The Madras High Court on Thursday (October 25, 2026) pulled up the Tamil Nadu Police for refusing to allow a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) march to pass through a route with a mosque and an Eidgah. A Single Bench of Justice V. Lakshminarayanan made strong remarks against the state police for denying permission for the march during the hearing of a plea filed by the State Secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), North Tamil Nadu, against the decision.
Marches cannot be denied for “lame” reasons
Justice V. Lakshminarayanan cited the High Court’s guidelines on route marches and said peaceful marches cannot be denied permission for “lame” reasons such as the presence of mosques and churches, the possibility of traffic congestion, or the presence of an organisation with a different ideology. The High Court reprimanded the state police for not complying with the guidelines, which were issued so that the court’s time is not wasted on deciding litigation arising from such matters.
“Before framing guidelines, the judge had concluded that the reasons that there are mosques and churches, possibility of traffic congestion, presence of organisations with different ideologies, should not be taken as a reason for rejection. In fact, he had termed these reasons as lame. It was the fervent hope of the Supreme Court and this court that after the guidelines, such unnecessary and frivolous litigation would be avoided. Alas, it was not to be,” the High Court sternly remarked.
“The reasons which this court had found lame had been yet again given by the police…The purpose for which the guidelines have been framed has been breached by the petitioner and the State. It was expected that the parties would cooperate. This faith has been entirely misplaced. This matter has been heard at length and time has been spent on a litigation that should not have arisen at all,” the court added.
Citizens can’t surrender their rights to the “whims” of the police
Furthermore, the High Court asserted that citizens cannot be made to surrender their rights to the “whims and fancies of the police”. “The problem is you (State) are surrendering everything to the police. Citizens’ rights cannot be surrendered to the whims and fancies of the police…God forbid I surrender the rights of the citizens to the Director General of Police,” the court remarked.
During the hearing of the petition yesterday, the High Court had questioned the Tamil Nadu police for denying permission for a route march in the state while the organisation was permitted to hold marches even in Jammu and Kashmir, which is a terrorist infested area. The court had told the RSS counsel and the State Public Prosecutor John Sathyan to find a solution, but it could not happen.
The High Court issued directions to the petitioner and the Advocate General. It sought from the petitioner details of the person in charge, and details of participants, etc in the form of an affidavit, along with an undertaking to the effect that the organisation would abide by the conditions given by the court. The court directed the Advocate General to get instructions from the Director General of Police with respect to granting permission upon filing of such affidavit.
The High Court’s previous stance on religious exclusivism
This is not the first time that such an issue relating to passing of processions or marches through some specific areas has come up before the court. In 2021, a similar matter came up before the court where the Muslim community in V. Kalathur village, Veppanthattai Taluk, Perambalur District opposed Hindu religious celebrations and processions. As a result of the opposition from the Muslim minority, the local administration had imposed certain conditions on Hindu religious festivities not to offend the Muslims’ sentiments.
A Division Bench of Justices N Kirubakarn and P Velmurugan upheld the Hindu community’s right to take out religious processions and stated that a religious procession passing through a public street cannot be prohibited merely for the reason that another community living in the area is opposing it.
The High Court noted that the villages had several Hindu temples, which had existed there for decades. It also pointed out that the Hindu religious processions had been passing through the streets of the villages as part of an old custom and that the local Muslims started opposing them since 2012.
“The temples have been there for decades together. Merely because a religious group got settled in a locality and has become vociferous, they cannot object to the custom of taking the temple’s procession through all the streets in the village, and consequent upon their objections, the customary and traditional practices cannot be prevented or prohibited,” the High Court stated.
The High Court made it clear that the presence of a place of worship cannot be a reason to prohibit other religious groups from exercising their religious rights. “The presence of religious structures/places of worship cannot take away the right of other religious groups who have been enjoying all the rights, including the conduct of religious processions for the past many years,” the High Court noted in its judgment.
The court cautioned that if the unfair resistance displayed by one community towards the religious celebrations of the other community is reciprocated, there would be “chaos, riots, religious fights causing loss of lives and destruction of properties” and the secular fabric of the country would be destroyed.
Abhijeet Dipke, founder of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), has announced an unauthorised program against the arrests of its co-convenors Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka for breaking into the denotified protest site at Jantar Mantar. The “Lehra Do Tiranga” march will be held at Connaught Place’s Central Park on 16th October (Friday).
Another Shaheen Bagh in the making: Intelligence agencies raise alarm
However, intelligence agencies have cautioned that the event could turn into an unending sit-in agitation for the release of the two leaders, reported News18. According to the sources, the participants might refuse to vacate the location after 5:00 pm, as they referred to 20th June, when permission was similarly granted until the same time, but the demonstration persisted for more than a month.
Additionally, agencies anticipate that the attendees will not travel directly to Central Park and instead congregate in small groups at different places, resulting in simultaneous assemblies throughout Central and New Delhi Districts.
It has been highlighted that extensive use of social media for livestreaming and mobilisation, along with last-minute venue or route modifications, could make crowd management and traffic control harder, especially during evening peak hours.
The insiders also mentioned that restrictions on Central Park could lead to attempts to move in the direction of Parliament House, India Gate, Rashtrapati Bhavan, the PMO, the Supreme Court, political party offices, and the homes of high-ranking public officials. Security has been identified as a top priority in the vicinity of these venues.
The evaluation also issued a warning regarding disorder. It stated that anti-social individuals could take advantage of the occasion to engage in unlawful activities, including overcrowding, rumour-mongering, or instigation, which might culminate in pushing, altercations, or damage to public property in and around the area.
The current apprehension stems from past CJP campaigns. Two police officers were hurt in an attack and stone pelting that took place during the 10th October protest close to Akashvani Bhawan. The next day was followed by reports of confrontational incidents.
On 20th July, organisers in the New Delhi district violated prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) when demonstrators tried to depart the designated protest area in defiance of regulations on unapproved processions and assemblies.
The sources stated that the number of people was significantly more than communicated. They also broke through police barricades, which could be repeated this time with another unanticipated surge. An eye is being kept out for mobilisation calls, gathering spots, and last-minute modifications on social media platforms.
Furthermore, preventive measures have been recommended at bus terminals, train stations, and metro stations, where sufficient force and crowd control measures are kept on hand. Police will remain on duty until the throng has entirely dispersed, and security around important installations and VIP zones in the national capital will be strengthened.
A familiar playbook in action
CJP regularly references democracy, the Constitution, the tricolour and other national symbols to portray its “movement” as a struggle for the better future of the country and its people. To the uninitiated, the rhetoric might seem to reflect a genuine commitment to democratic rights. However, a closer look at the party’s past conduct reveals how such revered symbols are routinely used to lend legitimacy to its actions.
It was not long ago that a CJP protest descended into violence and vandalism, leaving hundreds of police personnel attacked and injured over the demanded of the resignation of then Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan.
The group’s supporters were again caught trying to urge others, particularly members of “Gen Z,” to indulge in problematic antics and foment unrest ahead of the 10th October agitation against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Their plan, however, was thwarted by stringent measures taken by the authorities.
Hence, the invocation of national symbols, figures and constitutional ideals sits uneasily with its own conduct. The disconnect between its statements and its actions is difficult to ignore, as the appeals evidently serve not as a guiding force but as a convenient cloak to disguise its real objectives.
However, this is not an isolated matter but part of another part of a repetitive script that has often played out on the streets of India, ending up in violence, widespread disruption and chaos. Many agitations, including the anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) propaganda and the rallies against the three Farm Laws, which were later repealed, driven by unfounded assertions or political and ideological bias, descended into riots and turmoil against Hindus and the state.
The concentrated effort against the CAA, presented as a crusade to defend the Constitution and the rights of Indian citizens, issues entirely unrelated to the legislation, was unveiled to be a profound conspiracy against the nation. The pathway to citizenship for persecuted religious minorities from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh was framed as a great discrimination, while the national flag and the Constitution were brandished at the demonstrations, including the infamous Shaheen Bagh.
However, the drama finally exploded into the anti-Hindu riots in Delhi, which claimed at least 53 lives. Intelligence Bureau officer Ankit Sharma was killed during the violence, and former Aam Aadmi Party councillor Tahir Hussain has been convicted in connection with the murder and the rampage. Head Constable Ratan Lal met a similarly tragic fate at the hands of rabid Muslim fanatics.
Shahrukh Pathan, whose pistol-wielding image came to define this dark chapter, was arrested for pointing the weapon and firing at unarmed Head Constable Vivek Dahiya.
Notably, the primary names linked to the protests, including Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, who have been booked under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), dragged national symbols even as allegations of their involvement in orchestrating violence came to the fore. Khalid has alleged that Kashmir is illegally occupied by India, while Imam wanted to sever the “Siliguri Corridor” (Chicken’s Neck) from the rest of the nation.
Moreover, the incident happened during United States President Donald Trump’s visit, a period when the country’s international standing was under the spotlight. This cabal wanted to trigger disturbances across the country, target the Hindu community and tarnish India’s global reputation in the name of justice and the Constitution.
Similarly, the national flag and the Constitution featured heavily throughout the farmer protests, which were rife with charges of violence. Their most horrifying episode transpired on Republic Day 2021, when shocking scenes erupted at the Red Fort with assaults on police personnel, vandalism and destruction unfolding at a monument of immense national significance. The unruly mob even desecrated the tricolour in a further display of their contempt.
Afterwards, it was found that 299 police officials had been wounded, 236 iron barricades were damaged, and 11 Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses were vandalised. The year-long agitation also caused losses of nearly Rs 50,000 crore in only the Delhi-NCR (National Capital Region). The national symbols were essentially brandished to obscure the trail of carnage that accompanied the demonstration.
The very flag repeatedly invoked to lend the agitation a veneer of patriotism thus became part of a deeply disturbing episode that raised serious questions about the gap between the movement’s public symbolism and the conduct witnessed on the ground.
Furthermore, even the banned Popular Front of India (PFI) sought to project itself as a national and secular entity by exploiting these core values to attract Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes to its jihadi agenda. The Islamist outfit considered them potential instruments of political mobilisation to cultivate support while hiding its extremist goals.
PFI’s “India Vision 2047” clearly mentioned, “The party should utilise concepts such as the National Flag, the Constitution and BR Ambedkar to shield the real intention of establishing an Islamic rule and to reach out to SCs/STs/OBCs.” The symbols were appropriated to stand in direct opposition to the very principles they represent, to do away with the Constitution and to replace the entire system with the rule of Sharia.
Conclusion
It is not surprising to co-opt national symbols for their interests, and the CJP is also following suit. The tricolour and the Constitution are capitalised on as powerful instruments for swaying public opinion, with their symbolism conjuring a veneer of authenticity to narratives that might otherwise fail to win public support.
Neha Bora, national president of the All India Students Association (AISA), who has already aligned herself with the CJP, previously hailed Bangladesh’s regime change and expressed her desire to replicate it in India. Ironically, the national symbols are being harnessed to oust a democratically elected government to save democracy in India.
More troubling, Khalistani and other anti-national groups are also known to join such demonstrations, misusing the national symbols for their propaganda. The tricolour and the Constitution are transformed into tools of deception rather than expressions of genuine patriotism.
This tried-and-tested formula has been adopted by the AAP front CJP as well, with national symbols once again placed at the forefront of a politically motivated exercise. The party has also chosen to resort to age-old yet perilous tactics for short-term political gains, at a far greater cost to the nation and the people it consistently claims to champion.
Parvinder Singh Jhota was fighting what he saw as Punjab’s drug menace. He confronted medical-store owners, challenged the alleged illegal sale of addictive medicines and built a following by publicly exposing what he believed was a criminal network destroying the state’s youth. On October 13, 2026, his campaign came to a tragic end when he was shot dead in Mansa during a confrontation with a medical-store owner.
His murder has triggered outrage, protests and accusations against the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government. But beyond the immediate questions surrounding his killing lies a wider political story: Jhota had reportedly grown disillusioned with the Bhagwant Mann government’s handling of drugs and had moved closer to Amritpal Singh’s Waris Punjab De, an organisation led by a man who openly advocates Khalistan.
The photograph of Jhota standing in front of Bhindranwale adds another dimension to this story. Bhindranwale, whose legacy continues to inspire sections of the Khalistani movement, also rose to prominence amid a campaign against tobacco in 1981. He subsequently became a central figure in the Khalistani terrorism that engulfed Punjab.
Parvinder Singh Jhota (Image Source: India Today)
The parallel is worth examining, not because Jhota’s photograph or reported association proves that he was a Khalistani, but because Punjab’s history demonstrates how campaigns built around legitimate social and religious concerns can become intertwined with a much larger political project.
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale: The anti-tobacco campaign of 1981
In May 1981, Amritsar became the centre of a bitter confrontation over tobacco. Sikh organisations demanded restrictions on tobacco sales and sought recognition of the city’s religious character. The agitation escalated when opposing groups staged a procession in support of smoking, inflaming tensions between Sikh and Hindu organisations.
Bhindranwale, then emerging as an influential religious preacher, mobilised supporters around the anti-tobacco campaign. The agitation brought him greater public visibility at a time when Sikh identity, religious authority and political representation were becoming increasingly contentious issues.
The anti-tobacco campaign was not, in itself, a separatist movement. Opposition to tobacco has a basis in Sikh religious norms, and people could support restrictions on smoking without endorsing Khalistan. Yet the events of 1981 helped bring religious mobilisation and the politics of Sikh identity into sharper confrontation.
Historical accounts identify the tobacco controversy as an important episode in the escalation of tensions that would subsequently shape Punjab’s politics. The issue became entangled with competing political agendas, militant assertions and the broader question of Sikh political identity.
Bhindranwale’s subsequent trajectory went far beyond campaigning against tobacco. He emerged as a central figure in Khalistani terrorism, a movement seeking a separate Sikh homeland. His growing confrontation with the Indian state culminated in Operation Blue Star in June 1984, during which he was killed.
Amritpal Singh: From anti-drug preacher to Khalistani politics
Four decades later, Punjab witnessed another figure whose rise to prominence was closely associated with a campaign against intoxicants.
Amritpal Singh returned to Punjab from Dubai in August 2022 and began mobilising young people around religious revival and the drug problem. His message resonated with sections of the youth in a state where addiction, unemployment and the social consequences of substance abuse have become persistent concerns.
His father, Tarsem Singh, spoke about the impact of the campaign in an interview with The Times of India. According to him, young people responded to Amritpal’s appeal, with some abandoning drugs and returning to religious observance.
The anti-drug campaign helped Amritpal establish a public profile. But his political messaging soon extended well beyond addiction and rehabilitation.
Amritpal openly invoked Bhindranwale’s legacy, adopted a similar appearance and began advocating Khalistan. His turban-tying ceremony as the head of Waris Punjab De was held in September 2022 in Rode, Bhindranwale’s native village. Some of his supporters began referring to him as “Bhindranwale 2.0”.
In February 2023, Amritpal and a large group of supporters stormed the Ajnala police station over the arrest of an associate. Six police personnel were injured during the confrontation, according to contemporary reports. The incident brought national attention to his confrontational methods and political influence.
After a 37-day manhunt, Amritpal was arrested on April 23, 2023, and detained under the National Security Act. In the 2024 Lok Sabha election, he contested from Khadoor Sahib while in detention and won by a margin of nearly two lakh votes.
His electoral victory demonstrated that his appeal extended well beyond a small circle of followers. It also underscored the political reach he had acquired through religious mobilisation and his messaging on Punjab’s social and political grievances.
Amritpal’s trajectory therefore presents an important distinction: his anti-drug campaign was one aspect of his public profile, while his advocacy of Khalistan represented a separate political objective. The existence of the former does not erase the latter.
Jhota’s reported proximity to Waris Punjab De
This brings us back to Jhota.
His campaign against the alleged illegal sale of addictive medicines addressed a serious problem. Reports following his death indicated that he had become increasingly disillusioned with the AAP government’s handling of the drug menace and had grown closer to Waris Punjab De.
That association is relevant because of the organisation’s leadership and political outlook. But the available reporting does not conclusively establish that Jhota was a formal member of Waris Punjab De, had adopted Amritpal’s separatist ideology or intended to pursue a Khalistani political agenda.
The photograph showing Jhota in front of Bhindranwale cannot establish any of those things either. It is a reason to examine the context of his reported associations, not proof of his personal beliefs.
Nevertheless, the broader political question remains. When a campaigner fighting a genuine social problem moves closer to an organisation led by an unabashed separatist advocate, it is legitimate to ask whether the social cause is becoming intertwined with a wider political mobilisation and separatist ambitions.
This is particularly relevant in Punjab, where the memory of terrorism and Khalistani separatism remains politically consequential and where public anger over governance failures can create opportunities for alternative political actors.
The danger is not that every anti-drug activist is secretly a separatist. Such a claim would be both unfair and unsupported. The danger is that a legitimate public grievance can be used to build political influence that eventually serves objectives extending beyond the original cause and promotes a radical ideology that calls for the secession of Punjab, thereby offering ammo to Pakistan-based terrorists and intelligence agencies to foment trouble in India.
Jhota’s murder becomes a political flashpoint
The reaction to Jhota’s killing has demonstrated how quickly the tragedy has become a political confrontation.
Balwinder Kaur, mother of Amritpal Singh, accused the Punjab government of killing Jhota and demanded Bhagwant Mann’s resignation, underscoring the close association of Jhota with Singh’s group.
“Parvinder Singh Jhota, who used to raise his voice against drugs, was killed by the Govt. Why are you killing those who are trying to stop the drug menace?” she said, alleging that people had been detained and prevented from travelling to Mansa for a protest.
#WATCH | Tarn Taran, Punjab | Balwinder Kaur, mother of Waris Punjab De chief Amritpal Singh, says, "Parvinder Singh Jhota, who used to raise his voice against drugs, was killed by the Govt. Why are you killing those who are trying to stop the drug menace? People have been detained and taken to Police station. This is shameful. I would like to tell the Govt., if you fear God then mend your ways…We have been stopped from heading to Mansa for a ‘dharna’. The Govt is acting shamelessly…Bhagwant Mann should resign and leave."
The political significance of the episode lies in how Jhota’s death is now being invoked to challenge the AAP government and mobilise public anger. Such mobilisation is not inherently illegitimate. Demanding justice for a murdered activist is entirely reasonable. But the wider political objectives of those participating in that mobilisation must remain open to scrutiny.
The photograph of Jhota with Bhindranwale has added to the controversy because the latter remains an icon for sections of the Khalistani movement.
The more substantial question is whether the drug crisis is becoming a platform through which organisations with separatist objectives garner sympathy among the public and strengthen their influence.
The lesson Punjab cannot afford to ignore
Punjab’s drug crisis is real. Families have lost children to addiction, criminal networks have profited from the illegal supply of intoxicating substances, and successive governments have faced questions over their ability to dismantle these networks.
The AAP government must be judged on its record: whether illegal supply chains are being broken, traffickers are being prosecuted, rehabilitation services are accessible, and people who expose criminal activity are adequately protected.
But the legitimacy of the anti-drug cause must not become a shield against examining the political objectives of those who claim to champion it.
Bhindranwale’s rise amid the anti-tobacco agitation of 1981 and Amritpal Singh’s emergence through an anti-drug campaign offer two historical reference points for understanding the relationship between social grievances and political mobilisation. Their subsequent trajectories demonstrate why the stated objective of a campaign cannot be the only factor in assessing the movement surrounding it.
Jhota’s story is not yet evidence of a similar trajectory. But his proximity to Waris Punjab De and the picture of him with Bhindranwale’s portrait reveals a clear pattern of how an anti-drug campaign is used to fuel Khalistani politics.
Yet his death presents Punjab with two urgent challenges. The first is to establish the truth about his murder and hold those responsible accountable. The second is to ensure that the state’s drug crisis is addressed through effective governance rather than being reduced to a political contest.
The fight against drugs must remain focused on saving lives, dismantling criminal networks and restoring families. Governments must answer for their failures, while political organisations must answer questions about their ideology and objectives.
A genuine social cause deserves public support. It does not confer immunity from scrutiny on every person or organisation that invokes it. And it also presents the government with the challenge of scrutinising the anti-drug crusade as a platform to further the Khalistani movement.
That is the lesson Punjab’s history offers, and one the state cannot afford to ignore.
India’s electricity sector is undergoing a remarkable transformation, but there exists a contradiction. Renewable energy capacity is expanding at an unprecedented rate, with non-fossil sources now accounting for more than 54% of the country’s installed power capacity. Yet coal remains the backbone of electricity generation, particularly during periods of peak demand.
This contradiction reveals one of India’s most pressing energy challenges: installing clean energy capacity is not the same as ensuring a reliable electricity supply around the clock.
On September 10, 2026, India’s peak electricity demand reached 269.2 gigawatts (GW), an exceptionally high level for the monsoon season. Humid conditions, uneven rainfall and increased agricultural pumping contributed to the surge. The figure offered a glimpse of India’s rapidly growing electricity requirements. According to Central Electricity Authority projections, peak demand could rise from 243.3 GW in 2023–24 to 334.3 GW by 2029–30 and 366.4 GW by 2031–32.
These projections are crucial because India’s energy transition is occurring alongside rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and rising household consumption. Air conditioning, electric vehicles, data centres and expanding manufacturing facilities are adding substantial demand. India must therefore achieve two objectives simultaneously: produce significantly more electricity while progressively reducing dependence on fossil fuels.
The fundamental difficulty lies in the difference between installed capacity and actual generation. Solar plants produce electricity when sunlight is available, while wind generation depends on weather conditions. Neither can independently guarantee continuous supply. Solar output falls sharply in the evening, precisely when household electricity consumption increases. This creates the electricity-grid challenge commonly called the duck curve, requiring other sources to rapidly compensate for declining solar generation.
The September demand surge demonstrated why coal remains indispensable. Coal and lignite reportedly supplied approximately 188.8 GW, or 70.1% of peak demand. Wind contributed 18.2 GW, large hydropower 24.5 GW and nuclear energy approximately 6.2 GW. Solar generation was unavailable at the reported evening peak.
Consequently, despite expanding renewable capacity, India is planning to add approximately 80–97 GW of coal-based generation capacity, including more efficient ultra-supercritical plants. This reflects the need for dependable electricity during periods when renewable generation cannot meet demand.
Hydropower provides another important source of flexibility. Hydro turbines can increase output within minutes, helping balance fluctuations in electricity consumption. However, hydropower depends on adequate reservoir storage. Uneven monsoon rainfall and reported regional water-storage deficits of 8–15% during 2026 constrained its contribution, increasing reliance on thermal generation.
This exposes the interconnected nature of India’s water and energy security. Reservoirs must support irrigation, drinking water and electricity generation. Climate variability can therefore affect agricultural production and power availability simultaneously.
Energy storage is emerging as the critical missing component of India’s renewable transition. Grid-scale batteries can store surplus daytime solar electricity for evening consumption, while pumped-storage hydropower can shift energy between periods of low and high demand. Without sufficient storage infrastructure, adding renewable capacity alone cannot eliminate the need for conventional power stations.
Nuclear energy offers another potential solution. India’s installed nuclear capacity stands at approximately 8.78 GW, with ambitions to reach 14.8 GW by 2028, around 20 GW by 2031–32 and eventually 100 GW by 2047. Unlike solar and wind, nuclear reactors can provide continuous low-carbon electricity. However, substantial investment, regulatory requirements and long construction periods mean there is a long wait before we reach there.
India’s energy future will therefore depend on combining multiple technologies rather than relying on any single source. Solar and wind can provide increasingly affordable clean electricity, batteries and pumped storage can address intermittency, hydropower can balance sudden fluctuations, and nuclear energy can strengthen dependable low-carbon supply. Coal will remain necessary during the transition, but its contribution can decline as these alternatives mature.
Ultimately, the success of India’s energy transition cannot be measured merely by the number of solar panels installed or the percentage of renewable capacity added. What matters is how much clean electricity actually reaches consumers, how reliably the grid handles peak demand, and how effectively storage and transmission infrastructure reduce fossil-fuel dependence.
On July 13, 2026, Saudi-backed forces fundamentally altered the regional security architecture by bombing the runway of Sanaa International Airport. While ostensibly executed to intercept an Iranian civilian aircraft carrying a returning delegation, the strike officially terminated a fragile, multi-year de-escalation protocol. Consequently, the Houthi militia initiated a calculated campaign of strategic strikes against Saudi aviation and energy infrastructure. Despite possessing an annual defence budget exceeding $83 billion and advanced American hardware, Saudi Arabia remains fundamentally vulnerable to this impoverished insurgency. This persistent vulnerability exposes a systemic mismatch between conventional military doctrine and unconventional asymmetric reality.
The tactical engagements across the border are defined by extreme financial disparity. The Houthi arsenal heavily relies on mass-produced kamikaze drones, such as the Qasef and Sammad variants, costing merely ₹12 lakhs to ₹15 lakhs to manufacture using smuggled commercial components. To intercept these rudimentary systems, the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces must routinely fire sophisticated Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which cost upwards of ₹33 crores per launch. Consequently, this unsustainable dynamic weaponises the kingdom’s own high-tech defence budget against itself, granting the Houthis a massive economic victory even when aerial interceptions are completely successful.
Furthermore, the physical geography of northern Yemen severely handicaps conventional mechanised military operations. The Houthi heartland comprises rugged, serrated mountain ranges riddled with labyrinthine cave systems, rendering heavy Saudi armour virtually useless. Lacking the capacity for effective ground combat, Riyadh relies almost entirely on high-altitude aerial bombardment, which historically fails to uproot entrenched guerrilla infantry. Importantly, this operational failure is compounded by the deliberate institutional fragmentation of the Saudi armed forces. Engineered around a doctrine of “coup-proofing” since an aborted 1969 overthrow attempt, the military apparatus is intentionally divided into competing fiefdoms, severely undermining modern joint-force coordination.
Beyond military attrition, the Houthis have successfully weaponised regional geography to execute strategic economic blackmail against the Saudi state. For decades, Riyadh invested heavily in the 740-mile East-West Petroline to transport crude oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, specifically designed to bypass the Iranian-controlled Strait of Hormuz. However, by establishing a physical blockade at the southern Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Yemen-based militia has effectively nullified this strategic bypass. Therefore, maritime tankers must still navigate heavily contested waters, allowing the Houthis to directly threaten the sovereign revenue streams required to fund the Saudi administration.
Ultimately, the current framework of localised airstrikes and reactive naval patrols has comprehensively failed to restore credible deterrence against the Iran-aligned proxy network. The Saudi administration finds itself trapped in a profound strategic dilemma, caught between the absolute necessity of securing its borders for its Vision 2030 economic transition and its inability to militarily defeat a hardened militia. Until the broader architectural flaws of Middle Eastern security are decisively addressed, the asymmetric conflict will continue to bleed conventional state powers, fundamentally altering how modern wars are fought, funded, and ultimately lost.
The Modi government’s formal approval of the sale of a 60.72% controlling stake in IDBI Bank for ₹52,878 crore marks a defining moment in India’s modern economic history. This one move will dismantle years of fiscal drag and create a blueprint for strategic restructuring.
While the Opposition and the left-liberal cabal are fearmongering about the Modi government selling off the country’s assets, a thorough examination of the balance sheet data and key metrics demonstrates that the transaction is an economic masterstroke.
The Modi government has acknowledged the inherited debt from the Congress-led UPA, turned around the fortunes of the bank, and is now monetising it to fully recover public money while retaining substantial equity.
Between 2014 and 2026, IDBI transitioned from a lender crippled by crony capitalism into a high-earning institution. By securing ₹52,878 crore through this strategic restructuring, the Narendra Modi government has reversed the cycle of endless taxpayer bailouts.
It has further insulated the public from systemic banking liabilities and proven that strategic governmental intervention can be of public good.
To understand why the sale of IDBI Bank is an economic masterstroke, we need to first understand the institutional wreckage inherited by the Modi government in May 2014. IDBI was transformed into a full-service commercial bank in 2004, although it was originally established in 1964.
The bank required a ₹9,000 crore government cleanup package in 2004 to absorb industrial debt and enable its commercial conversion. During the Congress era, IDBI witnessed aggressive, politically connected balance-sheet expansion.
By March 2014, the bank carried ₹9,960 crore in gross bad loans, officially constituting 4.90% of its total loan book. IDBI extended roughly ₹900 crore to Vijay Mallya’s Kingfisher Airlines in 2009, despite internal cautionary red flags.
Loans linked to serial defaulter C. Sivasankaran totalled ₹322 crore in 2010 and approximately ₹523 crore in early 2014 prior to the May general election.
Subsequent investigations by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) revealed systemic violations of central credit appraisal guidelines, including top-tier management collusion and bypassed credit committees.
Under the Congress-led regime, standard banking practice relied heavily on loan restructuring schemes and issuing new debt to repay maturing interest, which artificially disguised the depth of bad loans.
When the Modi government assumed office in 2014, it confronted a choice. Either continue to conceal non-performing debt or choose transparency. The government and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) chose the latter.
In late 2015, the RBI launched the Asset Quality Review (AQR), mandating that all commercial lenders uniformly classify stressed assets and set aside cash provisions against deteriorating accounts. The impact on IDBI was catastrophic:
In March 2015, IDBI reported ₹12,685 crore in bad loans as initial scrutiny began. Within 12 months of strict reporting rules, reported bad loans doubled to ₹24,875 crore. As legacy infrastructure, steel, and power loans unraveled, IDBI’s gross bad loans reached an unprecedented ₹60,875 crore by September 2018.
At its peak in September 2018, bad loans swallowed 31.78% of IDBI’s entire loan book. Nearly one out of every three rupees lent was non-performing. The bank was technically insolvent.
In response, the RBI placed IDBI Bank under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework in May 2017. Under PCA sanctions, IDBI was barred from opening new branches, issuing large-ticket corporate loans, or paying staff bonuses.
Stripped of its core commercial function, the institution faced liquidation or permanent subsidisation at direct taxpayer expense. Faced with a collapse that could trigger a tsunami across India’s financial sector, the Modi government devised an aggressive turnaround strategy.
The bank refocused on personal loans, auto finance, home mortgages, and small enterprise lending. Simultaneously, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) allowed IDBI’s recovery teams to take chronic industrial defaulters directly to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). In this way, the banks recovered tens of thousands of crores in previously write-off-bound debt.
Liquidating the bank would have devastated millions of retail depositors and erased public trust. The Modi government structured a phased recapitalisation model combining direct exchequer support with institutional equity from the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC).
Between FY2015-16 and FY2019-20, the Centre injected ₹21,157 crore of direct equity into IDBI Bank across four separate tranches.
FY 2015–16: ₹2,229 crore
FY 2016–17: ₹1,900 crore
FY 2017–18: ₹12,471 crore
FY 2019–20: ₹4,557 crore
To lift the bank out of the PCA framework without breaching sovereign fiscal deficit targets, the government brought in LIC as a strategic co-promoter. In January 2019, LIC acquired a controlling 51% stake in the lender:
Follow-on Rights Capital (September 2019): LIC infused an additional ₹4,743 crore.
Total LIC Investment:₹26,367 crore.
Across both state institutions, total capital deployed to rescue IDBI Bank amounted to ₹47,524 crore. While it was dubbed a “backdoor state bailout,” the strategic rationale was clear.
It was to protect retail deposits, recapitalise the lender’s eroded net worth, purge legacy NPAs, and wait for the asset to appreciate before executing an organised exit.
The restructuring turned IDBI Bank from one of India’s most distressed state lenders into a competitive, profitable commercial bank.
By cleaning up provisions, reining in high-cost bulk deposits, leveraging LIC’s nationwide network for retail bancassurance, and adhering to strict risk-weight filters, IDBI steadily restored its operating ratios.
Gross NPAs plummeted from an alarming 31.78% in September 2018 to just 2.32% by March 2026. This drop of over 2,900 basis points was achieved through cash recoveries via the IBC, write-offs of uncollectible corporate loans, and a shift toward low-default retail lending.
After enduring heavy losses from 2016 through 2020, IDBI achieved a historic turnaround, generating ₹9,513 crore in consolidated net earnings in FY2025-26. Satisfied with the bank’s sustained capital adequacy ratio (CAR > 14%) and declining net NPA levels, the RBI formally lifted all PCA restrictions in March 2021, restoring full commercial operational autonomy.
The bank shifted away from volatile, high-cost wholesale deposits toward low-cost Current Account Savings Account (CASA) deposits, fortifying its net interest margins (NIM) against rate volatility. By early 2026, IDBI was no longer an impaired public liability.
It had become an efficient, well-capitalized commercial lender with strong return on assets (RoA).
With the balance sheet restored, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) approved the strategic sale of IDBI Bank to global investment giant Fairfax Financial Holdings, founded by Prem Watsa. The approved transaction parameters confirm that this sale is an economic masterstroke.
The Modi government and LIC together retain a 34% equity stake (Government 15%; LIC 19%). The government has not only recovered 100% of every rupee injected by both it and LIC during the crisis, but has extracted an immediate net cash profit of ₹5,354 crore.
Under private management led by Fairfax, IDBI will gain access to private global equity markets, streamlined credit risk systems and advanced digital banking architecture without needing sovereign recapitalization bonds.
With the bank generating ₹9,513 crore in profit and non-performing loans down to 2.32%, the Modi government executed a planned strategic restructuring for ₹52,878 crore.
The implicit has been made explicit by far-left anarchist Neha Bora. She has credited the “Gen-Z movement” of Bangladesh, which resulted in the forceful removal of a democratically elected government in August 2024, as a source of inspiration for the ongoing protests in India, intending to replicate similar scenes in the nation.
She is the national president of the All India Students Association (AISA), the student wing of the Communist Party of India Marxist–Leninist Liberation (CPI-ML).
Bora shared her sinister desires after Nahid Islam, a staunch Hinduphobic and anti-India voice, extended his support to the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) and its agitation. He also praised the Shaheen Bagh demonstration, which paralysed the national capital for over 100 days and spread disinformation about the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC).
Islam was among the names associated with spearheading the unrest that destabilised Bangladesh under the guise of anti-government resistance, only for the upheaval to descend into persecution of minorities, particularly Hindus. Bora, however, described the bloodshed as a “revolution,” hoping for the same to unfold in India.
Further highlighting her apparent admiration for such destructive turmoil, she was recently seen wearing a red T-shirt emblazoned with the Jolly Roger symbol of the Straw Hat Pirates from the popular “One Piece” manga, which has been prominently linked to deadly uprisings across Asia and the world, including Nepal, Indonesia and the Philippines.
A free hand for jihadis and Islamists to target Hindus: Neha Bora’s idea of “revolution” in India
The anti-Hindu onslaught unleashed by radical entities in Bangladesh became a defining feature of the widespread protests that had initially been presented as a student-led revolt against the government. On 5th August 2024, the very day Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave the country, the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council released a list documenting attacks on Hindu temples, homes and establishments.
It included 54 incidents, a figure that soon rose to more than 200, with the actual scale of the violence vastly exceeding the disclosed cases as numerous such occurrences remained unreported. The gravity of the situation compelled External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to address the issue in Parliament, drawing attention to the precarious position of Hindus in Bangladesh.
However, this was only the beginning of a prolonged plight for a vulnerable community left increasingly exposed to extremists. Hindus, both commoners and notable personalities alike, found themselves at the receiving end of a campaign marked by intimidation, arson, vandalism and unprecedented brutality.
Hate preachers and fanatic foot soldiers mobilised to incite hostility against Hindus, target women, torch properties, desecrate temples, damage idols and assault religious institutions and their members. Lynching and mob violence became recurring horrors for the community, with Islamist mobs celebrating over the bodies of their victims. Jamaat-e-Islami even prepared a list of their targets and blocked roads to prevent them from escaping.
On the other hand, Muhammad Yunus, who assumed charge as chief adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, blamed the Indian government and the media for spreading “propaganda” about the dire condition of Hindus rather than offering any protection or bringing the culprits to account.
His government repeatedly either denied or painted the communal violence as political retaliation, fake news or isolated conflicts, as relations with India hit a new low with each remark. The Indian High Commission was targeted as the strident anti-India rhetoric amplified, which also involved provocative statements over the “Seven Sisters” of the Northeast.
Hindus continued to be lynched while those entrusted with maintaining law and order appeared unwilling to address the grave situation. The ground reality pushed the minority groups to suspend their religious events due to the intensifying fear. Similarly, Durga Puja came under attack from the Islamists, who started to demand jaziya from Hindus in order to live in the country.
Meanwhile, the Islamo-leftist ecosystem, including their supporters in India, downplayed, sanitised or dismissed the massacre, reducing the future of Bangladeshi Hindus to a chilling ultimatum: convert or die. Their pain has shown little sign of easing, as those who speak out against the atrocities, including monk Chinmoy Krishna Das, have to endure the wrath of both Muslim hardliners and the government.
The frightening future Neha Bora envisions for India
This is not even a preview of the immense tragedy borne by the Hindu community due to protests that began under the banner of popular rebellion, which Bora and many like her want to mirror on the streets of India. More importantly, Bangladesh’s slide since Sheikh Hasina’s resignation has extended far beyond human and minority rights, affecting its economy, soaring inflation and other critical sectors.
The promise of a better tomorrow has proved to be an illusion. People have raised concerns over political suppression and unchecked surveillance, while bans on Islamist parties have been lifted. Bangladesh, where even walking alone has become a challenge, has to persistently grapple with deep-rooted lawlessness.
The demonstrations only succeeded in toppling the government and causing attacks on Hindus, but failed miserably to translate into any meaningful improvement in the overall state of affairs. If anything, conditions have deteriorated further.
The Indian opposition has been obsessed with the fantasy of somehow imposing a similar model in India to oust the democratically elected Modi government. These people champion the Constitution and constitutional institutions, such as the Election Commission and the judiciary, only when it suits their political interests and have no qualms about driving the country into permanent disarray and reducing it to a theatre of mass violence.
It goes without saying that such a volatile scenario would leave lasting scars and carry irreversible, dangerous consequences not only for the nation but also for countless people whose lives could be devastated in the process. Furthermore, the very symbols of a nation’s sovereignty, dignity and integrity, history as well as heritage are brought to ruin during such episodes, as starkly illustrated in Bangladesh.
Thus, this might offer an appealing prospect to leftists like Bora, who romanticise the carnage for political gain, but the implications would be catastrophic, in light of the size and population of India.
A fraction of such a breakdown could result in pervasive riots that spiral out of control, with repercussions spreading rapidly across the nation. It would also open a door for India’s adversaries, both within and outside its borders, allowing them to exacerbate the mayhem and add to the already daunting predicament.
The world’s largest democracy could find its foundations shaken, its Constitution stripped of meaning and mob violence replacing the ballot box. All this will happen without any certainty that the installed government would yield even marginal advantage for the nation in any regard.
However, the dismal ramifications are both evident and far-reaching. A regime change might appeal to Neha Bora in India or George Soros in the United States, but for the country itself, it would only usher in a mountainous set of crises, undermining its democratic values, eroding constitutional principles and crippling its institutions.
Cherry-picking “revolution”: The quintessential hypocrisy of the Left
The decision by Bangladesh’s High Court to reinstate the quota system, which reserved 30% of government posts for descendants of 1971 Liberation War veterans and raised the overall quotas to 56%, sparked outrage in Bangladesh. The students considered it discriminatory and unjust to merit-based recruitment.
However, in a classic example of the hypocrisy that has become synonymous with the Islamo-leftist ecosystem, Bora conveniently ignored the reasons behind the protests in Bangladesh, which she desperately wants to emulate in India. The Bangladeshi students took to the streets because they believed that quotas were introduced at the expense of merit, but Bora would never dare to make an argument remotely along these lines.
On the contrary, she has been among the loudest voices supporting reservations. She did not stand with students opposing the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations or those fighting for merit-based opportunities, even though the similar premise was central to the agitation in Bangladesh.
Bora wants to cherry-pick even the prime motivation of a movement she claims to idolise. Her selectivity exposes the shallowness of her “activism” and unmasks the pretence of “concern” for the nation.
The fundamental truth is that the opposition has consistently failed to defeat Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the elections. Hence, they are looking for alternative means of achieving their political objectives due to their inability to dislodge the saffron party.
They remain indifferent to what turning India into another Bangladesh or Nepal would mean for its people, democratic institutions and future. Their overriding aim is to capture political power and fulfil their own ambitions, by one means or another. As a result, they are eager to sacrifice India and its people, who will suffer the fallout of such a forsaken situation, in pursuit of these goals.
Conclusion
The irony is that those who assert to stand for India, its people and the Constitution happily overlook all three when it comes to achieving their political objectives. Bora’s calculated endorsement of the Bangladesh protests only reinforces this contradiction. Her complete disregard for democracy, the rule of law and constitutional ideals is revealed by her ominous vision for regime change.
However, the nation’s destiny cannot be relegated to the status of a political trophy for those who cannot secure power through elections. A country of more than a billion people is not a playground for experiments, and its citizens should not have to pay the price for anyone’s political prospects.
There is no place or takers for such a perilous gamble that could permanently jeopardise both India’s present and tomorrow. Bora and the opposition are unable to grasp this reality, but the people of India understand what is at stake.
After the leftist foreign media and human rights groups with mastery in selective outrage, US politicians have also begun expressing their unsolicited ‘concerns’ about the deletion of 130 million or 13 crore voter names from draft electoral rolls after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). Amid the Cockroach Janta Party and Opposition’s protest theatrics against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, Indian-origin US Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal extended support to the ongoing protests in Delhi.
In an X post published on 14th October 2026, Pramila Jayapal wrote, “I am deeply concerned about the actions of the Indian government to purge 130 million people from the voting rolls. This appears to be a similar playbook to what the Trump Administration is doing here at home to undermine voting rights in a democracy.”
In continuation, the US Congresswoman representing Washington’s 7th congressional district wrote, ” Protecting democracies everywhere is essential work, and the Indian people — like the American people — deserve free and fair elections. Non-violent resistance movements are essential in these moments and I stand with the Indian people who are engaging in non-violent protests to counter anti-democratic efforts in India.”
Have 130 million people been ‘removed’ from voting rolls as Pramila Jayapal claims?
Contrary to the insinuation that somehow 130 million or 13 crore voter names have been arbitrarily struck down from voter rolls, in a politically motivated mass disenfranchisement manoeuvre by the Election Commission of India, these are exclusions from the draft electoral rolls, not permanent final deletions.
The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across the country in recent months was conducted after a monumental gap of nearly 24 years. The SIR was not an illegal mass disenfranchisement action but a constitutionally aligned house-to-house enumeration exercise to update and clean electoral rolls.
The latest SIR was conducted across 30 states and Union Territories, scrutinising about 95.4 crore voters. Nearly 13.39 crore voter names were left out of the draft electoral rolls. These voter names were not singled out based on their religion, caste, gender or political leanings. These voter name deletions fall mainly under the ASDD, which means Absent, Shifted, Dead, and Duplicate voters.
Of the 13 crore names removed from the draft electoral rolls, 6.30 crore were Permanently Shifted, 3 crore Absent or not traceable, 2.80 crore Dead, 1.02 crore Duplicate and 0.26 crore under other categories.
As per the stated rules, there is a claims-and-objections window after the draft is published. After processing claims, objections, and any related appeals, the final rolls are published; only then are the voter’s name exclusions for that revision finalised.
Though there was an attempt by the Opposition to allege malice over the Supreme Court’s remark that it has not approved any fresh changes to Form 6, the apex court recently clarified that it has not disapproved of it either.
Pertinently, the ECI has maintained that Form 6 has not been altered or replaced. It pointed out that a new declaration mapping the parents of a prospective voter in the previous SIR was introduced as a separate eligibility verification requirement, and it wasn’t a modification of Form 6.
Previously, the ECI had pointed out that the decision to introduce this new declaration was taken unanimously by the Chief Election Commissioner and both Election Commissioners Vivek Joshi and Sukhbir Singh Sandhu. It has maintained that prescribing additional information for eligibility verification falls within its residual powers.
This interpretation was backed by the Supreme Court’s order dated 27th May 2026 in the Bihar SIR. The top court had recognised the ECI’s authority to prescribe documentation for verifying voter eligibility.
However, for the likes of Pramila Jayapal who are driven by their political-ideological agenda do not necessarily care about facts but are focused on making their contribution to stoking anarchy in India against the Modi government.
It is interesting that despite being an active politician in American electoral politics, Jayapal is more concerned about Indian electoral processes than about her own country’s flawed electoral system.
The US has a highly decentralised electoral system, with each state setting its own rules on voter registration, identification requirements, voting methods, and ballot access. Most of these remain contested. Jayapal should advocate modifications to the Electoral College in the US, which allows candidates to win the presidency despite their failure to secure the national popular vote. From voter suppression, non-citizen voting, gerrymandering, and controversies relating to mail-in and early voting, Jayapal will do better if she devotes her energy to domestic American matters, including structural issues in the electoral system, than be concerned about Indian electoral issues.
Nevertheless, as the US politician jumps on the bandwagon of foreign meddling in India’s internal electoral-political affairs, it is pertinent to know about her anti-India activities and her financial links with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stooge Neville Roy Singham, who leads the transnational pro-CCP information laundering network, House of Singham.
Pramila Jayapal: A rabid Hinduphobe and anti-India Democrat leader
Pramila Jayapal is a notorious anti-India and anti-Hindu Democrat leader active in American politics.
In December 2019, she brought a Congressional resolution urging India to end restrictions on communications in Jammu and Kashmir. Her stand against the Indian Government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 in the state made the Indian American community feel betrayed, cheated and saddened.
Following her resolution, MEA Jaishankar famously cancelled his meeting with a group of United States lawmakers following their refusal to exclude anti-India Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal from the delegation that was scheduled to meet him. “Don’t think her report has a fair understanding of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir or a fair characterisation of what the Government of India is doing. I have no interest in meeting her,” the External Affairs Minister revealed after speculations of cancellation of the meeting came forth.
In January 2026, Pramila Jayapal joined 7 other US lawmakers in signing an open letter to the Indian government demanding bail and a free trial for 2020 anti-Hindu Delhi Riots accused mastermind Umar Khalid. Even as Khalid’s case remained sub judice, the US lawmakers declared him downright innocent. Jayapal and other signatories demanded that Umar Khalid be released from jail, claiming that the anti-CAA protests were ‘peaceful’ and even painted Muslims as the victims of the anti-Hindu riots in 2020.
More recently, Pramila Jayapal was one of the 100 US politicians who signed a pledge prepared by Hindus for Human Rights (HfHR) Action and SACRED Acts, which urged them to stop accepting funds from Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-linked entities or its supporters.
In a press release issued on 31st August, Hindus for Human Rights Action and SACRED Acts said, “– Hindus for Human Rights Action and SACRED Acts announce an historic commitment against hate with nearly 100 American political leaders from across the United States pledging to reject political contributions from the anti-democratic movement behind the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R.S.S.).”
This move came when RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat was on a visit to the US. OpIndia has consistently reported about the anti-Hindu track record of Hindus for Human Rights and its Islamist parent bodies, the Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC) and the Organisation for Minorities of India (OFMI).
Pramila Jayapal received over $40,000 in funds from Neville Roy Singham and his wife, Jodie Evans
Pramila Jayapal has a documented record of having received more than $40,000 in donations from Neville Roy Singham, the US-born tech tycoon who sold his IT consulting firm Thoughtworks for about $785 million in 2017 before relocating to Shanghai, and his wife Jodie Evans, the Code Pink co-founder.
Jodie Evans (Source: CBS)
Jayapal began receiving funds from Roy Singham since 2016.
It was only after the media exposed Neville Roy Singham’s pro-China information laundering networks that Pramila Jayapal returned the funds in 2023 to evade backlash.
The House of Singham pro-China/Communism propaganda network
The pro-China information laundering network House of Singham is led by Neville Roy Singham, the US-born tech tycoon who sold his IT consulting firm Thoughtworks for about $785 million in 2017 before permanently moving to Shanghai.
This network is a sophisticated “information laundering” or “narrative laundering” machinery that modifies raw activism into polished propaganda, which is then amplified by the Roy-Singham-funded network to sow discord in the US, France and other democracies while burnishing China’s image as a ‘benevolent’ counterweight to ‘imperialism’, particularly American imperialism. The left-wing activism in Cuba and violent protests in France perfectly exemplify this.
Roy Singham is reported to have s funnelled over $278 million directly into his pro-China propaganda network since 2017, with total money flows exceeding $591 million across 223 transactions spanning five continents through the year 2025. The massive amount was pumped into over a thousand interconnected organisations, of which around 200 are directly involved in generating and propagating pro-China and anti-America messaging at the behest of the CCP.
The CCP-aligned propaganda launderer first established a system to funnel tax-exempt dollars via two shell entities and a donor-advised fund with links to Goldman Sachs, “GS Donor Advised Philanthropy Fund for Wealth Management Inc.” Goldman Sachs philanthropy arm “terminated” Singham’s donor-advised fund in February 2024.
Source: Fox News Digital
The House of Singham pro-China propaganda and activism network traces its origins to Neville Roy Singham’s wedding to Jodie Evans, the co-founder of CodePink Women for Peace, in Jamaica in 2017. The wedding event was attended by more than 80 core leaders, including Vijay Prashad of “TriContinental: Institute for Social Research”. Vijay Prashad, a Marxist journalist, later populated other boards within the network across shell-like entities, including Mutod LLC and Likewise Conceptions LLC. Fox News investigation finds that many of these organisations are registered at generic locations like hotels or UPS stores, apparently to obscure flows.
Eleven US non-profits are serving as a hub, redistributing funds, coordinating protests, generating media content, political education, and “Liberation Centres” that are similar to the infamous 20th-century Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s “united front” strategy of embedding ‘revolutionary’ actors in superficially independent social, media, labour, cultural, and educational groups to erode the targeted country’s state legitimacy from within.
From three organisations, GS Donors Advised Philanthropy Fund for Wealth Management Inc., and the two apparent shell companies, Roy Singham pumped $278 million into six nonprofits.
These nonprofit organisations include People’s Forum, which received $22.4 million; People’s Support Foundation, which received $167.5 million from Singham-linked sources; and the Justice and Education Fund, which received $68.7 million. BreakThrough BT Media, CodePink, co-founded by Singham’s wife Jodie Evans, and Tricontinental Ltd, which has Marxist ‘journalist’ Vijay Prashad as its Director.
Experts like Adam Sohn of the Network Contagion Research Institute and co-founder of Narravance opine that this structure enables an information laundering operation and a narrative laundering operation that is selling China’s propaganda to the world while sowing discord in America. A Fox News investigative report cites that the grassroots-looking protests, be it against ICE enforcement, the US offensive against Iran, the abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicholas Maduro, or in support of the Communist regime in Cuba, are all filmed, packaged into videos and commentary by House of Singham-linked media outlets like BreakThrough News, and recirculated to form a chimaera of organic global ‘resistance’.
Roy Singham-backed BreakThrough Media has been actively peddling an anarchist narrative in France, where student protests have been co-opted by pro-Palestine Islamist and Communist adult-led groups.
Notably, the Roy Singham-led pro-China information laundering network in the US also has a presence in India.
There are many Roy Singham network-backed pro-China propaganda factories actively peddling anti-India and anti-government narratives. OpIndia has reported on such entities, including People’s Dispatch, TriContinental, People’s Forum, among others.
From Kashmiri separatism, anti-Hindu tropes, glorification of Kerala’s ‘communist’ model, to Muslim victimhood, and propaganda maligning India’s global image, the core agenda of these CCP asset Roy Singham-backed entities is to weaponise relevant socio-political issues, nonprofit laws, digital media, and every other resource at hand to undermine rival states, influence policy decisions, weaken India, and deliver a geopolitical edge to China.
Roy Singham’s Justice and Education Fund donated $10.5 million to Delhi-based pro-China propaganda outlet, NewsClick.
One of the most prominent members of Roy Singham’s evil empire is Vijay Prashad. He has contributed several propaganda anti-India articles to NewsClick. Prashad is the nephew of Brinda Karat, a CPI(M) leader and wife of Prakash Karat, also a senior CPI(M) leader, whose email exchanges with Neville Roy Singham earlier revealed their close ties in the NewsClick Chinese funding scandal.
Vijay Prashad has also been a council member of the Progressive International, an international organisation that mobilises leftist activists and groups globally. OpIndia earlier highlighted how this outfit persistently publishes propaganda articles and statements peddling the insidious Muslim victimhood narrative to slander the Modi government. It regularly platforms notorious anti-Hindu and Islamist apologists like Harsh Mander and has Islamo-leftist cheerleaders like Jayati Ghosh and former Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn as its council members.
Roy Singham’s propaganda network has a connection with the pro-Hamas Tides Foundation. Tides Foundation is notorious for funding several anti-Hindu, anti-India organisations and elements. The Foundation gave grants to Hindus for Human Rights (HfHR), which has links to Islamists and Khalistanis, and was formed in 2019 by two Islamist advocacy groups, the Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC) athe nd Organisation for Minorities of India (OFMI).
Tides also funded AMAN Public Charitable Trust (AMAN). This trust is connected to the NewsClick-China funding scandal, where it is alleged that Chinese entities funded NewsClick to disrupt Indian sovereignty.
Among Indians introduced by Neville Roy Singham to his larger team, who worked with Tricontinental, one of the nonprofits that the New York Times said was involved in pushing Chinese talking points, were Prabir Purkayastha, Srujana, Prasanth, and Vijay Prashad.
Prashad also has close ties with Urban Naxal P Sainath, whose propaganda portal PARI recently removed references to Singham after his connection with the Chinese propaganda arm had come to light.
The pro-China propaganda portal NewsClick first made headlines when it came under the radar of the Enforcement Directorate in 2021. The portal was reportedly accused of fraudulently receiving foreign funds amounting to around Rs. 38 crores.
In 2023, the Delhi Police Special Cell filed an FIR and later an extensive chargesheet under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) against NewsClick founder Prabir Purkayastha, HR head Amit Chakraborty, among others.
Interestingly, akin to the pattern seen in French protests, the ongoing anti-CEC Gyanesh Kumar protests in India also have Communist/leftist outfits and leaders at the forefront.
Although the political Opposition and the Cockroach Janta Party, an Opposition-aligned ‘pressure group’ with most of its leadership tracing political roots in the Aam Aadmi Party, are actively involved, the anti-CEC protests are mainly led by the communist-leftist student groups like the Student Federation of India (SFI), All-India Students’ Association (AISA), and their leaders like Neha Bora. The leftist goons were found to be involved in clashing with the police and vandalising barricades, etc.
Pramila Jayapal’s unsolicited concerns about India’s electoral process and support for anti-CEC protestors suggest that she may have returned Roy Singham’s funds to avoid the allegations of being a CCP stooge; her ideological alignment with Singham and the broader anarchist Communist coterie remains intact.
The Opposition’s campaign against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar has exposed an interesting spectacle of political opportunism, competing egos and selective solidarity. The Congress, which viewed the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) as an Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) proxy, has now reached out to the same outfit through lawyer-activist Prashant Bhushan. CJP leader Dipke, however, was reportedly not particularly enthusiastic about the overture.
There is a lesson here for all three parties to this little political drama: Congress, CJP and Prashant Bhushan. None emerges from this episode looking particularly principled.
Let us begin with the Congress.
The grand old party reportedly kept a close watch on CJP’s October 10 protest against CEC Gyanesh Kumar in Delhi. Its assessment was that CJP had failed to mobilise a sufficiently large crowd, unlike the protests at Jantar Mantar in June and July. A section of the Congress leadership also reportedly viewed CJP as an offshoot or front of AAP, with concerns that it could occupy political space that the Congress would rather control itself.
Yet, within days, the Congress was attempting to establish contact with CJP through Bhushan.
What changed? Did the Congress suddenly develop confidence in CJP’s political credentials? Did it discover some extraordinary ideological affinity with the outfit? Or did it simply conclude that every additional organisation protesting against the CEC could help its campaign?
The last explanation appears the most plausible.
Rahul Gandhi declared on Monday that all protests against the CEC were part of one movement and that the Congress would support anyone defending the Constitution, regardless of the political formation they belonged to. On paper, this sounds like a reasonable appeal for Opposition unity. In practice, however, the reported outreach to CJP raises questions about the Congress’s earlier assessment of the organisation.
If CJP was merely an AAP proxy, as sections of the Congress leadership reportedly believed, why was its participation suddenly desirable? And if CJP was a legitimate political formation capable of contributing to a common cause, why was the party so concerned about the political space it might occupy?
The Congress cannot have it both ways. It cannot dismiss a rival formation when it fears competition and then seek its cooperation when doing so becomes politically convenient.
The party’s problem is not merely that its overture reportedly received a lukewarm response. It is that its conduct reinforces the impression that its appeals for Opposition unity are often subordinate to calculations about who gets to lead, who gets visibility and who gets credit.
CJP wants political relevance but cannot escape questions about its own motives
CJP, meanwhile, should not mistake the Congress’s reported outreach for a political victory.
The outfit has emerged as a recent phenomenon in the Opposition ecosystem and has sought to establish its identity through protests against everything under the sun. From resignation of the Education Minister to the resignation of the CEC, it appears that resignation is the currency on which CJP operates. And this currency is fuelled by the ‘blackmailing’ and holding the nation hostage through disruptive protests.
CJP has every right to organise demonstrations, criticise the government and demand accountability, but it must also accept that its political positioning and methods will attract scrutiny.
According to the report, Congress believed that CJP had failed to mobilise the numbers it had hoped for during its October 10 protest. The protest was disrupted by a substantial security deployment and police action, with an estimated 7,000 people detained across Delhi. The circumstances make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about CJP’s mobilisation capacity from that episode alone.
Nevertheless, the organisation faces a basic question: does it want to function as an independent political force, or does it want to become part of a larger Opposition campaign whenever doing so offers greater visibility?
Its decision to stay away from the INDIA bloc’s march to the Supreme Court on Monday suggests that it was not prepared to participate in that particular programme. That is its prerogative. But if CJP insists on maintaining an independent political identity, it must be prepared to build its own support base rather than depend on the recognition or endorsement of established Opposition parties.
There is also an uncomfortable irony in the organisation’s position. If CJP resents being viewed as an AAP proxy, it must demonstrate that its political decisions are driven by its own priorities rather than by the calculations of another party. Independence cannot be established merely by refusing an invitation from the Congress. It must be demonstrated through consistent political positions, transparent objectives and an ability to mobilise supporters on its own terms.
At the same time, CJP should not be expected to join every Opposition programme simply because Congress or Rahul Gandhi calls for unity. A common cause does not require every organisation to surrender its identity. The point is that CJP cannot simultaneously seek recognition as an independent political force and treat every question about its political positioning as illegitimate.
Why is Prashant Bhushan being used as the intermediary?
Then there is Prashant Bhushan, whose reported role as an intermediary adds another layer to this political spectacle.
According to The Indian Express, the Congress approached Bhushan and asked him to reach out to Dipke. Sources close to Bhushan confirmed that a request came in, though the circumstances made direct coordination difficult: Dipke was in Maharashtra, while senior CJP leaders Ashutosh Ranka, Saurav Das and Ajinkya Shinde were in police custody.
Bhushan is a “lawyer-activist” who has frequently been associated with political and civil society campaigns. He has long been a fervent critic of the Modi government, often amplifying fake news and blatant lies before quietly deleting them after being called out. His name also came up as the facilitator of the meeting of the characters currently charged with orchestrating the bloody anti-Hindu riots in Delhi in 2020.
But the episode raises a legitimate question about the political networks and individuals who project themselves as intermediaries that emerge around such campaigns. When a party that reportedly suspects a new organisation of being a rival’s proxy seeks to approach it through an “activist” who operates in overlapping Opposition circles, it becomes difficult to separate the language of a common cause from the practical business of political networking.
If the objective was simply to convey an invitation, there is little to criticise about the act of mediation itself. The larger question is whether the participants are interested in building a coherent campaign around clearly defined demands or merely coordinating whenever their immediate interests overlap.
An intermediary can bring people to the same table. He cannot manufacture ideological consistency where none exists.
Kejriwal’s snub avenged?
There is also a delicious irony here, given how Congress treated Arvind Kejriwal in 2019. Ahead of the Lok Sabha elections, Kejriwal had desperately sought an alliance with the grand old party, arguing that the anti-BJP vote should not be divided. “Humare mann mein desh ko lekar bahut zyada chinta hai… Usi wajah se hum lalayit hain. Unhone lagbhag mana kar diya hai,” he said on February 14, 2019, effectively admitting that Congress had almost rejected his overtures.
The remark became a political meme, immortalising the humiliation of a party chief seeking an alliance with a Congress that was not particularly interested. Nearly seven years later, the tables appear to have turned. Congress, which reportedly viewed CJP as an AAP proxy, is now reaching out through Prashant Bhushan, only to encounter a lukewarm response from Abhijit Dipke. Did CJP just deliver Congress its own “unhone lagbhag mana kar diya” moment?
Opposition unity or a convenient political arrangement?
Rahul Gandhi’s subsequent condemnation of the arrests of CJP leaders further demonstrated the Congress’s willingness to extend public solidarity to the organisation. On Wednesday, he declared that waving the Tricolour at Jantar Mantar during a peaceful protest was not a crime and described the jailing of young protesters as an act of cowardice.
Dipke thanked Gandhi for speaking out against the arrests and later called for Tiranga marches, including one at Central Park in Delhi’s Connaught Place on Friday, October 16.
These exchanges may help the two sides find common ground. But public messages of solidarity do not resolve the underlying tensions between competing Opposition formations. Nor do such exchanges whitewash the fact that CJP leaders were arrested not for unfurling the Tiranga but because they intended to protest at a site that was denotified as a protest site. However, truth hardly matters when the goal is to build opportunistic alliances and wrest power from the democratically elected entity.
The INDI bloc is supposed to bring together parties that disagree on numerous political questions but cooperate against a common opponent. It is obvious that removing the Modi government from power is the glue that is keeping these disparate elements together. Otherwise, there is no vision or ‘concern for democracy’ that has brought them together.
The problem arises when the language of constitutional principles becomes inseparable from calculations about political ownership. If every protest is one movement, as Gandhi argues, then the Congress must be willing to recognise the autonomy of other organisations even when they do not participate in its programmes. Equally, CJP must accept that independence brings responsibility and that it cannot demand recognition without demonstrating sustained political credibility.
And Bhushan, like other activists who facilitate these interactions, should be judged by the substance of the causes he supports rather than by his proximity to political figures. He should also be judged for subsequent violence and disruptions such associations and alliances may cause.
There is a distinction between cooperating on a specific demand and pretending that all participants share the same political objectives. The former is practical politics; the latter is often little more than messaging.
The Congress wants to lead the Opposition. CJP wants to establish itself as a political force in its own right. Activists such as Bhushan operate in the space where these ambitions intersect. Their interests may occasionally align, but that does not automatically make them a coherent movement.
Ultimately, the reported outreach and the lukewarm response tell us less about a sudden political realignment than about the transactional nature of Opposition politics. The Congress appears willing to approach a formation it reportedly viewed with suspicion. CJP appears unwilling to be drawn into a programme on the Congress’s terms. And Bhushan has reportedly been asked to help bridge the divide.
Everyone is entitled to pursue their political objectives. But none should be allowed to disguise political calculations as unquestionable moral virtue.
If the campaign against the CEC is genuinely about constitutional principles, its participants should be able to explain their demands, defend their methods and cooperate without pretending that their competing ambitions have magically disappeared. If the CEC is compromised, which all three actors — CJP, Prashant Bhushan, and Congress—believe, then why can’t they explain how the same CEC presided over Opposition victories in Punjab, Karnataka, Kerala, and Telangana?
Until then, the spectacle of the Congress courting CJP, CJP maintaining its distance and Bhushan being asked to facilitate contact looks less like a united political movement and more like a negotiation over who gets to occupy the Opposition’s increasingly crowded stage.
A landmark ruling against automatic reservation entitlement after conversion exposes the dangers of executive shortcuts, competitive-pool switching and vote-bank-driven classification — and invites a wider audit of OBC entries across states.
On 15 October 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court’s decision, striking down Tamil Nadu’s G.O. (Ms) No. 31 of 9 March 2024. The decision transforms the Sameer Ahmed dispute from a pending constitutional question into an important judicial affirmation: changing religion does not, by itself, make a person a member of a notified backward community in the adopted religion. Nor can an executive order or a private religious body manufacture the legal foundation for that entitlement.
The judgment does not restrict religious conversion. Instead, it prevents governments from making conversion an automatic route to reservation benefits. It also raises a serious political question: why are governments creating such pathways instead of ensuring that reservation is granted only on the basis of objectively established social and educational backwardness?
The case and the Supreme Court ruling
Sameer Ahmed, formerly Paramasivam, converted from Hinduism to Islam in 2015 and sought a Muslim Lebbai certificate to claim Backward Class Muslim (BCM) reservation. After his application was rejected, Tamil Nadu’s G.O. No. 31 came under challenge. The order allowed converts from BC, MBC, Denotified Communities and Scheduled Castes to be classified within one of seven notified Muslim backward communities. The Madras High Court quashed it on 25 June 2026.
Tamil Nadu argued that a person’s earlier disadvantage should not disappear after conversion. But the Supreme Court, through Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar, upheld the central finding: conversion alone cannot establish membership of a particular Muslim backward community. A community certificate records an existing status; it cannot create that status. Nor can a private religious body conclusively decide a statutory reservation entitlement.
The Court also addressed the separate Scheduled Caste rule under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, which limits SC status to persons professing Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism. Claims following reconversion require examination of their own facts, not automatic restoration.
Why this judgment matters
The distinction is straightforward. Article 25 protects the freedom to choose one’s religion; Articles 15 and 16 govern affirmative-action classifications. Exercising the first right does not, by itself, establish eligibility under the second. A government cannot simply transfer a person from an earlier caste or community category into a new reservation-bearing group through an executive order.
This is a significant check on arbitrary reservation policy. It requires the State to establish the legal and social basis of membership, rather than treat a change of religious label as sufficient proof. Comparable rules elsewhere may now face challenges, although this judgment does not automatically cancel them.
Reservation arbitrage and the risk of double benefits
Tamil Nadu has a separate 3.5% BCM quota. This makes the possibility of “reservation arbitrage” worth examining: a convert could, under an automatic certification rule, enter a different competitive reservation pool without independently proving membership of the notified group. The Court has rejected that shortcut.
There is also a legitimate need to examine whether benefits claimed before and after conversion overlap, or whether incompatible concessions are being obtained through different certificates. But the ruling does not establish that converts generally receive double benefits or that an organised conversion racket exists. Such allegations require evidence. The policy concern remains serious even without assuming that every conversion is motivated by reservation.
The political question: Social justice or vote-bank policy?
G.O. No. 31 attempted to create a broad administrative route into seven Muslim backward communities. Its rejection raises a question for political parties: are reservation policies based on verifiable disadvantage, or are governments using convenient identity rules to expand electoral support? Social justice cannot become a justification for bypassing eligibility tests. The Court’s legal finding concerns the order’s validity; vote-bank motivation is a political criticism, not a judicial finding.
Mandal Commission and the basis of non-Hindu OBC classification
The Mandal Commission considered backward groups among Muslims and Christians, including occupational communities and parallels with groups among Hindus. But neither religious identity nor occupation alone should replace evidence of an identifiable socially and educationally backward group. Equally, the egalitarian teachings of a religion do not prove that social disadvantage cannot exist among its followers.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning makes the distinction between religion and community membership especially important. A convert does not automatically acquire the history, characteristics or recognised membership of a particular backward group merely by adopting its religion.
A question mark over Muslim OBC lists in other states
The wider significance now goes beyond Tamil Nadu’s certificate policy. If conversion cannot automatically confer membership of a notified Muslim backward community, what is the basis on which Muslim groups have been included in OBC lists in other states? Were individual communities identified through evidence of social and educational backwardness, or did any entry or certification process rely mainly on religious identity? Are those original grounds still valid?
These are questions that can now be brought before Backward Classes Commissions and courts. State-specific OBC entries, particularly those based on broad religious labels or automatic post-conversion classification, may face closer judicial scrutiny. The same test should apply to Christian entries and, indeed, every other listed community.
The judgment does not strike down Muslim OBC reservation as a whole, nor does it declare Muslims ineligible for OBC status. Its significance is that it strengthens the case for examining each classification on objective evidence rather than accepting religion or conversion as a substitute for community membership. Where that evidence is missing, inclusion should be open to challenge.
Conclusion: A wider test for reservation policy
The Sameer Ahmed judgment is a landmark against automatic reservation entitlement through religious reclassification. Faith remains a matter of individual freedom; a reservation certificate must reflect a legally established social status.
It also puts political shortcuts under the spotlight. Governments should examine possible reservation arbitrage, overlapping benefits and weak certification rules instead of using conversion as an administrative gateway to a new quota. Most importantly, the ruling opens the door to wider scrutiny of Muslim and Christian OBC entries across states: every group should meet the same transparent constitutional test. Reservation must rest on demonstrated backwardness, not merely on a change of faith or an executive decision.
