The Supreme Court on Wednesday (29th April) held that no cognizable offence was made out against BJP leaders Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Sahib Singh Verma, who were accused of making hate speeches in January 2020. The decision was made by a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta on a plea filed by CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat, challenging a Delhi High Court order passed on June 22, 2023, which refused to direct the filing of an FIR against the two leaders.
The Delhi High Court had dismissed the writ petition filed by Karat and upheld the decision of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (I), Rouse Avenue Court, dated August 26, 2020. The trial court had declined to issue a direction for registration of an FIR against the leaders under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 504, 505 and 506 of the IPC, citing a lack of prior sanction for prosecution.
Allegations made by Brinda Karat
In her plea, Karat alleged that in speeches made by the two politicians, they threatened to use force to remove protestors, who were holding protests at Shaheen Bagh against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). It also alleged that their speeches promoted hatred and enmity against Muslims by portraying them as invaders who will enter houses and rape and kill people.
Karat referred to the speech made by Anurag Thakur on January 27, 2020, where he allegedly raised the slogan “desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaron saalon ko” (Traitors should be shot dead). She also referred to a speech made by Parvesh Verma on January 27-28, 2020, while campaigning for the BJP and a subsequent interview given to the media.
Background of the case
A complaint was submitted on January 29, 2020, to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, seeking registration of an FIR against the two politicians. Subsequently, on February 2, 2020, a communication was made to the Station House Officer, Parliament Street Police Station, New Delhi, reiterating the request for immediate registration of an FIR. When no action was taken, the appellants filed a complaint under Section 156(3) of the CrPC before the trial court. In the status report submitted before the trial court, the investigating agency said that no cognizable offence was made out based on the material placed on record.
The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the appellants, holding that it was maintainable because there was no prior sanction from the competent authority to prosecute the accused. Thereafter, the appellants approached the Delhi High Court via a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, read with Sections 482 and 483 of the CrPC, and challenged the verdict of the trial court. The High Court also dismissed the writ petition, upholding the reasoning of the trial court, which stated that a direction for the registration of the FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC could not be exercised in the absence of prior sanction.
What the Supreme Court said
The Supreme Court examined the record and declined to interfere with the Delhi High Court’s order on the merits. However, the apex court disagreed with the legal reasoning given by the High Court in making the order. The court observed that even though it did not find any ground to interfere with or overturn the High Court’s decision, it found fault with the High Court’s observation that prior sanction is required before a Magistrate can order registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC.
Explaining the point of law, the Supreme Court said that the power exercised by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC falls at the pre-cognisance stage and does not require prior sanction. “The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognisance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature,” the Supreme Court said.
However, after examining the case on the merits, the Supreme Court categorically held that no cognizable offence was made out against the two politicians. “Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated 26th February, 2020, submitted before the Trial Court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out,” the Court stated, adding that their speeches were not directed against any specific community.
“The High Court has, on an independent assessment, held that the speeches in question do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, observing that the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder,” the top court observed.
“Accordingly, while we disapprove of the reasoning adopted by the High Court on the issue of prior sanction, we find no ground to interfere with the ultimate conclusion. The appeal against the impugned judgment dated 13th June, 2022, therefore, stands partly allowed to the aforesaid extent,” the Supreme Court held.
A 2003 internal speech by then-President Hu Jintao warned his leadership of what he called the ‘Malacca Dilemma‘, China’s existential reliance on a waterway it does not control and cannot easily avoid, somewhere in the Chinese Communist Party archives.
That problem has continued to grow worse over the past 20 years. As of 2025, more than 80% of China’s oil imports, which are valued at about $312 billion a year, come through the Strait of Malacca, which is only 2.8 km wide at its narrowest point. Approximately $3.5 trillion in global business, or two-thirds of all Chinese marine traffic, travels through these waterways annually. Every day, China uses more than 15 million barrels of oil. Just 3.7 million are transported by its overland pipelines. The maths is harsh. Beijing’s economic engine is based on a bottleneck that it fears and cannot fix.
Now think about India’s position. Geostrategically speaking, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a 700+ kilometre stretch that spans the entrance to the Malacca Strait, are a natural aircraft carrier that India was gifted by geography. Great Nicobar, the southernmost island in this series, is nearly equidistant from Singapore, Port Klang, and Colombo. One of the main routes used by ships to enter and exit the strait is the Six Degree Channel, which it overlooks. The waterways around these islands are used for 60% of China’s entire trade. Control of the route is a strategic trump card in any significant battle with China, rather than a negotiation chip. India is finally realising it and moving ahead to use its geographical blessing. And a segment of its own political class is attempting to prevent this.
What the great Nicobar project actually is
The Great Nicobar Island Development Project, devised by NITI Aayog and approved by the Union Cabinet in 2021, aims to make the island one of India’s most important commercial and strategic hubs. There are four main parts to the project, which are expected to cost around ₹81,000 crore (almost $10 billion).
Built on a naturally occurring deep harbour of 18 to 20 meters, the transhipment port in Galathea Bay aims to have a capacity of 4 million TEUs by 2028 and 16 million TEUs by 2058. This would challenge Singapore’s capacity close to the mouth of the strait, which China is most afraid of. An international greenfield airport that can accommodate wide-body aircraft and has a 3,300-meter runway. A 450 MW solar and gas-powered power plant. The Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command will be upgraded into a frontline strategic arm with these dual-use military and civil facilities.
Economic security is national security. Currently, ~75% of India’s transshipped cargo is handled by foreign ports like Colombo and Singapore. The Galathea Bay ICTP aims to internalize this trade, securing supply chains and reclaiming strategic economic leverage.
A crucial economic problem is addressed by the port alone. Around 40% of India’s transhipment business is handled by Colombo, and 25% of the country’s cargo is currently transshipped through foreign ports. Every container that travels through Colombo rather than an Indian port costs India money and geopolitical advantage. Galathea Bay would put an end to such reliance and secure India’s place at one of the busiest maritime crossroads in the world. This is India’s counter to China’s ‘String of Pearls’ not through confrontation, but by creating hubs of connectivity and commerce,” stated maritime historian Nick Collins.
The string of pearls and India’s answer
Defence strategists refer to the network of military and commercial port facilities that China has meticulously constructed over the past 20 years as the ‘String of Pearls,’ which stretches from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa. Although the phrase was originally used in a Booz Allen Hamilton report for the US Department of Defence in 2005, the strategy it refers to has only become more complex since then.
The pearls are well known. Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is located close to the Strait of Hormuz and serves as China’s western anchor for energy security; Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which was leased to China for 99 years after Colombo was unable to pay its debts, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, which has pipelines that go straight into Yunnan, and Coco Islands in Myanmar, which is strategically placed to monitor India’s Andaman naval installations. Additionally, China has established military structures in the Maldives and has a permanent military base in Djibouti. Containment is the ring’s obvious purpose. China wants to be able to keep an eye on Indian naval activities, project strength into the Indian Ocean, and, most importantly, safeguard its own supply lines that depend on Malacca by gaining influence around every chokepoint before India does.
India has responded with what observers now refer to as the ‘Necklace of Diamonds‘ strategy, which consists of a series of strategic port access agreements, naval collaborations, and infrastructure investments aimed at encircling China. In addition to strengthening naval cooperation through the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia), India has gained port access in Oman’s Duqm, Indonesia’s Sabang (a deep-sea port right on the entrance to Malacca), and the Seychelles. A ₹5,650 crore military infrastructure upgrade was given to the Andaman and Nicobar Command in 2019. The command now houses INS Utkrosh at Port Blair, INS Baaz in Great Nicobar, and INS Kohassa in North Andaman.
The centrepiece of this whole architectural design is Great Nicobar. A full-fledged military and commercial base at Galathea Bay, located at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, would enable India to monitor and, if necessary, intercept shipping through one of the world’s most important waterways. That is not adventurism. That is the reasonable application of geography.
The Iran lesson
If anyone requires a practical demonstration of what it means to sit beside a critical strait and have the power to threaten, facilitate and weaponise global trade, Iran has been providing it since February 2026.
When the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, Tehran used a weapon it had been keeping in reserve for decades, the Strait of Hormuz. Iran successfully blocked one of the busiest energy routes in the world by using threats, drone attacks, naval mines, and anti-ship missiles. During peacetime, the Strait of Hormuz transports nearly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil and LNG. That flow is now only a trickle.
The effects have been quick and widespread. The price of a barrel of oil has risen past $100. Shipping companies have stopped doing business. Insurance firms withdrew their coverage for war risks. Energy shocks have affected nations ranging from Germany to Japan, which receives 93% of its crude oil from Hormuz. Iran hasn’t had to literally sink every ship as part of the de facto blockade; all it has needed is enough genuine threat to force insurers, captains, and shipping firms to reevaluate the risk.
According to the Atlantic Council in March 2026, Iran has proved that ‘mass-produced drones, limited firepower, and credible threats may be enough for any country positioned along a critical maritime chokepoint to shut down major shipping lanes.’
Even more startling is the fact that Iran has used this location as a bargaining chip. Tehran has made the Strait of Hormuz the currency of a peace deal by offering to reopen it in exchange for the US lifting its naval blockade and ending the conflict. Iran has demonstrated its ability to impose costs on international energy markets through minimal interruption, and the CSIS noted that this ability will continue long after the current war is resolved. Once utilised, geography turns into a long term strategic asset.
Apply this lesson to the Malacca Strait now. 20% of the world’s oil is transported via a strait that Iran controls just one side of. If Great Nicobar is developed, India will be at the mouth of a strait that transports more than 80% of China’s oil imports and two-thirds of its overall trade. By all measures, India has significantly more leverage. And, unlike Iran, India’s posture is defensive, not a threat to close anything, but the ability to ensure freedom of travel or, in a conflict situation, to deny it to an adversary whose entire economic model is based on those waters. The Great Nicobar Project is more than just infrastructure because of this.
Opposition demand, strategic consequences
During his visit to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Rahul Gandhi called the Great Nicobar Project ‘one of the biggest scams and gravest crimes against this country’s natural and tribal heritage.’ He referred to it as ‘destruction dressed in development’s language.’ In a September 2025 editorial, Congress Parliamentary Chairperson Sonia Gandhi described it as an existential danger to the islands’ indigenous population, the Shompen tribe, and a threat to their distinctive ecosystem. The party has met with tribal elders who have complained about lack of transparency and displacement.
However, it is important to note what the project’s opponents do not address. Rahul Gandhi has not proposed a revised development plan that respects tribal concerns while maintaining vital infrastructure. He hasn’t offered a rehabilitation timeline. He hasn’t even touched on the military aspect. In its current form, the opposition calls for stopping rather than improving.
The National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management, the Environment Ministry’s High Powered Committee, and the National Green Tribunal have all approved the proposal. The government claims, with substantial evidence, that the port covers roughly 10% of the island’s total area, and that the strategic imperatives are inextricably linked to the economic imperatives, 25% of India’s cargo passing through foreign ports is both a national vulnerability and a logistics inefficiency.
It is hyperbolic and biased to say that the Nicobar project automatically puts the Shompen people in danger. The 2015 Shompen Policy, geofencing, surveillance towers, and a monitoring committee for tribal welfare are just a few of the safeguards the government has put in place to ensure that the project won’t disrupt Shompen communities. Additionally, it has been stated that the project’s clearances include protections, and the administration as a whole continues to help tribal communities with basic infrastructure, health care, education, and other social services.
Who else wants India to stand down
The most obvious form of opposition to the Great Nicobar Project is the political opposition in Parliament. Beneath it is a larger ecosystem of global advocacy, which merits examination because of what it regularly chooses to highlight, what it routinely ignores, and whose interests its findings just so happen to serve. Survival International, a London-based advocacy group that released its annual report mentioning how India plans to sacrifice one of the world’s most isolated tribes to create ‘the new Hong Kong’ in 2025, has been the most vocal global voice opposing the project.
The report, which has received widespread coverage in Western media, declares the initiative genocidal and asks for its immediate abandonment. Additionally, 39 worldwide ‘genocide experts’ wrote an open letter on behalf of Survival International, characterising the project as a death sentence for the Shompen. The language used is remarkable.
However, it is worthwhile to pose a straightforward query: where are the comparable Survival International campaigns opposing China’s infrastructure projects in Tibet, Xinjiang, or along its Belt and Road corridor? These projects have uprooted much larger indigenous populations with minimal tribal consultation and regulatory oversight. The response is that those campaigns are hardly non existent. The largest state directed displacement of indigenous populations in the twenty-first century is taking place next door, and a London based organization with the means to launch a persistent international pressure campaign against democratic India’s nationally approved, officially authorised infrastructure project seems to have found no comparable bandwidth.
This trend was first noted by India’s Intelligence Bureau in 2014, when an official report that was leaked revealed that a number of foreign-funded NGOs consistently opposed infrastructure, mining, and nuclear projects, slowing an estimated $2.8 trillion in GDP growth. The structural observation remains true regardless of the accuracy of every aspect of that report that a nation that is democratic, accessible, and whose courts and regulators react to civil society pressure is, by definition, more vulnerable to globally coordinated opposition campaigns than one that is not. China isn’t. India is.
By definition, people who have become accustomed to the status quo will find it inconvenient when a country asserts itself in the global world order. The Indo-Pacific power dynamics would be altered in ways that go far beyond any bilateral rivalry between China and India if India were to establish a significant naval and economic presence near the Strait of Malacca entry point. Beijing’s maritime calculations, established transshipment hubs that profit from India’s current reliance on foreign ports, and an international NGO ecosystem that has more experience managing developing world governments than taking into account their strategic interests are all disrupted by a more powerful India, and this observation is not paranoid.
Conclusion
China has spent hundreds of billions of dollars and twenty years trying to resolve the Malacca Dilemma. It has constructed ports across the Indian Ocean rim, pipelines through Myanmar, and corridors into Pakistan. It has invested in alternate routes precisely because the Strait of Malacca provides an acute, structural weakness, one that an India with strong Nicobar infrastructure could, in extreme cases, leverage. The single development that would most intensify China’s concerns about Malacca is a fully functional Great Nicobar, complete with a significant transhipment port, a military airport that can accommodate strike and surveillance equipment, and enhanced tri-service command capability. It would imply that India, located at the strait’s entrance, is no longer merely a passive geographical beneficiary. The presence would be strategically active.
The present opposition to this project, which calls for stopping it rather than reforming it or strengthening its tribal protections, coincidentally aligns with Beijing’s preferred conclusion. It might just be a coincidence. It might represent a true, principled, and wholly domestic environmental perspective. It is possible for both to be true. However, in a world where Iran’s geographic location near a strait is worth negotiating a ceasefire, and China’s most acute strategic fear is the waterway outside India’s front door, India’s political leaders owe the country a conversation that is proportionate to the risks.
The results of the Gujarat local body elections held on 26th April witnessed an electoral sweep by the BJP on all 15 Municipal corporations. The party made a clean sweep in Morbi and Porbandar Municipal Corporations, bagging all 52 seats in both the local bodies. The BJP also emerged victorious in the municipal corporations of Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Bhavnagar, Gandhidham, Surendranagar, Mehsana, Anand, Nadiad, Navsari and Vapi.
Out of 1,044 seats on which polls were held across the 15 municipal corporations, the BJP won 937 seats. The Congress Party secured 95 seats, and the remaining 12 seats went to other parties, including the AAP, which won 6 seats.
In Ahmedabad, the BJP won 160 seats out of the total 192, while Congress won 32. The All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), which bagged several seats in Ahmedabad in the 2021 elections, failed to get even one seat.
In Nadiad, the BJP won 51 out of 52 seats, while the Congress secured only one seat. In Navsari, the BJP won 50 out of 52 seats. In the Surat Municipal Corporation, out of 120 seats, the BJP won 115, and the Congress won one seat. As against 27 seats won in the last elections, the AAP managed to secure only four seats in the municipal corporation.
In the Rajkot Municipal Corporation elections, the BJP won 65 out of 72 seats, while the Congress won the remaining 7 seats. In Surendranagar as well, the Bharatiya Janata Party won 51 out of the total 52 seats. The BJP won 69 out of 76 seats in the Vadodara Municipal Corporation elections, while the Congress secured 6 seats. One of the seats was won by an independent candidate.
In the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, the BJP has won 44 seats out of 52 seats. The Congress party won the remaining 8 seats. Out of the 52 seats in the Vapi Municipal Corporation, the BJP won 37 seats, and the Congress won 11 seats. The remaining four seats were won by independent candidates.
In the Gandhidham Municipal Corporation, the BJP bagged 41 out of 52 seats, and the Congress won 11 seats. Out of the 52 seats in the Anand-Karmsad Municipal Corporation, the BJP secured 43 seats, and the Congress got 8 seats. Similarly, in the Mehsana Municipal Corporation, the BJP won 47 out of 52 seats, while the remaining five seats went to the Congress.
Criminals fielded by the AAP and the Congress won 2 seats in Jamnagar
Meanwhile, the poll results on two seats of Ward Number 12 of the Jamnagar Municipal Corporation turned out rather alarming, as two candidates with criminal antecedents, fielded by the Aam Aadmi Party and the Congress Party, won the seats. The candidates named Aslam Khilji (AAP) and Altaf Khafi (Congress) are accused under the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime (GUJCTOC) Act, 2015. Out of the 64 municipal seats in Jamnagar, the BJP won 60 seats, while the Congress and the AAP won 2 seats each.
Both Aslam Khilji and Altaf Khafi are currently lodged in jail and contested the elections from there only. Before the elections, the local administration took stringent action against Congress candidate Altaf Khafi and his gang. The authorities demolished encroachments by Altaf and his gang on around 12,000 square feet on government land in the Titodi Wadi and Bangla Wadi areas of Jamnagar. A lavish farmhouse illegally constructed by Khafi and his associates was also demolished by the authorities. However, the victory of the two candidates with criminal backgrounds is a disturbing development.
The clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 was not just another episode in India-China border tensions, but it was a strategic rupture. For decades, New Delhi had managed Beijing through a mix of restraint, dialogue and confidence-building measures. The Galwan attack broke the framework. It revealed a harsh reality that China was no longer working within mutually agreed-upon boundaries but rather systematically upsetting the status quo through deliberate, below-the-threshold aggression.
What followed was a planned shift toward overt conflict rather than an immediate one. India began to reconsider not only its response, but its entire strategy toward China. The emphasis shifted from reactive crisis management to a larger, long-term strategy, one capable of matching China’s methods while avoiding escalation.
Today, that shift is increasingly visible. India is no longer merely responding to Chinese pressure; it is quietly pushing back across multiple domains, including the military, economic, and diplomatic, while carefully avoiding open conflict. In effect, New Delhi has entered the grey zone, adopting a calibrated counter-pressure strategy that mirrors China’s playbook but on its own terms.
China’s Grey Zone playbook
China’s approach towards India is not driven by the logic of decisive, large-scale conflict but by a far more calibrated strategy of incremental advantage. Rather than attempting to shift the balance of power through direct war, Beijing has relied on what is often described as “salami slicing”. It is a method described for small, controlled moves that individually appear insignificant but cumulatively reshape realities on the ground. On the Line of Actual Control, this has taken the form of limited intrusions, changes in patrolling patterns and the gradual establishment of a more persistent presence in contested areas.
A key component of this strategy is infrastructure. The rapid construction of roads, airstrips, logistics hubs, and dual-use villages along the border is not merely developmental; it is a strategic move by China. These assets allow China the mobility, sustainment, and long-term deployments, and enhance its ability to project control without engaging in open conflict.
Such developments over time create a structural advantage that is hard to reverse. The use of controlled military pressure is no less important. Events like Galwan, where Face-offs and non-lethal forces allow China to express hostility without risking escalation into traditional war. This creates a situation in which constant pressure is exerted on the other country without crossing the line, which ultimately escalates into a full military response. The objective of these measures is not immediate confrontation but rather the progressive redefining of the status quo.
China’s aim is to build a “new normal” along the border by restricting access, seizing militarily advantageous sites, and normalising its presence. Economic and geopolitical levers, such as trade dependencies and supply chain influence, add to the pressure and expand it beyond the military domain. All of this together represents a coherent grey-zone playbook, one that prioritises sustained, multi-domain pressure over decisive engagement. It allows China to expand its influence, shape outcomes over time, and complicate its adversary’s response, all while remaining below the threshold of open war.
India’s post-Galwan Grey Zone response
This behavioural pattern is exactly what led to a reevaluation in New Delhi following Galwan. India realised that a policy intended to function consistently below the threshold of conflict would not be adequately countered by sporadic military or diplomatic actions. The challenge was a persistent form of pressure that called for an equally measured answer rather than a single provocation. Therefore, India’s post-Galwan approach has evolved into a multi-domain strategy that mirrors this logic, while remaining mindful of escalation risks. On the military front, India moved swiftly to match Chinese deployments along the Line of Actual Control, ensuring that any attempt to alter the balance would be met with immediate resistance. The occupation of key heights on the Kailash Range in 2020 demonstrated a willingness to seize tactical advantage when necessary, but also reflected restraint in not converting that advantage into broader escalation.
At the same time, India hastened the construction of border infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and forward logistics, which had long lagged behind China’s capabilities. This was a structural response intended to lessen imbalance over time rather than just a protective one. Building long-term capacity became more important than responding to specific occurrences.
India’s response went beyond the military to include the economy. The banning of numerous Chinese Apps, tighter scrutiny of foreign investments, and efforts to diversify supply chains signalled a deliberate attempt to reduce strategic vulnerability. Even though these steps are small, taken together, they are part of a larger initiative to raise prices and reduce China’s power. Diplomatically, India increased engagement with like-minded partners. India revitalised the Quad, improved coordination with the United States, and deepened ties with Japan. This forms a new cooperative balancing framework in the Indo-Pacific. These partnerships stop short of formal alliances, so India still maintains strategic autonomy while improving its ability to counter China.
In essence, India’s response is not about matching China move for move. Instead, India adopts a logic of sustained, calibrated pressure. It combines military readiness, economic resilience and diplomatic outreach. New Delhi now operates in the same grey zone, shaping outcomes gradually while avoiding open confrontation.
Taiwan: The silent Grey Zone front
In the last few years, India’s interaction with Taiwan has gone beyond general diplomatic efforts and reflects a more concrete, though deliberately understated, form of strategic involvement. While New Delhi officially follows the “One China” policy and maintains no formal diplomatic or military ties with Taipei, its role in Taiwan’s Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS) program highlights a different reality operating beneath the surface.
Image via Navalnews
The IDS program ‘s objective, which revolves around the Hai Kun-class submarine, is to develop domestic naval capacity through a “Non-Red Supply Chain”. It is a network of reliable partners that excludes China. It is a term used in political and economic discussions to describe supply chains designed to reduce reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for certain goods and technologies.
India’s contribution to this framework is technical rather than symbolic. It is believed that important mechanical assemblies and sub-components, including structural components and specialised internal systems necessary for submarine operation, were supplied by Indian defence companies. Although these are not the platform’s main weapon systems, they are essential inputs for the platform to function.
Beyond hardware, India’s role extends into technical expertise. It has been stated that retired Indian Navy engineers and staff have provided advice and support in areas including design integration, maintenance architecture, and operational planning, especially those with experience on Scorpene and Kilo-class submarines. This form of knowledge transfer is especially valuable for a country like Taiwan, which is transitioning toward indigenous submarine construction and requires high-level technical competence.
Moreover, India’s contribution places it within a larger, largely unreported network of nations that support Taiwan’s defence industry. India’s role as a mid-tier industrial and technical partner adds depth to this distributed supply chain architecture, while the United States provides combat systems and weapons integration, and nations like the United Kingdom and Japan provide specialised technology. More importantly, the logic of the grey-zone strategy underpins all of this. India’s participation is cautious and avoids any official recognition . Without crossing diplomatic red lines or inciting direct confrontation with China, New Delhi can support Taiwan’s defence readiness. India is effectively bolstering a significant regional player while beating China in its own game.
Military spending: The strategic foundation
India’s changing approach toward China must also be understood within the broader context of rising global military expenditure, reflecting an increasingly competitive, security-driven international environment. According to the SIPRI 2026 report, the global military spending reached $2.887 trillion in 2025. It was the highest level ever recorded and the 11th consecutive year of growth. This sustained increase signals a shift toward long-term strategic competition rather than isolated conflicts.
Asia has emerged as a central driver of this trend. In which China’s military expenditure rose to an estimated $336 billion. On the other hand, India has raised its defence budget by 8.9% to $92.1 billion, solidifying its place among the world’s top five military spenders. These patterns indicate a broader reevaluation of national security objectives, alongside regional concerns. Notably, the rise of military expenditure does not necessarily indicate an imminent shift towards open warfare, but it provides the foundation for grey-zone competition. It helps to enhance capabilities, whether in conventional forces, technology or logistics. It enables exerting pressure, building deterrence, and shaping outcomes without crossing the border or entering direct war.
For India, increased defence spending complements its post-Galwan strategy. In 2020, India’s military spending was $72.94 billion, which has now increased to $92.1 Billion, a 26% increase. It strengthens military readiness along the border, supports naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, and underpins its ability to engage in multi-domain competition. In this sense, military expenditure is not merely about preparing for war, but about sustaining a long-term strategic posture that allows India to operate effectively in the grey zone while maintaining escalation control.
Japan factor: Expanding India’s strategic alignment
Alongside its quiet engagement with Taiwan, India has adopted a more open stance in supporting Japan’s evolving defence posture. In recent years, Tokyo has shifted away from its traditionally pacifist stance, most notably by easing restrictions on exporting lethal weapons. This marks a significant shift in Japan’s post-World War II security policy and reflects rising regional concerns, particularly regarding China.
Unlike its approach with Taiwan, India’s engagement with Japan is open and publicly acknowledged. However, it still fits within a broader grey-zone logic. India is building flexible partnerships that enhance collective deterrence without formally escalating tensions rather than forming rigid alliances. This approach allows India to increase pressure on China indirectly by strengthening regional actors and creating a more complex strategic environment. However, China views this development with concern. Beijing has warned that closer India–Japan cooperation could contribute to a containment framework in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the calculation remains clear that partnerships with technologically advanced and strategically aligned countries like Japan are essential for maintaining balance in a rapidly shifting regional order.
India’s emerging Grey Zone doctrine
While India does not have a formally declared “grey-zone doctrine,” its actions since the Galwan clash point to the emergence of a clear and identifiable strategic approach. Rather than relying on singular responses or direct confrontation, India has adopted a sustained, calibrated pressure strategy across multiple domains.
A few essential principles serve as the foundation for this evolving doctrine. First, India prioritises escalation management, responding decisively to Chinese activities while avoiding steps that could spark a full-scale conflict. Second, it employs a multi-domain strategy that combines military readiness with economic measures, technical progress, and diplomatic collaboration. Third, it employs strategic ambiguity, especially in sensitive areas like its relationship with Taiwan, where actions are meaningful but not overtly acknowledged.
Another important element is gradualism. India’s response is not designed to produce immediate results, but to build long-term advantage. Whether through strengthening border infrastructure, reducing economic dependence, or expanding regional partnerships, the approach reflects a shift toward continuous competition rather than episodic reaction. In the end, India’s grey-zone doctrine is defensive in nature. Unlike China’s expansionist use of grey-zone tactics to alter the status quo, India’s objective is to preserve balance, deter aggression, and prevent unilateral changes along the border. It is a strategy that prioritises stability while still allowing India to impose costs and shape outcomes.
Conclusion: From reaction to strategic competition
The transformation in India’s approach after Galwan is not merely tactical, but it is fundamentally strategic. For years, India sought to manage tensions with China through restraint and compartmentalisation, separating border disputes from broader engagement. That framework has now eroded.
What has emerged in its place is a more integrated and assertive approach. India is no longer reacting to individual incidents but adapting to a continuous form of competition. Through military preparedness, economic measures, diplomatic partnerships, and quiet strategic engagement with actors such as Taiwan, New Delhi has begun to operate effectively in the grey zone. This does not signal a move toward open confrontation. Instead, it reflects a recognition that modern geopolitical competition is rarely fought through declared wars. It unfolds through sustained, incremental actions that shape the strategic environment over time.
In this evolving landscape, India is no longer on the defensive. It is learning to compete with China on its own terms, carefully and deliberately, without crossing the threshold into full-scale conflict. Therefore, the real shift after Galwan is not just on the battlefield, but in how India understands and conducts strategy.
Aditya Dhar’s spy thrillers, Dhurandhar 1 and 2, inspired by the actual gangs of Karachi’s oldest neighbourhood, Lyari, and the story of an Indian agent who infiltrated these syndicates to tear down terror networks in Pakistan, captured the imagination of the Indian audiences. The series turned out to be an unexpected blockbuster as the characters were immortalised on the silver screen.
A few weeks later, National Investigation Agency (NIA) teams executing raids at various sites across West Bengal and Kolkata arrived at Gulshan Colony, the state’s very own Lyari, which, unbeknownst to many, has established itself as a hotspot for crime, Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltrators, violent occurrences and similarly notorious developments.
The anti-terror agency dispatched numerous personnel prior to the second phase of voting as a preventive step to ensure a peaceful electoral process and a swift response to any potential challenges in Bengal. The teams have been stationed in districts such as Purba Bardhaman, South 24 Parganas, Hooghly, Nadia, Howrah and Kolkata. According to officials, they are decisively looking into the matters pertaining to the confiscation of crude bombs, illicit weapons and ammunition.
They informed, “The agency has intensified its presence as part of precautionary measures to ensure a peaceful electoral process. The NIA teams are stationed on the ground to enable swift response to any untoward situation that may arise before, during, or after polling.” They stated that the move is intended to uphold law and order and avert any possible disruption associated with the capture of explosives or illicit firearms in sensitive regions.
NIA took over the case involving the recovery of crude bombs on 26th April and began its inquiry with a terror angle, following the registration of a fresh First Information Report (FIR) after directives from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), owing to the severity of the incident, the probable impact on national security and the need to unearth a larger conspiracy.
The Kolkata police discovered 79 homemade explosives and other incriminating materials that were being stockpiled at a place, posing a threat to property and human life, along with the intent to instil fear and panic among the people. The matter was first reported on 25th April at the Uttar Kashipur Police Station of Kolkata’s Bhangar division.
The official complaint was submitted in compliance with the applicable sections of the Explosive Substances Act of 1908 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) after reliable details regarding the storage of crude explosives and the components used to prepare them were received.
The authorities responded to the tip-off and recovered 9 spherical objects that seemed to be homemade bombs, tied with jute ropes alongside other evidence. These were stored by unidentified individuals in an abandoned home near a burial ground in Majherhat (Poilepara) hamlet, Uttar Kashipur police station in South 24 Parganas, which is an All-India Trinamool Congress stronghold.
The incident has, yet again, drawn attention to the Muslim-dominated Gulshan Colony, under ward number 10 of Panchannagram, is already known for its alarming activities and anti-social elements.
SIR highlighted a massive voter discrepancy in Gulshan Colony
Last November, the colony made headlines during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) in the state. The Booth Level Officers (BLOs) who went there were surprised to find that they could not identify eligible voters among a population of about 200,000. According to reports, nearly 90% of the inhabitants were outsiders and stayed in the vicinity for many years.
They were not registered voters and were originally from Bangladesh, but asserted to hold Voter ID cards. The overall count of authorised voters at the booth was just 2,500 to 3,000. It was also outlined by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Amit Malviya.
The mystery of Kolkata’s Gulshan colony!
A colony that mushroomed overnight claims to have nearly 2 lakh residents, but when BLOs went for verification, they could trace only 20,000 voters. Where are the rest?
The formation and expansion of the colony commenced with the rise of the TMC to power in 2011, and hundreds of buildings were constructed within a few months. There are allegations that the Kolkata Municipal Corporation does not possess any official records of the locality. Locals, who lived there before it was created, charged that Bangladeshis were settled in the area with the support of leaders from the ruling party.
Senior BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari also accused that intruders had been staying there for an extended period and only evacuated due to the execution of the SIR initiative. “If they are Indians, then why are their names not there in the voter list. If a fake identity card is created, then can anyone be called Indian? How was Gulshan Colony created? Who provided electrification there? Who provided water there,” questioned Samik Bhattacharya, president of the party’s state unit.
Union Minister Dr Sukanta Majumdar flagged the “noticeable demographic change in 13 years” in 2024, posting, “This area has become a hub for illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators and Rohingyas, fostering crime and lawlessness.”
Gulshan Colony in Kasba has undergone noticeable demographic changes over the last 13 years. This area has become a hub for illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators and Rohingyas, fostering crime and lawlessness.
“As Kolkata Mayor Firhad Hakim once remarked about a mini-Pakistan in Kolkata, it seems a mini-Bangladesh has now emerged,” Majumdar added, accusing TMC councillors of offering fictitious Aadhaar cards and voter IDs. “Is the Trinamool government truly unaware of the illegal constructions, encroachments and rising criminal activities here,” he asked and demanded answers.
It is evident that Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltrators have systematically occupied the colony, despite the contrary arguments of the TMC.
Gulshan Colony: The growing trouble zone
The colony has been described as a haven for offenders, and many terrorists have even been nabbed from there. Bar fights, shootings, stabbings in broad daylight, Bangladeshi hideouts and such events are persistent features of the colony.
An official of Kolkata police expressed, “Over the years, Gulshan Colony has become a den of criminal activities and a safe haven for criminals, several of whom come from outside the state as well as from outside the country. The dingy lanes and bylanes and closely connected buildings also allow criminals to flee and hide even during surprise raids. We have built a dedicated strong network in the area, but we have to admit, even then, it becomes difficult to prevent crimes at times,” reported The Times of India.
The illustrations of gang wars, which are more appropriate for the fictional world of Cinema rather than real life, often manifest on its streets. The same unfolded in September of 2025 after which Mohammad Nafis, Mohammad Sajid, Ahmed Hossain alias Mohammad Madhu, Raja Khan and Mohammad Firoz alias Mini Firoz were arrested as they were seen “vandalising bikes, assaulting shop owners and hurling crude country-made bombs,” adjacent to the EM Bypass of the Ananadpur police station area.
Gulshan Colony—Kolkata’s most notorious hotspot of lawlessness. Bike borne criminals open fire as terrified residents flee in fear. We heard of this from 90s Bihar. Worry much how SIR would happen here, police themselves avoid this area, sending ECI officials would be deadly https://t.co/jJWd2owM5Lpic.twitter.com/HIoqhcvmO4
A confrontation between two local syndicates had led to the unrest, which “aimed to establish Firoz’s dominance in the area” and terrified the locals. He also enjoyed political clout and was eventually caught in Delhi after a 10-day search. Police suspected collaboration from groups within the Trinamool Congress. Locals conveyed that disagreement over ownership of a factory was the trigger, and a retaliation took place when a gang tried to threaten the proprietor.
A few months before this, a building material supplier was brutally killed with a chopper on a busy road near his house in the colony. The assailant lived in the same neighbourhood as well. Furthermore, Kasba councillor Sushanta Kumar Ghosh mentioned, “It’s a difficult place to manage. Since the Left regime, the place has been a hub of illegal construction. Multiple water bodies have been filled up, and illegal buildings have been constructed here. I have tried to stop them, but it’s a big racket, and thus I think I was attacked,” while talking to the media house.
His home is also in Gulshan Colony, and he was targeted after a plan was hatched by Mohammad Afroz (Gulzar Khan per other reports), who confessed to the murder attempt, which stemmed from a land conflict there. Severe altercations involving properties occur frequently, and violent instances transpire almost every week. People in the surrounding territories face similar dread, avoid parking their vehicles outdoors and abstain from strolling on the road late at night.
Conclusion
Gulshan Colony has been in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons, and although it may closely resemble Luyari, the gang members are illegal immigrants, unlike those in Pakistan. Additionally, the SIR exercise raised another critical inquiry: if there are barely any legitimate voters in the colony, then were Bangladeshis and Rohingyas participating in the democratic process to choose a government for the citizens of the state?
With TMC’s track record and the dismissal of 9.1 million bogus voters during the drive, this is much more plausible than improbable. On the other hand, the authorities do not intervene strongly due to the political influence and the daunting network of these criminals, which is apparently supported by the party in power in the state.
The situation is so bleak that even people from nearby areas are scared for their lives and safety, as guns and weapons are brandished, and shootouts are carried out with impunity, leaving vulnerable citizens in shock. Thus, it is hardly astonishing that the latest NIA investigation is also concentrated on the area, as these dreaded intruders and perpetrators can jeopardise national peace and security, much like they did to the state.
One of South Kashmir’s largest religious seminaries, Darul Uloom Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom in Shopian’s Imam Sahib area, has been sealed by the Jammu and Kashmir administration under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. The action was taken after authorities found links between the madrasa and anti-national activities, including suspected terror funding, radicalisation, and irregular operations.
The order to declare the institution an unlawful entity was issued by Kashmir Divisional Commissioner Anshul Garg, who exercised powers under Section 8(1) of the law. This provision allows the government to seal premises and freeze assets if a place is found to be used for unlawful activities.
This is the first time in Jammu and Kashmir that a seminary of such scale has been declared unlawful.
Links to Jamaat-e-Islami raised serious concerns
Authorities say the madrasa had deep and continued connections with the banned outfit Jamaat-e-Islami, which has been outlawed in India since 2019. According to official records, individuals linked to this organisation were holding key administrative and academic positions in the institution.
Investigations and intelligence inputs suggested that the madrasa was not just functioning as a religious education centre but was also operating outside legal oversight. Officials pointed to a lack of proper registration, questionable land acquisition, and attempts to avoid regulatory checks.
The administration also highlighted unusual financial patterns. There were serious gaps between the funds received and how they were spent, raising fears that money may have been diverted for unlawful purposes.
A 15-acre madrasa has been under scrutiny for years
Siraj-ul-Uloom has been on the radar of security agencies for quite some time. Multiple investigations by agencies, including the National Investigation Agency and Jammu and Kashmir Police, had examined its activities over the years.
The institution, spread across nearly 15 acres with a large campus and garden, had around 500 to 800 students at different times. It also ran a school offering both religious and modern education, affiliated with the Jammu and Kashmir Board of School Education.
Despite its academic presence, authorities say the environment inside the madrasa gradually became a concern. Reports indicated that over time, it created conditions that encouraged Jihadi mindset among some students.
Connection to the Pulwama terror attack
One of the most serious concerns linked to the madrasa is its connection to the Pulwama attack, in which 40 CRPF personnel lost their lives.
Investigations revealed that Sajjad Ahmad Bhat, who played a key role in the attack by arranging the vehicle used in the bombing, had studied at this madrasa. He remained associated with the institution until around 2017.
After the Pulwama investigation, it also came to light that several former students of the madrasa had joined terrorist organisations. The madrasa’s own management reportedly admitted that at least 11 students had turned to terrorism over time.
Among them were names like Mohammad Shafi Butt and Adil Ahmed, who were later killed in encounters. Many of these individuals were linked to Pakistan-based terror groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Students, teachers and overground workers involved in terrorist activities
One such case is that of Shaukat Ahmed Sheikh, a teacher who was later arrested by the National Investigation Agency. Investigators found that he was linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and had played a role in recruiting young students into terrorism. Reports suggest that he influenced and radicalised around 20 students.
In addition to this, several overground workers (OGWs) who assist terrorists with logistics and support were also traced back to the madrasa. In 2020, three such individuals arrested in Shopian were found to have studied at Siraj-ul-Uloom and were linked to Jamaat-e-Islami networks.
Financial irregularities and illegal activities
Another major factor behind the sealing of the madrasa was its financial conduct. Officials found what they described as “financial opacity,” meaning that the handling of funds was unclear and suspicious.
The institution was accused of having a flawed financial control system, with frequent changes in how funds were managed. This raised doubts about whether the money was being used for legitimate educational purposes.
Authorities also pointed out that the madrasa was not properly registered and had encroached upon government land. It was said to be using various methods to bypass legal scrutiny and continue operations without accountability.
A show-cause notice was issued to the management, asking them to explain these issues. However, the response was found to be weak and not convincing.
Government action and sealing of premises
After reviewing the evidence, the administration concluded that the premises were being used in ways that supported unlawful activities. As a result, the madrasa was declared an unlawful entity and sealed.
Security forces have been deployed outside the campus, and posters announcing the sealing have been placed at the gates. The action also allows authorities to take further steps, including freezing assets and taking control of the property.
Officials have clarified that this action is preventive in nature. It is aimed at stopping the misuse of the institution rather than waiting for criminal cases to be proven beyond a doubt.
PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti condemns the sealing of the madrasa
The sealing of Siraj-ul-Uloom has triggered political reactions in Kashmir. Mehbooba Mufti, leader of the People’s Democratic Party(PDP), strongly criticised the move.
Every single day the j&k government acts as a mute bystander & a timid enabler of vicious assaults on J&Ks identity & dignity. Declaring Dar Ul Uloom Jamia Siraj Ul Uloom as an unlawful entity under UAPA is a flagrant injustice to the poor underprivileged sections of society.… pic.twitter.com/kkkvWNSQWA
She said that the madrasa had produced many professionals, including doctors and engineers, who have contributed positively to society. According to her, declaring the institution unlawful is unfair and ignores its educational role.
Similarly, National Conference MP Ruhullah Mehdi also opposed the decision. In his public statements, he said that shutting down such institutions affects hundreds of students and deprives them of educational opportunities.
These reactions have added a political dimension to the issue, with debates focusing on security concerns versus educational impact.
The larger network of madrasas
Siraj-ul-Uloom was reportedly linked to a broader network of institutions supported by Jamaat-e-Islami through its trust, Falah-e-Aam. At one point, hundreds of madrasas across Kashmir were connected to this network. In recent days, the Jammu and Kashmir administration has taken over 58 schools affiliated to the Falah-e-Aam trust.
Authorities believe that some of these institutions were used to influence young students, especially those from economically weaker backgrounds. According to investigations, certain students were exposed to extremist ideas and later recruited into terrorist groups.
A case that reflects a larger security challenge
The sealing of Siraj-ul-Uloom highlights the ongoing challenge faced by authorities in Kashmir, balancing education, religious institutions, and national security.
While the madrasa had a long history and provided education to many, the findings of investigations pointed towards a pattern of misuse that could not be ignored. By linking the institution to terror funding, recruitment, and even a major attack like Pulwama, the administration has made it clear why it considers the action necessary.
The United Arab Emirates announced its exit from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the broader OPEC+ alliance on Tuesday, 28th April. The decision will come into effect from 1st May.
The announcement, reported by the country’s state news agency, cited Abu Dhabi’s long-term economic vision as the key reason behind the move. It comes at a time when global oil markets are already under pressure due to the ongoing tensions linked to the US-Iran war, which has disrupted supply routes and raised concerns about energy security worldwide.
What is OPEC and the UAE’s role in it
OPEC is one of the world’s largest and most powerful oil cartels, formed in 1960. The organisation’s primary objective is to organise and regulate the oil production of member countries and keep global crude oil prices balanced by controlling supply.
The United Arab Emirates has been one of the integral members of the cartel from the beginning. The country joined the group in 1971, coinciding with the emergence of the seven-emirate federation.
However, Abu Dhabi, which holds a staggering 95% of the UAE‘s oil reserves, actually joined the group even earlier, in 1967. Back in the 70s, OPEC was at the height of its power. It completely changed the balance of power between countries that produce oil and those that consume it, helping former colonies take control of their own natural resources away from Western dominance.
The UAE’s oil production capacity has long outgrown its Opec limits. As capacity rises towards 5 million barrels per day, a widening gap with Opec+ quotas and years of mounting tensions over output limits and policy decisions have ultimately led to the UAE’s exit from Opec.
In 2016, OPEC further enhanced its market position by establishing OPEC+. The organisation now includes such non-OPEC oil giants as Russia, thus gaining a monopoly over 40% of global crude oil production and 60% of globally traded petroleum.
By leaving, the UAE removes one of the few “swing producers” that can quickly change production levels. This seriously weakens OPEC’s ability to react to fast-moving market changes in the future. Unlike smaller exits in the past, such as Qatar in 2019 or Angola in 2024.
OPEC’s role in the Global economy
OPEC has often been compared to a central bank for the global oil market. Its biggest tool is its ability to control supply. By setting production quotas for each member country, OPEC ensures that oil production is adjusted according to global demand.
If there’s too much oil in the market and demand is low, they order members to pump less to prevent a price crash. On the flip side, if there’s a shortage, they can increase production to stop prices from skyrocketing. For countries that rely almost entirely on oil money to fund their schools, hospitals, and roads, these mandates are a safety net that protects their domestic budgets from sudden market shocks.
These quotas, however, also mean that countries cannot always produce oil at their full capacity. For some members, especially those looking to expand production, this has often been a point of frustration.
Why the UAE decided to exit
The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC did not come out of nowhere. For several years, there have been differences between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia over how oil production should be managed.
These differences became visible during OPEC+ meetings in 2020 and 2021. At the time, the UAE wanted to increase production after cuts made during the COVID-19 pandemic, while Saudi Arabia preferred to keep output low to maintain high oil prices.
This difference reflects the economic realities of both countries. Saudi Arabia relies heavily on high oil prices to fund its large-scale projects. The UAE, on the other hand, has a more diversified economy and has been less dependent on oil revenues.
Instead of restricting output, Abu Dhabi has been investing heavily in expanding its production capacity. It aims to increase output from around 3.4 million barrels per day to 5 million barrels per day by 2027. This shows a clear intention to produce and sell more oil while demand still exists, especially as the world slowly moves towards cleaner energy.
After leaving OPEC, the UAE can now freely increase its oil production, thanks to the Fujairah Pipeline that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. The Emirates had planned and developed this independent export route for years, enabling it to add up to 2 million barrels per day. A… pic.twitter.com/rqQpwq7hB0
— سيف الدرعي| Saif alderei (@saif_aldareei) April 28, 2026
UAE Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei confirmed that the move was carefully planned. “This is a policy decision. It has been done after a careful look at current and future policies related to the level of production,” he said.
Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed Al Mazrouei says the UAE’s exit from OPEC and OPEC+ marks an evolution in strategy while reaffirming Abu Dhabi’s commitment to energy security, reliable low-emission supply, and stable global markets. pic.twitter.com/aVEyH0gYxt
Another key factor is infrastructure. The UAE has developed independent export routes like the Fujairah pipeline, which allows it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and export oil more freely. This gives it the flexibility to increase production without being tied down by OPEC quotas.
Role of the Iran War and regional tensions
The ongoing tensions linked to the US-Iran conflict have also played a major role in shaping the UAE’s decision. The Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil routes, has seen disruptions, with fewer ships passing through due to security concerns.
Before the conflict, nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply moved through this narrow passage. However, recent attacks and instability have made the region more unpredictable. Oil infrastructure in the Gulf has also been at risk, adding to the uncertainty.
With Iran itself being a founding member of OPEC, the organisation’s consensus-based system can limit how quickly countries like the UAE respond to such challenges. By exiting OPEC, the UAE now gains more control over its oil policy and can act independently to secure its exports.
There is also a larger geopolitical shift at play. Gulf countries have traditionally depended on the United States for security. However, recent events have raised questions about how effective that protection is during regional conflicts.
By stepping out of OPEC, the UAE is giving itself more room to use its oil resources strategically, not just for economic gain, but also to build new global partnerships and strengthen its position beyond traditional alliances.
A shift towards a broader economic vision
Beyond immediate concerns, the UAE’s exit from OPEC also aligns with its long-term strategy. The UAE has been making efforts towards economic diversification, with investments in industries such as technology, education, tourism, and finance.
However, the UAE knows that oil exports play a critical role in financing these efforts. By ramping up oil exports now, the UAE aims to capitalise on the value of its reserves in anticipation of falling demand for oil globally in the coming years.
With substantial investments via the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, the UAE intends to enhance its agility and competitiveness in the international energy market. Being a member of OPEC could potentially hinder the UAE in meeting its strategic objectives.
In many aspects, this step by the UAE reveals its unwillingness to be associated exclusively with oil production and its dependence on cartel policies. Instead, the UAE sees itself as a player in the global economy that is capable of making decisions based on its own interests.
The politically charged climate in West Bengal is rising as it nears Phase II of the assembly election voting on 29th April (Wednesday). Now, a fresh issue has come to light concerning an IPS officer, Ajay Pal Sharma, from the Uttar Pradesh cadre who has been assigned to the state as a police observer.
The matter began when his video surfaced online on 27th April (Monday). IPS Sharma visited the home of Jahangir Khan, who is reportedly close to Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s nephew Abhishek Banerjee and is an All India Trinamool Congress candidate (AITC or TMC) from Falta, to confront his goons on the last day of the election campaign.
“All of you comprehend this fully that strict action will be taken against anyone attempting to create trouble. If any instances of issues or problems are reported, appropriate measures will be enforced. Jahangir’s family members are present here. Inform him that we are receiving frequent information about his men threatening people. We will take firm action against him. Do not cry or repent later,” Sharma warned.
“Jahangir ki ghar wale bhi khade hai, usko bata dena kaide se — yeh baar baar jo khabar aa raha hai ke Jahangir ke log dhamka rahe hain, toh phir achchhe se khabar lenge. Phir baad mein rona aur pachtana mat karna.”
Sharma also discovered that 14 West Bengal police officers were stationed there and was told that 10 cops had been assigned to provide Khan with Y-category protection. He pointed out the disparity and sent out a notification to the Superintendent of Police demanding an explanation for the additional deployment.
Khan promptly responded to the occurrence and alleged, “Around 3 pm yesterday, he came and tried to threaten my security at this party office. Then he went and tried to threat my family. Is this the duty of a police observer? If he has to say something he has to tell the SP (Superintendent of Police) or IC (Inspector-in-Charge).”
He charged that Sharma acted beyond the scope of his authoritative jurisdiction as assigned by the Election Commission of India to aid the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and threatened the members of his party. “There is no rule of ECI that says that a police observer can go and threat people at their houses. To aid BJP these people are doing illegal things. They are trying to threaten TMC workers and leaders because they know that they won’t win but we are not afraid,” Khan claimed.
Diamond Harbour, West Bengal: On Police Observer Ajay Pal Sharma, TMC Candidate from Falta Constituency, Jahangir Khan says, "Around 3 pm yesterday, he came and tried to threaten my security at this party office. Then he went and tried to threat my family. Is this the duty of a… pic.twitter.com/xhJalkmn0s
“This is Bengal. If he is Singham, I am Pushpa. No amount of threat or coercion by the BJP-appointed police officials from Uttar Pradesh will be allowed in Falta. They came with forces and tried to pressure my people and me. Such actions are not acceptable in a democratic system,” Khan further retaliated.
On the other hand, TMC Lok Sabha MP Mahua Moitra, senior Congress spokesperson Supriya Shrinate and the opposition ecosystem resorted to sharing a video where a man was seen enjoying the dance of a scantily-clad woman to claim it was IPS Sharma. A “journalist” deleted the clip afterwards. However, formal complaints are reportedly being registered concerning this matter.
Sharma was spotted raiding Khan’s residence following grave accusations of voter intimidation by the latter’s supporters. He was joined by a combined team of Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), Flying Surveillance Team (FST) and Quick Response Team (QRT). Sharma is one of the 11 police observers that the Election Commission has provided for the peaceful organisation of second round of voting in the state. He is deployed to the district with the largest allotment, South 24 Parganas, along with 2 others.
TMC’s efforts to stop Ajay Pal Sharma from discharging his duties in Bengal have also been thwarted by the Calcutta High Court. A writ petition was filed today to claim his warning to Jehangir Khan is a violation of the Model Code of Conduct and he should be recalled from his current duties as Election Observer in the state.
The High Court refused to entertain the plea, stating, “We will not intervene until April 29. We will not interfere in the work of those entrusted with election duties.”
Calcutta refuses to interfere in the matter. “We will not intervene until April 29. We will not interfere in the work of those entrusted with election duties,” said Justice Krishna Rao. https://t.co/iOAZi31qXY
Sharma, who was born in Punjab’s Ludhiana on 26th October 1985 is renowned for his strict and unyielding approach to law enforcement. He joined the Indian Police Service in 2011 after completing his training as a dental surgeon at Government Medical College in Patiala.
The 40-year-old has reportedly participated in over 500 police encounters over the years, earning the title of “encounter specialist.” During these operations, nearly 15 criminals were killed, and numerous others were taken into custody. Notably, he launched 136 encounters in just 22 months as SP in Jaunpur, which is regarded as one of the greatest figures for a district assignment.
Sharma has also handled important tasks at Prayagraj, especially during the Kumbh Mela and served as SP/SSP (Senior Superintendent of Police) in Hathras, Shamli, Rampur and Jaunpur. He is presently Prayagraj’s Additional Commissioner of Police (Law and Order).
“We need IPS officials like Ajay Pal Sharma to tackle crime in our state. I would urge officials in my state to take inspiration from IPS Sharma and learn techniques to curb crime in the state,” former Haryana Chief Minister Manohar Lal Khattar declared while facilitating Sharma at a function in Karnal in 2017.
CM Yogi had also announced that the new law and order in place had put an end to the “Kairana-like exodus,” with local traders breathing a sigh of relief, when Sharma was posted in Shamli.
The region witnessed the killings of 4 infamous criminals as 20 others were wounded, while he was praised from all quarters. Locals gave him a chariot ride after the cops shot and killed two notorious criminals in two consecutive shootings. Dreaded criminals surrendered out of fear of similar action under his authority. Furthermore, offenders were writing to courts to express their desire to remain incarcerated and promised never to engage in any illicit activity.
From Sharma to “Singham”
Sharma first became popular in 2018 while serving at Rampur when he was searching for a man who raped and murdered a 6-year-old girl. A brief encounter ensued while attempting to apprehend the accused who was shot 3 times and nabbed. The police officer gained a lot of attention as a result of the instance. He was facilitated by Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath in March 2018. Afterwards, he was moved to Noida and became SSP.
Interestingly, Sharma is acknowledged for monitoring not only criminal gangs but also his own force. He was tipped off about a supposed list of bribe rates among police officers while he was posted in Noida. He made the decision to act independently and carried out an unexpected inspection. He dressed plainly, got into an autorickshaw and drove through the streets of Noida and Greater Noida. He succeeded in suspending a sub-inspector after catching him red-handed. There are numerous such tales about him in police circles.
Sharma has even shared his opinions regarding his designation as an “encounter specialist.” He voiced, “These encounters did not happen by will, it was just chance. We want to arrest criminals, make recoveries and collect the maximum information on their hiding places, their other gang members, etc. This is the last option. We do not know what situation arises on the ground,” in a conversation with The Print.
Sharma admitted that he killed at least 9 accused and wounded about 190 others during these violent face-offs. He actively pursued many wanted criminals, with bounties varying from ₹5,000 to ₹100,000 and effectively neutralised several of them. He even took decisive action, including the invocation of the National Security Act (NSA) against the mining mafia. He initiated disciplinary actions against almost 63 police personnel, demonstrating his unwavering stance against corruption.
Allegations of corruption and a significant presence on social media
There have been some controversies in Sharma’s career as well. He was ousted as Rampur SP in 2020 due to claims of posting irregularities. A vigilance investigation was then suggested by a Special Investigation Team (SIT). He was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act in Meerut for allegedly pushing for his relocation and posting.
Additionally, a woman accused Sharma of cheating under the guise of marriage, which resulted in the filing of a First Information Report (FIR) in Lucknow. The scandal hindered his career advancement for a while even though he eventually earned a clean chit.
Sharma has a large social media fan base. He has about 1,40,000 followers on a Facebook page in his name. His younger brother, Amit Pal Sharma, is also a 2015 batch IPS officer from Uttar Pradesh cadre.
A strong and early summer has gripped large parts of India and other regions of Asia, with temperatures crossing dangerous levels in April itself. Weather experts are now watching a global climate pattern called El Nino and an even stronger version known as “Super El Nino” to understand whether it is driving this extreme heat and what lies ahead for the coming months.
Heatwave tightens grip across India
Several states across north, central and eastern India are already seeing a sharp rise in temperatures, even before peak summer has fully set in. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) has issued heatwave alerts across multiple regions, including Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Odisha.
On 25th April, Banda in Uttar Pradesh recorded a scorching 47.4°C, the highest temperature in the country this year so far. In Delhi, temperatures touched 42.8°C at the Safdarjung observatory, which is more than 5°C above normal and qualifies as a heatwave.
In general, most parts of the country have been seeing daytime temperatures between 40°C and 45°C. Night temperatures are also staying unusually high, especially in Delhi, Haryana and Odisha, making conditions more uncomfortable.
The IMD says heatwave or severe heatwave conditions were active in at least 11 states and union territories, with some regions like Himachal Pradesh and eastern Uttar Pradesh seeing more extreme warnings.
A global heat signal, not just India’s problem
This extreme heat is not limited to India. Scientists say the current conditions are part of a much larger global pattern.
Data from NASA’s GISTEMP shows that March 2026 was among the hottest ever recorded globally, with temperatures about 1.27°C above the 1951-1980 average. Meanwhile, Europe’s Copernicus climate service pegged it at 1.48°C above pre-industrial levels, making it one of the warmest March months on record.
One of the most striking anomalies came from eastern Siberia, particularly the Yakutia region of Russia, where temperatures were recorded at more than 10°C above normal for March, something scientists say would have been “virtually impossible” without human-driven climate change.
Heat maps for late April show large parts of north India, the Sahel in Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula crossing 45°C, indicating a widespread heat zone.
What exactly is El Nino?
El Nino is a natural climate pattern that occurs every 2 to 7 years in the Pacific Ocean. Normally, strong trade winds push warm ocean water towards Asia. But during El Nino, these winds weaken, allowing warm water to shift eastward towards the central and eastern Pacific.
This warming of ocean surface temperatures changes global wind patterns and rainfall systems. As a result, it can influence weather across continents, including heat, storms, and monsoons.
In India, El Nino years are usually linked to hotter summers and weaker monsoons.
What makes a “Super El Nino” different?
A “Super El Nino” is simply a much stronger version of the same phenomenon.
While a regular El Nino sees sea surface temperatures rise by about 0.5°C to 1.4°C above average, a Super El Nino involves a spike of more than 2.0°C in the central Pacific.
Scientists track this using different climate models and indices, including the Super El Nino Index (SEI), which has shown a rising trend since the 1980s, something experts link to global warming.
According to forecasts from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, the current developing El Nino could turn into one of the strongest seen in over a century.
What are scientists saying right now?
Climate agencies, including the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), say there is growing confidence that El Nino conditions will develop between May and July 2026, after a neutral start to the year.
Wilfran Moufouma Okia, Chief of Climate Prediction at WMO, has said that climate models are now “strongly aligned” on the onset of El Nino, with the possibility of further strengthening later in the year.
However, he also pointed out a key challenge known as the “spring predictability barrier”, which makes it harder to forecast the exact strength of El Niño during this time. Forecast accuracy generally improves after April.
Some scientists have also warned that there is even a small chance that global temperature anomalies could briefly approach +2°C, which would be extremely unusual.
Is Super El Nino behind the current heat?
While it is still early to say that a Super El Nino is directly causing the current heatwave, experts believe it could intensify and prolong the conditions we are already seeing.
The IMD has already predicted above-normal heatwave days from April to June across parts of east, central and northwest India, as well as the southeast peninsula.
The current heat pattern over India also matches a broader global trend seen in recent weeks, suggesting that multiple factors, including background global warming, are at play.
What could this mean for India in 2026?
If a strong or Super El Nino develops later this year, it could have several impacts on India:
1. Longer and harsher heatwaves Daytime temperatures could remain high for longer periods, and nights may stay warmer than usual. IMD has already recorded “warm night” and even “severe warm night” conditions in some northern regions.
2. Pressure on monsoon rainfall El Nino is often associated with below-normal monsoon rainfall. Since the monsoon provides nearly 70% of India’s annual rainfall, any drop could lead to drought-like conditions.
3. Impact on agriculture and economy Agriculture contributes around 18% of India’s economy and supports nearly half the population. A weak monsoon could mean smaller harvests and financial stress for farmers.
4. Water and power stress India has already seen 60% below-normal rainfall in January-February 2026. If heat increases further, demand for water and electricity will rise sharply, increasing the risk of shortages and power cuts.
Short-term relief, but not a long-term fix
There may be brief breaks in the heat. For instance, weather systems like western disturbances can bring temporary cooling of 3-5°C, as expected around late April.
However, such relief is usually short-lived. Forecasts suggest temperatures could rise again in early May, showing that the heat cycle is far from over.
The bigger picture
The current situation highlights how local weather events are increasingly linked to global climate patterns.
India’s heatwave is not an isolated event but part of a larger warming trend seen across continents. The possibility of a Super El Nino adds another layer of uncertainty, one that could shape weather patterns not just in India, but across the world.
For now, scientists say nothing is fully certain yet. A timely and strong monsoon could still ease some of the pressure. But as things stand, the early signs point to a challenging summer and possibly an even tougher year ahead.
A special NIA court in Bengaluru has sentenced Mangaluru cooker blast case accused Mohamed Shafiq to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment in the 2022 Mangaluru Pressure Cooker Blast Case. The court has also imposed a total fine of ₹92,000 on him. A statement released by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on Monday (27th April) stated that it was found during the investigation that the accused was radicalised into the ISIS ideology by his associate Arafath Ali, who is an accused in the Shivamogga IS Conspiracy case and is already undergoing 6 years’ rigorous imprisonment.
“Mohamed Shariq had conspired with co-accused Syed Yasin and a foreign-based IS online handler to promote IS terror activities in India with the aim to terrorise the society through IED attacks. He was also involved in fundraising activities for IS,” the NIA said. He exchanged explosive materials with Syed Yasin on the instructions of his online handler. After the arrest of Yasin & others in the Shivamogga IS Conspiracy case in September 2022, he absconded. He forged identity documents, used fraudulently obtained SIM cards and bank accounts for terror financing, and frequently changed mobile phones to destroy evidence.
Special Court at Bengaluru has convicted and sentenced an ISIS member accused in the 2022 Mangaluru Pressure Cooker Blast Case to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment (RI). pic.twitter.com/hQm4jsgvjF
According to the NIA, Shariq had set up a hideout in Mysuru, procured IED raw materials and conducted reconnaissance of sensitive target places across Mangaluru, Davanagare, and Udupi areas of Karnataka. In November 2022, he carried a Pressure Cooker IED in an auto rickshaw with the intent to plant it at a temple in Mangaluru. However, the IED exploded prematurely, injuring Shariq and another person, who later filed a complaint with the police.
A case was registered by the Karnataka Police, which led to the seizure of a large quantity of IED raw materials from the accused’s hideout in Mysuru. Later, the NIA took over the case and arrested two individuals, which led to the exposure of a larger ISIS module involved in an anti-India conspiracy. The investigation into the conspiracy is underway.
Multiple sentences ordered by the Special NIA court
While the special NIA court in Bengaluru sentenced Mohamed Shariq to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, it handed him down multiple sentences for various offences committed under different laws. The court ordered the substantial sentences to run concurrently.
The court granted Mohamed Shariq 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment each for the offences of conspiracy, waging war against India, attempted murder, and causing grievous hurt under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 307, and 326 of the Indian Penal Code.
It convicted Shariq of the offences of forgery and using forged documents under Sections 465 and 471of the IPC and sentenced him to 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The court also convicted him of the offences of committing terrorist acts, funding, conspiracy, and membership/support of a terrorist organisation under Sections 16(b), 17, 18, 20, 38, 39, 40 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and granted him 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment for each offence.
Mohamed Shariq was also convicted by the special NIA court under Sections 3(a) and 5(a) of the Explosive Substances Act and was granted 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. In addition to that, a total of ₹92,000 fine was imposed on Shariq, and if he fails to pay the amount, he will have to undergo rigorous imprisonment ranging from one month to six months for each offence.
All the 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentences granted to Shariq will run concurrently. The period of imprisonment already undergone by him will be set off against the total 10-year rigorous imprisonment period under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C.
The Mangaluru Cooker Blast
On November 19, 2022, an explosive being carried by Shariq in an autorickshaw in Mangaluru exploded in his lap. The explosion caused by a timer error left him with severe burn injuries. He was admitted to a hospital for treatment. After being discharged from the hospital, he was arrested by the NIA.
On April 20, 2024, Shariq denied all the criminal charges framed against him. Later, in December 2025, he changed his stance and filed an application under Section 229 of the CrPC, pleading guilty to all the charges. His application was accepted by the court on March 26, 2026.
Mohamed Shariq is suspected of being a part of an Islamic State-inspired terror outfit operating from Shivamogga and has been involved in many incidents since 2020. He is accused of providing training for manufacturing IEDs and is wanted in the Shivamogga IS Conspiracy case filed in September 2022 for the testing of IEDs. He sent cryptocurrency funds to co-accused Syed Yasin to help build and test explosive devices.
Notably, the members of the Shivamogga module were also involved in the Rameshwaram Cafe blast in Bengaluru, which happened on March 1, 2024. The IED used in the blast was said to be similar to the one Shariq carried in the Mangaluru blast. Besides, key accused in that case include Mussavir Hussain and Abdul Matheen Taha, both linked to the same network.
