and maintenance.

The companies also said that the partnership could eventually go beyond the AMCA programme. The proposed facility could support wider cooperation in defence, civil aerospace and new power and propulsion technologies.

This could make the project broader than a single fighter-engine programme, with the potential to create an ecosystem for advanced aerospace engineering and manufacturing in India.

Why is the AMCA engine important?

The AMCA is India’s planned indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft. The programme is aimed at developing a more advanced combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force, with a focus on technologies associated with modern fighter jets.

One of the biggest challenges in India’s fighter aircraft programmes has been the development of a powerful indigenous engine. India has historically relied heavily on foreign manufacturers for fighter aircraft engines. Developing a domestic high-thrust powerplant has therefore remained an important part of the country’s push for greater defence self-reliance.

The Reliance-Rolls-Royce proposal is significant in this context because it seeks to combine international engine expertise with manufacturing and industrial capabilities available in India.

If the proposed complex is eventually established and the engine programme moves forward, it could help India build expertise in areas that go beyond simply producing aircraft. A domestic engine capability could give the country greater control over the design, production, testing and long-term support of fighter engines.

The project also fits into the government’s wider Atmanirbhar Bharat push, which seeks to reduce dependence on imports in strategically important areas, particularly defence.

What Anant Ambani said

Reliance Industries Executive Director Anant Ambani said the partnership was aimed at developing capabilities that are important for India’s strategic autonomy. “India’s strategic autonomy requires sovereign capability in critical technologies,” Ambani said.

He said the partnership would combine Rolls-Royce’s expertise in advanced propulsion with Reliance‘s capabilities in technology, manufacturing, scale and execution.

“Our intent with Rolls-Royce is to combine their world-leading expertise in advanced propulsion with Reliance’s technology, manufacturing, scale and execution capabilities to build an indigenous aero-engine ecosystem in India,” he said.

Ambani added that the objective was not just to create a capability for one programme but to develop an enduring national capability in advanced propulsion.

“Together, we aim to build an enduring national capability that can make India self-reliant and, over time, globally competitive in advanced propulsion technologies,” he said. He described the initiative as Reliance’s contribution to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of an “Atmanirbhar Viksit Bharat”.

Rolls-Royce calls it a major milestone

Rolls-Royce CEO Tufan Erginbilgiç also welcomed the proposed partnership, saying it would combine the British company’s experience in advanced engineering with Reliance’s industrial capabilities in India. “I welcome the opportunity to join forces with Reliance Industries, bringing together our century-long heritage in advanced engineering and proven engine expertise with their homegrown leadership in Indian industry,” Erginbilgiç said.

He said the proposed collaboration could help create a stronger aerospace ecosystem in the country. “Together, with our existing partnerships and capabilities in India, this marks a major milestone towards building a robust, self-reliant aerospace ecosystem in the country,” he said.

The companies said their existing capabilities and partnerships in India could also support the development of the proposed Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex.

What does it mean for India?

For India, the biggest potential benefit of the proposal is the possibility of developing a domestic ecosystem for fighter-engine technology. Aircraft engines are among the most technically demanding components of a modern fighter jet, requiring advanced engineering, manufacturing, testing and maintenance capabilities.

India’s dependence on overseas engine suppliers has been a long-standing challenge for its defence aviation ambitions. An indigenous engine programme could therefore strengthen the country’s strategic autonomy by reducing dependence on foreign sources for a critical component of military aircraft.

The proposed complex could also help build a specialised industrial base around aerospace propulsion. If the project develops as planned, it could bring together design engineers, manufacturers, testing facilities and maintenance capabilities under a broader domestic ecosystem.

Another possible benefit is the development of expertise that could be used for future aircraft and propulsion programmes. The companies have already indicated that their cooperation could eventually extend beyond the AMCA engine to other defence and civil aerospace projects.

The project could also support India’s ambition to become a larger player in the global aerospace manufacturing sector. Reliance brings the ability to operate at large industrial scale, while Rolls-Royce brings decades of experience in aircraft-engine technology. Combining these capabilities could potentially create opportunities for both domestic production and future exports.

However, the partnership is still at an early stage. The two companies have announced their strategic intent and plans to explore the Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex, but important details such as investment, ownership, production timelines and the final structure of the project have not been announced.

The government had also earmarked ₹15 billion (around $157 million) in May for the AMCA programme, as part of efforts to accelerate the development of India’s next-generation fighter aircraft.

Ultimately, the success of the Reliance-Rolls-Royce initiative will depend on whether the proposed plans translate into an actual engine development and manufacturing programme. For now, the announcement represents an important step towards bringing global aero-engine expertise together with India’s growing private-sector defence manufacturing capabilities.

If realised, the Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex could give India something it has long sought in military aviation: a stronger domestic capability to design, build, test and support advanced combat aircraft engines. That would make the AMCA programme not just an effort to build an indigenous fighter, but also an opportunity to develop a wider Indian ecosystem for advanced aerospace propulsion.